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Chapter 1
Africa and the Space Arena
Abstract In order to take stock of Africa’s progress in the space arena, and to
determine how far advanced the space sector is across the continent, this chapter
provides the foundation for the subsequent study of the African space ecosystem.
The continent’s political background and context is examined, with particular
emphasis on the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities that
constitute its key organs. This is followed by a discussion of the general socio-
economic situation (including the African economy and promise of the “digital
renaissance”) within a framework of the primary needs approach to African space
activities. These identify priority areas of critical importance, which must be
supported by space if it is to make a meaningful contribution to Africa’s develop-
ment and the lives of ordinary Africans. The identified areas are climate and
biodiversity, health, water, education, and space-related capacity building. Along-
side this, concepts of ubuntu (a uniquely African worldview), and emerging middle
powers, are utilised as novel frameworks to be drawn on throughout the subsequent
chapters. Throughout the discussion, focus is placed on the African Union’s Agenda
2063 as the core policy document on a continental level that will guide Africa
towards a sustainable development future, in line with the United Nations Sustain-
able Development Goals (SDGs). Methods used for ranking African space capabil-
ities are reviewed, as is the background of African space activities up to the end of
the twentieth century. The chapter concludes with a review of the African Space
Policy and Strategy that frames Africa’s “Astronaissance”, followed by a review of
debates around the establishment of an African Space Agency.
1.1 Introduction
I have walked that long road to freedom. I have tried not to falter; I have made missteps along
the way. But I have discovered the secret that after climbing a great hill, one only finds that
there are many more hills to climb. I have taken a moment here to rest, to steal a view of the
glorious vista that surrounds me, to look back on the distance I have come. But I can rest
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019
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only for a moment, for with freedom comes responsibilities, and I dare not linger, for my
long walk is not yet ended.
Nelson Mandela1
Former South African President Nelson Mandela’s words are not only a reflection
of his own life but of Africa’s journey as a whole. This is equally true in the space
arena. Africa has made tremendous progress over the past several decades, and its
accomplishments are worth recognising and celebrating. However, a long road still
lies ahead before Africa’s aspirations of “shared prosperity and well-being, for unity
and integration, for a continent of free citizens and expanded horizons, where the full
potential of women and youth, boys and girls are realized, and with freedom from
fear, disease and want”, as outlined in the African Union Agenda 2063,2 are realised.
There is, however, an increasing awareness of the importance of space and space-
related technology and applications in fulfilling this aspiration and in meeting
Africa’s socio-economic needs. For example, the African Space Strategy recognises
that “overcoming Africa’s economic, political, environmental and social challenges
is contingent upon a collective effort to formalise and sustain an indigenous space
sector that is responsive to these challenges”.3 This is an important recognition
because Martinez reminds us that “[s]pace is so much a part of the ‘plumbing’ of
modern life that it is often taken for granted”.4 Therefore, it comes as little surprise
that there remains a general lack of appreciation of the potential and importance of
space activities5 and that this is coupled with more pointed criticisms of the expenses
associated with space activities.6
In order to take stock of Africa’s progress—and remaining challenges—in the
space arena, and to determine how far advanced the space sector is across the
continent, this study, the first in a series, will review the continent’s space-related
activities, capacities, infrastructure, and institutions (in short, the African space
ecosystem), framed by the primary needs approach to African space activities,
discussed below. The next volume will build on this by delving deeper into the
space applications and policies of Africa, as well as the relationship between the
European Union (and European Space Agency) and the African Union in the space
1Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom (London: Abacus, 1994), 751.
2African Union Commission, Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want (Popular Version), 2015, Addis
Ababa, 1. https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/3657-file-agenda2063_popular_version_en.pdf
(accessed June 14, 2018).
3African Union Commission, African Space Strategy: Towards Social, Political and Economic
Integration, 2017, Addis Ababa, 5. https://au.int/sites/default/files/newsevents/workingdocuments/
33178-wd-african_space_strategy_-_st20445_e_original.pdf (accessed July 7, 2018).
4Peter Martinez, “Space Science and Technology in South Africa: An Overview,” African Skies/
Cieux Africains, 2008, no. 12: 46.
5Peter Martinez, “The African Leadership Conference on Space Science and Technology for
Sustainable Development,” Space Policy 28, (2012): 33.
6Paul Boateng, “Outer Space is the Place for Africa’s Future,” Mail and Guardian, May 26, 2016,
https://mg.co.za/article/2016-05-26-00-outer-space-is-the-place-for-africas-future (accessed June
12, 2018).
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arena, and present an assessment of the potential for further Europe/Africa collab-
oration in space. The overall aim of this work is thus to provide a useful overview of
how far advanced the space sector is across Africa and which policy initiatives
support, and are supported by, it. This is a response to Giannopapa’s observation7
that not enough work has been done in relation to analysing those space activities
and technologies that are used to meet African objectives and support African
policies or about the relationship between Africa and Europe in the space arena.
Accordingly, this work is fundamentally about Africa’s international space engage-
ment, since outer space has always been conceived of as an international arena, for
example, in the Outer Space Treaty.8 Moreover, Peter argues that from the start,
“international cooperation has been a central element of the strategy of most
countries involved in space activities” and “[i]nternational cooperation is now an
integral part of the space policy and strategy of different space agencies around the
world”.9 To this end, innovative emerging ideas originating from Africa in the field
of international relations theory will also be applied in tandem with the primary
needs approach to African space activities to help explain African behaviour and
actions in relation to space.
Two important concepts will be used throughout the volumes in this regard—
ubuntu and emerging middle powers. This is a novel endeavour since ubuntu, as a
unique African worldview and international relations perspective, has never been
coupled with the space arena and since the emerging middle powers concept will
help, along with ubuntu, to further an understanding of how Africa’s regional powers
fit into the global system and to give explanations to their behaviour and actions,
particularly on continental level. This is useful since it will be shown that African
space initiatives are largely driven by regional powers, and some, such as Aganaba-
Jeanty,10 argue that the best way to expand Africa’s space capabilities is through a
regional approach.
This introductory chapter is organised into five sections. First, a broad back-
ground will be presented to contextualise Africa as a challenged, but rising, conti-
nent. This will be followed by a discussion of the general socio-economic situation,
after which the concepts of ubuntu and emerging middle powers will be discussed in
relation to African politics. These analytical frameworks will be drawn on through-
out this study and will be coupled with an overview of various approaches to rank
and sort African countries in relation to their space activities and capabilities, to aid
analysis. An overview of the broad continental activities in the space arena, as well
as a discussion of Africa’s background in space until roughly the year 2000, will
follow. Finally, an overview of the following chapters will be provided.
7Christina Giannopapa, “Improving Africa’s Benefit from Space Applications: The European-
African Partnership,” Space Policy 27, (2011): 99.
8United Nations, Treaties and Principles on Outer Space (New York: United Nations, 2002).
9Nicolas Peter, “The Changing Geopolitics of Space Activities,” Space Policy 37, (2016): 145.
10Timiebi Aganaba-Jeanty, “Precursor to an African Space Agency: Commentary on Dr. Peter
Martinez ‘Is There a Need for an African Space Agency?’,” Space Policy 29, (2013): 173.
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1.2 Situating Africa: Background and Context
In order to provide the foundation and context for the African space ecosystem, this
section will review the demographics and politics of the African continent. Africa is
the world’s second largest continent and covers an area of 30.3 million km2
(one-fifth of the Earth’s land area). This includes a great diversity in physical
geography, with eight distinct major physical regions, namely, savannah, rainforest,
the Swahili Coast, the Ethiopian Highlands, Sahara, Sahel, African Great Lakes, and
the Southern African region.11 Figure 1.1, depicting African land cover, highlights
these regions as well as the great complexity in natural environments across the
continent. Compiled using a year’s worth of data (180,000 images) from the Sentinel
2A satellite, this land cover map is the “the first high-resolution map classifying land
cover types on the entire African continent”.12
The continent is home to 54 sovereign states,13 including the island nations off
the western and eastern coasts, with the territory of Western Sahara disputed
between Morocco and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Fig. 1.2).
According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA),
the population of Africa increased from 478 million in 1980 to about 1.2 billion in
2016, with a high growth rate of 2.5% in this period.14 Ten countries accounted for
61% of this growth—Nigeria, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Egypt, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, South Africa, and Algeria. It is important
to note that this “demographic dividend” is one of Africa’s key opportunities, which
“will be achieved by investing in its youthful and increasingly techno-savvy
population”.15
Roughly 40% of the continent’s population is currently urbanised, with the most
urbanised countries being Gabon (87.2%), Libya (78.6%), the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (77.3%), Djibouti (77.3%), Algeria (70.7%), Cabo Verde (65.5%),
Tunisia (66.8%), the Republic of the Congo (65.4%), and South Africa (64.8%) and
11National Geographic, “Africa: Physical Geography,” 2018, https://www.nationalgeographic.org/
encyclopedia/africa-physical-geography/ (accessed June 17, 2018).
12This European Space Agency image of African land cover “contains modified Copernicus
Sentinel data (2015–2016), processed by Land Cover CCI, ESA”; European Space Agency,
“African Land Cover,” Space in Images, 2017, http://www.esa.int/spaceinimages/Images/2017/
10/African_land_cover (accessed August 27, 2018); European Space Agency, “Africa Classified,”
Earth Online, 2017, https://earth.esa.int/web/guest/content/-/article/africa-classified (accessed
August 27, 2018).
13It should be noted that the country of Eswatini will still be referred to by the name of Swaziland in
this study, a while Cabo Verde will be referred to as Cape Verde, and The Gambia as Gambia.
14United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, The Demographic Profile of African Coun-
tries, 2016, Addis Ababa, VII, https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/demo
graphic_profile_rev_april_25.pdf (accessed June 17, 2018).
15Samsana Ismail and Ilunga Mpyana, “The Great Enabler: Aerospace in Africa,” Airbus, 2018,
8, https://www.airbus.com/content/dam/corporate-topics/publications/brochures/TheGreatEnable_
AerospaceinAfrica.pdf (accessed December 5, 2018).
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the least urbanised being Burundi (12.1%), Uganda (16.1%), Malawi (16.3%), Niger
(18.7%), South Sudan (18.8%), Ethiopia (19.5%), Swaziland (21.3%), Chad
(22.5%), Kenya (25.6%), and Lesotho (27.3%).16 Africa also has a very young
Fig. 1.1 African land cover and major physical regions. This European Space Agency image of
African land cover “contains modified Copernicus Sentinel data (2015–2016), processed by Land
Cover CCI, ESA”; European Space Agency, “African Land Cover,” Space in Images, 2017, http://
www.esa.int/spaceinimages/Images/2017/10/African_land_cover (accessed August 27, 2018);
European Space Agency, “Africa Classified,” Earth Online, 2017, https://earth.esa.int/web/guest/
content/-/article/africa-classified (accessed August 27, 2018). Regions are approximations, for
example, savanna is widespread, but notable example is the African Great Plains in Kenya and
Tanzania
16United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, The Demographic Profile of African Coun-
tries, 7.
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age structure, with about 60% of the population being under 25 years of age (with
40% being 0–14 and 20% being 15–24).17 Population density varies widely across
the continent, with the highest density recorded in Mauritius (627 people per km2),
followed by Rwanda (471 people per km2), Burundi (435 people per km2), the
Comoros (423.7 people per km2), and Nigeria (200 people per km2).18 Conversely,
the least densely populated countries all have less than 10 people per km2, namely,
Namibia, Botswana, the Central African Republic, Angola, Chad, Mauritania, Mali,
Niger, and Libya.19
Fig. 1.2 Africa’s political divisions (54 sovereign states plus Western Sahara). All maps used in
this study, unless otherwise stated, are generated with https://mapchart.net/ and countries for which
no data are available are excluded from relevant maps
17Ibid., IX.
18Ibid., 7–8.
19Ibid., 8.
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The ten largest cities in Africa (in 2017) were Lagos, Nigeria (21.0 million);
Cairo, Egypt (20.4 million); Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo (13.3
million); Luanda, Angola (6.5 million); Nairobi, Kenya (6.5 million); Mogadishu,
Somalia (6.0 million); Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire (4.7 million); Alexandria, Egypt (4.7
million); Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (4.6 million); and Johannesburg, South Africa (4.4
million).20 These cities and the most and least urbanised and most and least densely
populated countries are depicted in Fig. 1.3.
One of the greatest challenges facing continental cooperation is the immense
diversity in linguistic, cultural, and political arenas, as well as the large differences in
Fig. 1.3 Most and least urbanised and densely populated African countries, with largest cities
20James Karuga, “15 Biggest Cities in Africa,” worldatlas.com, April 25, 2017, https://www.
worldatlas.com/articles/15-biggest-cities-in-africa.html (accessed July 7, 2018).
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technological capabilities, and economic and industrial levels, between countries.21
Despite these differences however, all countries have come together to form the
African Union (AU), which is the vehicle of Africa’s unity and solidarity.
1.2.1 Africa’s Political Organisation
The AU is the most politically important organisation on the continent, with all
54 sovereign African states as members, in addition to the Sahrawi Arab Democratic
Republic.22 Its vision is to create “[a]n integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa,
driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena”.23
Figure 1.4 details the organisational structure of the AU and the AU Commission.
The AU can be subdivided into eight intergovernmental organisations—the
Regional Economic Communities (RECs)—that constitute the “building blocks”
of the union, having been proposed as a mechanism for regional and continental
African integration, through the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Develop-
ment of Africa (1980) and the Abuja Treaty (1991).24 All 54 countries are members
of at least one REC, with some having membership in more than one. The reasons
for this overlap are both political and economic, as the example of Tanzania (which
left the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa in favour of the Southern
Africa Development Community) shows. It is argued that Tanzania “pulled out of
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) on the pretence it
did not wish to remain concurrently a member of that group as well as SADC”, with
21Martinez, “The African Leadership Conference on Space Science and Technology for Sustainable
Development,” 36.
22The AU inherited most of its membership from its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity
(OAU). All 32 independent African states joined in 1963 to found the OAU, and a further 21 joined
by 2002, when the AU was created to succeed the OAU. Article 29 of the Constitutive Act of the
African Union stipulates that any African country may notify the Chairman of the AU Commission
that they wish to join, after which a vote is held by all members. A simple majority is needed for
membership. For this reason, while the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic is not formally
recognised by most states worldwide, it could join the OAU (in 1982) since most African states
recognise it. Morocco left the OAU in protest over the admission of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic
Republic in 1984 but rejoined the AU in 2017. African Union, “Constitutive Act of the African
Union,” 2000, https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/32020-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf (accessed
August 28, 2018); African Union, “Member State Profiles,” https://au.int/memberstates (accessed
August 28, 2018).
23African Union Commission, “Regional Economic Communities (RECs),” https://au.int/en/
organs/recs (accessed June 17, 2018).
24African Union Commission and New Zealand Crown, African Union Handbook 2018: A Guide
for those working with and within the African Union (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: African Union
Commission and Wellington, New Zealand: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade/Manatū Aorere,
2018, fifth edition), 10–11, https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/31829-file-african_union_hand
book_2018_english-2.pdf (accessed December 5, 2018).
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AFRICAN UNION STRUCTURE
AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION STRUCTURE
Fig. 1.4 AU and AU Commission structures. African Union Commission and New Zealand
Crown, African Union Handbook 2018: A Guide for those working with and within the African
Union (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: African Union Commission and Wellington, New Zealand: Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs and Trade/Manatū Aorere, 2018, fifth edition), 10–11, https://au.int/sites/
default/files/pages/31829-file-african_union_handbook_2018_english-2.pdf (accessed December
5, 2018)
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its continued presence in the East African Community described as “half-hearted”.25
A possible reason for this is because:
of its fear that its industries and businesses could never hope to succeed in any open and fair
competition with the Kenyan sub-regional powerhouse. It has also yet to really recover from
the collapse of the first East African integration experiment whose breakup, it believes,
unfairly favoured Kenyan interests.26
While this is only one possible reason for Tanzania’s decision to leave COMESA,
it nevertheless demonstrates that countries make calculated decisions based on
economic and political factors regarding what would best serve their interests.
However, the number of overlapping memberships can create competition or unnec-
essary duplication, even potentially adding to what is known as the “spaghetti bowl”
phenomenon, which is a proliferation of overlapping and often competing trading
agreements bringing complexities and duplications.27 However, since they predate
the creation of the AU itself, these RECs have somewhat different structures and
roles, and their broad mandate of fostering regional economic integration has
evolved to include coordination in wider areas such as governance, development,
and security.
The RECs are thus key organs of the AU. They are the Arab Maghreb Union
(UMA), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the
Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the East African Community
(EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Eco-
nomic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Southern African Development Com-
munity (SADC). This study will make use of the RECs in its analysis of African
space activities and policies, for the same reason that has been advanced for building
an African Regional Space Regime Complex from the RECs instead of through a
pan-African Space Agency approach, which could elicit a leadership competition at
a continental level (more on this later). It has also been argued that each of the RECs
has at least one national space agency, and since they are in effect the “implementing
arm of the African Union” and the building blocks of its economic integration,
building a broader continental “appetite” for space collaboration and integration
through the RECs is thus a sensible idea.28 Thus, the analysis in Chap. 3 will follow a
structure based on the RECs.
In several cases, these RECs also overlap with subregional economic communi-
ties (SECs), which are not considered pillars of the AU, but are important at the local
25Peterson Tumwebaze, “Tanzania should choose between EAC and SADC,” The New Times,
August 21, 2013, https://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/68537 (accessed August 28, 3018).
26Ibid.
27Jagdish N. Bhagwati, “U.S. Trade Policy: The Infatuation with FTAs,” Discussion Paper Series
No. 726, 1995, https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D8CN7BFM (accessed
August 28, 2018).
28Aganaba-Jeanty, “Precursor to an African Space Agency: Commentary on Dr. Peter Martinez ‘Is
There a Need for an African Space Agency?’,” 173.
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level. Figure 1.5 provides an overview of the various RECs and SECs and how they
overlap with each other. It is also notable that all AU members have recently agreed
to create the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which is currently
being ratified by member states and will come into effect 30 days after ratification by
a minimum of 22 AU members.29 The objectives of the AfCFTA include creating a
“single continental market for goods and services, with free movement of business
persons and investments, and thus pav[ing] the way for accelerating the establish-
ment of the Continental Customs Union”; expanding “intra African trade through
Fig. 1.5 Supranational African bodies. Wikimedia Commons, “Supranational African Bodies,”
2018, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Supranational_African_Bodies-en.svg (accessed
August 28, 2018). Modified to include Cape Verde in CEN-SAD and to include South Sudan in
East African Community (* Note: South Sudan is not a member of COMESA; it is only a member
of the AU, IGAD, and EAC). Indian Ocean Commission not indicated in figure
29Landry Signé, “Africa’s big new free trade agreement, explained,” The Washington Post, March
29, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/03/29/the-countdown-to-
the-african-continental-free-trade-area-starts-now/?noredirect¼on&utm_term¼.048473ec1b83
(accessed August 28, 2018).
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better harmonization and coordination of trade liberalization and facilitation regimes
and instruments across RECs and across Africa in general”; resolving “the chal-
lenges of multiple and overlapping memberships and expedite the regional and
continental integration processes”; and enhancing “competitiveness at the industry
and enterprise level through exploiting opportunities for scale production, continen-
tal market access and better reallocation of resources”.30 There is thus a direct link to
integrating the continent and the RECs more closely, precisely because “[m]any
African countries belong to multiple RECs, which tends to limit the efficiency and
effectiveness of these organizations” and “most RECs are underperforming, with a
low level of compliance by member states, which has delayed successful integra-
tion”.31 However, the progress that has been made at the REC level is to be the
foundation of the AfCFTA, as Article 5 of the agreement identifies (as one of the
principles of the AfCFTA) “RECs’ Free Trade Areas (FTAs) as building blocks for
the AfCFTA”.32
While it was agreed that the AfCFTA would come into effect within 18 months of
signing of the framework,33 it is reported that there are some concerns that the “time
frame may be too short, especially given the need for debate and negotiations within
each signatory nation”.34 The AfCFTA has been “billed as the world’s largest”35 free
trade area and:
tries to solve . . . the terrible state of trade within Africa. While trade within Europe makes up
67% of trade, in Africa it is just around 12%. That is, every African country trades more with
another continent than with their neighbour.36
As of August 8, 2018, six countries had ratified the AfCFTA.37 Since the RECs
(and the SECs) remain important, and are the building blocks of the AU and the
AfCFTA, they will be discussed in turn below.
30African Union, “CFTA – Continental Free Trade Area,” https://au.int/en/ti/cfta/about (accessed
August 28, 2018).
31Signé, “Africa’s big new free trade agreement, explained.”
32African Union, “Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area,” March
21, 2018, https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/34248-treaty-consolidated_text_on_cfta_-_en.pdf
(accessed August 28. 2018).
33Ibid.
34Signé, “Africa’s big new free trade agreement, explained.”
35Fin24, “Ramaphosa signs declaration on African free trade region,” March 21, 2018, https://
www.fin24.com/Economy/sa-signs-african-free-trade-agreement-20180321 (accessed August
28, 2018).
36Feyi Fawehinmi, “CFTA: A Free Trade Area Is Not The Same As a Free Trade Agreement,”
Medium, March 26, 2018, https://aguntasolo.co/cfta-a-free-trade-area-is-not-the-same-as-a-free-
trade-agreement-73b34404b299 (accessed August 28, 2018).
37African Union, “List of countries which have signed, ratified/acceded to the agreement
establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area,” August 8, 2018, https://au.int/sites/
default/files/treaties/34248-sl-agreement_establishing_the_african_continental_free_trade_area.
pdf (accessed August 28, 2018).
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Arab Maghreb Union (UMA)
The Arab Maghreb Union in the north is the smallest REC, with five members
(Fig. 1.6). It was established in 1989 through the Marrakesh Treaty,38 to promote
prosperity and strengthen the ties between its members; to facilitate the movement of
people, goods, services, and capital; and to defend the national rights of its mem-
bers.39 The secretariat of this political-level organisation is located in Rabat,
Morocco.
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)
The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, established in 1993, is the
second largest REC on the continent, with 21 members (Fig. 1.7). The primary
purpose of the organisation, as stated in the COMESA Treaty,40 is to create a free
trade region to support the economic development and growth of its members; to
coordinate their economic activity; to foster foreign, regional, and domestic invest-
ment; to build stronger relations globally; and to support peace and security in the
region.41 The secretariat of COMESA is located in Lusaka, Zambia.
One of Africa’s SECs, the Indian Ocean Commission (COI),42 comprises Indian
Ocean COMESA members, namely, Madagascar, Seychelles, Mauritius, the
Fig. 1.6 Arab Maghreb
Union (UMA)
38Treaty instituting the Arab Maghreb Union (with declaration). Concluded at Marrakesh on
17 February 1989. http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/other_treaties/text.jsp?file_id¼201318
(accessed September 23, 2018).
39African Union Commission, “Regional Economic Communities (RECs),” https://au.int/en/
organs/recs (accessed June 17, 2018).
40Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, http://www.comesa.
int/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/COMESA-Treaty.pdf (accessed September 23, 2018).
41Ibid.
42Established through the General Victoria Agreement of 1984.
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Fig. 1.7 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and SECs
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Comoros, and Reunion Island (France) as members.43 It functions as a vehicle for
the development of the Indian Ocean states and provides a framework for its
members to “conduct external collective actions of integration and cooperation
with the Eastern and Southern Africa region, the African continent (AU), the
South (South–South collaboration) and the rest of the world, and with multilateral
institutions and various donors”.44 It also aims to promote tourism and trade.45
Actions and projects have been initiated in several areas such as the environment,
tourism, intra-regional trade, fisheries, telecommunications, culture, climate change,
health, and gender issues.46
Another SEC within COMESA is the Economic Community of the Great Lakes
Countries (ECGLC),47 with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, and
Burundi as members and which operates with the aim of fostering economic
cooperation and integration in the region.48
For reference regarding the Indian Ocean region, Fig. 1.8 shows the political
boundaries in greater detail, including the areas administered by France and the
United Kingdom.
Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD)
The Community of Sahel-Saharan States, with 29 members, is the largest of the
RECs. Founded in 199849 to promote social, political, cultural, and economic
integration among its members, its focus includes the promotion of free movement
of people and capital, as well as foreign trade and closer telecommunications and
transport links in the region.50 It also focuses on establishing an economic union,
43Commission De L’Océan Indien, “Accueil,” 2018, http://www.commissionoceanindien.org/
accueil/ (accessed July 7, 2018).
44Commission De L’Océan Indien, “Qui sommes nous?,” English Translation, 2018, http://
commissionoceanindien.org/a-propos/qui-sommes-nous/ (accessed July 7, 2018).
45Seychelles Trade Portal, “Trade Agreements,” http://www.seychellestradeportal.gov.sc/trade-
agreements (accessed September 23, 2018).
46Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Seychelles, “International Relations:
International Organisations,” http://www.mfa.gov.sc/static.php?content_id¼33 (accessed
September 23, 2018).
47The Convention Establishing the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL),
Concluded at Gisenyi on 20 September 1976, https://wits.worldbank.org/GPTAD/PDF/archive/
CEPGL.pdf (accessed September 23, 2018).
48Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs, “Accueil,” 2015, http://www.cepgl.org/
(accessed July 7, 2018).
49CEN-SAD was established on February 4, 1998, following the Conference of Leaders and Heads
of States held in Tripoli, with a revised treaty of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States
(CEN-SAD), adopted on February 16, 2013, by the Conference of Heads of State and Government
from the organisation.
50African Union Commission, “Regional Economic Communities (RECs),” https://au.int/en/
organs/recs (accessed June 17, 2018).
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with particular emphasis on agriculture, industry, energy, society, and culture. It also
aims to coordinate the educational systems of its members and to foster scientific and
technical cooperation. The CEN-SAD secretariat is located in Tripoli, Libya.51
Fig. 1.8 Western Indian Ocean. University of Texas Libraries, “Indian Ocean—West (Political)
1996”, 2018, http://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/islands_oceans_poles/indian_ocean_w_96.jpg
(accessed August 27, 2018)
51United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, “CEN-SAD – The Community of Sahel-
Saharan States,” https://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/cen-sad-community-sahel-saharan-states
(accessed June 17, 2018).
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Member countries are predominantly located in the northern half of the continent
(Fig. 1.9).
East African Community (EAC)
The East African Community, formed in 1999,52 today includes a customs union and
a common market, spanning six states (Fig. 1.10). Its aim is to foster cooperation
between members in an array of fields including the economy, politics, society,
culture, security and defence, technology, and law.53 The ultimate aim is to create a
political federation. The East African Community headquarters is located in Arusha,
Tanzania.
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)
The Economic Community of Central African States, with 11 member states
(Fig. 1.11), was established in 1983,54 and aims to improve the living conditions
of its citizens through the promotion of economic and social development.55 It also
strives to maintain economic stability in the region. Other priorities include the
recognition of peace and security as a necessary foundation for development and the
creation of local capacities in order to uphold peace and security, as well as
economic (including monetary) integration. The administrative centre of ECCAS
is in Libreville, Gabon. Within ECCAS, the Central African Economic and Mone-
tary Community (CEMAC) SEC was formed in 199456 to promote greater economic
integration among countries that share a common currency, the CFA franc.57
Members include Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of
the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. The organisation is dedicated to remov-
ing internal economic barriers between these countries and the establishment of a
common market and economic union.58
52Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community (as amended on 14th December,
2006 and 20th August, 2007), http://eacj.org//wp-content/uploads/2012/08/EACJ-Treaty.pdf
(accessed September 23, 2018).
53African Union Commission, “Regional Economic Communities (RECs),” https://au.int/en/
organs/recs (accessed June 17, 2018).
54Treaty Establishing the Economic Community of Central African States, http://www.wipo.int/
edocs/trtdocs/en/eccas/trt_eccas.pdf (accessed September 23, 2018).
55Ibid.
56CEMAC Traité constitutive signé le 16 mars 1994, http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/
attachments/173_CEMAC%20Treaty%20(French).pdf (accessed September 23, 2018).
57International Democracy Watch, “Central African Economic and Monetary Community,” 2012,
http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/index.php/central-african-economic-and-monetary-
community (accessed July 7, 2018).
58Ibid.
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Fig. 1.9 Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD)
Fig. 1.10 East African Community (EAC)
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Fig. 1.11 Economic
Community of Central
African States (ECCAS) and
Central African Economic
and Monetary Community
(CEMAC)
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Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
Founded in 1975,59 the Economic Community of West African States strives for
“collective self-sufficiency” through cooperation and integration among its 15 mem-
bers (Fig. 1.12).60 Cooperation includes a broad range of economic spheres, as well
as cultural and political matters, and ECOWAS operates today as a large trading bloc
with a goal of a single currency and further macroeconomic convergence. The
administrative centre of ECOWAS is in Abuja, Nigeria.
Four SECs operate within ECOWAS. The first is the West African Economic and
Monetary Union (UEMOA) created in 1994,61 with Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Côte
d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo as members, operating within ECOWAS to
“create a common market among the Member States, based on the free movement of
persons, goods, services, and capital, the right of establishment of self-employed or
salaried persons, as well as a common external tariff and common market policy”.62
The second, the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ), was formed in 2000,63 is
dedicated to “a common West African Central Bank and the launching of a single
currency”.64 Its member states are Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, and
Sierra Leone. The third, the Mano River Union,65 comprises Liberia, Sierra Leone,
Guinea, and Côte d’Ivoire and aims to foster collaboration in areas such as security,
commerce, and others.66 The fourth is the Liptako-Gourma Region Integrated
Development Authority (ALG), formed by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger in
1970.67 Its mission is to focus on the “harmonious and integrated development” of
its members and to “promote sectoral integration, i.e. the integration of sectors,
coherence and complementarity of actions” and “articulate the regional program
59ECOWAS Revised Treaty 1993, http://www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Revised-
treaty.pdf (accessed September 23, 2018).
60Economic Community of West African States, “Basic Information,” 2016, http://www.ecowas.
int/about-ecowas/basic-information/ (accessed June 18, 2018).
61Traité Modifié de l’Union Economique et Monetaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA), http://www.
uemoa.int/en/system/files/fichier_article/traitreviseuemoa.pdf (accessed September 23, 2018).
62West African Economic and Monetary Union, “The Amended Treaty,” http://www.uemoa.int/en/
amended-treaty (accessed July 7, 2018).
63Agreement of the West African Monetary Zone, http://www.wami-imao.org/sites/default/files/
WAMZ%20Agreement.docx (accessed September 23, 2018).
64West African Monetary Institute, “Welcome to WAMI,” 2018, http://www.wami-imao.org/
(accessed July 7, 2018).
65The Mano River Declaration, 1973, https://wits.worldbank.org/GPTAD/PDF/archive/MRU.pdf
(accessed September 23, 2018).
66Front Page Africa, “Mano River Union Countries to Establish Legislative Body,” April 19, 2016,
https://frontpageafricaonline.com/politics/mano-river-union-countries-to-establish-legislative-
body/ (accessed July 7, 2018).
67Traité Revisé de l’Autorité de Developpement Intégré des Etats du Liptako-Gourma, http://www.
g5sahel.org/images/Docs/TRAITE_REVISE-VERSION_SIGNEE.pdf (accessed September
23, 2018).
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with actions at the level of States and other IGOs”.68 Its particular emphasis is on
resources including “agro-pastoral, hydraulic, mining, and energy resources”, which
often “exceeds the financial capacities of a single State” to effectively manage and
gain benefit from.69 The memorandum of understanding between the three member
Fig. 1.12 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
68Liptako-Gourma Region Integrated Development Authory, “Mission,” http://www.
liptakogourma.org/index.php/presentation/mission (accessed August 28, 2018). Translated from
French.
69Ibid.
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states to establish the ALG was signed in 1970, making the ALG “one of the first
sub-regional integration organizations in West Africa”, and, as mentioned, focused
on “the optimal development of the mining, energy, hydraulic, agro-pastoral and fish
resources of the Liptako-Gourma Region”.70
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
Located in Eastern Africa and headquartered in Djibouti, the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development was founded in 1996 as the successor to the Intergov-
ernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), which was founded in
1986.71 The eight member states of this organisation (Fig. 1.13) have been subject to
the effects of national disasters, particularly as a result of droughts that have led to
famine, making it “one of the most vulnerable regions on the African continent for
climatic variations”, coupled with land and environmental degradation.72
Fig. 1.13 Intergovern-
mental Authority on
Development (IGAD)
70Liptako-Gourma Region Integrated Development Authory, “Création,” http://www.
liptakogourma.org/index.php/presentation/creation (accessed August 28, 2018). Translated from
French.
71It was decided in 1995 to revitalize IGADD and expand areas of regional cooperation and adopt a
new organisational structure, which became known as IGAD in 1996. Intergovernmental Authority
on Development, “About Us,” 2018, https://igad.int/index.php?option¼com_content&
view¼article&id¼93&Itemid¼124 (accessed September 23, 2018). Agreement Establishing the
Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 1996, http://www.ifrc.org/docs/idrl/
N527EN.pdf (accessed September 23, 2018).
72Intergovernmental Authority on Development, “The IGAD Region,” 2018, https://www.igad.int/
about-us/the-igad-region (accessed June 18, 2018).
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Accordingly, IGAD focuses on issues such as food security, sustainable develop-
ment of natural resources, harmonisation of the policies of member states, and peace
and security.73
Southern African Development Community (SADC)
With 15 member states (Fig. 1.14), the Southern African Development Community,
founded in 1992, is the successor to the Southern African Development
Coordinating Conference (SADCC), which was founded in 1980.74 The broad
goals of SADC include economic growth and development and peace and security,
with the aim of raising the standard of living in the region, reducing poverty, and
supporting the socially disadvantaged. A free trade zone was established within the
region, with maximum tariff liberalisation attained in 2012.75 SADC’s Executive
Fig. 1.14 Southern African Development Community (SADC)
73African Union Commission, “Regional Economic Communities (RECs),” https://au.int/en/
organs/recs (accessed June 17, 2018).
74Southern African Development Community, “SADC Overview,” 2012, https://www.sadc.int/
about-sadc/overview/ (accessed June 18, 2018). The reason for the change was that SADCC was
originally formed to advance the cause of national political liberation in Southern Africa and to
reduce dependence particularly on the then apartheid South Africa. After Nelson Mandela’s release
in 1990 and the dawning of democracy in South Africa, this focus shifted in 1992 to spearhead
economic integration of Southern Africa. Southern African Development Community, “History and
Treaty,” 2012, https://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/history-and-treaty/ (accessed September
23, 2018). Declaration and Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, 1992, https://
www.sadc.int/files/8613/5292/8378/Declaration__Treaty_of_SADC.pdf (accessed September
23, 2018).
75Southern African Development Community, “Free Trade Area,” 2012, https://www.sadc.int/
about-sadc/integration-milestones/free-trade-area/ (accessed June 18, 2018).
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Secretary is based in Gaborone, Botswana. SADC goals include establishing a
common market, a monetary union, and a single currency.
Within SADC, one SEC exists, namely, the Southern African Customs Union
(SACU), with five members (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and
Swaziland), founded by the 1910 SACU Agreement76 and headquartered in Wind-
hoek, Namibia.77 One of the goals of SADC is to expand this customs union across
the region.78 Allied to SACU is the Common Monetary Area (CMA), which covers
all SACU members except Botswana. The CMA originated in 1921 when the
South African pound was made the only legal tender in SA, Bechuanaland (now
Botswana), Lesotho, Swaziland, and Namibia after the South African Reserve Bank
was established.79 Botswana withdrew from the CMA in 1975, but the currencies of
the remaining countries remain pegged to the South African rand,80 and it is reported
that “[w]ith SA accounting for more than 90% of the CMA’s GDP, trade and
population, the rand is still the only de facto common currency in the CMA”.81
Together, these RECs and the smaller SECs make up the African Economic
Community (AEC), which has laid the groundwork for African economic integration
since its founding in 1991 through the Abuja Treaty. This treaty called for the
strengthening of existing RECs and the creation of RECs in areas where none
existed, in order to facilitate broad continental economic integration, with a free
trade zone and customs union, a common market, and free movement of people,
goods and services, and capital, and the creation of a single African currency.82 The
AEC and the RECs thus form an integral part of the AU, and in addition to their
economic roles, they also support political and social integration. For this reason, the
RECs will form a key part of the approach taken in this study in the analysis of
African space activities, as mentioned. The RECs are powerful vehicles for eco-
nomic and political integration. Sustained growth and development in Africa
(including in the space arena) depends on “multiple growth poles”, with every
subcontinental region needing strong drivers of growth.83 Moreover, since the
76Southern African Customs Union Agreement 2002 (as amended on April 12, 2013), http://www.
sacu.int/docs/agreements/2017/SACU-Agreement.pdf (accessed September 23, 2018).
77Southern African Customs Union, “About SACU,” 2013, http://www.sacu.int/show.php?id¼394
(accessed June 18, 2018).
78Southern African Development Community, “Free Trade Area,” 2012, https://www.sadc.int/
about-sadc/integration-milestones/free-trade-area/ (accessed June 18, 2018).
79Times Live, “History of the common monetary area,” The Sunday Times, May 29, 2011, https://
www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/lifestyle/2011-05-29-history-of-the-common-monetary-area/
(accessed August 30, 2018).
80After independence, Namibia joined in 1992, replacing the CMA with the Multilateral Monetary
Agreement (MMA) of 1992.
81Ibid.
82Organisation of African Unity, Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, 1991,
Abuja, 12–14. https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7775-treaty-0016_-_treaty_establishing_the_
african_economic_community_e.pdf (accessed June 19, 2018).
83Godwell Nhamo, “New Global Sustainable Development Agenda: A Focus on Africa,” Sustain-
able Development, 2016: 1.
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SECs, in particular, work towards the removal of tariffs and other economic barriers
on a regional level, the spread of space technologies can be facilitated through this
intra-regional engagement. Accordingly, the analysis in Chap. 2 will highlight the
leading space actors in every REC since these can act as the gateway towards
expanding African participation in the space sector.
The next section will consider some of the major political challenges confronting
Africa, since the space sector and its operations are necessarily rooted and embedded
within the political sphere. Thus, a holistic understanding of the political challenges
facing the continent is necessary, since the space sector must navigate these in order
to meet the socio-economic challenges. This also explains why in far too many cases
space activities have taken a backseat to other more politically pressing concerns.
The following section will consider socio-economic factors, and thus, a brief
overview of some of the main trends and drivers of change in Africa leading up to
2025 is relevant here. A report by the European Union’s Institute for Security
Studies highlights several trends facing Africa in the coming years, including two
socio-political trends, namely, “the disappearance of ageing long-standing rulers”
and the “expansion of the youth bulge”.84 Two security trends are also highlighted,
namely, the “consolidation of multi-layered security challenges on the one hand and,
on the other, the persistence of religious extremism as a vector of violent
mobilisation”, while two economic and structural trends are “challenges of growing
resource depletion and land pressures, complemented by patterns of diverging
growth and inequality”.85 Underlying these are drivers of change, defined as factors
that “frame the environment in which . . . trends will unfold, thereby to some extent
conditioning how they will develop and with what impact”.86 These drivers of
change include systemic ones, namely, climate change, technological developments,
international economic policies, and global order, while macrosocial drivers of
change are demographics, epidemics, gender attitudes, education, and corruption.
Many of these will be considered throughout the course of this study.
1.2.2 Political Challenges
Laudable progress in democratisation and governance is being made across Africa.87
Political liberalisation is progressing as many of the longest-serving African leaders
have recently exited office, including Robert Mugabe, Yahya Jammeh, and José
Eduardo dos Santos. Joseph points out that about one-third of the states in
84Valérie Arnould and Francesco Strazzari, African futures: Horizon 2025 (Paris: EU Institute for
Security Studies, 2017), 6–7.
85Ibid.
86Ibid.
87Samuel Oyewole, “Space Research and Development in Africa,” Astropolitics 15, no. 2 (2017):
200.
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sub-Saharan Africa are “substantially democratic”, buoyed up by the third wave of
democratisation starting in the early 1990s, which left a lasting legacy emphasising
the rule of law, good governance, accountability, transparency, and human rights.88
Similarly, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation reports in its 2017 Ibrahim Index of African
Governance that one-third of African countries are driving the overall improvement
in governance on the continent, but 40 countries have shown positive improvements
in overall governance in the last decade.89 The countries with the best overall
governance score were Mauritius, Seychelles, Botswana, Cape Verde, Namibia,
South Africa, Tunisia, Ghana, Rwanda, and Senegal, while the worst performers
were Somalia, South Sudan, Eritrea, the Central African Republic, Sudan, Libya, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Chad.90 The measures used include safety
and rule of law, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity,
and human development. Specifically in terms of safety and the rule of law,
increasing improvements were seen in 11 countries (over a decade).91 However,
21 countries have shown a consistent slowing or increasing deterioration in this
area.92 This is troubling because without strong rule of law and safety all develop-
ment is placed in jeopardy.
Indeed, many political challenges still confront African countries and threaten
socio-economic development and progress in sectors, including space. Many coun-
tries are still politically fragile, such as Somalia, the Central African Republic,
Burundi, and South Sudan.93 Corruption remains a serious challenge, with much
of Africa continuing to perform poorly according to Transparency International’s
2017 Corruption Perceptions Index, which ranks countries on a scale of 0–100
(0 being highly corrupt and 100 being very clean).94 The best performing African
country is Botswana, ranking 34th out of 180 countries, with a score of 61 (for
88Richard Joseph, “Is Good Governance Necessary For Economic Progress in Africa?,” The
Brookings Institution, August 4, 2013, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/is-good-governance-
necessary-for-economic-progress-in-africa/ (accessed June 19, 2018).
89Mo Ibrahim Foundation, “Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance 2017: Key Findings,” 2018,
http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/2017-key-findings/ (accessed June 19, 2018).
90Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2017 Ibrahim Index of African Governance: Index Report, 2017: 16.
http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/11/21165610/2017-IIAG-Report.pdf?_ga¼2.205005072.
146642425.1529417846-97260619.1529417846#page¼25 (accessed June 19, 2018).
91Namibia, Senegal, Tanzania, Tunisia, Togo, Swaziland, Côte d’Ivoire, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia,
and Zimbabwe.
92Benin, Malawi, Algeria, Mauritania, Eritrea, Sudan, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Gabon,
Niger, Mozambique, Djibouti, Gambia, Cameroon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Burundi, Libya,
the Central African Republic, Somalia, and South Sudan.
93Caroline Kende-Robb, “These are the 8 reasons why 2018 could be Africa’s year,” World
Economic Forum, March 15, 2018, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/03/africa-s-year-of-
opportunity (accessed June 18, 2018).
94Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2017,” 2018, https://www.transpar
ency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017?
gclid¼EAIaIQobChMIvfHPt8Pd2wIVzZkbCh1B8QIQEAAYASAAEgI0afD_BwE, (accessed
June 18, 2018).
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reference, the best global performer is New Zealand with a score of 89). The worst
performing country is Somalia, placed 180th, with a score of 9. Only six African
countries have a score of 50 or higher,95 indicating that for the majority of Africa
corruption remains a very serious challenge. An overview of African performance is
given in Fig. 1.15.
A similar troubling image emerges when more broadly considering the political
scene across Africa. Freedom House produces its annual Freedom in the World
Index, which rates countries on their political rights and civil liberties, with the
former considering the electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and
the functioning of government and the latter considering issues of expression and
belief, personal autonomy and individual rights, associational and organisational
rights, and the rule of law.96 The average ratings of political rights and civil liberties
are then taken to produce the freedom rating (free, partly free, not free). Here too,
most of Africa performs poorly. Eritrea is the worst performer, with an aggregate
score of 3 out of 100 (the same as North Korea), while Cape Verde scores the best on
the continent with 90 out of 100 (the same score as France).97 Overall, less than a
fifth (10 out of 55) of African countries and territories (including Western Sahara)
are considered free98 (Fig. 1.15). Clearly there is much progress that must still be
made in terms of the rule of law, civil rights, and the political process.
Peace and security is another political arena where many challenges remain.
Seven out of the UN’s current 14 peacekeeping operations are active in Africa
(Table 1.1).99
Amnesty International reports in its 2017/2018 review that significant challenges
remain in the following seven categories: repression of dissent, armed conflict and
violence, people on the move, impunity, discrimination and marginalisation, right to
housing and forced evictions, and business and corporate accountability (some of
these will be reviewed in the socio-economic section).100 Another challenge, to be
explored in a future study, includes lack of birth certificates and other official
documentation, with “potentially dire consequences in regard to education, health
care, job prospects, and legal rights” for millions of Africans.101
95Botswana, Seychelles, Cape Verde, Rwanda, Namibia, and Mauritius.
96Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2018: Methodology,” 2018, https://freedomhouse.org/
report/methodology-freedom-world-2018 (accessed June 18, 2018).
97Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2018: Democracy in Crisis,” 2018, https://
freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018 (accessed June 18, 2018).
98South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Benin, Ghana, Cape Verde, Tunisia, Mauritius, Senegal, and
São Tomé & Príncipe.
99United Nations Peacekeeping, “Where we operate,” https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/where-we-
operate (accessed June 18, 2018).
100Amnesty International, “Africa 2017/2018,” 2018, https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/
report-africa/ (accessed June 19, 2018).
101Independent, “Hundreds of millions of children ‘lack any record of their birth’,” September
16, 2017, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/invisible-children-unicef-birth-regis
tration-campaign-india-uganda-somalia-birth-certificate-a7950056.html (accessed September
23, 2018).
1.2 Situating Africa: Background and Context 27
Fig. 1.15 Corruption Perceptions Index for Africa, 2017 (Transparency International), and Free-
dom in the World Index, 2018 (Freedom House)
28 1 Africa and the Space Arena
In terms of repression of dissent, it is reported that rights to peaceful protest were
denied in more than 20 countries through harassment, excessive force, arbitrary
arrests, and unlawful bans, making freedom of assembly “the exception rather than
the rule”.102 Of particular note in this regard are Angola, Chad, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Sudan, Togo, Sierra Leone, and Uganda. Human
rights and opposition activists, as well as journalists, were attacked, arrested,
harassed, or otherwise repressed in Cameroon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea,
Mauritania, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Sudan, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Uganda. Regres-
sive laws, and shrinking political space, were observed in Angola, Côte d’Ivoire,
Nigeria, and Malawi. Media freedom was also curtailed, with journalists facing some
form of criminalisation in more than 30 countries, with Uganda, Cameroon,
Botswana, Togo, and Ethiopia standing out. Political repression and election vio-
lence were observed in Rwanda, Burundi, and Angola.
Armed conflict and violence is another major area of concern.103 The conflicts in
Sudan, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, as well as the activities of Boko Haram and the troubling military actions
by Nigeria and Cameroon (both accused of gross human rights violations and crimes
in their response to Boko Haram), are noteworthy in this regard. The Boko Haram
and al-Shabaab armed groups have perpetrated attacks and violence against a range
of countries, including Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the
Central African Republic, Somalia, Mali, Nigeria, and Niger. Other acts of violence
on the continent including torture and ill treatment were identified in several states,
including Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Eritrea, Mauritania, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and
Sudan.
Table 1.1 UN peacekeeping operations in Africa
Peacekeeping operation and date established Location
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
(MINURSO)—1991
Western Sahara
The African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
(UNAMID)—2007
Darfur, Sudan
United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)—2010
Democratic Republic of
the Congo
United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)—2011 Abyei, Sudan
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in
Mali (MINUSMA)—2013
Mali
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)—
2011
South Sudan
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in
the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)—2014
Central African
Republic
102Amnesty International, “Africa 2017/2018.”
103Ibid.
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In recent times, Africa has grappled with several major refugee and migration
crises, including major internal displacements.104 For example, in their 2017/2018
review, Amnesty International reported that half the Somali population required
humanitarian aid, with more than one million internally displaced by a combination
of drought and conflict. This was in addition to the 1.1 million people who were
already internally displaced. More than a quarter of a million Somali refugees were
situated in Kenya. The conflict in the Central African Republic also contributed to
several hundred thousand people being internally displaced or seeking refuge in
neighbouring countries. Boko Haram’s operations displaced nearly two million
people within Nigeria, while nearly half a million refugees were to be found in
Chad as a result of conflicts in the Central African Republic, Sudan, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, and Nigeria. Thousands of people also fled the dire human
rights situation in Eritrea, while almost four million people in South Sudan were
displaced since 2013 due to conflict. These internal and cross-border movements
placed enormous strain on the limited resources of countries in the region, leading to
extremely dire situations for people fleeing conflict.
Concerns around impunity have been identified in the Central African Republic,
where a special criminal court to address human rights violations and crimes during
the 14-year-long conflict has not yet become operational, meaning “impunity
remained the norm”.105 Three transitional justice bodies planned for South Sudan
have also not yet become operational, while no findings have yet been made
available in Nigeria as a result of a probe into violations of human rights by the
military, and secret trials for suspected members of Boko Haram have been held. In
Ethiopia, the government rejected calls for investigations into violations committed
by the military and police in 2015/2016. Meanwhile, divisions are apparent regard-
ing the International Criminal Court (ICC), with Nigeria, Senegal, Cape Verde,
Tanzania, Malawi, Liberia, Tunisia, and Zambia rejecting calls for a mass with-
drawal of African countries from the ICC, while Burundi withdrew from the ICC,
and South Africa attempted to do the same until the North Gauteng High Court
determined the move invalid without parliamentary approval.106
Discrimination and marginalisation is also rampant, especially for women and
girls, people with albinism, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex
people.107 A range of countries were implicated, with Sierra Leone, Equatorial
Guinea, Tanzania, Liberia, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, and Swaziland
displaying gender-based violence and discrimination. Mozambique and Malawi
were noted for attacks against people with albinism, while discrimination, persecu-
tion, and violence occurred against LGBTI people in Senegal, Ghana, Malawi, and
Nigeria.
104Ibid.
105Ibid.
106Ibid.
107Ibid.
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The political challenges in Africa thus remain significant. However, Africa has
not remained passive in the face of these challenges. One of the core concepts used
as both an expression of Africa’s hope for the future and a driver of change is that of
an African Renaissance. Its aim is a “golden age of Africa’s social economic and
political institution building through good governance and improved state-society
relations”.108 The concept gained traction during the presidency of Thabo Mbeki in
South Africa, one of its main drivers, between 1999 and 2008, during which he
emphasised that Africans should determine their own future and create the condi-
tions for political, economic, and social renewal.109 The African Renaissance
became the vision to inspire, and create fertile ground for, the rebirth of the
continent. Mbeki was the chief architect of the New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (NEPAD) (2001) and the creation of the African Union (2002),
which aim to give substance to the vision.110 The governance instrument of
NEPAD is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), which is “a mutually
agreed-upon instrument for self-monitoring by participating member States of the
African Union”, with the aim of reinforcing good governance.111 While it is an
entirely voluntary mechanism, 35 states across the continent have signed up.112 The
mandate of the APRM is “to ensure that policies and practices of participating
Member States conform to the agreed political, economic and corporate governance
values, codes and standards contained in the African Union Declaration on Democ-
racy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance”.113 While the APRM has
suffered from its own challenges, including lack of funding contributions from
member states, it has recently been tasked with monitoring the progress made on
the governance aspects of Agenda 2063 and the United Nations Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals (SDGs).114 The APRM has been presented as evidence of African
agency in improving political, corporate, and socio-economic structures.115
Agenda 2063 is the core policy document on a continental level that will guide
Africa towards a sustainable development future, in line with the United Nations
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGS). It harkens back to the foundation of the
108Rosaline M. Achieng, “Can We Speak of African Agency?: APRM and Africa’s Agenda 2063,”
African Sociological Review 18, no 1. (2014): 54.
109Adekeye Adebajo, “Mbeki’s dream of Africa’s renaissance belied South Africa’s schizophre-
nia,” The Conversation Africa, April 24, 2016, https://theconversation.com/mbekis-dream-of-
africas-renaissance-belied-south-africas-schizophrenia-58311 (accessed June 20, 2018).
110Ibid.
111Achieng, “Can We Speak of African Agency?: APRM and Africa’s Agenda 2063,” 53–54.
112African Union Commission, “African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM),” https://au.int/en/
organs/aprm (accessed June 20, 2018).
113African Peer Review Mechanism, “About APRM,” 2017, https://www.aprm-au.org/page-about/
(accessed June 20, 2018).
114Carien Du Plessis, “African Peer Review Mechanism: Back with a, uhm, Bang?,” Daily
Maverick, March 16, 2018, https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-03-16-african-peer-
review-mechanism-back-with-a-uhm-bang/#.WypdwCB9jIU (accessed June 20, 2018).
115Achieng, “Can We Speak of African Agency?: APRM and Africa’s Agenda 2063,” 50.
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Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, which was transformed into the
African Union in 2002. It thus presents a vision of Africa after a century of African
self-determination. At its core, Agenda 2063 is a strategic framework that builds on
and accelerates previous and current initiatives to achieve sustainable development
and economic growth and lays the foundation for the socio-economic transformation
of Africa over a 50-year period.116 The document encapsulates the vision of the
continent to “become an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its
own citizens and representing a dynamic force in [the] global arena”,117 and
operationalises this vision through seven core aspirations. These aspirations are
then subdivided into goals, and priority areas, at national level (summarised in
Table 1.2). Each of these aspirations entails broad issues and action areas, while
the priority areas in turn have associated targets and indicative strategies for 2063, as
discussed later.
Via a critical document and discourse analysis approach, Nhamo identified the
top ten issues in Agenda 2063, namely, women, peace, youth, technology, trade,
gender, education, governance, infrastructure, and inclusiveness, revealing the four
core intersecting issue areas of women, education, technology, and inclusiveness.118
However, it was again cautioned that major obstacles must be overcome to achieve
the continent’s vision for 2063. As such, “this rising will not be realized if Africa
continues to look elsewhere for resources” including financial resources.119 Agenda
2063 does place an emphasis on self-reliance, a step in the right direction: “it is about
time for us to look at what we have at our disposal—the forests, minerals, land, water
and people—and put these resources into effective and appropriate use”, while the
2008 global financial crisis revealed “the fragility of relying on some of the so-called
‘advanced’ finance and investment schemes”.120 The scourge of corruption was
further lamented, and the tendency for African leadership to “think of the value
chain in Africa on a micro scale”, while sustainable development demands large-
scale thinking.121 These comments are worth repeating because they encapsulate the
shift underlying Agenda 2063. This is well summarised by the sentiment that “the
time for Africa to be its own master has come and the citizens must come to the
realization that hand-outs and begging for aid are a thing of the past . . . Africa
[needs] to get up and raise financial and other resources domestically”.122
Agenda 2063 furthermore identifies 12 key flagship projects for the continent,
one of which is the Africa Outer Space Strategy. The aim of this flagship programme
116African Union Commission, “What is Agenda 2063?,” https://au.int/en/agenda2063 (accessed
June 21, 2018).
117African Union Commission, “Vision and Mission,” https://au.int/en/about/vision (accessed June
21, 2018).
118Nhamo, “New Global Sustainable Development Agenda: A Focus on Africa,” 9.
119Ibid., 10.
120Ibid., 11.
121Ibid., 12.
122Ibid., 13.
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is to strengthen the use of outer space to support and reinforce Africa’s develop-
ment.123 It encapsulates the recognition that African development is critically
dependent on outer space and space technology. Moreover, it contends that the
products of space technology are “no longer a matter of luxury” and access to space
technology and products must be sped up.124 It also recognises that satellite tech-
nology is more accessible than ever to African countries. The discussion within the
Agenda 2063 framework document relating to space will be further deliberated in
the section on the African space arena later in this chapter.
In order to actualise the goals and targets encapsulated in Agenda 2063, five
10-year implementation plans, prepared by the African Union Commission, form the
basis over the medium term for the preparation of development plans in the indi-
vidual AU states, RECs, and AU organs.125 These 10-year implementation plans
serve to identify the goals and priority areas based on the current development
situation on the continent; provide a vision or snapshot of what the continent will
look like at the end of the 10-year period; provide outlines of the targets and
indicative strategies, key process actions, and milestones on national, regional, and
continental level; identify financing needs and implementation arrangements to
ensure financing; provide recommendations on partnerships; provide for monitoring
and evaluation; and identify key stakeholders and their roles and the principles to
guide the stakeholders.126
The first 10-year implementation plan covers the decade between 2014 and 2023.
All flagship programmes are included in this plan. Specific targets to be reached by
2023 and the key process actions/targets towards 2023 are also given, but because of
the large number of targets and actions, only those speaking to primary needs will be
highlighted here. In terms of Africa’s political challenges, Table 1.3, as follows,
presents the targets to be reached by 2023.
1.2.3 Socio-economic Overview
To further contextualise the African space sector, this section will provide back-
ground to and discussion of the broad socio-economic state of affairs on the
continent. This will include the main challenges confronting Africa, and while
many of these are well known, they will be summarised here since the use of
space technology in Africa must speak to these challenges in order to be viewed as
123African Union Commission, “The Key Agenda 2063 Flagship Programmes Projects,” https://au.
int/sites/default/files/documents/33126-doc-04_the_key_agenda_2063_flagship.pdf (accessed June
21, 2018).
124Ibid.
125African Union Commission, Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want – First Ten-Year Implementa-
tion Plan 2014–2023, 2015, Addis Ababa, 15. https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/33126-
doc-ten_year_implementation_book.pdf (accessed June 21, 2018).
126Ibid., 15–16.
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valuable and successful. The discussion will begin by deliberating on the primary
needs approach to African space activities model, which frames this study. The
broad socio-economic situation across the continent will then be considered.
Through this, many of the socio-economic challenges that Africans are grappling
with will be explored. However, since Africa is not only a continent of challenges,
but also of many positive developments, assets, and strengths, these will also be
highlighted. Throughout, the foundation will be on those primary needs often
associated with the basic needs approach to poverty, which emphasises provision
of “opportunities for the full development of the individual”,127 with particular
emphasis on the needs of health, water, education, and capacity building, with the
additions of biodiversity and climate, given that human well-being powerfully
depends on the natural environment. Since healthcare and education, and social
services in general, depend on the ability of the national government to provide
them, the economy of African states will necessarily form a critical component of the
discussion. First, a broad overview of the African economy and general human
development will be provided. Second, education will be considered, followed by
health, third. Fourth, water and related challenges will be discussed, followed finally
by climate and biodiversity, fifth. In each case, the Agenda 2063 targets for the first
10-year plan (ending in 2023) will be highlighted since these are Africa’s own
priority areas, and many challenges remain in fulfilling these targets. A brief
discussion will then reflect on the digital revolution in Africa in terms of
smartphones and Internet access, including some challenges relating to further
rollout.
The Primary Needs Approach to African Space Activities
As space and space-related products and services are “woven into the fabric of our
daily life as never before”,128 their impact on those priority areas that are of critical
importance for improving human development and welfare in Africa will be the
focus of this study. All human activity and welfare depend powerfully on the climate
and on biodiversity, and these areas are thus placed at the foundation of the primary
needs approach to African space activities model (Fig. 1.16). They directly feed into
health and water. Education, without which no lasting, genuine progress can be
made in the space sector or any other, is also here regarded as a primary need, since it
“increases the capacity of the people to transform their vision of the society into
operational reality, an essential means for sustainable human development”.129 This
127Paul. P. Streeten, “Basic Needs: Premises and Promises,” Journal of Policy Modeling, 1979,
no. 1: 136–146.
128Keith Gottschalk, “Astronaissance: Communicating Astronomy & Space to the African Imag-
ination,” The Re-emergence of Astronomy in Africa: A Transdisciplinary Interface of Knowledge
Systems Conference, Maropeng, South Africa, September 10–11, 2012: 1.
129Oyewole, “Space Research and Development in Africa,” 200.
38 1 Africa and the Space Arena
then feeds into space-related capacity building, which, in its turn, is a primary need
for the African space sector to take off and address the socio-economic development
needs of the continent. All these factors then directly feed into Africa’s space
activities and infrastructure, which will be analysed in Chap. 3. These then filter
back into the areas of climate, biodiversity, health, water, education, and space-
related capacity building since space activities, services, and technologies are used to
support these. The next volume will consider related space applications and policies.
An important note here is that these primary needs are all closely linked to the
United Nations Sustainable Development Goals 2030. Climate is linked to SDG
13 (“Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts”), biodiversity is
linked to SDG 14 (“Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine
resources for sustainable development”) and SDG 15 (“Protect, restore and promote
sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desert-
ification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss”), health is
linked to SDG 3 (“Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages”),
water is linked to SDG 6 (“Ensure availability and sustainable management of water
and sanitation for all”), education is linked to SDG 4 (“Ensure inclusive and
equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all”),
and space-related capacity building is arguably linked to SDG 9 (“Build resilient
infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster
Fig. 1.16 Primary needs approach to African space activities: model
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innovation”).130 The key to success in relation to the SDGs is how they are
domesticated and implemented on regional and national levels, and thus Africa’s
own related goals will be highlighted in each section below dealing with the
individual primary needs. In turn, these primary needs will guide the rest of the
study (including the next volume) although, first, a broader overview of the African
economy and digital renaissance is needed.
The African Economy and the Promise of the Digital Renaissance
An enduring theme of Africa’s development is its unevenness. Africa is a continent
of immense diversity, and it is always worth cautioning against viewing all its
54 states in the same light. Three times the size of Europe, with roughly half a
billion more residents, and as mentioned, a very young population, Africa presents
immense opportunities and potential. Many political leaders such as ThaboMbeki131
have looked at the twenty-first century with the hope that it will become the African
century, a time in which the ideals of the African Renaissance will be achieved and
Africa will take its rightful place in the world. Space, as will be discussed later in this
chapter, is seen as a cornerstone of this renaissance, with the promise of spurring on
Africa’s socio-economic development. However, first a detailed view of the current
status of the African economy must be taken in order to identify the scope of the
challenge and of the promise.
A useful guide to begin the overview of Africa’s socio-economic development is
the World Bank’s Country and Lending Groups classification, which purely con-
siders gross national income (GNI) per capita, calculated using the World Bank’s
Atlas method.132 Four categories emerge: high-income economies (GNI per capita
of $12,056 or more), upper middle-income economies (GNI per capita between
$3,896 and $12,055), lower middle-income economies (GNI per capita between
$996 and $3,895), and low-income economies (GNI per capita of $995 or less). Of
the 54 countries in Africa (excluding Western Sahara), only one—Seychelles—falls
into the high-income category. Eight are upper middle-income economies, 18 are
lower middle-income economies, and the remaining 27 fall into the low-income
category. This is summarised in Fig. 1.17. However, this measure alone does not
provide the full scope of development on the continent, such as human well-being.
For this, a broader measure is needed.
The yearly Human Development Index (HDI), compiled by the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), is an excellent tool to provide insight into the
130United Nations, “Sustainable Development Goals,” https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?
menu¼1300 (accessed December 6, 2018).
131British Broadcasting Corporation, “Thabo Mbeki’s victory speech,” BBC.co.uk, June 3, 1999,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/monitoring/360349.stm (accessed June 30, 2018).
132World Bank, “World Bank Country and Lending Groups,” https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/
knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups (accessed June 27, 2018).
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Fig. 1.17 Gross national income (GNI) per capita and human development in Africa (World Bank,
United Nations Development Programme)
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well-being of the residents of various countries since it places a variety of dimen-
sions of human development, including life expectancy, health, and education,
alongside economic factors such as standard of living.133 The latest report was
issued in 2017 and presents four categories: very high, high, medium, and low
human development (all for 2015).134 No African country displays very high levels
of human development. Only five display high levels, with the Seychelles achieving
the highest African rank of 63rd out of 188 countries, followed by Mauritius at 64th.
Thirteen states fall into the medium human development category, while (apart from
Western Sahara and Somalia, which are unranked) all remaining 35 countries are
characterised by low human development. This provides a slightly clearer picture
than theWorld Bank classification and is also presented in Fig. 1.17 as a comparison.
The HDI clearly reveals that human development is one of Africa’s most significant
challenges. However, despite its more comprehensive overview, the HDI does not
consider inequality or poverty levels. For this, another measure is needed.
For an insight into the inequality prevalent in societies, the Gini coefficient is a
valuable tool. It presents the wealth or income distribution within a country, mea-
sured between 0 (perfect equality) and 1 (perfect inequality, with all wealth owned
by one person). While perfect equality and perfect inequality are unattainable in
reality, the Gini coefficient provides a clear insight into the overall levels of equality
or inequality within a nation. The only drawback of the Gini coefficient is that data is
often incomplete for a range of countries, but the World Bank provides a database of
values for most states, while it is important to note not all data are from the same
year.135 Some countries will have recent (e.g. 2016) data, while others will have
more outdated information (e.g. 2012 or earlier). Some will have no data. Never-
theless, the most unequal country in the world is South Africa, with a Gini index of
0.63 (2014). For reference, World Bank Gini data indicated that the most equal
country on Earth is Ukraine with an index of 0.25 (2016). The most equal country in
Africa is Algeria with 0.276 (2011). There is thus a broad Gini spectrum present in
Africa. Therefore, to provide an overview for Africa, Fig. 1.18 will display incre-
ments of 0.05. It should be noted however that the data here are drawn only from the
World Bank, and other agencies, such as the US Central Intelligence Agency, have
Gini indexes that may have slightly different values. Since inequality is a major
challenge facing Africa, these slight variations are not noteworthy here, and this
discussion serves to provide an overview of Africa’s socio-economic status and
challenges (which must align with the uses of space technology).
133United Nations Development Programme, “Human Development Reports: Human Development
Index (HDI),” http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi (accessed June
27, 2018).
134United Nations Development Programme, “Human development reports, Table 1: Human
Development Index and Its Components,” http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI (accessed June
27, 2018).
135World Bank, “GINI index (World Bank estimate),” 2018, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
SI.POV.GINI (accessed June 27, 2018).
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Fig. 1.18 African Gini index and population below international poverty line (World Bank)
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Figure 1.18 reveals that inequality is most prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa,
specifically Southern Africa. North Africa and the Sahel region, as well as some
West African states, are generally more equal. The reason why inequality is such an
important measure is that a wide wealth disparity is associated with increased
instability, while tending to exacerbate both “rent-seeking and predatory market
behaviours” which negatively influence economic growth.136 Greater inequality has
also been associated with increased crime rates, while also being associated with
greater political inequality where a small wealthy minority wields disproportionate
political power.137 It should again be emphasised that inequality in wealth distribu-
tion says nothing about the level of wealth in a country, as the World Bank data in
Fig. 1.17 showed earlier. Therefore, many relatively equal countries in Africa (such
as Mali and Niger) are still extremely poor. Thus, considering the overall poverty
rates in Africa is instructive as well.
In this regard, the World Bank provides data on the percentage of population
living on less than $1.90 a day (at 2011 international prices) which, since 2015, has
been considered the international poverty line.138 Again, data are not always avail-
able for the same year, and other sources may indicate slightly different levels, but
this data serves as a good overview of the extreme poverty in Africa, in other words,
where primary needs are most urgent to the well-being of the population. These data
are displayed in Fig. 1.18 to compare with inequality data. According to this data,
Madagascar and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have the largest percentage
of people in extreme poverty in Africa (77.6% and 77.1%, respectively, both 2012).
While these figures are seven years old and there is hope for improvement since then,
the fact that more recent data are unavailable indicates the challenge related to data
collection in these countries. The states with the least extreme poverty are Algeria
and Mauritius, both with 0.5%.
From this comparison it can be observed that the most unequal states, concen-
trated in Southern Africa, generally have lower poverty rates than many of the more
equal states. Additionally, the Indian Ocean states of Seychelles and Mauritius, and
the North African states, again fare very well. It also reinforces, along with Fig. 1.17,
the immense disparity in development across the continent. To further understand
the prevalence of poverty in Africa, an overview of the main contributing sectors to
gross domestic product (GDP) and the main employment sectors is valuable.
In terms of economic activity, the three-sector theory has been used for decades as
a measure of development as economies moved away from relying on the primary
sector of agriculture and mining, towards the secondary sector of industry and
136Nicholas Birdsong, “The Consequences of Economic Inequality,” Seven Pillars Institute for
Global Finance and Ethics, February 5, 2015, https://sevenpillarsinstitute.org/consequences-eco
nomic-inequality/ (accessed June 27, 2018).
137Ibid.
138World Bank, “Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population),” https://
data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.DDAY (accessed June 27, 2018).
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manufacturing, and ultimately towards the tertiary sector of services.139 Despite
criticism of the three-sector theory, it still provides a useful framework for assessing
the dominant sectors that drive African economies. As Fig. 1.19 reveals, the tertiary
services sector is predominant.140 However, the caveat should be added that this
depicts only the largest GDP contributor and, in some cases, this lead is very small,
such as in Guinea-Bissau where agriculture contributes 44.1% of GDP but services
follow closely at 43%. It does however serve to reveal that most African countries
heavily rely on the services sector for economic growth. Of course, contribution to
GDP does not always match employment, and Fig. 1.19 also compares this data,
with the same caveat that it only displays the largest employment sector, and again
not all from the same year. The stark contrast in Fig. 1.19 clearly reveals that while
much of African GDP is generated by services, most people are still employed in,
and dependent on, agriculture. Even for those countries with no data, it is impossible
to imagine that most people do not depend on agriculture for their livelihoods (with
the possible exception of Botswana). For this reason, the backbone of Africa’s
growth and development agenda remains agriculture.141 The contrast between
GDP contributing sectors and leading employment sectors is clearly demonstrated
by Burundi where, as stated, services contribute 44.1% of GDP but where 93.6% of
people are employed in agriculture.142 These figures also reinforce the notion of the
vulnerability of African societies to the effects of climate change and famine.
While the leading contributing sectors to GDP provide valuable insight into the
mainstay of African economies, they do not reveal the extent of Africa’s vulnera-
bility in its exports. By considering the main exports of Africa, an even clearer
picture emerges—one overwhelmingly dominated by primary exports, with the
accompanying vulnerability to unstable commodity prices. Figure 1.20 delves into
these exports. Again, these are not the totality of African exports, only the largest
earning export commodities.143 Here again it becomes clear that Africa as a whole
overwhelmingly depends on primary exports for vital foreign exchange earnings,
with mining, oil and petroleum, fish, and agricultural goods being the main exports
of 50 states (and also Western Sahara). Only four have manufactured goods as their
139Alex Schafran, Conor McDonald, Ernesto Lopez Morales, Nihan Akyelken and Michele Acuto,
“Replacing the services sector and three-sector theory: urbanization and control as economic
sectors, Regional Studies,” Regional Studies, 2018.
140All data are drawn from the Central Intelligence Agency’s The World Factbook and again do not
necessarily depict data for the same year, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/fields/2012.html#ag (accessed June 26, 2018).
141Nhamo, “New Global Sustainable Development Agenda: A Focus on Africa,” 11.
142Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, 2018, https://www.cia.gov/library/publica
tions/the-world-factbook/fields/2012.html#ag (accessed June 27, 2018).
143These data were amalgamated from a variety of (sometimes contradicting) sources: World Bank,
“World Integrated Trading Solution,” 2018, https://wits.worldbank.org/Default.aspx / The Obser-
vatory of Economic Complexity, 2018, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/ / Trading Economics, 2018,
https://tradingeconomics.com/ / and the Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook, https://www.
cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2049.html#ag (all accessed June 27, 2018).
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Fig. 1.19 Largest contributing sector to GDP and largest employment sector (Central Intelligence
Agency)
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Fig. 1.20 Africa’s leading export commodities (see Footnote 143 for sources) and Economic
Complexity Index based on knowledge intensity of overall exports (Observatory of Economic
Complexity)
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leading exports, namely, Morocco, Tunisia, Swaziland, and Lesotho. Even for these,
the exports are not from global leading sectors, but consist of clothing, soft drink
concentrates, automobiles, and electric conductors. There is thus an urgent need to
continue efforts, as encapsulated in the Agenda 2063 first 10-year implementation
plan (Table 1.4), to pursue value addition, economic diversification, and manufactur-
ing and industrialisation driven by science, technology, and innovation (STI).144
Since the overview of the leading export commodities does not give deeper
insight into the overall exports of African countries, the Economic Complexity
Index (ECI), created by the Observatory of Economic Complexity, is useful to
present a more holistic picture. Since the ECI measures “the relative knowledge
intensity of an economy . . . by considering the knowledge intensity of the products it
exports”, it also provides a gauge of how well aligned African economies currently
are with economic development driven by the knowledge economy.145 It is also a
very useful indicator of how well African countries are poised to fulfil the economic
goals of Agenda 2063 (Table 1.4) and of their ability to contribute to, and benefit
from, the space economy (which is inherently knowledge intensive). A total of
131 countries are ranked per half decade starting in 1966–1970, with the most recent
being 2011–2016. Again some countries do not have data for every year, thus
necessitating the ranking per half decade. For 2011–2016, Tunisia is the top African
country in terms of economic complexity (58th, 2016). The second ranked African
country is South Africa at 63rd with Egypt third at 65th. That no African country
makes it into the top 50 in terms of economic complexity and that only three make it
into the top half is a profound sermon on the challenges Africa must overcome to
fully partake in, and benefit from, the global knowledge economy. It also suggests an
urgent need for more advanced skills across the continent. Figure 1.20 summarises
this data and sheds further light on the leading African exports.
Since the annual GDP growth rate target for 2023 is 7%, a brief overview of
World Bank data is useful to consider the current performance by African states in
this regard. Most data are for 2017, with a few from 2016, thus giving a recent
picture.146 Figure 1.21 provides a convenient overview of the continent’s GDP
growth rates. Libya, emerging from a turbulent period in its history after the fall of
Muammar Gaddafi, achieved a 26.67% GDP growth rate in 2017, as its economy
recovered from a period of negative growth. Apart from this rebound, Africa’s most
stellar performance was seen in Guinea (12.7% growth for 2017 and 10.45% for
2016) and Ethiopia (10.24% for 2017 and 7.56% for 2016). Strong growth was also
observed in Ghana (8.5% for 2017), Côte d’Ivoire (7.79%, 2017), and Tanzania
(7.1%, 2017), as well as several other states achieving a 6% or higher GDP growth
144African Union Commission, Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want – First Ten-Year Implementa-
tion Plan 2014–2023, 45–47 and 55–58.
145Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Economic Complexity Rankings (ECI),” https://atlas.
media.mit.edu/en/rankings/country/neci/ (accessed June 29, 2018).
146World Bank, “GDP growth (annual %),” 2018, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.
MKTP.KD.ZG (accessed June 30, 2018).
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Fig. 1.21 Annual GDP growth rates (%) and unemployment rates (%) (World Bank)
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rate. The most troubling situation was in South Sudan, where the economy severely
contracted by 13.83% in 2016, with no data for 2017, due to the conflict there.
Equatorial Guinea displayed sustained economic contraction in 2017 (3.22%), its
third year of negative growth figures. The Republic of the Congo also displayed its
second year of negative growth, at 4.58% for 2017 and 2.8% for 2016. Chad
similarly had its second year of negative figures with 2.95% for 2017 and6.25%
in 2016. Namibia previously displayed positive growth but dipped down to 0.77%
for 2017. Once again, the great diversity of economic performance is apparent, as
well as the serious challenges many countries will have to face and overcome to
achieve a 7% annual continental GDP growth rate by 2023. One of these challenges
is the unemployment rate, which in some cases is severe. World Bank data,147
reflecting the share of the labour force that is without work but which is available
and seeking employment (all for 2017), is compared with Africa’s economic growth
in Fig. 1.21. Southern Africa performs by far the worst in this regard, again reflecting
the high inequality in the region discussed above. In fact, South Africa has the
highest youth unemployment in the world, and it is noted that “a startling 57.4% of
our youth are unemployed”, with Swaziland fourth worst at 54.8%, Namibia ninth
worst at 45.5%, Mozambique 12th at 42.7%, Lesotho 16th at 38.5%, and Botswana
22nd at 22% of labour force aged 15–24 unemployed.148
In order to grow and create jobs, economies rely on an attractive business
environment, which is also a prerequisite foreign investment. Here too the World
Bank provides an excellent in-depth assessment of a range of factors affecting
business in its Ease of Doing Business report.149 It ranks 190 countries on 10 factors
(starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering
property, getting credit, protecting minority investors, paying taxes, trading across
borders, enforcing contracts, and resolving insolvency). Together these provide a
good indication of a country’s business environment. These factors are also crucial
for businesses in the space sector. Unfortunately, Africa performs very poorly. Only
one country manages to make the top 25 in terms of ease of doing business, namely,
Mauritius at 25th in its overall rank (2017). Only one more makes the top 50—
Rwanda at 41st. Apart from these two, only seven others make the top 100—
Morocco at 69th, Kenya at 80th, Botswana at 81st, South Africa at 82nd, Zambia
at 85th, Tunisia at 89th, and Seychelles at 95th. Of the remaining 45 countries,
18 rank between 100 and 149, and, very troubling, the remaining 27 countries (half
of Africa) fall between 150 and 190. Therefore, in terms of the measures identified,
businesses in most of Africa fight an uphill battle, and two of Africa’s most
147World Bank, “Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate),” 2018,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS (accessed June 27, 2018).
148The Citizen, “SA has highest youth unemployment in the world,” October 19, 2018, https://
citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/2025384/sa-has-highest-youth-unemployment-in-the-world/#.
W8nNRhIputM.facebook (accessed December 5, 2018).
149World Bank, “Doing Business: Measuring Business Regulations, Economy Rankings,” 2017,
http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings (accessed June 30, 2018).
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promising space nations—Algeria and Ethiopia—are included here. Figure 1.22
summarises the data for all of Africa.
The World Economic Forum (WEF) similarly ranks countries in terms of its
Global Competitiveness Index.150 This index ranks states according to 12 pillars,
subdivided into a broad and comprehensive range of factors affecting economic
competitiveness. While several African countries are unranked, a remarkably similar
picture to the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business report emerges. Mauritius is
Africa’s most competitive economy, at 45th out of 137 (2017), followed by Rwanda
at 58th, South Africa at 61st, Botswana at 63rd, Morocco at 71st, Algeria at 86th,
Fig. 1.22 Ease of Doing Business 2017 (World Bank)
150World Economic Forum, “Global Competitiveness Index, 2017–2018”, 2018, http://reports.
weforum.org/global-competitiveness-index-2017-2018/competitiveness-rankings/ (accessed June
30, 2018).
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Namibia at 90th, Kenya at 91st, Tunisia at 95th, and Egypt at 100th. All other
African states fall below this.
Despite these many challenges, information and communications technologies
(ICTs) have made rapid inroads into Africa as a result of the mobile phone revolu-
tion, and it has been argued that “many lesser developed countries have embraced
cell phone technology to leap-frog the cost barrier of landline phones”.151 It was
reported in 2014 that Africa had become the second most connected continent, as
well as the fastest growing region, by mobile subscriptions.152 By mid-2017, mobile
subscriptions in Africa had reached 985 million, with Nigeria showing the highest
growth in Africa (at three million new subscribers).153 Alongside this rapid expan-
sion of mobile devices came access to the Internet, which has been described as a
“game changer”.154 One of the first areas to be revolutionised by this development
was the financial services sector, making it easier for people to send and receive
money even without bank accounts. Alongside finance, the retail sector, where
mobile commerce helped to expand access to goods, often concentrated in urban
areas, outside of which organised retail penetration was historically low. Mobile
devices also greatly expanded access to healthcare information and medical services
providers, weather information, and agricultural market prices.
The key driver of the African digital revolution was, and remains, lower
smartphone prices.155 Between 2014 and 2016, smartphone connections increased
twofold in Africa, to 226 million, with a total of over half a billion mobile sub-
scribers. While Africa still lags behind other developing regions, particularly in
mobile broadband use, the main drivers of high data usage were the more techno-
logically advanced countries of South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, and Egypt, while
others like the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cameroon, and Algeria were
effectively leveraging 3G technology.156 The economic advantages of this revolu-
tion cannot be overstated, since by 2015 mobile services and technologies generated
$17 billion in taxes, 6.7% of the African GDP, 3.8 million direct jobs, and 2.43
million indirect ones.157
151Robert C. Harding, Space Policy in Developing Countries: The Search for Security and
Development on the Final Frontier (London: Routledge, 2013), 146.
152Nmachi Jidenma, “How Africa’s mobile revolution is disrupting the continent,” CNN, January
24, 2014, https://edition.cnn.com/2014/01/24/business/davos-africa-mobile-explosion/index.html
2014 (accessed June 30, 2018).
153Matshelane Mamabolo, “Africa edges closer to 1bn mobile subscriptions,” ITWebAfrica.com,
June 23, 2017, http://www.itwebafrica.com/mobilex/339-africa/238062-africa-edges-closer-to-
1bn-mobile-subscriptions (accessed June 30, 2018).
154Ibid.
155Abdi Latif Dahir, “Smartphone use has doubled in Africa in two years,” Quartz Africa, August
3, 2016, https://qz.com/748354/smartphone-use-has-more-than-doubled-in-africa-in-two-years/
(accessed June 24, 2018).
156Ibid.
157Ibid.
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While the impact of mobile connections in Africa is evident, The Economist
warned in 2016 that the digital divide between urban and rural areas could expand
due to mobile ownership being concentrated in urban areas and due to the immense
challenges of providing service to a population scattered across small villages and
farms.158 On top of this, powering phone masts is a challenge with diesel being the
most popular power source, while the “masts also need a way to transmit calls and
data to and from the broader network, so phone companies spend another fortune
laying cables or buying bandwidth on satellites to do so”.159 The result is that
Internet usage in particular suffers, with three-quarters of Africa’s population not
using the Internet (2016 data), only 43% able to get a 3G signal, and 16% able to get
4G mobile broadband. Of course, due to the rapid improvements in technology, it
was reported in mid-2017 that by 2018 4G is expected to overtake GSM in terms of
access technology share for mobile phones.160 Moreover, in sub-Saharan Africa
alone, smartphone penetration is expected to reach 80% by 2022.161 Nevertheless,
due to the long route data must travel via submarine cables and long overland routes,
seven of the ten countries in the world with the highest fixed-broadband costs are
African (particularly the landlocked ones).162 Furthermore, Africa’s expenditures
outside the continent to access the digital world amount to $400 billion, while the
continent’s contribution to creating its own digital wealth is a mere $5 billion.163
This is a major imbalance and challenge facing Africa.
Despite these challenges, solar-powered mobile masts and other innovations have
meant that profitable business can still be conducted with people who spend no more
than $2 per month on their mobile devices.164 Thus, the market is there, and satellite
Internet is another promising development to help tap into this market. The Econo-
mist does, however, raise concern over the high tax rates many governments are
placing on businesses and sales in the sector, such as Tanzania where “phone
companies pay almost half their revenues to the government” and Ghana where
handset costs are taxed at “almost 38%”.165 The conclusion of The Economist in
2016 was that the benefits of the smartphone revolution for the economies and
citizens of Africa “will not happen if governments keep standing in its way”.166 In
158The Economist, “Mobile phones are transforming Africa,” December 10, 2016, https://www.
economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2016/12/10/mobile-phones-are-transforming-africa
(accessed June 24, 2018).
159Ibid.
160Mamabolo, “Africa edges closer to 1bn mobile subscriptions.”
161Chris Tredger, “85%mobile subscription penetration in Sub-Saharan Africa,” ITWebAfrica.com,
November 16, 2016, http://www.itwebafrica.com/mobile/339-africa/237068-85-mobile-subscrip
tion-penetration-in-sub-saharan-africa (accessed June 30, 2018).
162The Economist, “Mobile phones are transforming Africa.”
163Tidiane Ouattara, “Earth Observation Service: Key pillar of the African Outer Space Programme
in support to the implementation of the Agenda 2063,” October 2018, 5, presentation at 12th
AARSE Conference, Alexandria, Egypt.
164Ibid.
165Ibid.
166Ibid.
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2017, The Economist reported that while “[c]orrupt governments are still terrible at
building roads, and state-monopoly power utilities are still awful at providing
electricity . . . tech-savvy entrepreneurs are finding ways to connect people, electrify
their homes and alleviate all manner of social problems”.167 Yet, despite the
potentials of solar power to help bridge the electricity gap, which would require
$63 billion per year to build a traditional power grid for the two-thirds of Africans
without it, and the potentials of 3D printing and robotics to encourage African
production previously hampered by the importance of scale in manufacturing, the
conclusion was that “many African governments are energetically discouraging the
spread of technology” through a series of barriers, including too little scientific and
research investment, overly complicated visa systems that hamper skilled immigra-
tion, and, as they observed in 2016, punitive taxes and fees amounting to 35% of
turnover in 12 African countries.168 The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a case
in point, where 17% of the national government’s revenues came exclusively from
taxing mobile operators, contributing to the country’s status of having some of the
lowest phone penetration on Earth. While some have argued that, despite this, the
ratio of tax to GDP in Africa (below 17% on average) is still much lower than in the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries
(35%), taxes in particular are harming the spread of “the most powerful tools yet
to alleviate poverty, boost growth and ultimately catch up with the rich world”.169
Indeed, the importance of the digital economy to Africa cannot be overstated. By
2025 the Internet’s contribution to African GDP is expected to be $300 billion, with
600 million Internet users.170 Unlocking this potential is contingent upon success-
fully meeting challenges in this field, which should thus be a top priority for all
countries on the continent.
Education
It is undeniable that the knowledge economy depends powerfully on education—a
notion reinforced by the Economic Complexity and Global Competitive Indices. The
African Union also recognises this, and the first 10-year implementation plan of
Agenda 2063171 reflects the targets identified in Table 1.5. A brief consideration of
the most basic educational achievements—African literacy rates and basic (primary)
education enrolment rates—derived from the United Nations Children’s Fund
167The Economist, “How the taxman slows the spread of technology in Africa,” November 9, 2017,
https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2017/11/09/how-the-taxman-slows-the-
spread-of-technology-in-africa (accessed June 30, 2017).
168Ibid.
169Ibid.
170Ouattara, “Earth Observation Service: Key pillar of the African Outer Space Programme in
support to the implementation of the Agenda 2063,” 25.
171African Union Commission, Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want – First Ten-Year Implementa-
tion Plan 2014–2023, 51.
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(UNICEF) and World Bank data will shed light on how far some countries still have
to go to achieve these targets. While the literacy data available for many African
countries (both UNICEF’s and the World Bank’s) are often outdated, with some data
up to 10 years old, the clear realisation emerges, as depicted in Fig. 1.23, that a large
swath of Africa’s Sahel region fares incredibly poorly in terms of UNICEF’s
definition of the “population aged 15 years and over who can both read and write
with understanding a short simple statement on his/her everyday life”.172 In almost
all cases, female literacy rates are lower than male literacy rates, reflecting the
enduring gender disparity in education. Agenda 2063 does focus on gender equality
as well, as Table 1.5 indicates. However, the net primary education enrolment rate in
Africa does give reason for optimism, as indicated by more recent United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) data, reported by the
World Bank.173 This data, drawn from different years for different states depending
on the latest available data, is also depicted in Fig. 1.23 and reveals that the largest
challenges are faced by South Sudan (32.11% net primary school enrolment for
2015) and Liberia (37.68% for the same year), with Equatorial Guinea and Eritrea
being further causes for concern.
Critically, the Pan-African University, which has graduated 364 students from
33 countries, will establish its Southern African (and fifth) hub in South Africa,
which will be dedicated to space sciences (Pan-African University Space Sciences,
PAUSS), through a consortium of eight universities (led by the Cape Peninsula
University of Technology).174 According to the Pan-African University, talks are
under way with the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) to become
thematic partners with PAUSS.175
The WEF Global Information Technology Report (2016) includes a compound
measure of education under its skills category, constituting the fifth pillar of the
Networked Readiness Index.176 This includes an assessment of the quality of a
country’s education system, the quality of its maths and science education, its
secondary education gross enrolment rate, and the adult literacy rate. This provides
an excellent broad-level assessment of how well (or how poorly) African countries
are doing in terms of education. The rankings in terms of this fifth pillar indicate that
the median rank of the 36 African countries included in the index is 116.5 out of
139 countries.177 The best performer is Mauritius at 53rd, while the worst is Chad at
139th.
172United Nations Children’s Fund, “Education is vital to meeting the Sustainable Development
Goals,” June, 2018, https://data.unicef.org/topic/education/overview/ (accessed June 29, 2018).
173World Bank, “School enrollment, primary (% net),” 2018, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
SE.PRM.NENR?view¼chart (accessed June 29, 2018).
174Pan African University, “About us,” 2018, https://pau-au.net/about-us/ (accessed June 29, 2018).
175Ibid.
176Silja Baller, Soumitra Dutta, and Bruno Lanvin, eds., The Global Information Technology
Report 2016: Innovating in the Digital Economy (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2016).
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GITR2016/WEF_GITR_Full_Report.pdf (accessed July 1, 2018).
177Ibid., 18.
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Fig. 1.23 Adult literacy rates (UNICEF) [Compiled by UNICEF in October 2015, but again
reflecting different years for states depending on latest available data. United Nations Children’s
Fund, “Literacy,” 2018, https://data.unicef.org/topic/education/literacy/ (accessed June 29, 2018)],
and net primary school enrolment rates (World Bank)
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Moreover, the picture is even more worrying when considering the two sub-
components of education system quality and maths and science education quality.
These two factors are based on the WEF’s Executive Opinion Survey, drawing on
over 14,000 business executives around the world, and they are measured on a scale
of 7 (best) to 1 (worst).178 What makes these indicators particularly valuable is that
they reflect the experience of the business community in terms of the skills they need
from the education system and thus also help to indicate how well education is
meeting the skills needs of the private sector (and the economy as a whole). In
relation to the quality of the education system as a whole (based on the question
“How well does the education system meet the needs of a competitive economy?”),
the African median improves to 86 out of 139.179 Zambia is the best performer,
ranked 35th globally, while, of grave concern, South Africa and Egypt ranked 137th
and 138th, respectively—the third and second worst globally. Of particular concern
is that the most active African countries in space fall below the African mean and
achieve some of the poorest ranks globally. Of even more concern is the quality of
Africa’s maths and science education—crucial sectors for a competitive economy
and active space sector—scoring a median rank of 94.5 out of 139 (based on the
question “How do you assess the quality of maths and science education?”), and
apart from Tunisia and Morocco, the leading African space states fare abysmally,
with South Africa last in the world, Nigeria third worst, Egypt fourth worst, and
Algeria 15th worst. While this index does not include all countries in the world, this
bodes ill for future African prospects in the space sector and suggests that it will be
many years before Africa can produce the space-related maths and science skills in
such a desperately short supply already. The WEF data are displayed in Table 1.6.
Health
It has been argued that addressing population growth is one of the “challenging
omissions” of the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 2063.180 Some have
called this a “ticking time bomb that cannot be left unchecked if we wish to be
sustainable, silence the guns, diffuse the bomb and have peace”, and it has been
argued that population growth rates and future projections for Africa are very
concerning, especially when coupling these with “limited and dwindling land
resources” in countries such as Rwanda.181 Naturally, population growth and density
are directly related to the challenges of healthcare. As indicated in Table 1.7, the AU
has identified ten specific healthcare areas of immediate concern leading up to
2023.182
178Ibid., 36.
179Ibid., 232.
180Nhamo, “New Global Sustainable Development Agenda: A Focus on Africa,” 13.
181Ibid.
182African Union Commission, Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want – First Ten-Year Implementa-
tion Plan 2014–2023, 53–54.
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Table 1.6 Skills rankings from the Networked Readiness Index (World Economic Forum Global
Information Technology Report 2016)
Fifth pillar: readiness sub
index—skills
Quality of the education
system
Quality of maths and science
education
Rank (out of 139)
Rating
(7–1) Rank (out of 139)
Rating
(7–1) Rank (out of 139)
Rating
(7–1)
53 Mauritius 5.3 35 Zambia 4.3 17 Côte d’Ivoire 5.2
74 Seychelles 5.0 36 Kenya 4.3 50 Mauritius 4.4
75 Cape Verde 5.0 38 Seychelles 4.3 53 Tunisia 4.4
85 Tunisia 4.7 39 Gambia 4.3 54 Zimbabwe 4.4
87 Botswana 4.6 42 Zimbabwe 4.2 56 Seychelles 4.3
89 Algeria 4.6 44 Lesotho 4.2 59 Rwanda 4.3
95 South Africa 4.4 45 Rwanda 4.2 66 Cameroon 4.1
96 Kenya 4.2 48 Côte d’Ivoire 4.1 72 Ghana 4.0
99 Swaziland 4.2 49 Mauritius 4.1 74 Morocco 4.0
100 Zimbabwe 4.1 55 Cape Verde 4.0 77 Cape Verde 4.0
102 Ghana 4.1 63 Senegal 3.8 78 Kenya 3.9
107 Cameroon 3.8 68 Ethiopia 3.7 81 Zambia 3.9
108 Lesotho 3.8 72 Cameroon 3.6 82 Senegal 3.9
109 Namibia 3.8 76 Ghana 3.6 86 Swaziland 3.7
110 Morocco 3.7 77 Botswana 3.6 87 Ethiopia 3.7
111 Egypt 3.7 80 Swaziland 3.5 91 Madagascar 3.6
114 Zambia 3.6 81 Uganda 3.5 93 Gambia 3.6
116 Gabon 3.5 83 Liberia 3.5 94 Liberia 3.5
117 Rwanda 3.5 89 Tunisia 3.3 95 Botswana 3.5
119 Burundi 3.3 91 Algeria 3.3 98 Burundi 3.5
121 Gambia 3.2 96 Namibia 3.2 100 Lesotho 3.4
123 Côte d’Ivoire 3.1 98 Tanzania 3.2 105 Algeria 3.3
125 Tanzania 2.9 104 Malawi 3.1 108 Gabon 3.3
126 Uganda 2.9 109 Mali 3.1 109 Benin 3.2
128 Senegal 2.8 115 Madagascar 2.9 110 Mali 3.2
129 Madagascar 2.8 118 Mozambique 2.8 111 Uganda 3.2
130 Malawi 2.7 119 Gabon 2.8 115 Guinea 3.1
131 Ethiopia 2.5 121 Morocco 2.8 120 Chad 3.0
132 Liberia 2.4 123 Chad 2.7 121 Namibia 2.9
133 Benin 2.4 124 Nigeria 2.7 123 Mauritania 2.9
134 Nigeria 2.4 126 Burundi 2.6 128 Malawi 2.7
135 Mali 2.4 130 Mauritania 2.5 129 Tanzania 2.6
136 Mozambique 2.1 132 Guinea 2.4 130 Egypt 2.6
137 Guinea 2.1 134 Benin 2.4 131 Nigeria 2.6
138 Mauritania 1.9 137 South Africa 2.2 132 Mozambique 2.5
139 Chad 1.9 138 Egypt 2.1 139 South Africa 2.0
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No healthcare goals can be achieved without access to quality basic healthcare
and services. At the most basic level, access means the number of qualified medical
professionals and healthcare workers that a population has access to. According to
the latest available data from the World Health Organisation (WHO)—again from
different years for different countries—only five African countries have more than
one physician per 1000 population.183 These are South Africa, Mauritius, Algeria,
Tunisia, and Libya. By comparison, France had 3.238 physicians per 1000 popula-
tion in 2016 and Germany 4.191 in 2015. In terms of nursing and midwifery
personnel per 1000, where France and Germany had 10.605 (2015) and 13.794
(2015), respectively, only South Africa and Libya had more than 5 per 1000
population, and Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Kenya, Seychelles, Mauritius,
Table 1.7 Health priority area and targets for 2023 (AU Commission)
Aspiration 1. A prosperous
Africa based on inclusive
growth and sustainable
development
Goal 3.
Healthy and
well-
nourished
citizens
• Priority area 1. Health and nutrition
Targets (2023):
1. Increase 2013 levels of access to quality basic
healthcare and services by at least 40%
2. Increase 2013 levels of access to sex and
reproductive health services to women and
adolescent girls by at least 30%
3. Reduce 2013 maternal, neonatal, and child
mortality rates by at least 50%
4. Reduce 2013 proportion of deaths attributable
to HIV/AIDS, malaria, and TB by at least 50%
5. Reduce under 5 mortality rate attributable to
malaria by at least 80%
6. Reduce the 2013 incidence of HIV/AIDS,
malaria, and TB by at least 80%
7. Reduce the 2013 level of prevalence of mal-
nutrition by at least 50%
8. Reduce stunting to 10%
9. Reduce the 2013 proportion of deaths attrib-
utable to dengue fever and chikungunya by 50%
(for island states)
10. Access to antiretroviral (ARV) drugs is
100%
Continental targets (2023):
1. African Centres for Disease Control and Pre-
vention is operational
2. Africa Volunteer Health Corp is established
and operational by 2018
3. African Medicines Harmonisation Frame-
work is completed and operational by 2017
African Union Commission, Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want—First Ten-Year Implementation
Plan 2014–2023, 53–54
183World Health Organisation, “Global Health Observatory Data Repository, Density per 1000
Data by country,” 2018, http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.main.A1444 (accessed July 1, 2018).
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Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Cape Verde, Gambia, São Tomé and Príncipe, Botswana,
Namibia, Angola, Gabon, and Nigeria had more than 1 per 1000 population.
Therefore, in order to increase access to basic health services, more skilled and
qualified healthcare personnel are required, which goes hand in hand with education,
especially in maths and science.
Without sufficient and easy access to qualified healthcare personnel, the fight
against the three great scourges of Africa—HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis—
remains an area of grave concern. Africa has the highest number of HIV-positive
people of any region in the world, with an estimated 22.9–28.6 million people of all
ages living with the virus in 2016.184 South Africa has the largest total HIV-positive
population, 7.1 million (2016), and Nigeria, Mozambique, Kenya, Tanzania,
Uganda, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi (plus India) all have over 1 million
HIV-positive people.185 While the WHO reports that there was a 37% decrease in
worldwide malaria incidence between 2000 and 2015 and a 62% decrease in global
malaria deaths over the same period, 88% of the estimated 214 million malaria cases
in 2015 occurred in Africa.186 The incidence of tuberculosis also remains the highest
in the world at 254 per 100,000 population.187 Dengue fever and yellow fever, as
well as chikungunya, and the major outbreak of Ebola between 2014 and 2016, all
compound the healthcare situation. Amnesty International also summarises some of
the other healthcare challenges that confronted Africa in 2017.188 These included
lack of medical equipment, medication, and staffing, which placed pregnant women
and infants at serious risk, in countries such as Burkina Faso. Female genital
mutilation continues despite being outlawed. Unsafe abortions and obstacles to
legal abortion services in places such as South Africa placed women at risk,
including the refusal of healthcare professionals to provide abortions. In Angola, a
parliamentary vote on legislation to decriminalise abortion in limited cases was also
postponed indefinitely.
One of the positive developments was the inauguration of the Africa Centres for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in 2017, as called for in the AUAgenda 2063
10-year implementation goals (Table 1.7). The Africa CDC “supports all African
Countries to improve surveillance, emergency response, and prevention of infectious
diseases . . . include[ing] addressing outbreaks, man-made and natural disasters, and
184World Health Organisation, “Global Health Observatory data repository, Number of people (all
ages) living with HIV estimates by WHO region,” 2017, http://apps.who.int/gho/data/view.main.
22100WHO?lang¼en (accessed July 1, 2018).
185World Health Organisation, “Global Health Observatory data repository, Number of people (all
ages) living with HIV estimates by country,” 2017, http://apps.who.int/gho/data/view.main.
22100WHO?lang¼en (accessed July 1, 2018).
186World Health Organisation, “Global Health Observatory (GHO) data, Number of malaria cases
estimated cases, 2000–2015,” 2018, http://www.who.int/gho/malaria/epidemic/cases/en/ (accessed
July 1, 2018).
187World Health Organisation, Global Tuberculosis Report 2017, 2017, Geneva, 218, http://www.
who.int/tb/publications/global_report/en/ (accessed July 1, 2018).
188Amnesty International, “Africa 2017/2018.”
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public health events of regional and international concern . . . [while] [i]t further
seeks to build the capacity to reduce disease burden on the continent”.189
Water
Table 1.8 depicts the priority area of water security in the first 10-year implemen-
tation plan of Agenda 2063.190 Africa is one of the driest continents on Earth, and its
vulnerability to droughts is well known, as major droughts have affected large
regions such as the Horn of Africa and Eastern Africa over the past decades. It
was reported that in March 2017 at least 17 countries in Africa were struggling with
the effects of drought, leaving over 38 million people at risk, including 5.7 million
people in Ethiopia, 6.7 million in Malawi, 2.6 million in Kenya, 6.2 million in
Somalia, 4.6 million in Sudan, and 4.1 million in Zimbabwe.191 While water is a
critical requirement for human survival, only a miniscule amount (0.3% of total
water) is fit for human consumption, mainly in the form of groundwater and surface
freshwater sources such as rivers.192 Of this small amount of water, the overwhelm-
ing majority is used for agriculture in Northern and sub-Saharan Africa193 and also
accounts for the devastating results of drought on food security in Africa.
It is virtually inevitable that, with the effects of population growth and climate
change (including more frequent droughts), more of Africa will have to confront the
reality of water stress in the future—a condition whereby local sources become
insufficient to supply demands.194 As discussed in the following section concerning
climate, South Africa is a good example of where this is already the case. Moreover,
mismanagement of water resources and pollution often compound the problem, and
with about 50,000 litres of raw or partially treated sewage being dumped into
South Africa’s rivers every second in July 2017, and with the effective “collapse”
of the municipal water system—“[o]f the 824 treatment plants, maybe only 60 release
clean water”—inevitable human health impacts follow.195 Another potential crisis
189Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, “About the Africa Centres for Disease
Control and Prevention (Africa CDC),” 2018, http://www.africacdc.org/about/about-us (accessed
July 7, 2018).
190African Union Commission, Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want – First Ten-Year Implementa-
tion Plan 2014–2023, 64.
191Obi Anyadike, “Drought in Africa 2017,” IRIN, March 17, 2017, https://www.irinnews.org/
feature/2017/03/17/drought-africa-2017 (accessed July 8, 2018).
192Christoffel Kotze, “Towards Total Water Awareness: A Technology Framework,” in Post 2030-
Agenda and the Role of Space: The UN 2030 Goals and Their Further Evolution Beyond 2030 for
Sustainable Development, ed. Annette Froehlich (Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Pub-
lishing AG, 2018), 29.
193Ibid., 30.
194Ibid.
195Sipho Kings, “50,000 litres of sewage flow into SA’s rivers every second,” Mail & Guardian,
July 21, 2017, https://bit.ly/2ttvuSV (accessed September 23, 2018).
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Table 1.8 Water security priority area and targets for 2023 (AU Commission)
Aspiration 1. A prosperous
Africa based on inclusive
growth and sustainable
development
Goal 1. A high standard of
living, quality of life and
well being for all
• Priority Area 4. Modern and
liveable habitats and basic qual-
ity services
National targets (2023):
1. Reduce 2013 level of propor-
tion of the population without
access to safe drinking water by
95%
2. Reduce 2013 level of propor-
tion of the population with poor
sanitation facilities by 95%
3. At least 5% of the national
budget is allocated to water and
sanitation by 2016
4. At least 70% of the popula-
tion indicate an increase in
access to quality basic services
(water, sanitation, electricity,
transpiration, internet
connectivity
Goal 6. Blue/ocean econ-
omy for accelerated eco-
nomic growth
• Priority Area 1. Marine
resources and energy
National targets (2023):
1. At least 50% increase in value
addition in the fishery sector in
real term is attained by 2023
2. Build at least one Giant
Aquaculture showpiece
3. Marine bio-technology con-
tribution to GDP is increased in
real terms by at least 50% from
the 2013 levels
4. At least 10% of renewable
energy sources is from wave
energy
5. Commission and complete
prospection of seabed’s for
minerals and hydrocarbon
potentials by 2023
Goal 7. Environmentally
sustainable climate resilient
economies and
communities
• Priority Area 2. Water secu-
rity
National targets (2023):
1. Increase 2013 levels of water
demand satisfaction by 25%
2. Increase 2013 levels of water
productivity from rain-fed agri-
culture and irrigation by 60%
3. At least 10% of rain water is
harvested for productive use
4. At least 10% of waste water is
recycled for agricultural and
industrial use
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facing South Africa and the world is the contamination of water supplies by
microplastic, with the drinking supplies of both Johannesburg and Tshwane con-
taminated with unknown consequences for human health.196 There is thus an overall
urgent need for solutions to secure Africa’s water supply for future generations,
including the use of space applications.
Climate and Biodiversity
Despite the fact that Africa has contributed the least to anthropogenic climate
change, according to the United Nations Environment Programme, Africa will be
the continent hardest hit by the impacts of climate change.197 Furthermore, the
limited adaptive capacity and widespread poverty increase the risks of climate
change in Africa, and it is the most vulnerable populations who will have their
livelihoods most threatened. It is important to frame any discussion or approach to
climate change from the outset with the reality that climate change is already
affecting the continent, in at least eight ways.198 First, as weather patterns are
impacted, the intensity of both flooding and drought increase. Flooding is already
the most prevalent natural disaster in North Africa; the second most prevalent in
Eastern, Southern, and Central Africa; and the third most prevalent in Western
Africa.199 Severe droughts, such as that in 2011–2012 in East Africa, have wide-
spread consequences, especially for the most vulnerable people. Second, water
supply and quality are already affected, not only through melting glaciers on
Mount Kilimanjaro but through fluctuating river and dam levels, changing rainfall
patters, increases in scarcity, and falling hydroelectric power potentials.200
South Africa’s recent and ongoing water crisis is a good example of the scale of
the impact of climate change, as the worst drought in a century has forced severe
water restrictions on the city of Cape Town.201
Third, in a combination of the first and second effects, fluctuating rainfall,
worsening droughts, and floods, as well as heat stress, can significantly hamper
agricultural productivity and lead to food shortages, as the shortages in Kenya,
196Melanie Gosling, “Drinking water contaminated with micro plastic pollution in Gauteng,”
News24, July 25, 2018, https://www.news24.com/Green/News/drinking-water-contaminated-
with-micro-plastic-pollution-in-gauteng-20180725 (accessed September 23, 2018).
197United Nations Environment Programme, “Responding to Climate Change,” https://www.
unenvironment.org/regions/africa/regional-initiatives/responding-climate-change (accessed July
3, 2018).
198350africa.org, “8 ways climate change is already affecting Africa,” December 12, 2014, https://
350africa.org/8-ways-climate-change-is-already-affecting-africa/ (accessed July 3, 2018).
199Ibid.
200Ibid.
201Derek Van Dam, “Cape Town contends with worst drought in over a century,” CNN, June
1, 2017, https://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/31/africa/cape-town-drought/index.html (accessed July
3, 2018).
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Somalia, and Ethiopia have demonstrated.202 Coupled with the high degree of
dependence of most of Africa on agriculture (and especially rain-fed agriculture),
as discussed earlier, the vulnerability to climate change is a cause for serious
concern. Fourth, human health, which is inseparable from the environment, is
another area of concern. Malnutrition can be greatly worsened by lower agricultural
yields or crop losses, while malaria rates can increase in areas receiving increased
levels of rainfall or floods. Worsening air quality, associated with heat waves, can
also negatively impact respiratory illnesses. Fifth, natural disasters that destroy
homes and villages can add to, and worsen, the mass migrations of people within
or between countries and further affect those already displaced. Sixth, all these
consequences disproportionately affect women and children and can place further
burdens on women especially, for example, “water scarcity places an additional
burden on African women, who walk hours and sometimes even days, to fetch it”.203
Seventh, conflicts over dwindling natural resources such as water have the potential
to worsen the security challenges facing African states such as Nigeria, especially in
tandem with cross-border migration. Lastly, climate change has serious conse-
quences for African ecosystems and habitats, and there are already cases of “changes
in freshwater and marine ecosystems in eastern and southern Africa, and terrestrial
ecosystems in southern and western Africa”.204
In terms of biodiversity, the United Nations Environmental Programme reports
that the African continent houses a quarter of global biodiversity across its diverse
range of biomes.205 In fact, of the 19 Like-Minded Megadiverse Countries—which
together contain 36% of all terrestrial protected areas, 480 of the total 821 terrestrial
ecoregions, 89 marine ecoregions, 20% of identified Important Bird and Biodiversity
Areas, 61% of all Identified Alliance for Zero Extinction sites, and 25% of other Key
Biodiversity Areas—5 are in Africa.206 These are South Africa, Kenya, Ethiopia,
Madagascar, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Africa’s rich natural heritage has been the source of intense conservation efforts
but still faces immense challenges in relation to “reconciling human well-being with
environmental and economic prosperity”, especially when considering rising human
pressures due to population growth, urbanisation, and the expansion of cultivated
lands.207 The plight of Africa’s rhinos, elephants, lions, and other large mammals is
well known, as is the ever-present threat of poaching. This threat, and that of habitat
202350africa.org, “8 ways climate change is already affecting Africa.”
203Ibid.
204Ibid.
205United Nations Environmental Programme World Conservation Monitoring Centre, The State of
Biodiversity in Africa: A mid-term review of progress towards the Aichi Biodiversity Targets,
Cambridge, UK, IV, https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/9944/Biodiversity_
Review_AFRICA.pdf?sequence¼1&isAllowed¼y (accessed July 3, 2018).
206United Nations Environmental Programme, “Like-Minded Mega-Diverse Countries Carta to
Achieve Aichi Biodiversity Target 11,” December 7, 2016, https://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/cop/
cop-13/information/cop-13-inf-45-en.pdf (accessed July 3, 2018).
207Ibid.
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loss, can only be sustainably addressed by coupling conservation efforts with human
welfare and local community buy-in. Successful examples abound, such as the
all-female antipoaching unit known as the Black Mambas.208 Therefore, the need
for clear and actionable targets in relation to the environment and climate led to the
targets listed in Table 1.9 in the AU 10-year implementation plan.
1.3 Theoretical Framework
1.3.1 African Contributions: Ubuntu and Emerging Middle
Powers
The two concepts from international relations (IR) literature mentioned earlier—
ubuntu and emerging middle powers—will be discussed here and aligned with the
objectives of the study, namely, to provide an overview of the space sector across the
continent. These concepts can help position Africa’s rising powers globally and
illuminate African states’ behaviour in this arena.
While the five major space-related treaties and related principles adopted by the
UN General Assembly, forming the canon of international law in the space arena,
will not be repeated here, the key concept of space as international has been
enshrined since UN General Assembly Resolution 1962 (XVIII). This Declaration
of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space made it explicit that outer space is the province of all mankind, open to
all states without discrimination, while subject to the sovereignty of none.209 There-
fore, as an international arena, theoretical contributions from IR theory can provide
valuable insight. Since this study pertains specifically to Africa, bringing uniquely
African IR concepts into the study of space (and adapting them accordingly) is
valuable for an analysis of African actors and actions in this area.
There has been a recent effort in the field of IR theory to seek non-Western,
including African, concepts to enrich a discipline that is still primarily dominated by
work from the United States and Europe.210 One such concept is ubuntu. It must be
emphasised that there is no single “African view” and that this is only one view that
has recently made its way into IR discourse and scholarship. It does however
reinforce the notion of Smith that Africa has always possessed agency in the world
system and has not simply been “acted upon” by others.211 This agency has been
208Christina Goyanes, “These Badass Women Are Taking on Poachers—and Winning,” National
Geographic, October 12, 2017, https://www.nationalgeographic.com/adventure/destinations/africa/
south-africa/black-mambas-anti-poaching-wildlife-rhino-team/ (accessed July 3, 2018).
209United Nations, Treaties and Principles on Outer Space, 39.
210Karen Smith, “Contrived boundaries, kinship and Ubuntu: A (South) African view of ‘the
international’,” in Thinking International Relations Differently, ed. Arlene B. Tickner and David
L. Blaney (London: Routledge, 2012).
211Smith, “Contrived boundaries, kinship and Ubuntu: A (South) African view of ‘the interna-
tional’,” 304.
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clarified by arguing that its uniqueness “lies in its qualification ‘African’ which is
both self and place bound” and the role of Afrocentricity within this agency in the
sense that “Afrocentricity emerges as a methodology that consciously operates
within African ways of knowing and existence and results in the implementation
of principles, methods, concepts and ideas that are derived from our own African
cultural experiences”.212
However, no attempt has been made to bring such unique African insights into the
outer space literature, and even in the IR theory field, it is a new development. The
first concept here, ubuntu, is well known in Africa in terms of human rights, peace
building, and conflict resolution, but it remains a peripheral concept in IR scholarly
work.213 Ubuntu has been argued to be an indigenous worldview, and although the
word itself originates from Southern Africa, specifically the Nguni language family,
manifestations of ubuntu can be found across Africa, legitimising it as an African
view of the international.214 While direct translation of the term into English is
difficult, it approximates, if literally translated, “collective personhood” or “the
African principle of transcendence through which an individual is pulled out of
himself or herself back towards the ancestors, forward towards the community, and
towards the potential each one of us has”.215 The term ubuntu is encapsulated in the
well-known isiXhosa proverb Ubuntu ungamntu ngabanye abantu, which means
“people are people through other people”.216 Its value in IR, and thus space
literature, is that it puts forth an alternative collectivist understanding in contrast to
the Western individualist ontology.217 Ubuntu is a valuable tool in IR since it can
explain behaviour among African states that may seem “perplexing” to Western
observers, such as the tendency for African leaders to be unwilling to criticise other
leaders publicly or to even refuse to arrest Sudanese President al-Bashir in contra-
vention of the International Criminal Court (ICC).
Ubuntu goes beyond the predominant IR relationship dichotomy of friend or
enemy and instead proffers the “metaphor of the African family and community
structure”.218 In this African family, neighbouring states are seen as “part of the
clan”, while other states in Africa are seen as more broadly “part of the tribe” where
shared values and solidarity are still strong. For this reason, some scholars have
presented the example that (from a South African perspective) dealing with other
212Achieng, “Can We Speak of African Agency?: APRM and Africa’s Agenda 2063,” 52.
213Karen Smith, “Reshaping International Relations: Theoretical Innovations from Africa,” All
Azimuth 7, no. 2 (2018): 88.
214Smith, “Contrived boundaries, kinship and Ubuntu: A (South) African view of ‘the interna-
tional’,” 311.
215Drucilla Cornell, “uBuntu, Pluralism and the Responsibility of Legal Academics to the New
South Africa,” Law Critique, 2009, no. 20: 47.
216Smith, “Contrived boundaries, kinship and Ubuntu: A (South) African view of ‘the interna-
tional’,” 311.
217Smith, “Reshaping International Relations: Theoretical Innovations from Africa,” 87.
218Smith, “Contrived boundaries, kinship and Ubuntu: A (South) African view of ‘the interna-
tional’,” 307–312.
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Southern African states is not seen as “international”, as reflected in the popular
discourse of referring to countries beyond Africa as “overseas”.219 Evidence of
ubuntu in international relations can be seen in the statement of then Minister of
International Relations and Cooperation Nkoana-Mashabane, who stated in 2009
that “Our [aim] is to export Ubuntu and partnership amongst our people, people of
the continent and the world. Let their problem(s) be our problem”.220
Ubuntu, then, is a concept of group solidarity and support and, like in an extended
family, provides for “corrective mechanisms” of family discussion and association
with peers, often evidenced by “quiet diplomacy”.221 Smith summarises Tieku’s
three features of ubuntu that contribute to a better understanding of African rela-
tions.222 The first is consensual decision-making. This reveals the African preference
for reaching decisions through consensus, which is reinforced by Africa’s colonial
experience (whereby Africans were given little or no say in how their lives were
managed), and this explains the strong African emphasis on respect for sover-
eignty.223 Immediately this identifies a confluence with the decision-making within
the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS), which is
also based on consensus, and invites the question as to why African participation in
this forum has historically been lacklustre. This issue will be further explored in the
next chapter.
The second feature and manifestation of ubuntu within African relations is
groupthink.224 Closely related to consensual decision-making, groupthink places a
premium on maintaining harmony and conformity within the group. Former Tanza-
nian President Nyerere summarised these two features neatly in his statement, “We
talk until we agree”.225
The third feature is the norm of pan-African226 solidarity, which combines the
previous two features and adds it to the collectivist ontology of familial solidarity as
described above. Smith points to the “strong preference for soft tools” and that AU
members “are not allowed to criticise offending states in public” as manifestations of
this.227 Combined, these features also explain why Africa’s preferred form of
international engagement is multilateralism.228 While it is true that not all Africans
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manifest the principles of ubuntu, as evidenced by the xenophobic attacks in
South Africa against migrants from other African states, as stated earlier, there is
no single African view of the international. It is, however, a powerful analytical tool
for explaining the behaviour of African states internationally. Throughout this work,
ubuntu will be drawn on to explain, for instance, the strong preference on a political
level for an African Space Agency, while arguments have been proffered as to why it
is premature to create such an agency. This will be returned to later in the study.
The second concept to be incorporated is that of emerging middle powers. The
middle power literature is well-established in IR, but an important adjustment was
made by a South African scholar to distinguish between traditional and emerging
middle powers. The general definition of the concept sees middle powers as “states
that are neither great not small in terms of international power, capacity and
influence, and demonstrate a propensity to promote cohesion and stability in the
world system”.229 Traditional middle powers include states such as Canada,
Australia, Sweden, and Norway. However, while there are similar features in their
foreign policy behaviours, there are also important differences between these and the
emerging middle powers, which include South Africa, Nigeria (not coincidentally
the two leading space-capable states in Africa), Brazil, and Malaysia. First, and most
fundamentally, middle powers are states that uphold the global status quo.230 In
doing so, they prefer multilateral engagements within global institutions and adopt
more of an “activist” posture in pursuing conflict resolution and compromise with
international partners. They do not challenge or threaten the global economic or
military balance and support liberal democracy as a desirable ideology.
Secondly, middle powers tend to stabilise and legitimise the world order since
they occupy relatively privileged positions within it, whether that privilege is global
(for traditional middle powers) or regional (for emerging middle powers).231 They
therefore pursue security and order internationally, as well as incremental and
gradual reform, and strongly uphold international law since it secures their interests
and reduces threats. Because middle powers do not have the ability of the great
powers to directly change global structures, they prefer to build legitimacy through
multilateral arrangements in international organisations. In turn, middle powers help
to legitimise global power relations since international organisations reflect these
power relations in their structure (including “institutionalised global inequality”).232
The differences between traditional and emerging middle powers include both
constitutive and behavioural elements. First, in contrast to traditional middle powers,
emerging middle powers possess not only deep social divides, but also in many
cases, democracy is far from consolidated, and “undemocratic practices” are still
prevalent.233 Second, because emerging middle powers do not, like traditional
229Eduard Jordaan, “The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations: Distinguishing
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middle powers, have to mediate between two superpowers locked in the Cold War,
they place more of an emphasis on economic matters and issues of justice and
equality than on military or political ones. This is another feature visible in Africa’s
space posture. Third, emerging middle powers tend to fall in the medium human
development category, and despite having great economic inequalities, they have
elites who are closely tied and integrated into the global economy.234
Fourth, because emerging middle powers are dominant in their regions, such as
South Africa and Nigeria, they are much more in favour of regional cooperation and
integration. Traditional middle powers are much more doubting of the prospect of
regional integration since they are not the most powerful states in their regions. The
reluctance of Scandinavian countries to engage in regional organisations is an
example of this (both for the European Union in the case of Norway and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation in the case of Sweden).235 This also explains why
emerging middle powers in Africa are drivers of regional structures, such as
South Africa in the case of SADC and Nigeria in ECOWAS, while presidents
Obasanjo and Mbeki were some of the key figures in promoting NEPAD.236
Regionally emerging middle powers “seek to exploit their dominance . . . [while]
they attempt to smooth over the destabilising effects of their regional dominance”.237
The lingering distrust and scepticism by many African states of South Africa, due to
its Apartheid history, the “imperialist posture” of South African corporations in
business dealings on the continent, and “instances where Pretoria has pursued its
narrow interests at the expense of other African countries” are examples of this.238
Emerging middle powers are regarded globally as more neutral precisely since they
tend to focus on their regional associations,239 such as the example of South Africa
being more accepted in global institutions than in regional ones, such as the World
Trade Organisation or BRICS.240 In line with this, emerging middle powers are also
more likely than traditional middle powers to be active members (and leaders) of
associations dominated by the South, such as the UN General Assembly and the
Non-Aligned Movement.241 This has been called the “tightrope” that emerging
middle countries must walk in mediating between their regional, and narrower,
interests and the demands of the great or hegemonic powers in the world system.242
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In terms of behaviour, emerging middle powers have depended on internationally
prominent leaders to construct their middle power identity, and the roles of Nelson
Mandela in mediating in a series of international conflicts (including the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, Northern Ireland, war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
etc.) is a case in point.243 Thabo Mbeki, Olusegun Obasanjo, and other high profile
leaders in Brazil, Argentina, and Malaysia in establishing their states as middle
powers are further examples. Additionally, emerging middle powers tend to be more
reformist than traditional middle powers, while still being averse to fundamental
change.244
This concept of a middle power (traditional or emerging) has never been applied
to the space arena before. In doing so, the features discussed above will be specif-
ically applied to the space activities and relations of (African) countries. The goal
and advantage of this is that it provides a framework for identifying and classifying
the emerging space nations of Africa and provides a model for predicting states’
behaviour (activities and relations) vis-à-vis space. The hypothesis is that the
emerging (space) middle powers of Africa (primarily South Africa and Nigeria,
plus others identified through this study) will carry forth these principles in their
space postures as well. Thus, these middle powers are expected to (1) be strong
proponents of the existing order in relation to outer space and will be advocates of
international law in this field (evidenced by their roles and actions in UNCOPUOS
and other space organisations and ratification of UN treaties on outer space);
(2) stabilise and legitimise this order through multilateral arrangements in interna-
tional organisations; (3) place strong emphasis on the socio-economic benefits of
space technology as opposed to military or security objectives; (4) strongly favour
and drive regional and continental efforts to create space institutions and structures
(including policy) in Africa while taking a leading or dominant position in these;
(5) tend to mediate or foster relationships between global powers and other African
states; and (6) seek gradual reforms in international bodies to increase the profile of
Africa. This framework allows us to identify several emerging “space middle
powers” in Africa that uphold the international order in space and contrast them to
those states that have challenged the international order, such as Kenya, Uganda, and
the then Zaire which were signatories to the Bogotá Declaration.245
This concept of emerging space middle powers also contains an important
distinction from that of more traditional regional powers. The features of regional
powers are summarised as states that conceive of themselves as leaders in their
region; possess power projection capabilities; influence regional affairs; influence
the “political-ideational construction” of their region; use their influence in regional
governance structures; strongly influence the regional security agenda; present a
243Ibid., 175.
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common regional identity or project; provide or assist in providing a collective good
for the region; are recognised globally for their regional leadership; and represent
their regions in global forums.246 While there are many similarities, the concept of
regional powers misses the crucial distinction of middle powers as upholders of the
global status quo (since they have a stake in it to maintain their relative advantage)
and as mediators in legitimising that status quo in their regions. Thus, if the active
participation of all (or most) African states in the space arena is to be achieved, the
role of the emerging space middle powers in legitimising the governance structures
and “status quo” (treaties, etc.) is crucial. These emerging space middle powers must
be the bridge between Africa and outer space.
1.3.2 Methods for Ranking African Space Capabilities
In the literature, a variety of frameworks are employed to facilitate analysis of
national space capabilities. These will be considered in the following chapters and
applied during the analysis of African space activities and infrastructure, as part of
identifying those emerging space middle powers that are the drivers of developments
in the space arena. The first approach, taken by Wood and Weigel, uses the Space
Technology Ladder to provide a framework to chart the path countries have taken in
terms of their technological capacity in space technology.247 It provides four major
technology categories that allow for the mapping of the historical achievements of
countries. These categories emphasise the milestones representing “steps forward in
capability building and technological learning” and thus increase in technological
complexity, namely, (1) establishing a national space office or agency; (2) having a
satellite in low Earth orbit (LEO); (3) having a satellite in geostationary orbit; and
(4) having independent launch capability.248 What makes the Space Technology
Ladder such a powerful analytical tool is that within each of these categories,
subcategories are found that clearly identify where countries are in terms of techno-
logical complexity. It is thus particularly suited to studying the space achievements
of emerging space countries, since large players such as the United States, Europe,
Russia, China, and India have already achieved all milestones. The milestones are
ranked within each category in terms of their “technical complexity and managerial
autonomy” but not necessarily between categories. For example, building an LEO
satellite locally ranks higher in terms of complexity and autonomy than procuring a
GEO satellite from abroad, explaining why milestones are not always ranked
between categories.
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Wood and Weigel’s Space Technology Ladder is also useful since it allows for
the creation of a graphical timeline, comparing the achievements of various African
countries. Wood and Weigel only did so for Algeria, Nigeria, and Egypt, up to 2012,
and thus this study will take their framework further up to the present, for all African
countries that have achieved at least one of the milestones. This will be done in
Chap. 3, along with modifications found in literature related to the Space Technol-
ogy Ladder. Such an analysis will inform the discussion of how space is currently
being used in Africa to support the primary needs discussed earlier, and this
particular framework is well-suited to unpacking the space-related capacity-building
efforts of various countries, such as through procuring an LEO satellite with training
services from abroad.
The second framework was created by Harding and provides a larger picture that
identifies two main groups of countries.249 The first group is the category of
developed space actors (DVSAs). These are the actors with a “full range of capa-
bilities”.250 The United States, Russia, Japan, and Europe fall in this category.251
The second group is that of emerging space actors (EMSAs).252 This category is
itself further subdivided into three tiers. The first-tier EMSAs are the “largest and
most capable” states within their group and are China, India, and Brazil.253 More
important for this study are the second- and third-tier EMSAs, which Harding
describes as “smaller but no less enthusiastic states [that] now make up the majority
of the world’s space actors”.254 Harding explains the differences between second-
and third-tier EMSAs as follows:
The ‘second tier’ states are those that produce some of their own space technology, have
basic launch capacity (typically sounding rockets), have national space agencies, and
frequently, out of necessity, collaborate with more advanced states’ programs in the pro-
duction of space technology. The ‘third tier’ states occasionally make contributions in space-
related technology, almost always purchase space-related technology from more advanced
producers, and almost always collaborate with other more developed space actors to achieve
their space policy goals. Rather than being space-faring, third tier space actors have made the
policy decision to invest in space technology to accomplish what could not be done
otherwise.255
For Harding, the only African country falling within the second tier is
South Africa, for the following reason:
While, in almost every case, these second tier space programs’ projects have included plans
with dedicated socioeconomic designs, such as remote-sensing satellites to improve agri-
cultural production, the underlying rationale for second tier programs conforms to the central
thesis of this book. Given sufficient investment potential, the space activities of most second
249Harding, Space Policy in Developing Countries.
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tier EMSAs began as security-oriented programs that, as was the case with space programs
in the developed world, were at best projects in which a country’s military has had great
institutional interest and occasional participation, and at worst mere window dressing for
furthering ballistic missile development programs. However, for some second tier space
actors, their bellicose beginnings have transformed over time into purely civilian programs
with the sole purpose of contributing to national socio-economic development.256
Third-tier states do sometimes make contributions in space-related technology
but “almost always” collaborate with more developed space actors and purchase
space-related technology from these.257 Thus, while these states are not space-faring
per se, they have made policy decisions to “invest in space technology to accomplish
what could not have been done otherwise”.258
While South Africa’s space endeavours have undergone this transformation into
serving purely civilian ends (with the exception of one military reconnaissance
satellite—more on this later in the study), it underscores the point that all of the
space activities in the rest of Africa began with a focus on socio-economic benefit,
not military ends. For third-tier space actors, “the definition of national security now
transcends the traditional realist paradigm to include a plethora of socioeconomic
and political benefits derived from ownership of a slice of the space pie”.259 Harding
also makes the critical point—that goes beyond Wood and Weigel’s ladder—that
countries do not have to own their own satellites to take part in the space arena: “[q]
uite a few developing states today utilize space-based assets for a wide variety of
applications, including communications, weather monitoring, and resource plan-
ning, even if the data is merely purchased from more developed space actors”.260
This point has been underscored by the argument that it “has become apparent . . .
that a nation does not need to have a satellite in space to be space capable”, for
example, “[s]everal countries are space capable, are avid users of Earth observation
data, and do not yet have any specific space-based assets of their own”.261 For this
reason, it has also been cautioned against jumping over “fundamental steps” of
building local space expertise and indigenous scientific and technological skills and
infrastructure in any race to pursue participation in space, since such participation
“does not necessarily mean a physical presence in space and satellites and space
vehicles, nor does it necessarily mean that a given country should be able to deploy
payloads in space with its roaring rockets”.262 This is also echoed by Sharpe, the
business manager of the Square Kilometre Array (SKA) in South Africa, that “[s]
pace science and technology is not just rockets. It’s everything from data analytics,
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data storage and transport and more. There are so many areas of development within
the arena which are classified as space science”.263 This is a potent response to those
criticisms, discussed below, that Africa is wasting money on grandiose space pro-
jects instead of focusing on more pressing concerns.
Thus, the approach of Harding will be used to augment that Space Technology
Ladder of Wood and Weigel in this study, and it will be investigated whether any
African third-tier EMSA has joined the second tier.
The third framework that adds more detail than the Space Technology Ladder is
the European Space Agency’s Technology Readiness Level (TRL). Although this
TRL applies to the “technical maturity of instruments and spacecraft sub-systems
with respect to a specific space application”,264 it is not difficult to see some overlap
with Wood and Weigel’s ladder when viewed in a broader sense. The TRL consists
of nine levels, increasing in complexity: (1) basic principles observed and reported;
(2) technology concept and/or application formulated; (3) analytical and experimen-
tal critical function and/or characteristic proof of concept; (4) component and/or
breadboard functional verification in laboratory environment; (5) component and/or
breadboard critical function verification in relevant environment; (6) model demon-
strating the critical functions of the element in a relevant environment; (7) model
demonstrating the element performance for the operational environment; (8) actual
system completed and accepted for flight (“flight qualified”); and (9) actual system
“flight proven” through successful mission operations.265 While it is outside the
scope of this study to analyse technical components to this degree, some reference
will be made in tandem with the Space Technology Ladder to, for example, satellites
that are accepted for flight but not yet in space (thus not yet appearing on the ladder).
Thus, the TRL will only be used to supplement the other frameworks where relevant.
The regional approach discussed earlier will form the final framework. As
Aganaba-Jeanty argues, it makes more sense to approach space activities in Africa
from such an REC-based approach than through a pan-African one, since the RECs
are both the building blocks of the AU and have at least one space agency each.266
The reduction of trading and tariff barriers within the SECs also means that space
technology can make easier inroads in a region from the inside and via local
partnerships. While some of the RECs have overlapping membership, the study
will approach African space activities, infrastructure, and capabilities from
REC-based perspective. This will greatly facilitate the discussion of space-related
policies as well. Indeed, as was mentioned earlier, it has been argued that Africa
needs a variety of subregional “growth poles”267—and for the purposes of this study
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these include space growth poles. Indeed, one of the key themes of this volume is to
identify these African space growth poles.
1.4 The African Space Arena
Today, space forms an integral part of the everyday lives of people on all continents
and in all countries. While the role of space technology often goes unseen, it has
become an integral part of the global economy, and modern life is made possible
because of the data that comes from, or through, space.268 Weather forecasts,
satellite navigation, communications, Earth observation (EO), and monitoring of
the natural environment, including disasters, all these are dependent on space data
and space technology. The global space economy reached $345 billion worldwide in
2016.269 This can be broken down into two main categories: the satellite industry
($260.5 billion) and the non-satellite industry ($84 billion), with the latter consisting
almost entirely of government budgets ($82.9 billion) plus a small ($1.1 billion)
commercial human spaceflight segment. The biggest segment of the satellite indus-
try is made up of television services ($97.7 billion) followed by satellite ground
equipment ($60.8 billion) and GNSS chipsets and related technology ($52.6 billion).
Fixed satellite service made up a further $17.4 billion, followed by satellite
manufacturing ($13.9 billion), launch services ($5.5 billion), satellite radio ($5
billion), mobile satellite service ($3.6 billion), and broadband and commercial
remote sensing (both $2 billion). The non-satellite industry can be broken down
into US government spending ($47.5 billion) and non-US government spending
($35.4 billion) with China and Europe dominating this category. Furthermore, the
space economy is expected only to grow in the future, giving more urgency for all
countries to become more involved. Over the next three decades, the Bank of
America Merrill Lynch expects the space economy to grow to “at least” $2.7
trillion.270
When reflecting on these figures, it is worth emphasising that all money is spent
on the ground, where it creates jobs and stimulates large sectors of the economy,
including those commercial enterprises indirectly taking part in the space arena and
those that depend on space-related data. The same is true for space-related tourism,
of which 99% takes place on the ground (astronomy tourism in South Africa is a
good example of this).271 It is thus of little surprise that many countries are showing
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growing interest in space and in participating in space activities. This is because
apart from the symbolic significance of space in terms of technological achievement
and prestige, today, space investment constitutes a “tangible national need”.272
Today, the space sector, of which Africa forms part, looks different from that
which was dominated by the Cold War superpowers. For one, the very fact that there
are more independent states today due to the breakup of the colonial empires during
the Cold War, and the Soviet Union at its end, has resulted in greater system
complexity.273 On top of this, the growing presence of non-state actors alongside
state actors in space has created a very different landscape than that which was
characterised by US-Soviet rivalry. While state actors will continue to dominate the
space arena for the foreseeable future, it is clear that non-state actors will play an
increasingly important role. Apart from the change in actors, the motivations for
states to participate in the space sector have also expanded. During the early phase of
the Cold War, space was an extension of the ideological struggles between the
superpowers, and security and military concerns were predominant. For example,
the first-generation satellites were dedicated to military purposes, especially espio-
nage, and space activities were subjected to Cold War logic.274 By the latter part of
the Cold War, scientific activities and commercial concerns (especially in commu-
nications, as was seen in the modern space economy) had become major parts of the
space arena, and today even though space technology maintains its dual-use char-
acteristic, “the market for military use is falling and the market of civil use is on the
rise”.275 On top of this, space-faring countries are now making use of space as a
political tool to build relationships with nontraditional partners, such that “foreign
policy and space are now increasingly overlapping, and therefore reinforcing the
radical restructuring that started in the 1990s”.276 While Africa has not been absent
from space, it was only by the last decade of the twentieth century that national space
programmes were formed or consolidated, and only during and after the 1990s have
African countries moved from consumers of space-related services to generators
thereof. The next section will provide a brief consideration of this shift.
1.4.1 African Space Activities up to the End of the Twentieth
Century
While Africa has taken part in the space sector since its earliest days, and in
astronomy since humans first began observing the night sky, Africa’s participation
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in contemporary space activities only truly took off around the turn of the twenty-
first century. While this study is not dedicated to an in-depth analysis of the history
of African space activities, this section will provide a brief overview of this back-
ground to contextualise the in-depth analysis of contemporary African space activ-
ities and infrastructure in Chap. 3.
Gottschalk notes that evidence exists to support the notion that astronomy began
in Africa at least 35,000 years ago.277 During the colonial period, the foundations of
modern astronomy were laid by European astronomers, such as Nicholas-Louis de
Lacaille, who pioneered southern hemisphere astronomy through observations made
at the Cape of Good Hope.278 Additionally, the first permanent telescopic observa-
tory on the continent—the South African Astronomical Observatory (SAAO)—was
established by the British Royal Navy in 1820.279 However, Africans themselves
were excluded from these developments, and as Anguma, Jurua, and Asiimwe point
out, little consideration was given by missionaries to science and astronomy in early
colonial school curricula.280
During the twentieth century, African involvement in the space arena gradually
increased. In South Africa, involvement in space activities can be traced to the early
“Moonwatch” programme that observed the orbits of American and Soviet satellites,
and institutional satellite tracking activities continued until the 1970s.281 Meanwhile,
the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) built a Deep Space
Network station—DSS 51—at Hartebeesthoek to support both its early robotic and
later manned lunar missions. This station was transferred to the South African
government in 1974 as sanctions against the apartheid regime gained ground, and
it remains an important centre for radio astronomy in the country. Ground-based
astronomy and space physics also gained ground in South Africa from the 1970s,
and apart from the Hartebeesthoek Radio Astronomy Observatory, other efforts
included the Hermanus Magnetic Observatory and a research base in Antarctica.282
These and other facilities will be discussed further in Chap. 3. South Africans also
took part in amateur rocket experiments via the South African Rocket Research
Group (SARRG), formed in 1959.283 However, South Africa’s space endeavours
took a military turn in the early 1960s, when the apartheid regime began expanding
its military-industrial sector, and civilian rocket experiments were closed down and
absorbed into a military rocket programme with Israel as partner.284 In this regard,
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South Africa is the only African second-tier space actor, as per Harding’s defini-
tion,285 because its space activities had “specific direct as well as indirect benefits to
. . . national security and developmental goals”, with space specifically seen and
utilised as a “force multiplier”. These efforts went alongside the development of
nuclear weapons.
South Africa was not the only African country with space ambitions or activities.
In Zambia, the well-known case of Edward Makuka Nkoloso, and his plans in the
1960s to take Zambians to the moon and Mars in an effort to beat the United States
and Soviet Union,286 demonstrates that Africa was not devoid of space ambition.
Nkoloso also coined the term Afronauts. His efforts were derided, and Nkoloso was
described as a crackpot and Zambia’s village idiot.287 Others have described him as
an inspirational figure because in “the year of which he had such a huge dream, it
was just highly impossible to think like that in Zambia”.288 In other parts of Africa,
space activities were undertaken by European countries, such as the launch of
France’s first rockets between 1952 and 1967 from the Hammaguir launch facility
in the Algerian Sahara,289 and the Italian activities in Kenya at the Luigi Broglio
Space Centre in Malindi and the San Marco offshore launch platform, starting in the
1960s.290 Non-governmental activities were also undertaken by European actors,
such as the controversial operations of the West-German Orbital Transport und
Raketen Aktiengesellschaft (OTRAG) in the then Zaire and Libya.291
Elsewhere in Africa, fitful efforts were undertaken to establish national space
programmes. In Egypt, “half-hearted” efforts were undertaken in the late 1950s,292
while President Nasser’s envisioned full-fledged space agency in the 1960s never
came to fruition.293 In Zambia, the idea of the Zambian Space Administration was
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(accessed July 4, 2018).
287Namwali Serpell, “The Zambian “Afronaut” Who Wanted to Join the Space Race,” The
New Yorker, March 11, 2017, https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/the-zambian-
afronaut-who-wanted-to-join-the-space-race (accessed July 4, 2018).
288China Central Television, “Faces of Africa 09/09/2013 Makuka Nkoloso: the Afronaut.”
289GlobalSecurity.org, “Hammaguir/Hamaguir,” 2011, https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/
world/france/hammaguir.htm (accessed July 4, 2018).
290Agenzia Spaziale Italiana, “‘Luigi Broglio’ Space Center,” 2009, https://www.asi.it/en/agency/
bases/broglio (accessed July 4, 2018).
291Oyewole, “Space Research and Development in Africa,” 189.
292Peter Schwartzstein, “The Bizarre Tale of the Middle East’s First Space Program,” Smithsonian.
com, October 17, 2016, https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/bizarre-tale-middle-easts-first-
space-program-180960808/ (accessed July 4, 2018).
293Africa Times, “Egypt’s space program takes another step toward liftoff,” September 27, 2017,
https://africatimes.com/2017/09/27/egypts-space-program-takes-another-step-toward-liftoff/
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touted in 1991 but “unfortunately died a natural death”.294 However, as the twentieth
century drew to a close, the end of the Cold War and the fall of the apartheid regime
in South Africa signalled a fundamental transformation of the space arena and the
rapid development of more concerted, formal, civilian space programmes in
Africa—in Egypt (1971), Nigeria (1999), Algeria (2002), and South Africa (2010).
More followed after these, and they and their space activities will be analysed in
following chapters.
As Harding295 argues, at the end of the Cold War, the emerging third-tier space
actors (such as Egypt, Nigeria, and Algeria) “genuinely embraced space activities as
legitimate long-term means to promote socioeconomic development”, and the
second-tier EMSAs began to view national security in a much broader sense to
include human well-being, as mentioned earlier. For this reason, Gottschalk refers to
the synergy and merger of the African Renaissance, the resurgence of African
astronomy, and the rise of space science and astronautics as the Astronaissance—a
term originating from the organisers of the first International Astronautical Congress
held in Africa in 2011 in Cape Town, South Africa.296 This term powerfully
encapsulates the recognition that is now afforded to space in achieving Africa’s
developmental goals. The next section reflects on how space has been harnessed in
the AU’s African Space Policy and Strategy, a guiding document for the develop-
ment of the sector on the continent. Debates around the establishment of an African
Space Agency will also be considered.
1.4.2 The Astronaissance: The African Space Policy
and Strategy and the African Space Agency
Africa has particular natural advantages that make it well-suited for advances in the
space sector, particularly astronomy and space sciences. Southern Africa, for exam-
ple, is a favourable location for large optical and radio astronomy projects because of
“excellent climatic conditions”, political stability, and an adequate industrial base
and infrastructure,297 while Ethiopia’s “topography, its proximity to the equator, and
the dry atmospheric conditions on its highlands qualify it as one of the very few
countries in the world that is best suited for space science and astronomy
research”.298 Southern Africa’s location between Australia and Chile also allows
for “uninterrupted long baseline observations in the Southern hemisphere”, and the
294P. Sibanda and L.A. McKinnell, “Space Science and Technology in Zambia: Recent Develop-
ments,” African Skies/Cieux Africains, 2008, no. 12: 50.
295Harding, Space Policy in Developing Countries, 145–146.
296Gottschalk, “Astronaissance: Communicating Astronomy& Space to the African Imagination,” 1.
297Martinez, “Space Science and Technology in South Africa: An Overview,” 47.
298S.B. Tessema, “Astronomy and Space Science Development in Ethiopia,” African Skies/Cieux
Africains, 2012, no. 16: 41.
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benefit to astronomy of having in Sutherland (in South Africa) “one of the observa-
tories with the darkest skies on Earth” cannot be overstated.299
Despite these natural advantages, when considering government spending on
space, Africa is a very small player in the space arena. Considering the figures listed
earlier of total government space budgets in 2016 ($82.9 billion), African space
budgets are a very modest share of this: Euroconsult reports that, for the same year,
only seven African countries spent more than $10 million.300 These were Algeria
($115 million), Morocco ($73 million), Angola ($63 million), Nigeria ($61 million),
Egypt ($53 million), the Democratic Republic of the Congo ($20 million), and
South Africa ($20 million). Of South Africa, it was remarked in 2010 that it is “on
the tightest budget of any space player”,301 but this remains a good characterisation
of Africa as a whole. At the same time, despite the previous space investments made
in South Africa, there is clear evidence of the willingness to commit to the devel-
opment of the space sector since the “democratic black state has committed more
funds to Astronomy during its first 15 years than all the earlier colonial and apartheid
regimes spent over the previous 150 years”.302 Yet, it is argued that government
investment in space is lagging in Africa, and this has a very negative consequence
since “[w]ithout government investment in space, you don’t get an industry that
burgeons around it”.303 This is where the recognition by the AU of the importance of
space, and the laying out of why Africa needs to take part in the space economy and
what it needs to do to get there, is so important.304 For this reason, the adoption of the
African Space Policy and Strategy (ASPS) in 2016 by the African Union Heads of
State and Government, drawn up by the African Union Working Group on Space,
was such an important milestone for the space sector on the continent. Additionally,
the Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy for Africa 2024 (STISA),305
adopted in 2014, also recognises the space sector’s importance.
The African Space Strategy is built upon, and supports, five core principles:
(1) development of the services and products required to respond effectively to the
socio-economic needs of the continent; (2) development of indigenous capacity to
operate and maintain core space capabilities; (3) development of an industrial
capability that is able to translate innovative ideas from research and development
299R. Sefako, “The Astronomy Geographic Advantage Act – Protecting South African Astronomy,”
African Skies/Cieux Africains, 2012, no. 16: 38.
300Euroconsult, “Government Spending in Space Programs Reaches $62 Billion in 2016,” May
30, 2017, http://euroconsult-ec.com/30_May_2017 (accessed July 5, 2018).
301Gottschalk, “South Africa’s Space Programme – Past, Present, Future,” 3.
302Ibid., 7–8.
303Sarah Wild, “Making the case for African investment in space programmes,” AfricaPortal.org,
February 6, 2018, https://www.africaportal.org/features/making-case-african-investment-space-
programmes/ (accessed July 5, 2018).
304Ibid.
305African Union Commission, STISA-2024: Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy for
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into the public and commercial sectors; (4) coordination of space activities across
member states and regions to minimise duplication, but maintaining sufficient
critical mass; and (5) fostering international cooperation within Africa and with
the rest of the world as a means of realising the full value proposition of the space
sector.306 The strategy recognises that the implementation of the continent’s policy
frameworks “is highly dependent on space technologies and applications” and that
decision-making depends on “sound, secure spatial data”.307 It also places an
emphasis on the need for indigenous capabilities and space programmes, so as to
avoid Africa remaining a net importer of space technologies.
Four key areas of space technology and applications are highlighted for their
value to Africa’s socio-economic development. These are Earth observation, navi-
gation and positioning, satellite communications, and space science and astron-
omy.308 The strategy sets out the vision for “[a]n African space programme that is
user-focused, competitive, efficient and innovative” with two broad goals309: first,
the provision of “[s]pace-derived products and services used for decision-making
and addressing economic, political, social and environmental challenges” and,
second, the development of “[a]n indigenous space capability, in both the private
and the public sectors, for a coordinated, effective and innovative African-led space
programme”.310 The five associated strategic actions to make these possible are
listed in Table 1.10.
Some of the indicators listed in Table 1.10 will be discussed in greater depth in
later chapters, particularly under African space activities, as well as in the subse-
quent volume. The strategy further delves into specific interventions in relation to
each of the four key areas of space technology and applications listed earlier.311 It
also recognises that in order to actualise these specific technical interventions,
supporting programmes are required focusing on human capital and on generating
and promoting space awareness.312 Infrastructure, industrial involvement, and inter-
national partnerships are further supporting programmes. However, the best way to
summarise the strategy is to consider its projected outcomes, which are listed on
1-year, 5-year, and 10-year timescales. Some of these are very ambitious, and others,
like the creation of an African space programme, are subjects of intense debate
regarding the appropriateness of establishing such an agency within the given
timescale. These outcomes are listed in Table 1.11, with the note that the policy
and strategy documents were adopted in 2016, thus meaning 2018 constitutes the
second year.
306African Union Commission, African Space Strategy: Towards Social, Political and Economic
Integration, 3.
307Ibid., 5.
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Table 1.10 Strategic goals, actions, and associated indicators of the African Space Strategy
Strategic
objectives
1. Addressing user needs: harnessing the potential of space science and technology
to address Africa’s socio-economic opportunities and challenges
2. Accessing space services: strengthening space mission technology on the
continent to ensure optimal access to space-derived data, information services, and
products
3. Developing the regional and international market: developing a sustainable and
vibrant indigenous space industry that promotes and responds to the needs of the
African continent
4. Adopting good governance and management: adopting good corporate gover-
nance and best practices for the coordinated management of continental space
activities
5. Coordinating the African space arena: maximising the benefit of current and
planned space activities and avoiding or minimising the duplication of resources
and efforts
6. Promoting international cooperation: promoting an African-led space agenda
through mutually beneficial partnerships
Strategic
actions and
indicators
1. Leveraging space-derived benefits
Space-derived benefits must transcend
all spheres of government, from conti-
nental level right down to municipal
level. In addition, benefits for women
and the youth must be factored into the
outcomes of these initiatives
Indicators:
a. Number of communities of practice
b. Returns on investment
2. Strengthening research, develop-
ment, and innovation
Research, development, and innovation
initiatives should provide opportunities
for the scientific and engineering space
workforce to internalise the current
intellectual capital and excel in the
development of next-generation tech-
nology platforms, products, and
services
Indicators:
a. Number of services and products
using African capacities
b. Number of publications
c. Number of patents
d. Number of industrial designs
e. Number of space-related research
centres
3. Developing and using human capital
Investment in human capital develop-
ment should ensure that higher educa-
tion and training institutions, including
the special purpose Pan-African Uni-
versity Space Science Institute, are
capacitated to produce the next cohort
of scientists and engineers
Indicators:
a. Number of graduates in space-
related fields
b. Number of space-related experts
employed in space-related professions
4. Institutionalising a corporate gover-
nance structure
A corporate governance structure,
including rules and procedures, should
be adopted for the management of
Africa’s space programme and activities
Indicators:
a. A formal corporate governance
structure established
b. Achievement of strategic goals
5. Adhering to regulatory requirements
A regulatory framework should be
Indicators:
a. A regulatory framework that is
(continued)
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Table 1.10 (continued)
institutionalised to support Africa’s
space activities so that the continent can
compete effectively in the global space
market, in line with international
treaties, conventions, and principles. It
is also important to ensure effective
African participation in international
multilateral forums to secure Africa’s
access to space, including the assign-
ment and use of orbital slots and the
frequency spectrum, for both space
infrastructure and ground-based
infrastructure
supportive of space activities
b. Number of contributions made in
multilateral forums crucial for the
peaceful uses of outer space
c. Coordination of mechanisms insti-
tuted by AU member states
d. Number of orbital slots obtained for
Africa
6. Building critical infrastructure
An integrated network linking regional
and continental institutions should be
established to build appropriate infra-
structure. It is also necessary to develop
an integrated network and complemen-
tary data processing facilities dedicated
to the provision of data to users for
applications at continental, regional,
and local levels
African governments should be encour-
aged to create an enabling environment
for the development of an indigenous
space-related industry. The African
Resource Management Constellation
initiative should be leveraged and the
participation of other African countries
encouraged
Indicators:
a. Number of early warning systems on
the continent
b. Number of space missions
c. Number of space receiving/trans-
mitting/processing facilities
d. Number of networks created and
percentage of coverage
7. Fostering regional coordination and
collaboration
Joint technology development, knowl-
edge sharing, technology transfer, and
the management of intellectual property
should be promoted and strengthened
Indicators:
a. Number of collaborative
intracontinental programmes
8. Promoting strategic partnerships
All partnerships should be underpinned
by complementary contributions and
mutual benefits
Indicators:
a. Number of public-private partner-
ships
b. Number of intra-Africa institutional
partnerships
c. Number of international partnerships
9. Funding and sustainability
Funding should be secured from Afri-
can governments, the private sector, and
philanthropists. A financial mechanism/
instrument should be developed to gen-
erate the funds needed for the African
space programme
Indicators:
a. Level of long-term funding secured
from the continent
b. Financial mechanism for the raising
of funds developed
African Union Commission, African Space Strategy: Towards Social, Political and Economic
Integration, 3
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The Africa Space Strategy works in tandem with the African Space Policy, which
at its core “provides the main tenets and guiding principles for the establishment of a
formal African space programme”.313 The policy begins by setting out some of the
ways in which space is already benefiting the African continent. These include space
applications, which “are effective tools for monitoring and conducting assessments
of the environment, managing the use of natural resources, providing early warnings
of and managing natural disasters, providing education and health services in rural
and remote areas, and connecting Africa with people around the world” while also
being “heavily employed in transportation services, which is another essential
component of sustainable development in Africa . . . [since] transportation allows
mobility, promotes commerce, and fosters education and health”.314 This is not done
by accident, since in Africa there is always a “need to justify expenditure on space-
Table 1.11 Projected outcomes of the African Space Strategy
Projected 1-year outcomes:
1. Establishment of the governance elements needed for a sustainable space programme,
including regional centres of excellence
2. Approval and implementation of an intercontinental and international partnership plan
3. Approval and implementation of a human capital and infrastructure development plan
4. Ongoing research, development, and technology transfer programmes that will contribute to
building the foundations for a continental space programme
Projected 5-year outcomes:
1. An established continental space programme
2. Appropriate technology platforms in place to support the various components of a conti-
nental space programme
3. Advances in human capital development that support the continental space programme
4. Strategic partnerships, both intercontinental and international, through projects that promote
research and technology development
5. Operational and ongoing developments of space application services and products for the
broader public good
6. Well-defined funding mechanisms for sustainability
Projected 10-year outcomes:
1. A continental space programme that is globally positioned and ranked in the world’s top 10
2. Independent Earth observation high-resolution satellite data available for all of Africa from a
constellation of satellites designed and manufactured in Africa
3. Appropriate services and products relating to space applications
4. Indigenous space capacity, in terms of both technology platforms and human capital
5. Spin-off enterprises emanating from space activities and programmes
6. Strategic partnerships, both within and outside Africa, that are translated into viable space
missions, applications, products, and services
African Union Commission, African Space Strategy: Towards Social, Political and Economic
Integration, 24
313Ibid., 25.
314African Union Commission, African Space Policy: Towards Social, Political and Economic
Integration, 2017, Addis Ababa, 6. https://au.int/sites/default/files/newsevents/workingdocuments/
33178-wd-african_space_policy_-_st20444_e_original.pdf (accessed July 3, 2018).
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related endeavours”, and not without reason.315 Any expenditure on space, however
modest, must always compete against many other pressing socio-economic needs.
This goes hand in hand with the continued need to spread public and political
awareness about the impact of space on people’s everyday lives. The criticisms
levelled against African space endeavours have been based on the idea that these
expenditures have been a waste and do not contribute to development. For instance,
in 2013 the UK government came under fire for giving aid to Nigeria amounting to
300 million pounds in 2013 and 1.14 billion pounds over 5 years, which was also
meant to support the Nigerian space programme. Fierce criticism included UK
Members of Parliament remarking “don’t worry, we will feed your public for you
while you waste your money on all sorts of other projects”, while another MP
commented “it was folly to give billions in aid to Bongo Bongo land”.316 This
underlying current of thought that space spending is wasteful for African govern-
ments is a major reason for the need to continue awareness campaigns regarding the
benefits and everyday roles of space technology in supporting modern life. It is also
rightly argued as “a wakeup call to Nigeria [and other African governments] to
expedite its space human capacity programme and its goal of self-reliance in space
science and technology”.317
Consequently, it is argued that one of the needs for the African Space Policy is to
counter the lack of political commitment to space and satellite applications on the
continent and to establish a clear link between “priorities of the various African
countries and how space can assist in achieving them”.318 The policy is also needed
to establish sufficient coordination in space at both the regional and continental
levels. The specific policy goals, objectives, and principles encapsulated in the
policy document, which together form the “guiding framework for the formalisation
of an African space programme”,319 are given in Table 1.12.
In concert with the African Space Policy and Strategy, the earlier-mentioned
STISA-2024 is a critical document and African Union policy framework for the
space sector since it situates “science, technology and innovation at the epicentre of
Africa’s socio-economic development and growth”.320 The strategy identifies six
priority areas (Table 1.13) and four mutually reinforcing pillars. These pillars are
“building and/or upgrading research infrastructures; enhancing professional and
technical competencies; promoting entrepreneurship and innovation; and providing
315Luncedo Ncofe and Keith Gottschalk, “The Growth of Space Science in African Countries for
Earth Observation in the 21st Century,” South African Journal of Science 109, no. 1/2 (2013): 3.
316Tella, “Space as a Fulcrum of Nigeria’s External Relations and Regional Hegemony,” Quoted in
Tella, 4.
317Ibid., 4.
318Giannopapa, “Improving Africa’s Benefit from Space Applications: The European-African
Partnership,” 101–102.
319African Union Commission, African Space Policy: Towards Social, Political and Economic
Integration, 15.
320African Union Commission, STISA-2024: Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy for
Africa 2024, 10.
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Table 1.12 The high-level policy goals, objectives, and principles of the African Space Policy
High-level policy goals:
1. To create a well-coordinated and integrated African space programme that is responsive to the
social, economic, political, and environmental needs of the continent, as well as being globally
competitive
2. To develop a regulatory framework that supports an African space programme and ensures that
Africa is a responsible and peaceful user of outer space
Policy objectives: Policy principles:
1. Addressing user
needs
a. To improve Africa’s economy and the quality of life of its people
b. To address the essential needs of the African market
c. To develop the requisite human resources for addressing user needs
d. To develop products and services using African capacities
e. To establish communities of practice
f. To develop and enhance early warning systems on the continent
2. Accessing space
services
a. To use existing space infrastructure
b. To coherently develop, upgrade, and operate cutting-edge African space
infrastructure
c. To promote capacity building for the development of space services
d. To develop and increase our space asset base
e. To establish regional and subregional centres of space competencies
f. To adopt data-sharing protocols
3. Developing the
regional market
a. To develop a globally competitive African space programme
b. To create an industrial capability
c. To promote public-private partnerships
d. To promote R&D-led industrial development
e. To use indigenous space technologies, products, and services
4. Adopting good
governance and
management
a. To establish an organisational framework
b. To support the African space programme financially
c. To maintain an efficient and sustainable African space programme
d. To promote knowledge sharing
e. To conduct and maintain an awareness campaign
f. To monitor and evaluate space activities
5. Coordinating the
African space arena
a. To commit funds to optimise and improve effectiveness
b. To harmonise and standardise all infrastructure
c. To regulate space activities
d. To secure the space environment for Africa’s use
e. To preserve and maintain the long-term sustainability of outer space
6. Promoting intra-
Africa and other
international
cooperation
a. To promote intracontinental partnerships
b. To forge international partnerships
c. To foster partnerships across all sectors
d. To facilitate equitable partnerships
e. To ensure a reasonable and significant financial and/or social return
f. To influence international agreements
African Union Commission, African Space Policy: Towards Social, Political and Economic
Integration, 8–14
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an enabling environment for STI development in the African continent”.321 As with
the Agenda 2063 10-year implementation plan, STISA-2024 is actualised on three
different levels, namely, continental, where the “African Union Commission (AUC),
NEPAD Agency and their partners should advocate and create awareness, mobilize
necessary institutional, human and financial resources, track progress and monitor
implementation”; regional, where the RECs and “regional research institutions,
networks and partners should leverage the strategy in designing and coordinating
initiatives”; and, most fundamentally, national, where STISA must be incorporated
within the development plans of the various African states.322 What is critical about
STISA-2024 is that it recognises space and space technology as critical to Africa’s
Table 1.13 Science, technology, and innovation strategy for Africa 2024: priorities, research, and
innovation areas
Priorities Research and/or innovation areas
1. Eradicate hunger and ensure
food and nutrition security
a. Agriculture/agronomy in terms of cultivation technique,
seeds, soil, and climate
b. Industrial chain in terms of conservation and/or trans-
formation and distribution infrastructure and techniques
2. Prevent and control diseases and
ensure well-being
a. Better understanding of endemic diseases—HIV/AIDS,
malaria, hemoglobinopathy
b. Maternal and child health
c. Traditional medicine
3. Communication (physical and
intellectual mobility)—physical
communication in terms of land,
air, river, and maritime routes
equipment
a. Physical communication in terms of land, air, river, and
maritime routes equipment
b. Infrastructure and energy
c. Promoting local materials
d. Intellectual communications in terms of ICT
4. Protect our space a. Environmental protection including climate change
studies
b. Biodiversity and atmospheric physics
c. Space technologies, maritime, and sub-maritime explo-
ration
d. Knowledge of the water cycle and river systems as well as
river basin management
5. Live together—build the society a. Citizenship, history, and shared values
b. Pan-Africanism and regional integration
c. Governance and democracy, city management, mobility
d. Urban hydrology and hydraulics
e. Urban waste management
6. Create wealth a. Education and human resource development
b. Exploitation and management of mineral resources, for-
ests, aquatics, marines, etc.
c. Management of water resources
African Union Commission, STISA-2024: Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy for Africa
2024, 24
321Ibid.
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development. Specifically it states, under priority area 4 (Protection of our space),
that “Earth Observation and Monitoring of Africa’s abundant natural resources,
including minerals, and biodiversity (and associated indigenous knowledge), are
important for conserving the welfare of current and future generations”, while:
Space presents a unique opportunity for the continent to collectively address socio-economic
development issues through derived services such as Earth Observation, Navigation and
Positioning, Satellite Communication Space Science and Astronomy. It further provides a
platform for Member States to cooperate and share the enabling infrastructure and data and
jointly manage programmes of mutual interest such as disease outbreaks; natural resources
and the environment; hazards and disasters; weather forecasting (meteorology); climate
change mitigation and adaptation; marine and coastal areas, agriculture and food security;
peacekeeping missions and conflicts.323
Despite the overriding push for an African space programme within these
AU-level documents, and from other high-level sources, there is an ongoing debate
within the literature about the merits of such a continental programme. The African
Space Strategy in particular is very ambitious in this regard, calling for a continental
space programme to be established by 2021 (bearing in mind the policy was formally
adopted in 2016 and this is a 5-year goal), and for this programme to rank among the
top ten in the world by 2026 (although the strategy is silent on which measures will
be used to establish its rank). The next section will highlight the arguments for and
against the establishment of such a programme within this timeframe, again with the
recognition of the immense disparities in African development identified earlier.
As before, the Agenda 2063 10-year implementation plan provides related prior-
ity areas and targets, provided in Table 1.14.324
Importantly, one of the key process actions/milestones for this priority area is that
an African common position on the international space agenda must have been
attained by 2018 (the next volume explores how the statute of the African Space
Agency was accepted in 2018). This African position internationally will be
explored further in Chap. 2, including the challenges of engaging African states in
international space fora.
1.4.3 Debates Around the Establishment of the African Space
Programme
While the ASPS does not specifically call for the creation of an African Space
Agency, it does, as mentioned, speak of a continental space programme. The desire
for an agency is, however, encapsulated in the 2012 Khartoum Declaration, made at
the Conference of Ministers in Charge of Communication and Information
323Ibid.
324African Union Commission, Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want – First Ten-Year Implementa-
tion Plan 2014–2023, 91.
1.4 The African Space Arena 93
Technologies, held in Sudan. The declaration issues the request to the AU Commis-
sion to “IMPLEMENT the recommendations of the feasibility study on the African
Space Agency (AfriSpace) and DEVELOP a space policy for the Continent in
collaboration with relevant stakeholders; taking in to account remote sensing appli-
cations and satellite imagery processing”.325 The latter part, the development of a
space policy, has been completed, but as CNN reports, although the AU approved
the feasibility study in 2010 and Sudanese President al-Bashir repeated the call for
this in 2012 (in tandem with the Khartoum Declaration), “[i]t largely fell on deaf
ears”.326 However, it is difficult to see how a “formal African space programme”—
as the African Space Strategy puts it—will be implemented without a continental
agency, especially since the same strategy states that “[a]ppropriate governance
structures will be mandated to ensure that this strategy is implemented to ensure
the effective development and coordination of an African space programme, which
Table 1.14 Global affairs priority areas and targets for 2023 (AU Commission)
Aspiration 7. Africa as a
strong, united, resilient,
and influential global part-
ner and player
Goal 19. Africa as a
major partner in global
affairs and peaceful
co-existence
• Priority area 1. Africa’s place in
global affairs
National targets (2023):
1. National infrastructure for African
networked space research and explora-
tion in place
2. National systems/infrastructure for
research and development that will con-
tribute to the stock of global intellectual
property rights is fully functional
3. Increase 2013 level of exports by 20%
in real terms
Regional/continental targets (2023):
1. Africa speaks with one voice on global
affairs
2. African Space Agency established and
is fully operational
3. Strategic freight maritime task force is
established
4. AU standalone department for mari-
time affairs to be responsible for AIMS
implementation established
5. African island states are fairly
represented in appointments to regional/
continental and international bodies
6. All colonies are free by 2020
325African Union Conference of Ministers in Charge of Communication and Information Technol-
ogies, “2012 Khartoum Declaration,” African Union, 2012, 4, https://au.int/sites/default/files/
newsevents/pressreleases/27218-pr-declaration_khartoum_citmc4_eng_final_0.pdf (accessed July
5, 2018).
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will draw on the capacities of member states and regional programmes”.327 Indeed,
the AU Agenda 2063 framework document and the 10-year implementation plan
make it clear that the AU is determined to establish the African Space Agency. The
framework document states “Africa will also be in a position to finance the Union
Government, and other key strategic initiatives, inter alia the African Space
Agency”, while the implementation plan clearly states that “[a]n African Space
Agency would have been established by 2023”.328 Therefore, debates with strong
positions regarding the establishment of an African Space Agency abound.
It is interesting to note how the sides of the debate still reflect the enduring rift in
Africa between the Casablanca and the Monrovia Groups of the 1960s. The Casa-
blanca Group was an informal association of states in Northern and Western Africa
that pushed for Africa’s unification and radical deep integration on the continent,
while the Monrovia Group favoured nationalism over pan-Africanism, and although
they still supported cooperation on the continent, they were reluctant to pursue the
level of integration sought by the states of the Casablanca Group. While the
formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 was a compromise,
the Casablanca Group ultimately failed in their desire for African unification,
although those themes were still echoed by former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi
and still strongly featured in current AU discourse, for instance, in realising an
African passport. While these two groups no longer exist, the tension between full
and limited integration endures, including in the space arena.
On the one hand, proponents highlight the need for such an agency by arguing
that “this agency will enhance the contribution of other African countries towards
space science”, and criticism is countered through arguments that “the development
of the ASA could provide the vehicle for the continent to negotiate better offers for
satellite construction, space launches, technology transfer and infrastructure, than
could individual countries alone”, whilst “working on a regional basis is no longer
an option, but a necessity for development”.329 This sentiment is echoed elsewhere
through lamentations that Africa “is dissected into many other negotiating blocks
that include our colonial boundaries and continued ties with former colonial masters,
all of which make life and negotiations on a common agenda difficult”, summarising
this view by arguing that the “divide and rule tactic remains alive in global negoti-
ating platforms”.330 This strongly echoes the sentiments issued by Ghanaian Pres-
ident Nkrumah (a member of the Casablanca Group) on the eve of the formation of
the OAU that “[w]e must unite now or perish”, based on the theme that “[u]nless we
327African Union Commission, African Space Strategy: Towards Social, Political and Economic
Integration, 25.
328African Union Commission, “Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want, Framework Document,”
2015, Addis Ababa, 42. https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/33126-doc-framework_docu
ment_book.pdf (accessed July 6, 2018); African Union Commission, Agenda 2063: The Africa
We Want – First Ten-Year Implementation Plan 2014–2023, 24.
329Ncofe and Gottschalk, “The Growth of Space Science in African Countries for Earth Observa-
tion in the 21st Century,” 3.
330Nhamo, “New Global Sustainable Development Agenda: A Focus on Africa,” 13.
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do this by our concerted efforts, within the framework of our combined planning, we
shall not progress at the tempo demanded by today’s events and the mood of our
people”, with the question being that “[b]y belonging to different economic zones,
how will we break down the currency and trading barriers between African states,
and how will the economically stronger amongst us be able to assist the weaker and
less developed states?”.331
On the other hand, the contrary view is encapsulated in the argument that an
“African Space Agency will be beneficial in the long term but is a little premature”
because “countries need to develop and grow their own capabilities first”.332 A new
pan-African space entity thus does not need to be established to achieve closer
African cooperation or advance the continental space agenda.333 Arguments that
such an agency is needed to foster competition are also repudiated on the basis that
the African Resources Management Satellite Constellation (ARMS-C—more on this
in Chap. 2) came about without such an agency and is based on the similar objectives
of the partner countries.334 It is also maintained that those who call for the European
model of a continental space agency miss the crucial fact that space capabilities were
initially developed within various European countries and that initiatives such as the
European Launcher Development Organisation created the experience and critical
mass required to sustain the success of the European Space Agency (ESA). This
included established national space programmes, which remain in place today, and
the creation of a cadre of capable scientists and engineers.
African development, as discussed earlier in this chapter, is very uneven, and
there is a dearth of skills that would enable Africa as a whole to benefit from a
continental space agency. In this way, it is maintained that “it is difficult to see how a
top-down approach of multilateral cooperation can lead to purposeful programmes
that cannot be executed more effectively and efficiently among a few partners”,
while the majority of African countries “scarcely have the resources to plough into
science and technology activities in general, let alone in the space domain”.335 More
likely, the result of “creating a new multilateral space agency with partners having
very limited space experience” would be “a dilution of the individual efforts”.336 In
contrast to the arguments that a space agency will place Africa in a stronger
negotiating position, the risk could also be that “an African space agency could be
an attractive proposition for the global space industry seeking a single point to access
African markets . . . [which] could lead to a situation where the agency would
become a sort of clearinghouse to consider proposals from entities outside of
331Kwame Nkrumah, “Power of Words: Kwame Nkrumah speaks in Addis Ababa in 1963,” Joburg
Post, May 26, 2017, http://www.joburgpost.co.za/2017/05/26/power-words-kwame-nkrumah-
speaks-addis-ababa-1963/ (accessed July 5, 2018).
332Giles, “Africa Leaps Forward into Space Technology.”
333Peter Martinez, “Is There a Need for an African Space Agency?,” Space Policy 28, (2012): 145.
334Ibid., 143.
335Ibid., 143.
336Ibid., 144.
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Africa”.337 Additionally, rather than creating a new continental institution, there is a
case to be made for strengthening existing ones and supporting them better. An
example of this is the African Regional Centre for Space Science and Technology, of
which two were established on the continent under the UN Programme on Space
Applications. These will be further deliberated in Chap. 2, but the case in point is that
the Nigerian centre, which supports the English language, is an example of the “host
country shouldering the lion’s share of the costs” even though many other countries
benefit from the training services there, underscoring the need to better fund existing
continental institutions and centres before opening new ones.338 The African Lead-
ership Conference on Space Science and Technology for Sustainable Development
(ALC) at its fourth conference in 2011 (more on this in Chap. 2) agreed that an
African Space Agency would be premature.
One of the alternatives to the European model is the Asian example of the Asia-
Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF), which is a forum for the
exchange of information and views and is a platform for the discussion of future
space cooperation.339 The ALC could potentially evolve into an equivalent APRSAF
if given more influence. Three major stumbling blocks to a new continental space
agency are foreseen—first, without African champions, such an endeavour is
unlikely to succeed, with arguments made that there is an “apparent lack of visible
support from space capable African countries”; second, the benefits accruing from a
continental space agency would unfairly advantage those countries with no existing
space programmes, while simultaneously they would be able to contribute least
given the absence of space industries, and thus a European juste retour principle
would be unlikely to succeed; and third, some African countries, particularly in
Northern Africa, are currently more aligned to other cooperative space organisations
such as the Inter-Islamic Network on Space Sciences and Technology (more on this
in Chap. 2), calling into question whether a new pan-African initiative could succeed
given the multitude of directions countries are turning to for cooperation outside the
region.340 As mentioned earlier, a regionally focused approach is proposed instead,
in line with the argument that multiple growth poles are needed. It is cautioned that
while Africa might be considering developmental leapfrogs, “running too fast can
lead to grazed knees”, since human capacity remains a serious problem, for example,
with a “lack of appropriate skills to analyse and interpret remote sensing data and to
maintain local and regional collaboration”.341 Arguments have instead been made
for African countries to make greater use of established networks of international
cooperation, such as the regional centres mentioned, since they are already “geared
337Ibid.
338Ibid.
339Aganaba-Jeanty, “Precursor to an African Space Agency: Commentary on Dr. Peter Martinez ‘Is
There a Need for an African Space Agency?’,” 172.
340Ibid.
341Ibid., 173.
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towards capacity building in Africa”.342 As if to reinforce the notion that an African
Space Agency is premature, the troubling observation has been made that:
the recent focus has not been the programmes or plans to make the African space economy a
reality. Rather, it is who gets to host the African Space Agency. Although the creation of a
space agency is not explicitly mentioned in either the policy or the strategy, this is the issue
that is getting attention—rather than the governance framework and implementation plan
which are what the space strategy lays out as the next steps for developing space on the
continent.343
This view is echoed through the caution that “Africa also must not forget the
decades’-long individual national attitude of its member states towards science and
technology, the indisputable foundation of any space programme”, and African
attempts to bypass these foundations over the years have “won it either bench
warmer status at international meetings or exclusion”.344 This participation in
international fora will be explored in Chap. 2.
1.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, the foundation has been provided for the discussion of Africa’s
contemporary international space ecosystem, discussed in Chap. 2, and for the
analysis of African states’ space-related capabilities and infrastructure, discussed
in Chap. 3. The aim here was to contextualise the broad political and socio-economic
landscape of the continent and to explore the “Astronaissance” that has taken hold
since the relatively limited involvement of Africa in space during the twentieth
century. This rebirth of African space efforts is accompanied by the African Union’s
Space Policy and Strategy, which will undoubtedly have an important role in
coordinating the efforts of individual states and in stirring further debate about the
nature of African space activities in coming years (such as the proposed African
Space Agency), but about which little has been published to date.
Focus was also placed on African theoretical contributions, drawn from interna-
tional relations literature, which will be applied to the space arena throughout these
chapters (and volumes). This is an important effort since the “awkward silence”345 of
Africa in the realm of theory is a grave concern, especially since the continent has
much to contribute to theory generation if scholars would listen. Together, these
theoretical contributions, and the political and socio-economic context and back-
ground, are refracted through the prism of the primary needs approach to African
space activities, which prioritises the continent’s efforts in the realms of climate,
342Ibid., 173.
343Wild, “Making the case for African investment in space programmes.”
344Abiodun, “Trends in the Global Space Arena – Impact on Africa and Africa’s Response,” 288.
345Ashley Harris, “An awkward silence: Reflections on theory and Africa,” Kunapipi 34, no.
1 (2012): 1.
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biodiversity, health, water, education, and space-related capacity building. The
importance of these primary, or basic, needs is clear when considering the efforts
of all states in meeting the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals 2030,
which also prioritises these fundaments to human dignity and quality of life. If space
is to make any meaningful contribution to Africa, it must be in supporting the
meeting of these needs, and in improving the lives of ordinary African citizens.
Africa is rising. Its people, its states, and its ambitions are on the move. Now is the
time of taking seriously African efforts and activities in space. As Nelson Mandela
indicated, our long walk is not yet ended.
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Chapter 2
The African International Space Ecosystem
Abstract The states of Africa find themselves embedded within an international
space ecosystem, which, in this chapter, is argued to consist of three closely related
dimensions. These are intra-African space relations and activities, African partici-
pation in global space fora (with emphasis on the United Nations Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UNCOPUOS), and the engagement with Africa by
other global space actors. These are explored in turn, with various key intergovern-
mental organisations and non-governmental organisations within the African conti-
nent explored first, followed by a ranking of the engagements of African states
through the Intra-African Space Engagement Matrix. This provides a clear indication
of which states lead in space engagements on the continent. Next, Africa’s partici-
pation in international fora beyond the continent is considered, with participation
ranked via the International Space Engagement Matrix. Together, these matrices
clearly identify African outliers in the space arena and enable the identification of
Africa’s emerging space middle powers. Finally, key space-related activities, agree-
ments, and initiatives of non-African actors on the continent are examined. This
chapter therefore provides a comprehensive overview of space-related initiatives
involving Africa and which African states are leading in this regard.
2.1 Introduction
As the Secretary General of the United Nations, an organization of the 147 member states
who represent almost all of the human inhabitants of the planet Earth, I send greetings on
behalf of the people of our planet. We step out of our solar system into the universe seeking
only peace and friendship, to teach if we are called upon, to be taught if we are fortunate. We
know full well that our planet and all its inhabitants are but a small part of this immense
universe that surrounds us and it is with humility and hope that we take this step.
Kurt Waldheim, United Nations Secretary General, 19771
1Astrobiology Magazine, “Voyage of The Voyagers: First Quarter-Century,” Astrobio.net, August
20, 2002, https://www.astrobio.net/news-exclusive/voyage-of-the-voyagers-first-quarter-century/
(accessed September 3, 2018).
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Just over 40 years ago, as the Voyagers 1 and 2 spacecraft began their long
journeys to the stars, the then-Secretary General of the UN contributed the above
message to the now-famous golden records accompanying the Voyagers. It paints a
picture of a relatively unified planet, whose inhabitants stand together as they step
out into space. This example reinforces both points made in the previous chapter—
that international cooperation and partnerships are fundamental tenets of humanity’s
approach to space and that an engagement with space is therefore also an engage-
ment with the international. What the message of the Secretary General does not
reveal however is the extent to which the participation and involvement of various
countries and regions differ in relation to space and how various international
relations and partnerships on multiple levels shape the international space
ecosystem.
This chapter is therefore dedicated to analysing the African international space
ecosystem (Fig. 2.1). This international ecosystem is conceptualised here as
consisting of three dimensions, each of which will be explored in turn. The first of
these dimensions concerns intra-African space relations and activities taking place
between various countries on the continent. The second dimension revolves around
African relations and participation in international fora, with emphasis on the UN
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) as the official
intergovernmental decision-making body on outer space. The third dimension is
concerned with the involvement of international space actors on the African conti-
nent, as well as various other international agreements and initiatives (with the
relationship between Africa and the European Space Agency/European Union
being explored in greater depth in a separate chapter in the next volume).
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The two concepts discussed in the previous chapter—ubuntu2 and emerging
space middle powers—will be incorporated into the discussion of the African
international space ecosystem to help explain the behaviour and actions of African
states in the space arena. These concepts will also be critical in identifying the major
drivers or promoters of space in Africa, since these states are best suited to bridge the
gap between the rest of Africa and space. Themes of African unity and self-
determination will also be highlighted in this discussion as cornerstones of African
international relations. In line with the primary needs approach to African space
activities identified in the previous chapter, the emphasis will be placed on interna-
tional space relations that promote climate, biodiversity, health, water, education,
and space-related capacity building initiatives.
This chapter consists of three main sections dedicated to the dimensions of the
African international space ecosystem identified above. Accordingly, intra-African
space relations and activities will be considered first. This will include a discussion
of various international projects taking place such as the African Resource Manage-
ment Satellite Constellation (ARMS-C), the Square Kilometre Array (SKA), and
other continental initiatives. These will be analysed through the Intra-African Space
Engagement (IASE) Matrix, a tool that helps to identify emerging space middle
power candidates via the regional dimensions of the middle powers concept as
discussed in Chap. 1. The following section will explore Africa’s involvement in
international space fora, most notably UNCOPUOS. This will in turn be analysed
through the International Space Engagement (ISE) Matrix, which will identify
emerging space middle power candidates based on the international dimensions of
the concept. Together, the IASE and ISE Matrices will identify Africa’s emerging
space middle powers and help to account for their actions, along with ubuntu, within
the international space ecosystem. After this, the subsequent section will consider
various international efforts taking place within Africa, such as African agreements
with foreign partners, and international bodies such as the ARCSSTE (African
Regional Centre for Space Science and Technology Education) and UN-SPIDER
(Space-based Information for Disaster Management and Emergency Response)
initiatives of the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA). Finally,
the conclusion will summarise the chapter and discuss key points.
2.2 Intra-African Space Relations and Activities
This section explores the main space-related relationships and joint activities
between African countries, both of intergovernmental and non-governmental
natures. The African Space Policy and Strategy, AU flagship projects, and
2One example of ubuntu will be evident throughout this chapter through the use of “international”
and “foreign” to refer to relations between Africa and the rest of the world, not within Africa – one
of the features discussed in the definition of ubuntu in Chap. 1.
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Pan-African University Space Sciences initiatives discussed in the previous chapter
will not be included here. An important point in this regard is that intra-African
space-related cooperation is a relatively new phenomenon due to the relatively
recent establishment of African space agencies or government space offices, which
are important drivers for cooperation. These will be explored in depth in the next
chapter.
2.2.1 Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs) and Relations
The first focus here will be placed on key IGOs operating within Africa in the space
arena. Ten in particular have been identified, operating in areas of satellite commu-
nication, resource management, policy, science and astronomy, geospatial and Earth
observation, geographic information systems, meteorology, and governance.
Together, these ten IGOs demonstrate that African states are active in a broad
spectrum of space-related activities and that the political leadership of the continent
recognises value in participating in these activities.
The Regional African Satellite Communication Organisation (RASCOM)
The first pan-African space initiative was RASCOM, established in 1992.3 A
feasibility study was undertaken between 1987 and 1990, which focused on the
African telecommunications arena and which involved 50 African countries and
hundreds of experts, with support from the International Telecommunication Union
(ITU), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the African
Development Bank (ADB).4 This was the most comprehensive study ever carried
out in the arena of telecommunications in Africa. Two key findings from this study
were that a telecommunications satellite “tailored to well-defined specifications is
the best technological choice for satisfying Africa’s telecommunications needs,
globally and optimally” and that it must be designed and undertaken on a continental
scale to be financially viable.5
RASCOM is made up of three key organs: the Assembly of Parties, which is
made up of the member governments and meets every 2 years; the Board of
Directors, which is responsible for the “design, development, construction, estab-
lishment, operation and maintenance of the RASCOM space segment and any other
activities which RASCOM is authorized to undertake” and meets every 3 months;
3Ngcofe and Gottschalk, “The growth of space science in African countries for Earth observation in
the twenty-first century,” 3.
4Regional African Satellite Communication Organisation, “Background,” http://www.rascom.org/
info_detail.php?langue_id¼2&id_r¼23&id_sr¼0&id_gr¼2 (accessed September 7, 2018).
5Ibid.
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and finally the Executive Organ, which, under a Director General, oversees daily
operations.6 The secretariat is based in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. Currently, 45 African
countries are members, highlighted in Fig. 2.2, and telecommunications operators,
including regulatory bodies, have signed the RASCOM operating agreement in 43 of
these.7 RASCOM’s mission is stated as follows: “to design, implement, operate and
maintain the space segment of the African telecommunications satellite system and
Fig. 2.2 Member states of the Regional African Satellite Communication Organisation
(RASCOM). Regional African Satellite Communication Organisation, “Members”, http://www.
rascom.org/info_detail.php?langue_id¼2&id_r¼25&id_sr¼0&id_gr¼2 (accessed September
7, 2018)
6Regional African Satellite Communication Organisation, “Organs”, http://www.rascom.org/info_
detail.php?langue_id¼2&id_r¼24&id_sr¼0&id_gr¼2 (accessed September 7, 2018).
7Regional African Satellite Communication Organisation, “Members,” http://www.rascom.org/
info_detail.php?langue_id¼2&id_r¼25&id_sr¼0&id_gr¼2 (accessed September 7, 2018).
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translate into services and tools for African integration, all the opportunities pro-
vided by satellites by linking it, where necessary, with any other appropriate
technology”. Six key objectives are outlined, namely, to (i) provide an affordable
infrastructure on a large scale to rural areas of the continent by using appropriate
technology; (ii) improve and/or develop interurban communications in each country;
(iii) establish direct links between all African countries without exception;
(iv) provide facilities for radio and television broadcast in each country and enable
the exchange of radio and television programmes between African countries;
(v) support international connectivity and pursue connectivity where others cannot
go; and (vi) provide a range of services, voice, data, multimedia, tele-education,
telemedicine, video conferencing, etc.8
RASCOM’s satellite operations are managed by a private company registered in
Mauritius in 2002, named RascomStar, which extended the first satellite contract to
Thales Alenia Space in 2003 to build the RASCOM-QAF1, which was launched in
2007.9 Unfortunately, due to a helium (propellant) leakage, the lifespan of the
satellite was reduced to 3 years, and a replacement satellite RASCOM-QAF1R
was launched in 2010, thus “providing the first pan-African satellite with coverage
of the entire continent and off-shore islands with a single C-band and two Ku-band
(North and South) footprints”.10 RascomStar has two satellite control centres—one
in Gharyan, Libya, and one in Fucino, Italy, which is operated in partnership with
Telespazio—while the network control centre is located in Douala, Cameroon,
which “controls and manages all RascomStar Ground Services, such as our Rural
GSM Extension Service and our Rural Fixed-line Extension Service, plus our VSAT
Service”, and one customer service centre, also in Douala, Cameroon.11 RascomStar
provides a range of services across Africa, including Bandwidth Lease Service,
GSM Extension Service, Telephony Extension Service, GSM Backhaul Solutions,
VSAT Solutions, Hybrid Solutions, combined satellite and Wi-Fi, as well as televi-
sion broadcast services.12
Despite long delays related to intergovernmental negotiations and in
“implementing long-promised commitments”, as well as “two of the three locations
[Côte d’Ivoire and Libya] having been affected by civil wars”, RASCOM has proven
8Regional African Satellite Communication Organisation, “Our Objectives,” http://www.rascom.
org/info_detail.php?langue_id¼2&id_r¼19&id_sr¼0&id_gr¼2 (accessed September 7, 2018).
9RascomStar, “Our History,” http://rascomstar.com/about-us/our-history/ (accessed September
7, 2018).
10Ibid.
11RascomStar, “Ground Stations,” http://rascomstar.com/our-resources/ground-stations/ (accessed
September 7, 2018).
12RascomStar, “Our Solutions,” http://rascomstar.com/our-solutions/ (accessed September
7, 2018).
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its resilience.13 The roughly 20-year period it took to become operational also “offers
a realistic time frame for future Pan-African space initiatives”.14
In relation to the primary needs model outlined in Chap. 1, RASCOM fulfils
important functions in education (since educational services often rely on satellite
communications in Africa) and space-related capacity building (since it was Africa’s
first continental space initiative and has generated valuable experience in telecom-
munications operations in the countries where its ground facilities are located).
Indeed, RASCOM can support education since “[i]nvestment in communication
satellites can help to digitize education and enhance literacy in the region”.15
The African Resource Management Satellite Constellation (ARMS-C)
The ARMS-C is a multilateral satellite project focused on African needs. This
collaborative initiative between four countries—Algeria, Kenya, Nigeria, and
South Africa—was originally conceived around 2003.16 A series of meetings were
held between the four governments in 2005, with other workshops taking place
between 2006 and 2008, in order to lay the groundwork for the agreement, which
was signed in December 2009 as a Memorandum of Understanding in Algiers,
Algeria, at the third African Leadership Conference on Space Science and Technol-
ogy for Sustainable Development (see below for more information on the ALC).17
The ARMS-C was conceived as a data-sharing agreement between the four countries
to pool their satellite imagery, and negotiations took 6 years to be completed.18
The need for the ARMS-C is evident due to the widespread use of medium- and
high-resolution image data in Africa by end users in a variety of fields, including
infrastructure, disaster management, water resource management, land use, food
security, and public health—data that existing satellites such as SPOT 5 could not
provide in a timely or cost-effective manner. For example, it was noted that SPOT
5 required a 16-month period to image the whole of South Africa alone, due to
prevailing cloud cover patterns.19 Thus, by creating a satellite constellation, more
timely data could be provided, and by pooling their efforts via the data-sharing
13Ngcofe and Gottshalk, “The growth of space science in African countries for Earth observation in
the twenty-first century,” 3.
14Ibid.
15Samuel Oyewole, “Space Research and Development in Africa,” Astropolitics 15, no. 2 (2017):
199.
16Sias Mostert, “The African Resource Management (ARM) Satellite Constellation,” African Skies/
Cieux Africains, 2008, no. 12:56.
17Simon Adebola, “African Resource Management Satellite (ARMC) Constellation,” iinitiative,
December 21, 2009, https://iinitiative.wordpress.com/2009/12/21/african-resource-management-
satellite/ (accessed September 5, 2018).
18Luncedo Ngcofe and Keith Gottschalk, “The growth of space science in African countries for Earth
observation in the twenty-first century,” South African Journal of Science 109, no. 1/2 (2013): 3.
19Mostert, “The African Resource Management (ARM) Satellite Constellation,” 53.
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agreement, individual member countries would not have to purchase satellite imag-
ery separately (thus saving costs).
Accordingly, in the conceptualisation phase of the ARMS-C initiative, user
requirements were identified and collected from the four countries and prioritised,
with the top five user requirements identified as (i) agriculture, climate, and envi-
ronment (3–5 m multispectral resolution, monthly revisit times); (ii) environmental
impact assessment, farmer settlement, housing, planning and urban planning, and
border monitoring (0.6–1 m PAN and RGB resolution, 1–2 year revisit time); (iii)
disaster monitoring (1–250 m PAN, VIS, NIR, MIR, TIR resolution, twice daily
revisit time—night and day); (iv) land use, cover mapping (0.5–5 m PAN resolution,
once per 2 days revisit time); and (v) water management, land use, and land care
(10 m multispectral resolution with twice per year or quarterly revisit times).20 From
these, the core technical requirements for the constellation were identified, divided
into three phases. ARM 1 was proposed to have a 3–5 m multispectral resolution
with once per 2 days revisit time, to be focused on applications in the following
fields: agriculture, climate, environment, disaster monitoring, land use/cover map-
ping, managed agriculture, water resources management, and mineral, oil, and gas
exploration.21 ARM 2 would have a requirement for 20–30 m multispectral resolu-
tion with a swath of 600 km and daily or twice-daily revisit times, aimed at disaster
monitoring, water management, land use and land care, mapping food vulnerability,
drought status, food security, mineral, oil, and gas exploration, and fishing applica-
tion.22 Finally ARM 3 would have a requirement of 0.5 m Pan, RGB resolution with
once per annum revisit time, supporting applications of environmental impact
assessment; farmer settlement; housing; planning and urban planning; border mon-
itoring; disaster monitoring; land use/cover mapping; water resources management;
mineral, oil, and gas exploration; and peace-keeping missions.23
Following this conceptualisation phase, the final design specifications of the first-
phase satellites were decided. According to Draft Version 3 of the ARMS-C User
Needs and Technical Requirements section of the agreement, these specifications for
ARM 1 would be a 2.5 m resolution panchromatic imager with a 12 m multispectral
imager with bands blue, green, red, and NIR, a maximum swath width of 180 km,
and a 3-day revisit time with four satellites.24 However, other sources report
20Agreement between The Government of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria and The
Government of the Republic of Kenya and The Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and
The Government of the Republic of South Africa Concerning a Framework for Co-operation in
Relation to the African Resource and Environmental Management Satellite Constellation, ftp://ftp.
earthobservations.org/AfriGEOSS/Data_Infrastructure_Coordination_Team/References/ARMC%
20Agreement%20Docs.pdf (accessed September 7, 2018).
21Mostert, “The African Resource Management (ARM) Satellite Constellation,” 55.
22Ibid.
23Ibid.
24Agreement between The Government of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria and The
Government of the Republic of Kenya and The Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and
The Government of the Republic of South Africa Concerning a Framework for Co-operation in
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specifications of a 2.5 m resolution panchromatic imager and a 5 m resolution
multispectral imager in six multispectral bands.25,26
With these specifications in mind, it was agreed that each country would contrib-
ute a satellite with “identical payload specifications” to the constellation and where
“the data generated by the satellites are shared by the Parties for their mutual
benefit”.27 Accordingly, ARMS-C satellites would be “optimised for the use of
African countries for regional conditions” to meet their domestic needs for regular,
high-resolution data over the continent for resource management applications, thus
creating a “combined space asset that collectively serves a unique need for regular
up-to-date monitoring of the African environment”.28 Beyond meeting the need for
data, the ARMS-C joint project also serves to promote capacity building as well as
the development of low-cost receiving stations.29 One of the strengths of the
constellation is that, based on the common set of requirements agreed upon, the
countries are under no obligation to harmonise the technology they use, develop, or
procure to meet the requirements. This facilitates cooperation and removes addi-
tional barriers related to harmonisation.
Thus far, only Nigeria has placed its required generation 1 ARMC satellite in
orbit, with Algeria, South Africa, and Kenya yet to do so. While satellites will be
discussed in greater depth in the next chapter, the Nigerian contribution is
NigeriaSat-2, launched in 2011, making it “the first satellite in the African Resource
Management (ARM) constellation”,30 with specifications reported as:
NigeriaSat-2 (N2) is an Earth observation mission. N2 is a space-based optical sensor system
that provides accurate and timely images of the Earth. The N2 imaging payload provides
very high resolution 2.5 m panchromatic and 5 m 5-band multispectral high resolution
imaging. N2 is a contributing sensor to the Disaster Monitoring Constellation [sic]. Imagery
Relation to the African Resource and Environmental Management Satellite Constellation, Appen-
dix 1, ftp://ftp.earthobservations.org/AfriGEOSS/Data_Infrastructure_Coordination_Team/Refer
ences/ARMC%20Agreement%20Docs.pdf (accessed September 7, 2018).
25Adebola, “African Resource Management Satellite (ARMC) Constellation.”
26Mohamed Yahia Edries, “African Satellite Collaborative Projects (Past, Present and Future),”
National Authority for Remote Sensing and Space Sciences (NARSS), December 11, 2017, http://
www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/psa/activities/2017/SouthAfrica/slides/Panel01.pdf (accessed
September 5, 2018).
27Agreement between The Government of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria and The
Government of the Republic of Kenya and The Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and
The Government of the Republic of South Africa Concerning a Framework for Co-operation in
Relation to the African Resource and Environmental Management Satellite Constellation, 2–4, ftp://
ftp.earthobservations.org/AfriGEOSS/Data_Infrastructure_Coordination_Team/References/
ARMC%20Agreement%20Docs.pdf (accessed September 7, 2018).
28Mostert, “The African Resource Management (ARM) Satellite Constellation,” 53–56.
29Edries, “African Satellite Collaborative Projects (Past, Present and Future).”
30Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd, “Nigeria’s new satellite demonstrates hi-res capability,”
September 28, 2011, https://www.sstl.co.uk/media-hub/latest-news/2011/nigeria%E2%80%99s-
new-satellite-demonstrates-hi-res-capabi (accessed December 6, 2018).
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transmitted to ground stations will be used for humanitarian, environmental and commercial
applications.31
According to the World Meteorological Organisation’s Observing Systems Capa-
bility Analysis and Review Tool (OSCAR), NigeriaSat-2’s expected end of life is
2018, although its current status is unclear.32 It has also served the needs of the
Disaster Monitoring Constellation (DMC) of which Nigeria is a member and which
will be discussed later in this chapter. Algeria’s satellites AlgeriaSat (AlSat) 2A and
2B, both reported by UNOOSA as being “Earth observation satellite[s] equipped
with a camera with a spatial resolution of 2.5 m in panchromatic mode and 10 m in
multispectral mode”, were launched in 2010 and 2016, respectively.33 AlSat 2B has
an expected end of life of 2021 according to the World Meteorological Organisation
and also contributes data to the DMC.34 However, while these satellites also conform
to the general requirements of the ARMC-C, they are not part of the constellation,
and “four countries agreed to the constellation in 2009, but so far, only Nigeria has
any satellites in orbit”.35 South Africa’s contribution will be EOSat-1, planned for
launch in 2020, with an expected lifetime of 7 years, although challenges are being
reported: “the programme is hampered by a lack of funding—in addition to the
satellite, the ground station and launch also need to be funded”.36 No details on
Kenya’s future contribution are yet available. Beyond these four countries, the
ARMS-C is open to all other interested African countries to join (Fig. 2.3).
When aligning the AMRS-C with the primary needs model, it is clear that the
constellation speaks to the full range of issues (as indicated by the wide variety of
applications supported by ARM 1), including climate and environment, biodiversity,
land use/cover mapping, water resources management, health (via disaster monitor-
ing), education, and capacity building (both directly through practical experience
related to managing the constellation and indirectly via easy access to satellite data
for end users in Earth observation fields, which also includes educational uses and
31United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, “Online Index of Objects Launched into Outer
Space,” NigeriaSat, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/osoindex/search-ng.jspx?lf_id¼ (accessed
September 7, 2018).
32World Meteorological Organisation, “NigeriaSat-2,” OSCAR: Observing Systems Capability
Analysis and Review Tool, 2018, https://www.wmo-sat.info/oscar/satellites/view/314 (accessed
September 7, 2018).
33United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, “Algeria,” Online Index of Objects Launched into
Outer Space, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/osoindex/search-ng.jspx?lf_id¼ (accessed September
7, 2018).
34World Meteorological Organisation, “AlSat-2B,” OSCAR: Observing Systems Capability Anal-
ysis and Review Tool, 2018, https://www.wmo-sat.info/oscar/satellites/view/10 (accessed
September 7, 2018).
35Sarah Wild, “Launching satellite is space agency’s big focus,” Business Day, February 3, 2017,
https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/business-day/20170203/281711204380878 (accessed
December 6, 2018).
36Guy Martin, “South Africa to increase focus on space,” Defenceweb.co.za, April 17, 2018, http://
www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option¼com_content&view¼article&id¼51386:south-africa-
to-increase-focus-on-space&catid¼35:Aerospace&Itemid¼107 (accessed September 7, 2018).
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capacity building). Beyond the four member countries, the ARMS-C agreement also
stipulates that data can be made available to non-signatory countries if all signatories
approve it.37 South Africa has also indicated that data from EOSat-1 “will be made
available for use by all African countries”.38 The data can therefore be valuable to
the entire continent in relation to all layers of the primary needs model.
Fig. 2.3 Member states of the African Resource Management Satellite Constellation (ARMS-C)
37Agreement between The Government of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria and The
Government of the Republic of Kenya and The Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and
The Government of the Republic of South Africa Concerning a Framework for Co-operation in
Relation to the African Resource and Environmental Management Satellite Constellation, ftp://ftp.
earthobservations.org/AfriGEOSS/Data_Infrastructure_Coordination_Team/References/ARMC%
20Agreement%20Docs.pdf (accessed September 12, 2018).
38Valanthan Munsami, “DRAFT Statement by South Africa: The ISF 2017-International Space
Forum at Ministerial Level: The Africa Chapter,” South African National Space Agency, February
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Two important notes in relation to the ARMS-C initiative can be made here. First,
while the example of this project reveals the great difficulty in aligning political
timelines to actualise such a multinational endeavour, the requirements set out for
the three phases remain valid and worth pursuing. Second, future projects will need
to sidestep such political barriers and challenges related to bilateral and multilateral
projects (and the very long timelines demonstrated by RASCOM as well) by
engaging in focused public-private partnerships in the form of commercial enter-
prises with large numbers of partners and sustainability (through users integrated and
dependent on timely services). One example of such an upcoming project is the
HyperFarm hyperspectral nano-satellite constellation focused on agriculture, of
which South African commercial satellite company SCS Space39 and small
South African start-up FarmPin40 (incubated by AfroLabs and Agro Innovation
Lab) are part.41 By 2021 HyperFarm is planning to have 24 satellites in orbit
working as a constellation, with a 5-day revisit time. Political projects such as
ARMS-C remain important for building capacity across the continent and generating
support for space-related initiatives, but more emphasis will need to be placed on
commercial space enterprises to build a successful and sustainable African space
sector.
The African Leadership Conference (ALC) on Space Science
and Technology for Sustainable Development
The ALC originated as a result of a proposal by the Nigerian delegation at
UNCOPUOS in 2004 to promote an appreciation of the role of space technology
in achieving African development goals among both the political leadership and
other key decision-makers on the continent (including those of the AU and the New
Partnership for Africa’s Development, NEPAD).42 It was formally established in
2005 by the governments of Algeria, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa.43 The goals
of the ALC are to (i) raise awareness among African leaders of the importance of
space science and technology, (ii) provide a regular forum for information exchange
among African countries regarding their space activities, and (iii) enhance intra-
African cooperation in the development and applications of space technology.44
13, 2018, http://www.iafastro.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/20180213-ISF-africa-chapter-SA-
statement.pdf (accessed September 12, 2018).
39See http://scs-space.com/.
40See https://farmpin.com/#sien-wat-anchor.
41HyperFarm Hyperspectral Nano-Satellite Constellation, 2018, http://hyperfarm.space/ (accessed
December 6, 2018).
42Peter Martinez, “The African Leadership Conference on Space Science and Technology for
Sustainable Development,” Space Policy 28, (2012): 33.
43African Leadership Conference Youth Forum, “Home,” https://alcyouthforum.wordpress.com/
(accessed September 13, 2018).
44Ibid., 33.
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Its vision is to “be a forum which offers continuous advisory services and support to
African Member States on space related activities”, while its mission is to “improve
cooperation among African space professionals and to raise awareness among
African Governments of the important benefits of space S[cience] and T[echnology]
for Africa’s sustainable development through a regional platform”.45 The ALC
draws a wide range of participants. For example, at the 2011 ALC, 165 participants
from space-related agencies around the world attended, while a range of African
countries were represented (including Algeria, Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Tan-
zania, Sudan, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Morocco, and Kenya), as well as other organi-
sations such as UNOOSA.46
The ALC consists of two governance levels, namely, the ALC Steering Commit-
tee and Secretariat and the ALC Programme Committee.47 The former is responsible
for the long-term building of the ALC, is made up of African space experts, and is
chaired by the country that hosted the last conference, with a goal to represent all
four major regions of Africa equally (North, South, East, West). The ALC Secre-
tariat is also hosted by the last host of the conference. In contrast, the Programme
Committee is tasked with developing the next conference’s programme and is also
comprised of “eminent African and international space experts”, chaired by the host
of the next conference.48 Thus far, the ALC has been hosted by Nigeria (2005),
South Africa (2007), Algeria (2009), Kenya (2011), Ghana (2013), Egypt (2015),
and again by Nigeria (2018).49 One of the outcomes of the 2015 ALC was “a major
resolution for the formation of [an] African Space Agency and ad[o]ption of African
Policy and Strategies on Space Science and Technology by the Africa Union”.50
The ALC thus provides a platform for exchanging ideas and holding discussions,
for example, around joint projects. It was thus at the 2009 Algerian ALC that the
ARMS-C agreement was signed, not coincidentally by the hosts of the first four
conferences.51 At the same conference, an agreement was also signed between
Algeria and UNOOSA in relation to Algeria hosting a UN-SPIDER regional office
(more on this later in the chapter). At the 2011 Kenyan ALC, issues surrounding the
formation of an African Space Agency were discussed by space agencies or related
entities from Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, and Sudan, and it was
45Margaret W. Maimba, “4th African Leadership Conference on Space Science and Technology for
Sustainable Development,” Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology, Kenya,
February, 2012, http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/pres/stsc2012/tech-29E.pdf (accessed September
8, 2018).
46Ibid.
47Ibid., 34.
48Ibid.
49Ibid.
50Regional Centre for Mapping of Resources for Development, “RCMRD attends the 6th African
Leadership Conference in Egypt,” http://www.rcmrd.org/archives/380-rcmrd-attends-the-6th-afri
can-leadership-conference-in-egypt (accessed September 8, 2018).
51Martinez, “The African Leadership Conference on Space Science and Technology for Sustainable
Development,” 35.
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determined at that time that an African Space Agency would be premature, and not a
necessity for space-related cooperation in light of the ARMS-C and (at the time) the
bid for the Square Kilometre Array.52 The output of that ALC was the Mombasa
Declaration, which “is essentially an affirmation of the commitment of Africa’s
space leaders to take concrete and collective action to address a number of needs and
challenges”.53 Eight broad areas were identified, along with a range of actions,
which are presented in Table 2.1. These actions, committed to by the participants
of the ALC (including Algeria, Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Tanzania, Sudan,
Ghana, Burkina Faso, Morocco, and Kenya), are worth outlining here in detail
since they encapsulate the commitments related to space by the major space-related
African actors. Some of these themes will be discussed later in this chapter, and
others will be elaborated on in the next two chapters.
At the 2015 ALC in Egypt, additional measures were adopted, as encapsulated in
the ALC—2015 Resolution listed in Table 2.2.
While the ALC is an important forum for space affairs in Africa, as a pan-African
forum, it must confront four particular challenges. First, the great linguistic, indus-
trial, and economic differences in Africa present a challenge to the ALC as it
attempts to foster cooperation, although it has crucially been noted that “the partic-
ipants in the ALC feel a common bond of being Africans and facing a set of common
African challenges”.54 This is directly related to the spirit of ubuntu. Second, the
ALC continues to face the challenge of integrating itself into the continent’s political
structures and of promoting space in the development agendas of the AU and
NEPAD.55 Third, the ALC is grappling with the challenge of increasing and
broadening the participation of African countries, since it “is still a very long way
away from having representation from all 5[4] African countries”, partly due to
expensive intra-African travel costs and linguistic barriers.56 Fourth, the ALC
continues to face challenges around building sufficient capacity to implement its
recommendations and to conduct its work in-between sessions.57
The most recent ALC was hosted by Nigeria in November 2018, where a range of
issues were discussed such as leveraging on a regional space programme for the
sustainable development of Africa, growing the space science sector in Africa by
Africans and for the African continent, the role of the start-ups/commercial space
ecosystem in the proposed African Space Agency, key elements for the successful
implementation of the African space programme, long-term sustainability of the
African Space Policy and Strategy, and discussions on Space Resource Mining
52Ibid., 36.
53Ibid.
54Martinez, “The African Leadership Conference on Space Science and Technology for Sustainable
Development,” 36.
55Ibid.
56Ibid.
57Ibid.
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Table 2.1 Actions related to African space arena, Mombasa Declaration
1. For protection of Africa’s natural environ-
ment and the collective management of the
continent’s resources for sustainable socio-
economic development, action should be taken:
a. To develop and implement the African
Resource Management Constellation
b. To make maximum use of existing capabil-
ities in worldwide satellite coverage
c. To assess the infrastructure related to data
availability, archiving, and dissemination in
Africa, particularly in regard to freely available
fundamental data
d. To promote data exchange among African
countries and to develop data exchange poli-
cies and models
2. For the enhancement of human security,
development, and welfare, action should be
taken:
a. To improve public health services by
expanding and coordinating space-based ser-
vices for telehealth and telemedicine
b. To implement an integrated regional disaster
management system, in coordination with
existing international efforts, such as
UN-SPIDER and its Regional Support Offices
in Africa
c. To improve literacy and enhance education
by implementing and coordinating satellite-
based tele-education programmes and the
related ground-based infrastructure
3. For the development of Africa’s human cap-
ital resources in space science and technology,
action should be taken:
a. To improve access to high-level education
and training in space science and technology
on the continent
b. To acknowledge and harness the expertise
already present on the African continent
through the development of a comprehensive
database of African space science and tech-
nology experts
c. To align with existing human capital devel-
opment initiatives of the African Union
d. To utilise existing training centres in Africa
and to promote greater cooperation among
education and training institutions to develop
appropriate training programmes in space sci-
ence and technology that respond to Africa’s
needs
e. To encourage African countries to increase
their utilisation of and support for the Regional
Centres for Space Science and Technology
Education, affiliated to the United Nations,
located in Morocco and Nigeria
f. To promote knowledge sharing through
regional space conferences and through schol-
arly interaction among African institutions
g. To support the existing networks and asso-
ciations of space professionals in Africa
h. To encourage the development and
(continued)
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Table 2.1 (continued)
implementation of university curricula in space
science and technology in Africa
4. For the advancement of scientific knowledge
of outer space and to protect the space envi-
ronment for future generations, action should be
taken:
a. To promote and strengthen intra-African
cooperative activities in areas such as astron-
omy, space physics, and the study of near-
Earth objects and to encourage participation of
African institutions in global lunar and plane-
tary exploration efforts
b. To protect the near-Earth space environment
through responsible actions in outer space,
including the implementation of the Space
Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the United
Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, and other established interna-
tional best practices in this regard
c. To ensure that the activities of African States
do not introduce electromagnetic interference
that may disrupt space applications or interfere
with Earth observation in certain bands or with
ground-based astronomical activities
5. For the advancement of the widest possible
adherence to international treaties governing
the use of outer space for peaceful purposes,
action should be taken:
a. To encourage African States to accede to the
existing United Nations treaties governing the
peaceful uses of outer space in order to protect
their legitimate rights and interests in space
activities
b. To encourage African states to develop
national policies and regulatory frameworks to
govern the activities of States and their space
agencies at the level of domestic legal order
and to regulate such activities under their legal
jurisdictions
c. To encourage closer cooperation and dia-
logue between universities and institutions
with established space law programmes and
those wishing to develop such programmes, for
the benefit of students and professionals in the
public and private sector
d. To promote overall capacity building in
space law in Africa, for which regional coor-
dination and cooperation could play an impor-
tant role
6. For the enhancement of public awareness of
the importance of space activities, action should
be taken:
a. To promote the celebration, in all African
countries, of World Space Week, proclaimed
by the United Nations General Assembly to be
celebrated annually from October 4 to 10
b. To increase awareness among decision-
makers and the general public in Africa of the
importance of utilising space infrastructure to
improve the common economic and social
welfare of humanity
c. To encourage all African countries to
(continued)
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Table 2.1 (continued)
provide their children and youth, of both gen-
ders, with opportunities to learn more about
space science and technology and its impor-
tance to human development, as an investment
in the future
d. To develop a mechanism for the sharing of
experiences, knowledge, and resources to
improve space awareness in Africa
7. For the strengthening of space activities in
the African Union, action should be taken:
a. To establish, within the African Union, the
African Leadership Conference on Space Sci-
ence and Technology for Sustainable Devel-
opment as a consultative mechanism on space
science and technology
b. To encourage participation of a greater
number of African states in the ALC though
engagement with the African Union
c. To establish a special African Union fund for
the purpose of implementing the recommen-
dations of the ALC conferences
8. For the strengthening of African participation
in the United Nations Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS)
and other global space fora, action should be
taken:
a. To reaffirm the importance for African
member states of UNCOPUOS and to partici-
pate actively in the sessions of UNCOPUOS
and its Scientific and Technical Subcommittee
and Legal Subcommittee
b. To promote better coordinated African par-
ticipation in UNCOPUOS and other global
space fora, to ensure that the agendas in those
fora address Africa’s needs and to engage in
those fora with well-developed African posi-
tions on key issues
c. To affirm, through statements in
UNCOPUOS, the value of the United Nations
Programme on Space Applications for Africa
and the importance of ensuring the provision of
adequate resources for the continuation of this
Programme
d. To take note of the outcomes and recom-
mendations of other regional conferences for
Asia and the Pacific and Latin America and the
Caribbean that are relevant to efforts to pro-
mote cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer
space at the regional, interregional, and global
levels
African Leadership Conference, “The Mombasa Declaration on Space and Africa’s Development”,
Space Policy 28, (2012): 68–69. Emphasis added
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(SRM), among others.58 Ethiopia was selected as host for the eighth ALC in 2019
(Fig. 2.4).
In relation to the primary needs model, the ALC is a critical forum that speaks to
all primary needs, as evidenced by the Mombasa Declaration. The ALC fulfils the
critical needs of raising awareness of the importance of space among political
leaderships, exchanging ideas and building dialogue, and enhancing intra-African
cooperation. None of the primary needs can be addressed without these functions.
Moreover, by committing to the Mombasa Declaration, a number of countries
(including Algeria, Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Tanzania, Sudan, Ghana, Burkina
Faso, Morocco, and Kenya) have undertaken to “harness space science and technol-
ogy for the betterment of the human condition in Africa”.59
The ALC also has a Youth Forum (ALC-YF), which was formed to be a platform
for young space sector professionals and students to “interact, share knowledge and
experiences, and contribute towards space development in the continent”, and this
Table 2.2 Measures adopted at the 2015 ALC in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt
1. To pursue the establishment of the African Leadership Conference on Space Science and
Technology for Sustainable Development as a think-tank and a consultative body for the benefits
of the African governmental entities and institutions on space science and technology and its
applications
2. To finalise the constitution of the African Leadership Conference (ALC)
3. To encourage greater participation of African states, institutions, and professionals in the ALC
4. To assist the capacity development of African Young Professionals and African Women in
Aerospace and encourage gender equity in space science and technology
5. To encourage the establishment of the African Space Agency
6. To encourage the participation of the African Diaspora in the implementation of space science
and technology on a continental level
7. To encourage the Pan-African University Space Sciences to partner with other relevant African
universities
8. To promote intra-Africa cooperation as well as collaboration with other regional and interna-
tional organisations
9. To promote coordination between the Institute of African Research and Studies, Cairo
University in Egypt, and other relevant African universities to conduct and prepare studies in
space policies and strategies
10. To recommend strengthening of Africa’s flagship projects and initiatives in space communi-
cation and navigation
African Leadership Conference, “ALC—2015 Resolution,” 2015, http://www.alc.narss.sci.eg/
webroot/attachments/ALC2015-Egypt-Declaration.pdf (accessed September 12, 2018)
58Space in Africa, “All about the ongoing African Leadership Conference on Space Science and
Technology,” Africa Space News, November 6, 2018, https://africanews.space/all-about-the-ongo
ing-african-leadership-conference-on-space-science-and-technology/ (accessed December
6, 2018).
59African Leadership Conference, “The Mombasa Declaration on Space and Africa’s Develop-
ment,” 68.
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effort is based on the recognition that “in the future, young professionals will take up
the leadership of ALC”.60 The specific focus of the ALC-YF is on serving “as a
platform for youth participation in space issues and policies in Africa”, to “influence
government decisions through public campaigns organized for the citizens, and
lobbying the members of the political class” and to “provide opportunities for
African students and young professionals to contribute to space development
(satellite technology, space sciences, space law, etc.) in Africa”.61
Fig. 2.4 Host states of the African Leadership Conference (ALC)
60African Leadership Conference Youth Forum, “Home.”
61African Leadership Conference Youth Forum, “Vision, Mission and Objectives,” https://
alcyouthforum.wordpress.com/about/objectives/ (accessed September 13, 2018).
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The Square Kilometre Array (SKA)
The SKA represents the goal of 12 member states and over 100 organisations from
about 20 countries to build the world’s largest radio telescope with an eventual
collecting area of over one square kilometre.62 The 12 member states are represented
on the SKA Board of Directors by national organisations. These member states and
their representative organisations are Australia (Department of Industry and Sci-
ence), Canada (National Research Council), China (Ministry of Science and Tech-
nology of the People’s Republic of China), France (National Centre for Scientific
Research), India (National Centre for Radio Astrophysics), Italy (National Institute
for Astrophysics), New Zealand (Ministry of Economic Development), South Africa
(National Research Foundation), Spain (Ministry of Science, Innovation and Uni-
versities), Sweden (Onsala Space Observatory), the Netherlands (Netherlands Orga-
nisation for Scientific Research), and the United Kingdom (Science and Technology
Facilities Council).63 A variety of developed and developing countries are thus
participating in the project.
What makes the SKA project particularly exciting for intra-African space rela-
tions is that while both South Africa and Australia were selected as co-hosts for the
array, due to factors including “atmospherics above the desert sites, through to the
radio quietness, which comes from being some of the most remote locations on
Earth”,64 eight other African countries will also host extended facilities (Botswana,
Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, and Zambia).65 This
is depicted in Fig. 2.5. The SKA thus represents an international partnership both
globally and within Africa, and while it promises to expand our knowledge on a
range of topics, including “insight into the formation and evolution of the first stars
and galaxies after the Big Bang, the role of cosmic magnetism, the nature of gravity,
and possibly even life beyond Earth”,66 it also promises spin-off benefits to the
participating countries and space communities since large-scale astronomy projects
“in addition to the scientific benefits . . . also provide lucrative opportunities for local
industry”67 and skills development.
Prior to being awarded the right to co-host the SKA, South Africa had constructed
the Karoo Array Telescope (KAT), in particular the KAT-7 (a seven-dish array),
which was “the world’s first radio telescope array consisting of composite antenna
62Square Kilometre Array, “The SKA Project,” 2018, https://www.skatelescope.org/the-ska-pro
ject/ (accessed September 9, 2018).
63Square Kilometre Array, “Square Kilometre Array Project,” 2018, https://www.skatelescope.org/
participating-countries/ (accessed September 9, 2018).
64Square Kilometre Array, “The SKA Project.”
65Square Kilometre Array, “Africa,” 2018, https://www.skatelescope.org/africa/ (accessed
September 9, 2018).
66Square Kilometre Array, “SKA Science,” 2018, https://www.skatelescope.org/science/ (accessed
September 9, 2018).
67Peter Martinez, “Space Science and Technology in South Africa: An Overview,” African Skies/
Cieux Africains, 2008, no. 12: 47.
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structures”.68 This was also accompanied by “an extensive human capital develop-
ment programme” in an effort to bolster support for the South African bid for the
SKA.69 The KAT-7 was an “important testing ground” for the MeerKAT array of
64 dishes, currently under construction, and which now forms part of the first phase
of the SKA.70 This will be integrated into the SKA1 MID, which will be the SKA’s
mid-frequency instrument (the low-frequency aperture array antennas will be hosted
Fig. 2.5 Square Kilometre Array locations across Africa. Based on: Brian Sandberg,
“South Africa—home to “The Greatest Know on Earth”?,” Viva Afrika, May 31, 2012, https://
vivaafrika.wordpress.com/tag/square-kilometre-array/ (accessed September 9, 2018)
68Square Kilometre Array South Africa, “KAT-7,” http://www.ska.ac.za/gallery/kat-7/ (accessed
September 9, 2018).
69Martinez, “Space Science and Technology in South Africa,” 47–48.
70Square Kilometre Array, “Africa.”
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by Australia), and will be complemented with an additional 130 dishes, bringing the
SKA MID1 up to almost 200 dishes in the Karoo region of South Africa.71 Phase
1 of the SKA is expected to be completed by 2023.72 Phase 2 will see the construc-
tion of about 2000 dishes across Africa and up to 250 Mid-Frequency Aperture
Array Stations also in Africa (although these are not confirmed).73 Phase 2 is
expected to last until the late 2020s.74
The MeerKAT project has already started to produce a cadre of “young scientists
and engineers with world-class expertise in the technologies which will be crucial in
the next 10–20 years, such as very fast computing, very fast data transport, large
networks of sensors, software radios and imaging algorithms”.75 In addition, the
African SKA Human Capital Development Programme has awarded nearly 1000
grants between 2005 and 2017 for studies in fields of astronomy and engineering,
from undergraduate to post-doctoral levels, and “[a]stronomy courses are being
taught as a result of the SKA Africa project in Kenya, Mozambique, Madagascar
and Mauritius (which has had a radio telescope for many years) and are soon to start
in other countries”.76 With an estimated total value of €2 billion, and an annual
operations cost of between €150 million and €200 million, the SKA is a formidable
and valuable project for African-participating countries.77 It is also a powerful
catalyst for astronomy and space science development on the continent, as well as
skills development, as witnessed by the fact that “1054 (as at February 2018)
students have benefited from SKA South Africa bursaries and scholarships, includ-
ing many students from other African countries”.78 In terms of the primary needs
model, the SKA thus speaks directly to both education and space-related capacity
building. This includes the fostering of valuable skills in fields related to astronomy,
including computer science, statistics, and eResearch technologies.79 It also
“increases the prospects of science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM)
education in Africa”.80
71Ibid.
72Square Kilometre Array, “SKA Technology,” 2018, https://www.skatelescope.org/technology/
(accessed September 9, 2018).
73Square Kilometre Array, “The Location of the SKA,” 2018, https://www.skatelescope.org/loca
tion/ (accessed September 9, 2018).
74Square Kilometre Array, “SKA Technology.”
75Square Kilometre Array South Africa, “The Project,” https://www.ska.ac.za/about/the-project/
(accessed September 9, 2018).
76Ibid.
77Samuel Oyewole, “Space Research and Development in Africa,” Astropolitics 15, no. 2 (2017):
194.
78Square Kilometre Array South Africa, “Research and study opportunities,” https://www.ska.ac.
za/students/ (accessed September 9, 2018).
79University of the Western Cape, “Three SA Universities join forces to bolster SKA,” 2013,
https://www.uwc.ac.za/News/Pages/Three-SA-universities-join-forces-to-bolster-SKA.aspx
(accessed September 12, 2018).
80Oyewole, “Space Research and Development in Africa,” 199.
122 2 The African International Space Ecosystem
Annual ministerial meetings are held between the nine African partner countries,
with the fifth, and most recent, being held in October 2018. There, all countries
pointed to “financial constraints as a major obstacle to the full rollout of the AVN
project [African Very Long Baseline Interferometry Network], [but] they were
unanimous that progress was being made”, and another initiative funded by
South Africa and the United Kingdom “aimed at developing radio astronomy
capacity in partner countries, namely the Development in Africa through Radio
Astronomy (DARA) programme” was noted.81 The importance of the Big Data
Africa project was noted by the ministers, for “both astronomy as well as more
general preparations for the fourth industrial revolution”, and “[g]iven the signifi-
cance of big data and cyber infrastructure in economic development at both national
and regional level, it was agreed that South Africa and Namibia would explore ways
of integrating the Big Data Africa activities in Southern Africa into the SADC
Industrialisation Strategy, taking into account prior work within SADC, and liaising
with the other members of SADC”.82 Thus, the SKA project presents spin-off
benefits for the entire region.
AfriGEOSS
AfriGEOSS represents the African Earth Observation community within the Global
Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS).83 AfriGEOSS is an initiative
“developed within the GEO [Group on Earth Observations] framework, [which]
will strengthen the link between the current GEO activities with existing capabilities
and initiatives in Africa” in order to “provide the necessary framework for countries
and organizations to access and leverage ongoing bilateral and multilateral EO-based
initiatives across Africa, thereby creating synergies and minimizing duplication for
the benefit of the entire continent”.84 It also serves “as the gateway into Africa for
International partners and as a platform for Africa’s participation in GEO”.85 More
specifically, AfriGEOSS identifies the following vision and goal:
81Space in Africa, “Joint media statement on the outcomes of the 5th Ministerial Meeting of the
Square Kilometre Array (SKA) African Partner Countries,” Africa Space News, October 25, 2018,
https://africanews.space/joint-media-statement-on-the-outcomes-of-the-5th-ministerial-meeting-of-
the-square-kilometre-array-ska-african-partner-countries/?
fbclid¼IwAR0oKjmgRzEYsTsOnP5TNbRd4Z2_FrupnBh1pvFWyiTgvkTWp1s0-jMQ08A
(accessed December 7, 2018).
82Ibid.
83AfriGEOSS, “About AfriGEOSS,” Group on Earth Observations, http://www.earthobservations.
org/afrigeoss.php (accessed September 9, 2018).
84Ibid.
85Ganiy I. Agbaje and Olusoji N. John, “Cooperation in Earth Observation Missions in Africa: A
Role for AfriGEOSS,” GeoJournal, 2017: 7.
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a continent where decisions on policy and implementation programs, involving the produc-
tion, management and use of Earth observation, are taken with the involvement of all
stakeholders, through a coordination framework enabling the linkage country-region-conti-
nent that AfriGEOSS wants to build. This is expected to be realized, in the medium-long
term, by strengthening and enlarging the role of the existing national, regional and conti-
nental institutions.86
AfriGEOSS aims to provide the necessary framework for African countries and organiza-
tions as well as international partners to access and leverage on-going local and international
bilateral and multilateral EO-based initiatives across Africa, thereby creating synergies and
minimizing duplication for the benefit of the continent.87
Seven objectives are stated, namely, to (i) coordinate and bring together relevant
stakeholders, institutions, and agencies across Africa that are involved in GEO and
other Earth observation activities; (ii) provide a platform for countries to participate
in GEO and to contribute to GEOSS; (iii) assist in knowledge sharing and global
collaboration; (iv) identify challenges, gaps, and opportunities for African contribu-
tions to GEO and GEOSS; (v) leverage existing capacities and planned assets and
resources; (vi) develop an appropriate strategy and participatory model for achieving
the above goals; and (vii) develop a strategy of communication of the Earth
observation data in Africa.88
While the broader GEO initiative is comprised of over 100 national governments
and over 100 participating organisations, focused on “a future where decisions and
actions for the benefit of humankind are informed by coordinated, comprehensive
and sustained Earth observations”, AfriGEOSS has 27 African states as members
(Fig. 2.6).
The third AfriGEOSS Symposium was held in Libreville, Gabon, on June 26–28,
2018, focusing on the topic of building smarter Earth observations to support
sustainable development policies.89 Representatives from other African countries,
such as Rwanda and Togo,90 as well as organisations beyond Africa, such as the
European Space Agency (ESA) and the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration, were also present, with the latter agencies being involved in various training
sessions.91
86AfriGEOSS, “Vision, Goal and Objectives,” http://www.earthobservations.org/afrigeoss.php
(accessed September 9, 2018).
87Ibid.
88Ibid.
89AfriGEOSS, “3rd AfriGEOSS Symposium,” Group on Earth Observations, 2018, http://www.
earthobservations.org/documents/me_201806_afrigeoss/me_201806_afrigeoss_final_agenda.pdf
(accessed September 9, 2018).
90Ibid.
91AfriGEOSS, “Trainings sessions, 22–25 June 2018,” Group on Earth Observations, 2018, http://
www.earthobservations.org/documents/me_201806_afrigeoss/me_201806_afrigeoss_training_
schedule.pdf (accessed September 9, 2018).
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Accordingly, the broader GEO network has good African representation, as well
as intra-African relationships in the form of AfriGEOSS. GEO itself is predicated on
“creating a Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS) to better integrate
observing systems and share data by connecting existing infrastructures using
common standards”,92 and thus strong African participation is beneficial for the
continent. This is especially the case given that there “are more than 400 million
open data resources in GEOSS from more than 150 national and regional providers
Fig. 2.6 African member states of AfriGEOSS within the Group on Earth Observations.
AfriGEOSS, “Member Countries,” Group on Earth Observations, http://www.earthobservations.
org/afrigeoss.php# (accessed September 9, 2018)
92Group on Earth Observations, “About Us,” http://www.earthobservations.org/geo_community.
php (accessed September 9, 2018).
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such as NASA and ESA; international organizations such as WMO and the com-
mercial sector such as Digital Globe”.93
African participation within the broader GEO network, and more specifically
within the AfriGEOSS initiative, thus can once again directly link up with all aspects
of the primary needs model. Earth Observation (EO) data supports all facets of
climate, biodiversity, health, water, education, and capacity building, and by facil-
itating access and leveraging EO-based initiatives across Africa, as well as
organising symposia and training sessions, AfriGEOSS is strengthening Africa’s
capabilities in this arena, and the “initiative has been recognized [as] essential to
enhance Africa’s capacity for producing, managing and using Earth observations,
thus also enabling the Region’s participation in, and contribution to, the Global Earth
Observation System of Systems (GEOSS)”.94 Moreover, the importance of EO data
cannot be underestimated since “Africa remains the least mapped continent in the
world” with serious consequences—“if it can’t map, surely it can’t be managed”.95
Accordingly, all efforts in this field are critical given the power of remote sensing
technology to change “the way we think and solve problems related to the environ-
mental and sustainable stewardship of our planet”.96
The African Regional Institute for Geospatial Science and Technology
(AFRIGIST)
The AFRIGIST (formerly known as the Regional Centre for Training in Aerospace
Surveys—RECTAS) was founded under the auspices of the United Nations Eco-
nomic Commission for Africa (UNECA) in 1972 to act as an “educational ‘one-stop’
solution institution that trains highly skilled manpower in geospatial information
science and technology, and its applications”.97 It is based at the campus of Obafemi
Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria. While other educational institutions in Africa,
such as UNOOSA’s ARCSSTE, will be discussed in a later section due to their
forming part of a broader international network, AFRIGIST is an “inter-governmen-
tal joint institution for Africa”, operating on a bilingual (English and French) basis,
with membership open to all African countries.98 Currently, 11 African countries are
members of AFRIGIST—Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana,
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal (Fig. 2.7).
93Ibid.
94AfriGEOSS, “About AfriGEOSS.”
95Agbaje and John, “Cooperation in Earth Observation Missions in Africa,” 2.
96Pratistha Kansakar and Faisal Hossain, “A review of applications of satellite earth observation
data for global societal benefit and stewardship of planet earth,” Space Policy 36, (2016):53.
97African Regional Institute for Geospatial Science and Technology, “About Us,” 2018, https://
afrigist.org/about/# (accessed September 12, 2018).
98Ibid.
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Training packages (including e-learning options) are offered in a range of subject
areas of geospatial science technology, as are a range of courses—including Tech-
nologist Diploma (TD), Postgraduate Diploma (PGD), Professional Master (PM),
and Master’s of Science in Geo-Information Science (MGIS).99 AFRIGIST also
maintains a consultancy outfit named RECTAS Consult. Over 2200 trainees have
attended AFRIGIST, making it an important contributor to education as part of the
primary needs approach, since Geospatial Information Science and Technology is a
critical component in making use of EO data (thus indirectly also supporting the full
range of primary needs).
Fig. 2.7 Members of the African Regional Institute for Geospatial Science and Technology.
African Regional Institute for Geospatial Science and Technology, “About Us,” 2018, https://
afrigist.org/about/# (accessed September 12, 2018)
99Ibid.
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The Regional Centre for Remote Sensing of North Africa States
(CRTEAN)
Headquartered in Tunis, Tunisia, is the CRTEAN (Centre Régional de Télédétection
des Etats de l’Afrique du Nord), which is an international organisation with seven
North African member states (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Sudan,
and Tunisia—seen in Fig. 2.8).100 CRTEAN was founded in 1990.101 Organisations
from the member countries which are part of CRTEAN are the National Centre for
Mapping and Remote Sensing (CNCT), Tunisia; the Royal Centre for Remote
Sensing (CRTS), Morocco; Survey Department (SDL), Libya; the Ministry of
Housing and Urbanism and Reclamation Turabi, Mauritania; the National Authority
for Remote Sensing and Space Sciences (NARSS), Egypt; and the Sudan National
Survey Authority (SNSA), Sudan.102 Observer members of CRTEAN include
General Organisation for Remote Sensing (GORS) in Syria; General Authority for
Remote Sensing in Sudan; Libyan Centre for Remote Sensing and Space Sciences
(LCRSSS) in Libya; Yemen Centre for Remote Sensing and GIS (YRSC) in Yemen;
Fig. 2.8 Member states and other African state observers of CRTEAN. Regional Centre for
Remote Sensing of North Africa States, “The Centre: Composition”
100Regional Centre for Remote Sensing of North Africa States, “Home,” 2014, http://www.crtean.
org.tn/en/ (accessed September 12, 2018).
101Regional Centre for Remote Sensing of North Africa States, “The Centre: Presentation,” 2014,
http://www.crtean.org.tn/en/index.php/the-center/presentation (accessed September 12, 2018).
102Regional Centre for Remote Sensing of North Africa States, “The Centre: Composition,” 2014,
http://www.crtean.org.tn/en/index.php/the-center/composition1 (accessed September 12, 2018).
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International Space University (ISU), France; Mali (representative); and Senegal
(representative).103 The Arab Maghreb Union REC is also a partner.104 Its objectives
revolve around encouraging institutions in member states to (i) use remote sensing
techniques and upstream systems in the areas of sustainable development and
scientific research, (ii) promote technology transfer, and (iii) build capacity in
member states.105 More specifically, the Constitutive Act of CRTEAN stipulates
the objectives as listed in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3 Objectives stipulated in the constitutive act of CRTEAN
a. Promote the development of remote sensing activities in the member states and encourage them
to set up specialised national facilities
b. Promote the setting up of regional projects related to remote sensing and coordinate remote
sensing activities in the member state territories to improve the exploration, the inventory, and the
development of national natural resources that are of common economic interest to more than one
member state
c. Encourage multilateral and bilateral close relations between the member states in the field of
remote sensing as well as promote staff and know-how exchanges
d. Be informed of the existing potentials in the region, of the new technics [techniques] intro-
duced, and of the associated management methods. In addition, get the member states informed
through magazines, directories, and other publications, and encourage the national and optimal
use of the existing means based on self-reliance, according to the spirit of the Lagos Action Plan
[this was an Organisation of African Unity-backed plan to increase Africa’s self-sufficiency,
drafted in Lagos, Nigeria, in April 1980]
e. Enhance the flourishing of sciences alongside the mastering of geographical information at the
level of the member states
f. Enable member states to have access to remote sensing technics [techniques], and promote
training
g. Encourage continuous training as well as high-level training for member states’ nationals with
the participation of the operative organisations. Promote the holding of conferences, seminars,
exhibitions, and other scientific and technical events related to remote sensing at the national and
regional levels
h. Operate within the African Organisation of cartography and remote sensing along with the
international, regional, and operative organisations in order for the centre to be effectively
involved in the coordination of actions and projects of common interest targeting the member
states’ territories
i. Support the African Organisation of cartography and remote sensing to coordinate projects and
implement action plans related to the region and to the member states in the field of remote
sensing, and seek the assistance of international, regional, and operative organisations to guar-
antee the success of these projects
Regional Centre for Remote Sensing of North Africa States, “The Constitutive Act of the North
African Center of Remote Sensing (CRTEAN)”, http://www.crtean.org.tn/Nouveau/pdf/Texte_Jur.
En.pdf (accessed September 12, 2018)
103Ibid.
104Ibid.
105Regional Centre for Remote Sensing of North Africa States, “Home.”
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As outlined in the organisation’s 2013 General Strategy, there are ten identified
“Accessible fields from a research point of view” for which remote sensing appli-
cations can be of benefit, namely, environment, natural resources, agriculture,
periodic surveillance and security, geodesics and space, urbanisation and population
census, disaster monitoring, space science, space culture and community awareness,
and space legislation.106 CRTEAN thus directly supports the full range of primary
needs identified in Chap. 1, including education and capacity building, without
which remote sensing data cannot be effectively utilised. CRTEAN thus forms an
important North African hub for “international cooperation in the field of space
technology . . . to benefit from them as much as possible through the creation of
programs between Member States and these agencies”.107
SERVIR and the (Eastern and Southern African) Regional Centre
for Mapping of Resources for Development (RCMRD)
SERVIR is a result of a joint partnership between the US Agency for International
Development (USAID) and the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) and regional institutions in East Africa in order to “improve environmental
management and resilience to climate change”.108 The project was originally set up
in Latin America but was extended to Africa in 2008 when NASA and USAID
partnered with the Kenyan Regional Centre for Mapping of Resources for Develop-
ment (RCMRD) in Nairobi.109 SERVIR “integrates satellite observations and pre-
dictive models with other geographic information (sensor and field-based) to
monitor and forecast ecological changes and respond to natural disasters”110 and
applies to “multiple sectors and supports the objectives of the Intergovernmental
Group on Earth Observations (GEO) in the areas of agriculture, biodiversity, climate
change, disasters, ecosystems, health, water, and weather”.111 The Eastern and
Southern African hub caters primarily to:
better hydrologic estimation in the region, delivering data to aid flood forecasting, flood
relief and post-event flood mapping. It works to manage precious natural resources and to
promote sustainable development through dissemination of satellite information and ser-
vices among participating nations across the region—and throughout the continent as a
106Regional Centre for Remote Sensing of North Africa States, “General Strategy of the Regional
Center for Remote Sensing of North African States,” Regional Centre Administration, December,
2013, 19–22, http://www.crtean.org.tn/en/images/PDF/Strategy%20-%20english.pdf (accessed
September 12, 2018).
107Ibid., 9.
108Regional Centre for Mapping of Resources for Development, “SERVIR Eastern & Southern
Africa,” http://www.rcmrd.org/projects/servir-esa (accessed September 13, 2018).
109Agbaje and John, “Cooperation in Earth Observation Missions in Africa,” 3–4.
110Ibid., 4.
111Regional Centre for Mapping of Resources for Development, “SERVIR Eastern & Southern
Africa.”
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whole. The end result—reducing risks associated with famine and disease epidemics
springing up in the wake of drought and flood cycles to devastate the population.112
SERVIR builds on the strengths of the RCMRD, which aims to “promote
sustainable development in the member States through generation, application and
dissemination of geo-information and allied ICT technologies, products and ser-
vices” and which was founded in 1975 under UNECA auspices, followed by the
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and ultimately the African Union.113 The
RCMRD is an intergovernmental African hub of expertise and is “instrumental in
capacity building in resource survey, mapping, remote sensing, GIS and natural
resources assessment and management in Africa”, assisting with the setting up of
various national mapping agencies in Africa, and trains “more than 3000 technical
officers from its member States and other African countries in the fields of surveying
and mapping, remote sensing, GIS and natural resources assessment and Manage-
ment” yearly.114 It is comprised of 20 contracting member states and five
noncontracting member states, as outlined in Fig. 2.9.
Together, SERVIR and the RCMRD address all aspects of the primary needs
model. In its training capacity, the RCMRD plays a critical educational and capacity
building role in relation to surveying and mapping, remote sensing, GIS, and natural
resource assessment and management, while in its capacity of providing services on
a demand-driven basis, including problem-solving applications in natural resource
and environmental management, and together with SERVIR, environment, biodi-
versity, health, and water are all addressed. Its range of services cover “the fields of
surveying and mapping including aerial photography, photogrammetry, photo-
interpretation, first order geodesy, remote sensing, calibration and maintenance of
surveying and mapping equipment”115—which can be used in relation to the pri-
mary needs areas mentioned above.
The 11th RCMRD Conference of Ministers (held every 2 years) was held in
November 2018 in Kasane, Botswana, where over 100 senior government officials
and ministers in charge of Lands andMapping from Southern and Eastern Africa met
to discuss their new strategic plan for the period 2019–2022 as well as “the role of
mapping, remote sensing and GIS in the promotion of the economic development,
poverty reduction, environmental conservation, land management and administra-
tion in the region”.116 The 52nd meeting of the Governing Council (GC) of the
RCMRD and its committees was also held at the same venue to review and approve
“implementation of the 2018 Annual Work plan, consider and approve the 2019
112Jennifer Harbaugh, “SERVIR-Eastern and Southern Africa,” National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, August 4, 2017, https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/servir/africa.html (accessed
September 13, 2018).
113Regional Centre for Mapping of Resources for Development, “About Us,” http://www.rcmrd.
org/about-us/organization (accessed September 13, 2018).
114Ibid.
115Ibid.
116Space in Africa, “11th RCMRD Conference of Ministers Held in Kasane, Botswana,” Africa
Space News, November 23, 2018, https://africanews.space/11th-rcmrd-conference-of-ministers-
held-in-kasane-botswana/ (accessed December 7, 2018).
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Fig. 2.9 Member states of the RCMRD. Regional Centre for Mapping of Resources for Develop-
ment, “About Us,” http://www.rcmrd.org/about-us/organization (accessed September 13, 2018)
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Work Plan, receive the 2017 financial audit report, appoint senior staff and appoint
contractors for infrastructure projects at the Centre”.117
The African Centre of Meteorological Application for Development
(ACMAD)
ACMAD was founded in 1987 by the Conference of Ministers of UNECA and the
World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and has been based in Niamey, Niger,
since 1992.118 All African states are members of the organisation.119 ACMAD is a
weather and climate centre that is operated by a “staff complement of 12 persons
(experts and support personnel included)”, but this number can grow to 30 depending
on “personnel on attachment from National Meteorological Services and those on
On-the-Job training programmes”.120 Besides its African member states, ACMAD
also has a range of other partners, namely, foreign states (France, the United States,
the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany, Canada, China, Australia), various subre-
gional groupings including some RECs (SADC, ECOWAS, IGAD, CEMAC,
CILSS,121 COI), and a number of partner institutions (DMC, Harare, and IPCAC,
Nairobi; NBA, AGRHYMET CERMES, CRESA, EAMAC, ICRISAT, METEO,
France; IRD, MEDIAS, France; UKMO, INM, Espagne; NOAA, IRI CIMMS,
EUMETSAT, CEPMMT, PNUD, PNUE, WorldSpace).122
ACMAD’s mission is to provide weather and climate information and to promote
sustainable development in the context of national poverty eradication strategies, in
117Space in Africa, “Excerpts from 52nd RCMRD Governing Council meeting in Kasane,
Botswana,” Africa Space News, November 19, 2018, https://africanews.space/52nd-rcmrd-
governing-council-in-kasane-botswana/ (accessed December 7, 2018).
118African Center of Meteorological Application for Development, “About Us,” 2018, http://www.
acmad.net/new/?q¼en/pages/about-us (accessed September 13, 2018).
119While ACMAD’s website (Ibid.) states “ACMAD is composed of 53 Member States, the
53 countries of ‘Africa’ continent”, a presentation by the centre’s acting Director General indicates
all countries are members: B.L. Lamptey, “Weather and Climate Services in Africa,”African Center
of Meteorological Application for Development, June, 2017, https://www.google.com/url?sa¼t&
rct¼j&q¼&esrc¼s&source¼web&cd¼8&cad¼rja&uact¼8&
ved¼2ahUKEwiRorPMvLjdAhUpCcAKHWiYCRoQFjAHegQIAxAC&url¼ftp%3A%2F%
2Fftp.earthobservations.org%2FAfriGEOSS%2Fafrigeoss2017%2FFinal%2520Proceedings%
2FSession09%2520Climate%2520adaptation%2FS09-2%2520Lamptey_ACMAD%
2520AfriGEOSS2017.ppt&usg¼AOvVaw17hWpzNcnL9uY2LWvmJwtT (accessed September
13, 2018).
120African Center of Meteorological Application for Development, “About Us.”
121Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel, created in 1973 following
severe drought in the Sahel region, with its secretariat based in Burkina Faso, and with 13 member
states—Cape Verde, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Chad, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Senegal, and Togo; Le Comité Permanent Inter-Etats de Lutte contre la
Sécheresse dans le Sahel, “Présentation du CILSS,” 2018, http://www.cilss.int/index.php/640-2/
(accessed September 13, 2018).
122African Center of Meteorological Application for Development, “About Us.”
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the fields of agriculture, water resources, health, public safety, and renewable
energy.123 The centre also engages in capacity building of the National Meteorolog-
ical Services (NMS) of members, in terms of “weather prediction, climate monitor-
ing (extreme events. . .), transfer of technology (telecommunications, computing and
rural communication) and in research”.124 It also undertakes activities related to
(i) preparation and dissemination of products and services; (ii) development and
transfer of tools and technology to NMSs; (iii) monitoring communications with
users notably in rural communities; (iv) networking with NMSs and regional
development aid institutions; (v) provision of a window to technology partners,
under conditions which are typical of the African situation; (vi) supplementing
member states and partner's contributions through a resource mobilisation policy;
(vii) being a “nursery” for sustainable development of Africa; and (viii) utilising
climate and the environment as resources for development.125 Accordingly,
ACMAD’s services and activities are indicative of all levels of the primary needs
model.
The African Union Space Working Group (SWG)
The AU SWG originated from a recommendation by the Fourth African Ministerial
Conference on Science and Technology (AMCOST IV) in March 2010.126 The
working group was responsible for the drafting of the African Space Policy and
Strategy (ASPS), discussed in the previous chapter, and apart from organisations
such as the AU Commission, the UNECA, and the NEPAD Agency, ten states make
up the membership of the body, as indicated in Fig. 2.10.127 Membership in the body
thus indicates a level of recognised expertise in space affairs, a national interest in
shaping space policy, and in coordinating inputs from a variety of user sectors and
AU policy organs. Since the ASPS constitute key documents in relation to the
African space arena, and they speak to the full range of space activities on the
continent, the activities of the SWG can thus be argued to indirectly align with all
aspects of the primary needs model.
2.2.2 Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs)
This section will detail key African space-related NGOs and their alignment with the
primary needs model. Seven NGOs have been selected, including well-known ones
123Ibid.
124Ibid.
125Ibid.
126African Union, “The African Union Working Group on Space Meeting,” Press release No
137/2013, August 26, 2013, https://au.int/sites/default/files/newsevents/pressreleases/27555-pr-pr_
137-au_working_group_on_space_meeting.pdf (accessed September 13, 2018).
127Ibid.
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such as the African Association of Remote Sensing of the Environment (AARSE)
and smaller, less well-known ones such as the Foundation for Space Development.
Again, the goal is to demonstrate that African space activities extend to a diverse
range of fields and do not solely depend on governmental initiatives.
The African Association of Remote Sensing of the Environment (AARSE)
AARSE is a non-political scientific NGO founded in 1992, based in South Africa,
and motivated by the primary aim to “increase the awareness of African govern-
ments and their institutions, the private sector and the society at large, about the
empowering and enhancing benefits of developing, applying and utilizing
Fig. 2.10 Member states of the African Union Space Working Group. African Union, “The
African Union Working Group on Space Meeting,” Press release No 137/2013, August
26, 2013, https://au.int/sites/default/files/newsevents/pressreleases/27555-pr-pr_137-au_working_
group_on_space_meeting.pdf (accessed September 13, 2018)
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responsibly, the products and services of Earth Observation Systems and
Geo-information Technology”.128 Its specific objectives are outlined in Table 2.4.
AARSE has held biennial conferences across Africa since 1996, which constitute
“the largest and premier forum in the continent for researchers on remote sensing
technologies and geospatial information science, gathering leading scholars from the
remote sensing and related communities” in order to present achievements, discuss
challenges, and share experiences.129 AARSE also consists of four technical com-
mittees, in the fields of Capacity Building and Outreach; Applications and Algo-
rithm; Politics, Economics, and Entrepreneurship; and Sensors and Data.130 Past
AARSE conference locations are indicated in Fig. 2.11.
By stimulating research and discussions around remote sensing policies and
remotely sensed data and GIS in environmental and natural resources assessment,
and by providing an African forum for remote sensing professionals, as well as
hosting workshops, symposia, and tutorials, AARSE relates to all aspects of the
Table 2.4 Objectives of the African association of remote sensing of the environment
a. To create an enabling environment for the continent of Africa to derive benefits from and
contribute to international space science, technology, and application programmes
b. To assist its members as well as national, regional, and international user communities through
timely dissemination of scientific, technical, policy, and programme information in all aspects of
space science and technology
c. To provide a forum to address issues of common interest through the conduct of conferences,
seminars, and workshops
d. To promote greater cooperation and coordination of efforts among African countries, institu-
tions, and industries in the development of space technology and its application to natural
resources and environmental issues
e. To promote greater appreciation of the benefit of the technology, especially remote sensing and
geographic information system (GIS), in the pursuance of an African priority programme for
economic recovery and sustainable development
f. To exchange views and ideas on technology, systems, policy, and services of earth observation
systems and geoinformation science which are applicable to the betterment of Africa
g. To improve teaching and training in EO systems and geoinformation science and to collect,
evaluate, and disseminate results and failures in remote sensing activities from all over the world
h. To bring together experts in remote sensing, GIS, and environmental problems and foster good
understanding among the members
i. To promote or to organise public meetings and congresses with scientific reports
j. To conduct other remotely sensed and GIS activities consistent with its aims
African Association of Remote Sensing of the Environment, “Overview,” http://www.
africanremotesensing.org/page-1611993 (accessed September 12, 2018)
128African Association of Remote Sensing of the Environment, “Overview,” http://www.
africanremotesensing.org/page-1611993 (accessed September 12, 2018).
129African Association of Remote Sensing of the Environment, “AARSE Conferences,” http://
www.africanremotesensing.org/page-1612007 (accessed September 12, 2018).
130African Association of Remote Sensing of the Environment, “Technical Committees,” http://
www.africanremotesensing.org/Technical-Committees (accessed September 12, 2018).
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primary needs model. The effective use of remote sensing data speaks to environ-
mental, biodiversity, climate, water, and health issues, while workshops and tutorials
promote education and capacity building. This is especially critical since “[r]emote
sensing will play increasingly important roles in the solution to environmental
problems, the study of global climate change and the monitoring of natural
disasters”.131
The most recent AARSE conference was held in October 2018, in Alexandria,
Egypt, and was also attended by representatives of the African Union
Fig. 2.11 AARSE conference locations
131African Association of Remote Sensing of the Environment, “Why Join AARSE,” http://www.
africanremotesensing.org/Why-Join-AARSE (accessed September 12, 2018).
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Commission.132 At the conclusion of the successful conference, the AARSE Alex-
andria Declaration was accepted and called on the African Union and African
governments to (i) “support the implementation of the Pan African Space Policy
and Strategy and recognise the necessity for establishing the African Space Agency
to manage and coordinate the implementation”, (ii) “Urge African National Space
Agencies and Remote Sensing Organisations to contribute to the implementation of
the Pan African Space Policy and Strategy”, (iii) “Encourage the development of
national space policies and strategies flowing from and in line with the Pan African
Space Policy”, (iv) “Support the African Union Commission to strengthen Africa’s
space science and technology capabilities across the continent for the development
of African nations”, (v) “Ensure the realisation of the AU Agenda 2063 and the
African Action Plan on the UN Global Geospatial Information Management
(UN-GGIM)”, (vi) “Stimulate African dialogue on space as a front-runner for
innovation, technology development and job creation”, (vii) “Build and invest in
African capacity and capability, in both human resources and technology”, (viii)
“Encourage and support African universities and other institutions of higher educa-
tion through adequate funding for fundamental and applied research and teaching in
Earth Observation and geoinformation science and technology including the mea-
suring of the indicators for the targets to be achieved by the SDGs”, (ix) “Strengthen
public-private partnership in space related activities and service delivery by private
sector companies based on space-derived data”, (x) “Recognise the role of
specialised institutions at both the national and continental levels in geoinformation
and Earth Observation and the role that they can play with AARSE to improve the
knowledge and capacity in Africa”, (xi) “Increase local investments to complement
external investments to ensure sustainability of Earth Observation in Africa”, and
(xii) “Inspire Africa’s youth through innovative space based education and outreach
programs”.133 This declaration was unanimously accepted. The next AARSE con-
ference will be held in Rwanda in 2020.
The International Astronautical Federation (IAF) African Regional
Group
The IAF is one of the best-known space advocacy NGOs, founded to promote
dialogue on space research between its member organisations.134 The IAF has an
African regional group (along with an Asia-Pacific Regional Group and a Latin
American and Caribbean Regional Group), and these regional groups “review and
132Space in Africa, “12th AARSE International Conference commences today in Alexandria,
Egypt,” Africa Space News, October 25, 2018, https://africanews.space/12th-aarse-international-
conference-commences-today-in-alexandria-egypt/ (accessed December 7, 2018).
133African Association of Remote Sensing of the Environment, “AARSE Alexandria Declaration,”
October 29, 2018, presentation at 12th International AARSE Conference, Alexandria, Egypt.
134International Astronautical Federation, “History,” http://www.iafastro.org/about/history/
(accessed September 13, 2018).
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report to the IAF via its Bureau on the status of the space activities and technologies
in their region” while also submitting “recommendations to encourage and facilitate
cooperation in their region in the uses of outer space”.135 Regional groups also
undertake activities to “encourage institutions, corporations and individuals based in
their region, especially those from the developing nations, to take interest and
participate in the activities of the Regional Groups and in the wider framework of
IAF”.136 Finally, regional groups also “coordinate representatives of the region in
promoting space research and technology, formulating local demands in technology
and applications, define regional interests, discuss membership matters, political
priorities and stimulate proposals on potential venues for futures IACs”.137 It is not
clear which African organisations are currently (voluntary) members of the African
Regional Group, but Table 2.5 indicates the full list of IAF African members.
Due to the broad range of topics discussed at the IAF, it can be argued that it
relates to all aspects of the primary needs model. As indicated by the activities of the
regional groupings, the promotion of space research and technology, cooperation,
formulating demands and refining interests, and stimulating proposals can thus apply
to the full spectrum of space activities.
Table 2.5 African member organisations of the IAF
Algeria • Agence Spatiale Algérienne (ASAL)
Kenya • Kenya National Space Secretariat
Libya • Association of Arab Remote Sensing Centres (AARSC)
Mauritius • SpaceLand Africa
Morocco • Centre Royal de Télédétection Spatiale
Nigeria • The Federal University of Technology Akure (FUTA)
• Nigerian Meteorological Agency
South Africa • Denel Spaceteq
• South African National Space Agency (SANSA)
• South African Space Association (SASA)
• Space Commercial Services Holdings (Pty) Ltd
• Stellenbosch University
• University of the Western Cape
Tunisia • Centre National de la Cartographie et de la Télédétection (CNCT)
International Astronautical Federation, “Our Members”, http://www.iafastro.org/membership/
(accessed September 13, 2018)
135International Astronautical Federation, “IAF Regional Groups (2015–2018),” http://www.
iafastro.org/committees/iaf-regional-groups/ (accessed September 13, 2018).
136Ibid.
137Ibid.
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The Space Generation Advisory Council (SGAC) Africa
Also worthy of mention is the profit NGO SGAC which, in support of the United
Nations Programme on Space Applications, “aims to represent university students
and young space professionals ages 18–35 to the United Nations, space agencies,
industry, and academia” and is headquartered in Vienna, Austria.138 Conceived in
1999 at UNISPACE III, the SGAC “works diligently to raise awareness among the
next generation of space professionals on a global scale working together with the
United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) in promoting UN
workshops and activities, and in supporting SGAC members to attend UNOOSA
workshops, events and High Level Fora”.139 The organisation has an African
regional network with national points of contact in Algeria, Cameroon, Ethiopia,
Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria,
South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.140 Given the importance of
mobilising Africa’s youth, the African regional block within the SGAC fulfils a vital
role. The second African Space Generation Workshop (AF-SGW), organised by
Space Generation Advisory Council and held in Port-Louis, Mauritius, on December
17 and 18, 2018, has the theme “Launching Africa: Space Exploration, Innovation
and Business”.141 This is the largest gathering of young space professionals in
Africa, with delegates from over 20 countries, bringing together “around 100 dele-
gates, students (bachelor’s, master’s and doctoral degree candidates), young pro-
fessionals and industry representatives to examine, consider and collaboratively
stimulate interdisciplinary perspectives on space and scientific matters in the African
region”.142
The Foundation for Space Development
The Foundation for Space Development, founded in 2009, is a South African NGO
based in Cape Town, which aims to drive space awareness, outreach, and educa-
tion.143 It is currently focusing on four programmes, namely, Asteroid Mining,
138Space Generation Advisory Council, “About SGAC,” 2018, https://spacegeneration.org/about
(accessed December 7, 2018).
139Ibid.
140Space Generation Advisory Council, “Africa Region,” 2018, https://spacegeneration.org/
regions/africa (accessed December 7, 2018).
141Space in Africa, “5 reasons you should not miss the 2nd African Space Generation Workshop,”
Africa Space News, August 1, 2018, https://africanews.space/5-reasons-you-should-not-miss-the-
2nd-african-space-generation-workshop/ (accessed December 7, 2018).
142Ibid.
143Foundation for Space Development, “Foundation for Space Development,” Twitter, https://
twitter.com/developspacesa (accessed September 12, 2018).
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Space and Data, Disaster Management, and Africa 2 Moon.144 The last is a project to
raise funding for Africa’s first moon mission, with the aim of “sending an African
lander or orbiter to the Moon to stream live images back to classrooms on the
continent” whereby “the project also hopes to inspire young Africans”.145 The
project aims to achieve this by “transmit[ting] data from the surface of the moon
to micro satellites in orbit around the moon, which can then be relayed back to
Earth”.146 The activities of the Foundation for Space Development thus link up with
the educational aspect of the primary needs model, since “[i]nspiration leads to
education and in turn education leads to opportunity and economic empower-
ment”.147 Thus far, the foundation has raised over $25,000 via crowd funding.148
The Environmental Information System (EIS) AFRICA
EIS-Africa is a network consisting of individual professionals and organisations,
established in South Africa in 2000 to “improve the use of geospatial and environ-
mental information in order to enrich policy debate and support decision-making for
the well-being of Africa’s people”.149 It originated out of the EIS Programme for
sub-Saharan Africa (EIS-SSA) of the 1980s and 1990s, which saw experts develop-
ing what “was then called the National Environmental Action Plan (NEAPs) to
gauge the state of the environment and to measure climate change”.150 EIS-Africa
“evolved from an informal Advisory Group of experts into a World Bank funded
initiative, based in the United States”, but it proved “difficult to have an African
organisation trying to work locally while being based out of the U.S.”, which then
saw it being relocated to South Africa in 2000.151 Initially, the EIS Programme
focused on the environment but expanded this focus “to the broader geospatial field
and included Geographic Information Systems (GIS), Earth Observation, Remote
Sensing, and Photogrammetry”, meaning that EIS-Africa “focussed broadly on the
144Foundation for Space Development, “Programs,” https://developspacesa.org/programs/
(accessed September 12, 2018).
145Gareth van Zyl, “African moon mission project seeks funding,” Fin24, November 28, 2014,
https://www.fin24.com/Tech/News/African-moon-mission-project-seeks-funding-20141128
(accessed September 12, 2018).
146Foundation for Space Development, “Africa 2 Moon,” https://developspacesa.org/africa2moon/
(accessed September 12, 2018).
147Africa2Moon, “Africa’s First Moon Mission,” Foundation for Space Development, https://
africa2moon.developspacesa.org/ (accessed September 13, 2018).
148Ibid.
149Sives Govender, “EIS Africa aims to improve use of geospatial and environmental information
in Africa,” Geospatial World, December 2, 2014, https://www.geospatialworld.net/article/eis-
africa-aims-to-improve-use-of-geospatial-and-environmental-information-in-africa/ (accessed
September 13, 2018).
150Ibid.
151Ibid.
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use of Geospatial Science and Technology and the coordination thereof to support
sustainable development in Africa”.152 Its efforts are to support “capacity building,
networking, influencing policy strategy and project activities contributed to this
broad role”.153
EIS-Africa also hosts a biennial conference, AfricaGIS, first held in Tunis in
1993, which brings geospatial experts from around the globe to Africa, and includes
a week of training, workshops, and demonstrations, as well as the exhibition of about
50 organisations.154 Other initiatives have included (i) establishing of fully func-
tional training units to meet the acute and perennial need for trained personnel
(Madagascar, Tanzania, Ghana); (ii) creation of a complete series of environmental
datasets (Madagascar and Ghana); (iii) environmental information system operations
becoming an integral part of a State of Environment reporting process founded on
national legislation (Uganda); (iv) development of a platform for sharing environ-
mental and geospatial data on the internet (known as SISEI in French), as part of a
virtual clearing-house mechanism in support of the implementation of its National
Environmental Action Program (NEAP) (Benin); (v) extending applications to
support national-level investment and tourism promotion, as well as tax collection
at the local level (Côte d’Ivoire); and (vi) supporting the development of the Greater
Banjul Master Plan to identify waste disposal sites for the city of Banjul (The
Gambia).155 Given its broad-ranging activities, including training efforts,
EIS-Africa is thus fully aligned with all aspects of the primary needs model.
The African Space Foundation (ASF)
The ASF was founded by Adigun Ade Abiodun who, among other achievements,
was the Nigerian Chairman of UNCOPUOS between June 2004 and June 2006.156
The ASF was founded to “support the aspirations of African countries to be active
participants in the space enterprise, and to enrich Africa in its knowledge, contribu-
tions and use of space science and technology for its sustainable development”.157
Its mission is to encourage African states to build partnerships on the continent as
well as with relevant global entities, while encouraging African states to “be active
participants in the exploration and use of the space environment for the benefit of the
African people”.158 The ASF focuses on three particular areas, namely, (i) awareness
152Ibid.
153Ibid.
154Ibid.
155EIS-Africa, “About Us,” 2018, http://www.eis-africa.org/about/ (accessed September 13, 2018).
156African Space Foundation, “ASF Founder,” https://www.africanspacefoundation.org/about-asf-
founder (accessed September 12, 2018).
157African Space Foundation, “About African Space Foundation,” https://www.
africanspacefoundation.org/about-asf (accessed September 12, 2018).
158Ibid.
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and knowledge generation and acquisition, so that African states can recognise the
role of space science and technology in development and its potential to solve an
array of human problems and generate knowledge related to the social, economic,
and strategic development needs of Africa; (ii) public and private investment in
infrastructure and organisation, to encourage African states to pursue public and
private investments in relevant science and technology infrastructure, including the
evolution of collaborative organisational arrangements open to all participants; and
(iii) dissemination and application of knowledge, so as to facilitate the adoption and
application of pertinent new and emerging space technologies that will rapidly
connect and inform communities that are presently isolated in order to raise the
living standards and unleash the creative potential and imagination of all
Africans.159
Women in Aerospace Africa (WIA Africa)
Women in Aerospace (WIA) was founded in 1985 in the United States with the goal
to “connect women in aerospace-related professions, raise their visibility within the
sector, promote their advancement, and attract other women to its ranks”. Today it is
comprised of about 2000 individual members representing 250 companies and more
than 80 corporate members.160 A broad range of aerospace issues are covered by
WIA, including human space flight, aviation, remote sensing, satellite communica-
tions, robotic space exploration, and related policy issues.161 WIA consists of a
range of global networks, including Women in Aerospace Africa.
WIA Africa operates with the mission to expand the opportunities of women in
aerospace in Africa and supports the following objectives: (i) increase undergraduate
and postgraduate opportunities for African women in aerospace and engineering,
(ii) implement graduate internship programme, (iii) work with industry and govern-
ment to increase employment opportunities for women in aerospace and engineer-
ing, and (iv) implement school-level awareness programme for young women.162
Chapters exist in Nigeria, South Africa, Ethiopia, Botswana, South Sudan, Kenya,
Egypt, Ghana, Cameroon, and others, and WIA met at the sidelines of the ALC held
in Nigeria in November 2018, to discuss “key issues to promote women participation
in the Aerospace industry in Africa”.163
159Ibid.
160Women in Aerospace, “History,” 2018, https://www.womeninaerospace.org/about/history.html
(accessed September 12, 2018).
161Women in Aerospace, “Home,” 2018, https://www.womeninaerospace.org/ (accessed
September 12, 2018).
162Women in Aerospace Africa, “Overview,” http://wia-africa.org/resources/Women-in-Aero
space-Africa_Overview.pdf (accessed September 12, 2018).
163Space in Africa, “Women in Aerospace Africa meets at ALC – to organize 1st regional workshop
in 2019,” Africa Space News, November 7, 2018, https://africanews.space/women-in-aerospace-
africa-meets-at-alc-to-organize-1st-regional-workshop-in-2019/ (accessed December 7, 2018).
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Attendance included “about 50 participants from 10 countries”, with a goal to
organise the first regional workshop in 2019.164
2.2.3 Intra-African Space Engagement (IASE) Matrix
The foregoing discussion aimed to provide an overview of the key IGOs and NGOs
operating in the space arena within Africa. While some of them, like SERVIR, were
instigated from outside the continent, the key criterion for the IGOs was that they
bind African states together in some way and promote intra-African relations in the
space arena, while for NGOs it was that they advance the cause of space in Africa in
some way. All of them were shown to relate to the components of the primary needs
model presented in Chap. 1, and, in fact, most of them promote all the components of
climate, biodiversity, health, water, education, and space-related capacity building
either directly or indirectly. In this section, the first goal will be to present the Intra-
African Space Engagement (IASE) Matrix, derived from the above discussion of the
IGOs and NGOs. This will facilitate the second goal, which is to link up to the
concepts of ubuntu and space middle powers discussed in Chap. 1 and to identify the
emerging space middle powers in Africa. This in turn will link up to the discussion of
African relationships and participation in international fora in the next section.
Here, a matrix is understood as the cultural, social, or political environment in
which something develops, in this case, specifically the use of space to meet primary
needs in Africa. The environment in this case is made up of the various IGOs and
NGOs discussed earlier, which all serve individually as vehicles for developing the
use of space and collectively as a web or network of African space-related organi-
sations, relationships, and activities. The next step is to explicate the methodology
used in the creation of the IASE Matrix.
While all of these organisations play critical roles in promoting space technolo-
gies, data, or skills, for the purpose of producing the IASE Matrix, two points will be
assigned to each African country for membership in an IGO or for hosting the
activities or conferences of an IGO (such as the ALC), whereas involvement in the
NGOs will be assigned one point. The reason for this distinction is because when a
state joins an organisation such as ARMS-C, it signifies greater national involvement
in promoting space activities than when their citizens found a space-related NGO
(such as the African Space Foundation). Of course, not all organisations are equiv-
alent in their status, membership, or activities, and so, for instance, AARSE, which is
a regular attendee at UNCOPUOS, plays a greater role than the African Space
Foundation. However, the aim is not to quantify the “value” of such organisations
for Africa but to provide a general indication of which countries are more active
players in intra-African space affairs and thus an image of patterns of intra-African
164Ibid.
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relations and activities. The IASE Matrix thus simplifies a very complex field in
order to facilitate comparison.
Moreover, while countries receive a score for participating in an organisation or
project, such as the SKA, they receive an additional point if they are a host nation.
This is because “experience with African continental organisations has shown that
the host country winds up shouldering the lion’s share of the financial burden of
sustaining such entities”.165 For the sake of analysis here, the same will apply to
NGOs, such as the AARSE, which is based in South Africa but has held conferences
across the continent. In this case, South Africa gets the extra point as a measure of
the vibrancy of the space sector in the country, while conference hosts also get one
point since this is an indication of interest in space fora and exchanges in the country.
In the case of EIS-Africa, points will also be awarded for the milestones achieved in
various countries. Table 2.6 presents the IASE Matrix.
From the IASE Matrix, it becomes apparent that every country in Africa is
involved in at least some capacity in the space sector, apart from being a user of
space data. A very clear picture also emerges in terms of which countries are leaders
in intra-African space engagement. This is a critical insight since the South African
Department of Trade and Industry has argued that “[t]he key element to successful
regional cooperation seems to be the emergence of one or more actors to take the
lead” while “[t]he most mature form of regional cooperation is one where countries
individually have significant space capabilities, but do not have the political will or
economic means to ‘go it alone’”.166 A potent example of this was the comment
made by Nigeria’s Communication Minister in 2001 when the country signed the
agreement ratifying the RASCOM Convention: “Nigeria played a major role in the
RASCOM project, as we are aware that the problems encountered by Africa can only
be overcome through a regional approach”.167 In other words, regional leaders are
critical in order to bind together the efforts of individual countries, precisely so that
they do not have to go it alone.
This is where the concept of emerging space middle powers comes to the fore. To
summarise from Chap. 1, a middle power is a country that is neither particularly
great nor small on the international stage in terms of its power, capacity, or influence,
which tends to uphold and support the international order or status quo. Thus middle
powers do not challenge but legitimise and stabilise that word order (this therefore
excludes states such as Iran, Venezuela, and North Korea). Middle powers also
strongly favour multilateral initiatives in order to build consensus and legitimacy.
However, there is a distinction between traditional (developed) and emerging
(developing) middle powers, in that emerging middle powers do not typically have
fully consolidated democracies; tend to place more emphasis on economic matters,
165Peter Martinez, “Is There a Need for an African Space Agency?,” Space Policy 28, (2012): 143.
166Department of Trade and Industry, Republic of South Africa, The International Space Land-
scape, 2009, Pretoria, South Africa: 8.
167Panafrican News Agency, “Nigeria Ratifies RASCOM Convention,” AllAfrica Global Media,
February 2, 2001, https://allafrica.com/stories/200102020033.html (accessed September 4, 2018).
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equity, and justice than on military or political ones; fall into the medium human
development category; are regionally dominant and tend to be drivers of regional
structures in which they are dominant; have a more neutral global posture; and are
more active participants of international organisations dominated by the South.
Based on these features, it is possible to produce a framework to identify and
classify the emerging space nations of Africa, based on the hypothesis that emerging
middle powers of Africa will carry forth these principles in their space postures as
well. Since this section focuses on intra-African relations, the posture of African
countries vis-à-vis the international order will only be discussed in the next section,
but the expectations on a regional level following from the hypothesis here is that
African space middle powers will (i) place a strong emphasis on the socio-economic
benefits of space technology as opposed to military or security objectives and
(ii) strongly favour and drive regional and continental efforts to create space
institutions and structures (including policy) in Africa while taking a leading or
dominant position in these. Based on the IASE score assigned to each country in
Table 2.6, it is possible to identify the “outliers” in intra-African space engagement,
shown in Fig. 2.12.
Figure 2.12, which also indicates the mean (8) and median (6.5) values, enables
the clear identification of those states that are engaged “above average” in the space
arena. The median value evenly splits the states of the continent into two groups, the
less engaged and the more engaged, while the mean further narrows the more
engaged group and identifies those states that are clear leaders in intra-African
space engagement. In descending order (or alphabetical in the case of similar
score), these are South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, Algeria, Egypt, Mauritius,
Tunisia, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Namibia, Niger, Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia, Tan-
zania, Zimbabwe, Burkina Faso, Republic of the Congo, Guinea Bissau, Mali,
Morocco, Senegal, and Zambia. Two important distinctions must be made here.
First, this score does not account for national space activities or infrastructure such as
satellites built, owned, or launched (encapsulated by Wood and Weigel’s Space
Technology Ladder—as applied in the next chapter—for instance), and second, it
does not take into account the power, capacity, or influence of the states on the
international stage.
In order to arrive at a conception of African emerging space middle powers, the
concept of power also needs to be accounted for. However, power can be defined in
many different ways and is highly subjective. For the purposes here, a study and
model used to score and rank countries developed by Y&R’s BAV Group and the
Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania will be utilised. Once again, it
should be emphasised that this is not being used to assign “value” to countries but to
gain a better understanding of emerging space middle powers in Africa. In that study,
80 countries were scored in a survey by over 21,000 respondents on 65 different
attributes, including perceived power, understood as a country being or having “a
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leader, economically influential, politically influential, strong international alliances,
strong military”.168 While the study did not include all countries, by virtue of making
the top 80, the countries on the list can already be seen as possessing some power to
be recognised. The following African countries made the list, along with their rank
out of 80: Egypt (25), South Africa (28), Nigeria (44), Algeria (54), Angola (57),
Morocco (60), Kenya (61), Tanzania (62), Ghana (63), and Tunisia (66).169 For the
purposes of the discussion here, the individual ranks will not be important, since
these 10 African countries can thus on some level all be perceived as relatively
powerful in some way. For reference, Tunisia at 66 was considered more powerful
than Chile (68), Czech Republic (69), or Slovenia (80). Figure 2.13 combines the
results of the IASE scores and the power rankings to identify Africa’s emerging
space middle power candidates based on their intra-African relations.
Based on the findings presented in Fig. 2.13, nine African emerging space middle
power candidates are identified according to their perceived international power and
IASE score. These are Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria,
South Africa, Tanzania, and Tunisia. However, this does not yet reflect the interna-
tional dimension of whether these countries actively support the international order
or status quo in space, and thus the next section will delve into this dimension and
complete the picture. Nevertheless, Fig. 2.13 does reveal six categories of African
states—those which are (i) more powerful and leaders in space engagement,
(ii) those which are more powerful and well-engaged, (iii) those which are more
powerful and not well-engaged, (iv) those which are less powerful and leaders in
space engagement, (v) those which are less powerful and well-engaged, and
(vi) those which are less powerful and not well-engaged. This is depicted in
Table 2.7.
Those states that are perceived as powerful and are leaders in their space
engagement are the above-mentioned candidates for Africa’s emerging space middle
powers—situated at the inner core of the continent’s network of space-related
organisations, relationships, and activities speaking to primary needs. In the outer
core are those 15 states that perform very well in their space engagement, but are not
considered to be very powerful, and thus in a sense these states are “punching above
their weight”, showing a concerted effort to take part in the continent’s space sector.
At the periphery lie those states that are less powerful and received an IASE score
below the median. These represent the untapped potential of the intra-African space
arena, since even though each state is engaged in some way as Table 2.6 showed,
these particular 27 states are at the lower end of the space engagement spectrum. In
this periphery, there is one very clear outlier however—Angola—which is perceived
as more powerful than Morocco, Kenya, Tanzania, Ghana, and Tunisia, yet which
168Deidre McPhillips, “Methodology: How the 2018 Best Countries Were Ranked,” U.S. News &
World Report L.P., January 23, 2018, https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/meth
odology (accessed September 14, 2018).
169U.S. News &World Report L.P., “Power Rankings,” 2018, https://www.usnews.com/news/best-
countries/power-full-list# (accessed September 14, 2018).
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has remained relatively poorly engaged in the space sector. An argument can thus be
made that Angola is the underperformer in space when measured against expecta-
tions of its power internationally. Between the core and periphery lies the semi-
periphery, with three less powerful states performing better than the median but not
better than the mean in their IASE scores. Benin, Libya, and Madagascar can thus be
argued to be rising African space actors.
In terms of the African RECs, all are represented by at least one emerging space
middle power candidate, with the notable exception of ECCAS. However, ECCAS
Fig. 2.13 Emerging space middle power candidates based on power perception and IASE score
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does have other outer core members (Table 2.8). The core states in each of the RECs
are thus the regional leaders called for by the South African Department of Trade and
Industry, and they are the drivers and promoters of infusing space into African
societies to assist meeting primary needs. This will also be seen in the following two
chapters when considering the individual national space infrastructures, activities,
and policies.
Before considering the concept of ubuntu, as elucidated in Chap. 1, it is useful to
summarise the main features. Ubuntu is characterised by (i) consensual decision-
making, with an accompanying strong emphasis on respect for national sovereignty
based on the continent’s colonial experience, with a strong focus on multilateralism,
(ii) groupthink with a premium on maintaining harmony and conformity, and (iii)
pan-African solidarity. From the discussion of African IGOs and NGOs, this pref-
erence for multilateralism, collective decision-making, and harmony is evident,
since all African states that have moved from “a spectator to a participant in
space—from a consumer to a sponsor of space technology” (as will be seen in
Chap. 3) have shown a willingness to engage in space-related networks, to share data
(such as through ARMS-C) or otherwise be active promoters and drivers of conti-
nental space initiatives. Thus, in essence, African states are not “going it alone”
when it comes to space efforts on the continent, and relationships are indeed a
cornerstone of understanding Africa’s relationship with space. However, this dis-
cussion cannot be completed without first considering the other major dimension of
African involvement in international fora, particularly UNCOPUOS, which will
round out the emerging space middle power concept.
Table 2.7 Six categories of African states based on power and space engagement
A. IASE above mean
B. IASE
above
median C. IASE below median
1. More
powerful
Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya,
Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa,
Tanzania, Tunisia
Angola
2. Less
powerful
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte
d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Guinea-
Bissau, Mali, Mauritius,
Namibia, Niger, Republic of the
Congo, Senegal, Sudan, Uganda,
Zambia, Zimbabwe
Benin,
Libya,
Madagascar
Botswana, Burundi, Cape Verde,
Central African Republic, Chad,
Comoros, Democratic Republic
of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial
Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Guinea,
Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauri-
tania, Mozambique, Rwanda, São
Tomé and Príncipe, Seychelles,
Sierra Leone, Somalia, South
Sudan, Swaziland, Gambia, Togo
2.2 Intra-African Space Relations and Activities 153
2.3 African Relationships and Participation
in International Space Fora
This section will consider the dimension of Africa’s relationships and participation
in international space fora. In terms of such fora, UNCOPUOS is by far the most
significant, having been founded in 1959 by the UN General Assembly to govern the
use of space and space exploration in line with the tenets of peace, security, and
Table 2.8 IASE categories per regional economic community (REC)
Core
Semi-
periphery Periphery
Arab Maghreb
Union (AMU)
Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia Libya Mauritania
Common Market
for Eastern and
Southern Africa
(COMESA)
Egypt, Kenya, Tunisia,
Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda,
Mauritius, Zambia,
Zimbabwe
Libya,
Madagascar
Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia,
Rwanda, Burundi, Comoros,
Seychelles, Democratic
Republic of the Congo,
Malawi, Swaziland
Community of
Sahel-Saharan
States (CEN-SAD)
Egypt, Ghana, Morocco,
Nigeria, Kenya,
Tunisia, Sudan, Niger,
Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire,
Guinea-Bissau, Senegal,
Mali
Benin,
Libya
Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia,
Central African Republic,
Comoros, Cape Verde, São
Tomé and Príncipe, Chad,
Togo, Liberia, Sierra Leone,
Guinea, Mauritania, Gambia
East African
Community
(EAC)
Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda South Sudan, Rwanda,
Burundi
Economic
Community of
Central African
States (ECCAS)
Cameroon, Republic of the
Congo
Rwanda, Burundi, Demo-
cratic Republic of the
Congo, Angola, Gabon,
Equatorial Guinea, São
Tomé and Príncipe, Central
African Republic, Chad
Economic
Community of
West African
States (ECOWAS)
Ghana, Nigeria, Burkina
Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-
Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal
Benin Guinea, Sierra Leone, Libe-
ria, Togo, Cape Verde,
Gambia
Intergovernmental
Authority on
Development
(IGAD)
Kenya, Uganda, Sudan,
Ethiopia
South Sudan, Djibouti, Eri-
trea, Somalia
Southern African
Development
Community
(SADC)
South Africa, Tanzania,
Mauritius, Namibia, Zam-
bia, Zimbabwe
Madagascar Lesotho, Swaziland,
Mozambique, Seychelles,
Botswana, Angola, Demo-
cratic Republic of the
Congo, Malawi
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development.170 It was also within UNCOPUOS that the core body of international
space law was shaped by the five major treaties.171 Alongside these treaties, five
more declarations and legal principles were adopted by the General Assembly.172,173
Two subcommittees, namely, the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee (STSC)
and Legal Subcommittee (LSC), work alongside the main UNCOPUOS committee
to address questions related to the scientific and technical aspects of space activities
and the legal questions related to the exploration and use of outer space, respectively.
The importance of UNCOPUOS as the “only committee of the General Assembly
dealing exclusively with international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer
space” cannot be overstated, given its role “as a forum to monitor and discuss
developments related to the exploration and use of outer space”.174 As such, this
section will analyse Africa’s involvement in this body, by way of the International
Space Engagement (ISE) Matrix, which supplements the previously discussed Intra-
African Space Engagement (IASE) Matrix by considering the international dimen-
sion of Africa’s space engagement. UNCOPUOS is especially important here
because middle powers are known by their global roles, not only their regional
ones, and the international order in outer space (and other fields) is embodied by the
UN. Moreover, since UNCOPUOS is the global governance forum for outer space,
its activities are comprehensive and highly relevant to all basic needs.
170United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, “Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space,” 2018, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/index.html (accessed September
18, 2018).
171(i) Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty, OST, entered into force
1967); (ii) Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of
Objects Launched into Outer Space (Rescue Agreement, ARRA, entered into force 1968); (iii)
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Liability Conven-
tion, LIAB, entered into force 1972); (iv) Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into
Outer Space (Registration Convention, REG, entered into force 1976); (v) Agreement Governing
the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Moon Treaty, MOON, entered into
force 1984).
172(i) Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Uses
of Outer Space (Declaration of Legal Principles, 1963); (ii) Principles Governing the Use by States
of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting (Broadcasting Princi-
ples, 1982); (iii) Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space (Remote
Sensing Principles, 1986); (iv) Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer
Space (Nuclear Power Sources, 1992); (v) Declaration on International Cooperation in the Explo-
ration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular
Account the Needs of Developing Countries (Benefits Declaration, 1996).
173United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, “Space Law Treaties and Principles,” 2018,
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties.html (accessed September 18, 2018).
174United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, “Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
and its Subcommittees,” 2018, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/comm-subcomms.
html (accessed September 18, 2018).
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2.3.1 Africa and UNCOPUOS
Currently, as of March 2019, UNCOPUOS has 92 member states, 18 of which are
African.175 Therefore, one third (33.3%) of African states are members of
UNCOPUOS, as seen in Fig. 2.14. However, the distribution of these members
means that each of the RECs has at least one UNCOPUOSmember, as highlighted in
Table 2.9.
African membership of UNCOPUOS has steadily increased along with total
membership as depicted in Fig. 2.15. The largest increases in African membership
Fig. 2.14 African member states of UNCOPUOS (September 2018)
175United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, “Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space:
Membership Evolution,” 2018, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/members/evolu
tion.html (accessed September 18, 2018).
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occurred in 1961, 1973, and 1977 with three new African states joining in each of
those years. This can largely be attributed to the decolonisation of Africa and
subsequent newly independent states joining the world stage. Another small jump
occurred in 1994 with the joining of South Africa along with Senegal, with the
former ending a period of international isolation due to apartheid. Apart from these
increases, African states have been slow to join UNCOPUOS, with the occasional
member increasing the number by one. Only one African state was a founding
member of UNCOPUOS, namely, Egypt, since most of Africa was still under
European colonial control at the time. From 1961 to 2019, African membership
made up about 18–21% of total membership.
Table 2.9 UNCOPUOS member states by regional economic community
Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco
Common Market for Eastern and
Southern Africa (COMESA)
Egypt, Kenya, Libya, Mauritius, Sudan, Tunisia
Community of Sahel-Saharan States
(CEN-SAD)
Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya,
Libya, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
Sudan, Tunisia
East African Community (EAC) Kenya
Economic Community of Central
African States (ECCAS)
Cameroon, Chad
Economic Community of West Afri-
can States (ECOWAS)
Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal,
Sierra Leone
Intergovernmental Authority on
Development (IGAD)
Kenya, Sudan
Southern African Development Com-
munity (SADC)
Mauritius, South Africa
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Fig. 2.15 UNCOPUOS membership evolution. United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs,
“Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Membership Evolution,” 2018, http://www.
unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/members/evolution.html (accessed September 18, 2018)
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However, a more important consideration than mere membership is whether
states are active members of UNCOPUOS. At the most basic level, active member-
ship, or participation, is defined here as states that have attended at least half
the UNCOPUOS sessions (including the subcommittees) in the last 4 years
(2015–2018).176 In that respect, only 9 out of 17 African member states can be
considered as active members (Mauritius, the 18th member, joined recently and is
thus excluded here).177 Of these 17, four states have attended all meetings during the
stated period, namely, Algeria, Burkina Faso, South Africa, and Tunisia. In contrast
to these nine active states, three states have attended less than half of the
UNCOPUOS sessions in the above mentioned period, namely, Ghana, Libya, and
Cameroon. In the case of Libya, the civil war which erupted in 2014 no doubt made
attendance difficult, but in the last 2 years, its attendance has improved with it
being present at five of the six sessions (again including subcommittees). However,
beyond these 12 states, 5 African member states have not attended even 1
UNCOPUOS session in the last 4 years, namely, Niger, Benin, Chad, Sierra
Leone, and Senegal. One explanation for this is travel fund constraints, since these
five states are all among the low-income economies as identified in Chap. 1.
However, some doubt is cast upon this explanation since Burkina Faso is also in
this category and yet has been present at every UNCOPUOS meeting (including
subcommittees) in the last 4 years. Thus, political will and awareness of the
importance of participating at UNCOPUOS sessions could also be lacking.
It could be argued that the principle of international space cooperation, as
contained in the Benefits Declaration of 1996 (see footnote 172), which specifically
spoke to the role of developing countries in the space arena, is a strong motivator for
states to actively participate in international space affairs and cooperation.178 As the
Benefits Declaration of the General Assembly states, in paragraph two, while “States
are free to determine all aspects of their participation in international cooperation in
the exploration and use of outer space on an equitable and mutually acceptable
basis”, paragraph three argues that:
All States, particularly those with relevant space capabilities and with programmes for the
exploration and use of outer space, should contribute to promoting and fostering interna-
tional cooperation on an equitable and mutually acceptable basis. In this context, particular
attention should be given to the benefit for and the interests of developing countries and
countries with incipient space programmes stemming from such international cooperation
conducted with countries with more advanced space capabilities.179
176The most recent years were selected to give a good sense of engagement with current contem-
porary issues, and it reflects consistency in engagement.
177Analysis performed by identifying yearly participants from official COPUOS documentation.
178Joel A. Dennerley, “Emerging space nations and the development of international regulatory
regimes,” Space Policy 35, (2016): 28.
179United Nations, United Nations Treaties and Principles on Outer Space: Text of treaties and
principles governing the activities of States in the exploration and use of outer space, adopted by
the United Nations General Assembly (New York: United Nations, 2002), 56.
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Thus, the principle of international space cooperation is “well established in space
law”.180 Moreover, “[a]rguably, this cooperation [principle] regarding the explora-
tion and use of space would extend to the cooperative multi-lateral development of
laws, rules, regulations and standards applicable to spatial activities”.181
The need for participation in major standard setting bodies related to space is clear
since once those standards are set, especially in relation to international law, they
become (with sufficient support) applicable to all states, even those that did not
participate in setting those standards. In addition, the effect of this is even more
pronounced for small developing countries such as Benin, Senegal, Niger, Chad, and
Sierra Leone: “certain emerging space nations such as Iran, Pakistan, Mexico or
South Africa would not be as adversely affected by the international standard setting
process as compared to many other much smaller developing countries that may
simply not participate, or do so in a limited way”.182 The reason for this is that small
developing countries have much less leeway in “going it alone” or not complying
with international standards. Thus, “an essential strategy for the inclusion of devel-
oping countries is their active participation in these groups, committees and meet-
ings, because inevitably their competitors will be there”, meaning that “[a]n attitude
of apathy toward the development of international standards will simply leave
certain States behind”.183 This concern is also echoed elsewhere: “Africa must
move beyond mere scepticism at proposals that seek to make change, but be
proactive about contributing ideas about what that change should look like”—a
scepticism often based on the “misconception that space activities are not a third
world concern”—because such “scepticism without action to increase knowledge,
balance beliefs against criteria and criteria against beliefs, ensu[r]es that one remains
at the periphery in a given situation”.184 This also includes issues such as space
debris, because “even if few African countries are yet active in space, they are
equally at risk from asteroid and space weather hazards, and also need to feel that,
once they are in a position to build and launch their own satellites, these will still find
room in crowded orbits”.185 In fact, African countries have already been affected by
space debris, such as debris from an Ariane 3 booster that fell in Kasambaya,
Uganda, in March 2002, during which a pressure sphere hit a home, and debris
from an Ariane 4 booster which fell near the village of Manzau, Angola, in August
2002.186 These are only a few examples, stretching back to October 1962 when
180Dennerley, “Emerging space nations and the development of international regulatory regimes,”
28.
181Ibid.
182Ibid., 29.
183Ibid.
184Timiebi Aganaba-Jeanty, “Why Africa Must Move beyond Scepticism to Influence International
Law,” Business Day, August 26, 2014, https://www.businessdayonline.com/exclusives/analysis-
sub/article/why-africa-must-move-beyond-scepticism-to-influence-international-law/ (accessed
September 18, 2018).
185Abiodun, “Trends in the Global Space Arena – Impact on Africa and Africa’s Response,” 286.
186Ibid., 287.
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debris from an Atlas booster from Mercury MA-8 fell in Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina
Faso. A more recent example is that of Namibia, where a metallic ball fell near
Onamatango village close to Outapi, 750 kilometres northwest of Windhoek in
November 2011.187 Two similar titanium spheres fell in South Africa one day
apart outside Cape Town in 2000.188
In contrast to the lack of participation by some African states, a small minority has
assumed leadership positions within UNCOPUOS or its subcommittees. Since 2002,
three states have chaired a committee, a total of five times. These are Nigeria
(2004–2005 main committee), Algeria (2014–2015 main committee), Algeria
(2008–2009 STSC), South Africa (2018–2019 STSC), and Nigeria (2012–2013
LSC).189 These three states thus stand out in their level of engagement and ability
to provide recognised leadership in these international fora.
Apart from active participation in UNCOPUOS, another critical indicator of
engagement in international space affairs is whether states have signed or ratified
the five major space-related treaties referred to above (footnote 171). Doing so is not
dependent on being an UNCOPUOS member, but African states in general have
been slow to accede to these treaties. A total of 19 states have neither signed nor
ratified any of the treaties.190 Only one, Morocco, has ratified all five treaties, while
only four others have ratified all treaties apart from the Moon Agreement. Africa’s
international engagement in this regard is thus lacklustre, possibly again due to the
misconception that it is to a large extent irrelevant for developing countries with
other priorities.
Finally, in order to gauge African engagement in the broader UNOOSA archi-
tecture, participation and hosting of (i) regional offices of the United Nations
Platform for Space-based Information for Disaster Management and Emergency
Response (UN-SPIDER), (ii) appointing of a National Focal Point “who serves as
a contact person for the application of space technologies to disasters and disaster
risks”191 as requested by UN-SPIDER of all member states, and (iii) hosting of a
Regional Centre for Space Science and Technology Education are taken as indica-
tions of African states’willingness to bear the financial responsibility of hosting such
an office or centre and their political will to take part in cooperation. This helps to
provide a more complete picture of African engagement with UNCOPUOS and
187Discover Namibia, “Mysterious space ball landed in Namibia,” Gondwana Collection Namibia
(Pty) Ltd, December 14, 2018, https://www.gondwana-collection.com/news/article/2018/12/14/
mysterious-space-ball-landed-in-namibia/ (accessed December 18, 2018).
188Ibid.
189Compiled from reports by United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, “Past Sessions of the
Committee and its Subcommittees,” 2018, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/past-
sessions.html (accessed September 19, 2018).
190United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, “Status of International Agreements relating to
Activities in Outer Space,” 2018, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/status/
index.html (accessed September 19, 2018).
191United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, “UN-SPIDER’s Network,” 2018, http://www.
unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/un-spider/network.html (accessed September 19, 2018).
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UNOOSA. All of the factors discussed in this section are combined to create the
International Space Engagement Matrix, discussed in the next section. In the next
volume of this series, where African states have made use of UN-SPIDER in
supporting their disaster management and emergency response efforts will be
investigated.
2.3.2 International Space Engagement (ISE) Matrix
By assigning a score to the factors discussed above, it becomes possible to gain a
clearer understanding of the remaining dimensions of emerging space middle pow-
ers. Apart from those factors considered in Sect. 1.2.3, emerging space middle
powers can be characterised (to summarise the discussion in Chap. 1) by the
following: (i) they are strong proponents of the existing international order in
relation to outer space and will be advocates of international law in this field
(evidenced by their roles and actions in UNCOPUOS and other space organisations
and ratification of UN treaties on outer space), (ii) they will strive to stabilise and
legitimise this order through multilateral arrangements in international organisa-
tions, (iii) they will tend to mediate or foster relationships between global powers
and other African states, and (iv) they prefer gradual reforms in international bodies
to increase the profile of Africa rather than dramatic changes in the status quo.
By combining the factors of treaty signature or ratification, UNCOPUOS mem-
bership, active participation in UNCOPUOS, chairing or UNCOPUOS or its sub-
committees, participating in UN-SPIDER, and hosting a Regional Centre for Space
Science and Technology Education, it is possible to clearly identify those states that
are strong proponents of the existing international order and its multilateral arrange-
ments and which, by virtue of their strong engagement, become African “represen-
tatives” or mediators for the entire continent. The issue of gradual versus radical
reform will be considered shortly after the discussion of the ISEMatrix by way of the
Bogotá Declaration.
To make the ISE Matrix meaningful, higher scores are assigned for greater
engagement. Thus, scores are assigned as follows: signing a treaty, 1 point (S);
ratifying a treaty, 2 points (R); being an UNCOPUOS member, 3 points (Mem.);
being an active participant (attending more than half of all sessions from 2015 to
2018), 4 points (Particip.); chairing any committee, 4 points (Ch.); participating in
UNOOSA’s African institutions (UN-SPIDER National Focal Point),
3 points (Particip.); and hosting one of these institutions (UN-SPIDER Regional
Office or Regional Centre for Space Science and Technology Education),
4 points (H.). The ISE Matrix is presented in Table 2.10.
As with the IASE Matrix, it is possible to identify the “outliers” in international
space engagement based on the ISE score assigned to each country in Table 2.10.
This is done in Fig. 2.16, and again the mean (8.15) and median (6) are provided.
While Fig. 2.12 identified clear emerging space middle power candidates in terms
of the regional dimension of space engagement, Fig. 2.16 identifies equally clear
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Fig. 2.16 ISE scores
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candidates based on the international dimension of space engagement. The leaders in
this regard are (in descending order) Nigeria, Algeria, Morocco, South Africa,
Kenya, Tunisia, Egypt, Burkina Faso, Libya, Niger, Senegal, Zambia, and Sey-
chelles. A small number of states do not score at or above the mean but nevertheless
score at or above the median, which divides the continent between 21 more inter-
nationally engaged and 33 less internationally engaged states. These are Sierra
Leone, Sudan, Mauritius, Togo, Benin, Burundi, Cameroon, and Ghana. While the
picture presented by the ISE (and IASE) scores do not necessarily provide an
exhaustive account of all African engagement with space (e.g. Namibia attended
five of the last 12 UNCOPUOS sessions, including subcommittees, as an observer,
while Angola did so twice), a very clear trend emerges nevertheless, and again the
purpose behind compiling these scores is not to “value” states or their engagement
but to illuminate the main patterns thereof.
Similar to how the Intra-African Space Engagement Matrix was combined with
the concept of power to narrow the emerging space middle power candidates, here,
the economic dimension in terms of gross national income (GNI) per capita will be
combined with the International Space Engagement Matrix. As was seen above, an
argument regarding limited funds can be made to partially explain the absence
within UNCOPUOS of Niger, Benin, Chad, Sierra Leone, and Senegal—all classi-
fied as low-income economies by the World Bank (as was seen in Chap. 1). While
the exception of Burkina Faso does stand out in this regard, just as a less powerful
state will have difficulty fulfilling the role of a middle power, so too will a
low-income economy. This is again not a fixed rule but is a helpful heuristic device.
Thus, Fig. 2.17 combines ISE scores and GNI per capita (World Bank country
classifications for 2017).
Based on these findings, 12 categories of African states can be identified.
Table 2.11 presents these categories, which are defined by the level of the economy
and the ISE score of all 54 states. Again, a core, periphery, and semi-periphery are
apparent. In the core, a pattern emerges that shows that countries with high levels of
international space engagement are spread out throughout all economic categories.
Thus, a key finding is that other factors such as political will must be the primary
drivers of national space engagement and cannot be discounted, while awareness and
outreach efforts must continue. In this low-income category, while both Niger and
Senegal score above the mean despite not being active UNCOPUOS members, the
true outlier is Burkina Faso given its dedication in attending each UNCOPUOS
session in the last 4 years. It can thus be argued that Burkina Faso has shown a high
level of political will to drive a concerted effort to take part and cooperate in the
space arena, although the factor of maintaining an embassy in Vienna does make it
easier for Burkina Faso to attend UNCOPUOS meetings. Conversely, it could be
argued that the upper-middle-income countries of Botswana, Equatorial Guinea,
Gabon, and Namibia are underperformers since none of them have joined
UNCOPUOS despite Namibia’s attendance as observer, and Namibia also maintains
an embassy in Vienna.
In the case of the ISE scores, the entire core category can thus be considered as
emerging space middle power candidates, since it has been shown that space
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engagement does not depend on levels of economic development. Thus, the 13 high-
scoring states will be compared to the list of candidates from the IASE Matrix
(combined with power perception) discussed earlier, to find the African emerging
space middle powers in the next section.
2.3.3 African Emerging Space Middle Powers
Based on the most active participants in the major intra-African space efforts and
activities discussed in Sect. 2.2, and the most active African states in terms of the key
international space forum, treaties, and affiliated organisations such as UN-SPIDER,
Fig. 2.17 Emerging space middle power candidates based on economic classification (see
Fig. 1.17) and ISE score
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it is now possible to identify the major African space actors in terms of their
engagement and cooperation, and thus the emerging space middle powers, as done
in Fig. 2.18. The major African space actors in terms of their national activities and
capabilities will be explored in Chap. 3, but this dimension of cross-border engage-
ment and cooperation is, as argued previously, a cornerstone of the global space
sector. Given the importance of ubuntu and its aspects of group support, cooperation,
and solidarity, these emerging space middle powers are called upon to provide the
continental leadership, encouragement, and support needed to extend the African
involvement in, and ownership of, the space sector and its regulations. As Nelson
Mandela put it in a speech to the then-OAU in 1998, “we charge you with the
responsibility to lead our peoples and Continent into the new world of the next
century—which must be an African Century—during which all our people will be
freed of the bitterness born of the marginalisation and degradation of our proud
continent of Africa”.192 It is therefore up to the nations of Africa to stand by one
another to advance the continent’s interests in the space arena, without which this
marginalisation and degradation will repeat itself.
The result of this analysis reveals the emerging space middle powers, and thus the
continental leaders that meet the criteria set forth in Sect. 1.3.1 of Chap. 1, to be
Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, and Tunisia. These seven
countries must play the main leadership role for Africa to meet its goals and targets
set out in the AU’s Agenda 2063 first 10-year implementation plan, specifically
those elements highlighted in bold in Table 2.12 below.
Table 2.11 Twelve categories of African states based on economy and space engagement
A. ISE above mean
B. ISE above
median C. ISE below median
1. High-
income
Seychelles
2. Upper-
middle-
income
Algeria, Libya,
South Africa
Mauritius Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon,
Namibia
3. Lower-
middle-
income
Egypt, Kenya,
Morocco, Nigeria,
Tunisia, Zambia
Cameroon,
Ghana, Sudan
Angola, Cape Verde, Republic of the
Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Leso-
tho, Mauritania, São Tomé and Príncipe,
Swaziland
4.
Low-income
Burkina Faso, Niger,
Senegal
Benin,
Burundi,
Sierra Leone,
Togo
Central African Republic, Chad, Com-
oros, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mada-
gascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique,
Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanza-
nia, Uganda, Zimbabwe
192Nelson Mandela, “Mandela Quotes and Interesting information,” South African History Online,
2017, https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/mandela-quotes-and-interesting-information (accessed
September 20, 2018).
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While the indicative strategies accompanying the goals in Table 2.12 include
setting up continental grant systems, strengthening interuniversity collaboration, and
facilitating the adoption of curricula in space technology in member states univer-
sities/polytechniques (all important), there is no word on achieving a common
African position on the international space agenda or even how Africa can speak
with one voice on global affairs in general. In 2012 it was observed that the AU
“does not have the capacity to develop common African positions on space-related
matters”,193 and this goal is still severely hampered by the lack of engagement with
the international space agenda, or even continental space initiatives, by far too many
African states. This includes signing and ratifying the major space treaties. Without
Fig. 2.18 African emerging space middle powers revealed
193Martinez, “The African Leadership Conference on Space Science and Technology for Sustain-
able Development,” 36.
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Table 2.12 Global affairs priority areas and targets for 2023 (AU Commission)
Aspiration 7. Africa as a
strong, united, resilient, and
influential global partner and
player
Goal 19. Africa as a major
partner in global affairs
and peaceful co-existence
• Priority area 1. Africa’s place
in global affairs
Regional/continental targets
(2023):
1. Africa Speaks with One
Voice on Global Affairs
2. African Space Agency
established and is fully opera-
tional
3. Strategic Freight Maritime
Task Force is established
4. AU stand-alone department
for Maritime Affairs to be
responsible for AIMS imple-
mentation established
5. African island states are fairly
represented in appointments to
regional/continental and interna-
tional bodies
6. All Colonies are free by 2020
Key process actions/milestones
towards 2023 on AU framework
(s)
1. Science Technology and
Innovation Strategy for Africa
(STISA-2024)
2. STISTA is adopted by AU
Summit in 2014
3. Development/implementation
of first set of flagship
programmes under STISA takes
place between 2015 and 2017
4. Development/implementation
of second set of flagship
programmes under STISA takes
place between 2018 and 2020
5. Development/implementation
of the third set of flagship
programme under STISA takes
place between 2021 and 2023
6. Final Evaluation of STISA
takes place in 2023
7. African Space Policy
8. Development and Adoption of
African Space Policy and Strat-
egy is done in 2015
9. Preparation and Implementa-
tion of Action Plan on African
Space Policy starts in 2016
10. African Common Position
on International Space Agenda
is attained by 2018
African Union Commission, Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want—First 10-Year Implementation
Plan 2014–2023, 2015, Addis Ababa, 91. https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/33126-doc-
ten_year_implementation_book.pdf (accessed June 22, 2018)
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this engagement, meeting the primary needs of Africa through space is made
unnecessarily difficult. While some efforts are under way to address this, such as
the ALC, much more needs to be done, including within the RECs. Space data and
activities are important for all economies; thus the Regional Economic Communities
are a good platform for encouraging greater space engagement. Space must therefore
be afforded a higher priority within these communities, and on the continent as a
whole, and this is where the emerging space middle powers can play a powerful role.
As Table 2.13 shows, all but one REC has one of these middle powers as a member,
and, even for ECCAS, Cameroon and the Republic of the Congo can still play
important leadership roles as Table 2.8 showed earlier.
It is encouraging to note, as a statement by the South African Ambassador on
behalf of the African Group pointed out at the 49th STSC meeting in 2012, that the
group “stresses the importance of dissemination of knowledge and technology
transfer through bilateral channels as well as in reinforcing multilateral cooperation,
with increased role for the Office of Outer Space Affairs (OOSA)” and reaffirmed its
support for ARMS-C, UN-SPIDER, and the ALC.194 The statement also reflected
that the African Group considered that “the efforts of the UNCOPUOS, are para-
mount to promoting international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space”
and highlighted two particular concerns, namely, that the “geostationary orbit is a
limited resource at risk of becoming saturated . . . [and that] its use should be
streamlined giving priority to activities with long term perspective, leading to
achieve the Millennium Development Goals while taking into account the conditions
of equality of all countries irrespective of their current space capacities” and that
“[t]he Group attaches great importance to the preservation and sustainability of space
activities, to ensure that they benefit all nations”.195
Table 2.13 Emerging space middle powers by regional economic community
Emerging space middle powers
Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA)
Egypt, Kenya, Tunisia
Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, Kenya,
Tunisia
East African Community (EAC) Kenya
Economic Community of Central African States
(ECCAS)
Cameroon, Republic of the Congo
Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS)
Nigeria
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Kenya
Southern African Development Community (SADC) South Africa
194Xolisa Mfundiso Mabhongo, “Statement of the African Group during the forty-ninth session of
the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of Committee on the Peaceful uses of Outer Space,”
South African Council for Space Affairs, February, 2012, http://www.sacsa.gov.za/conferences/
African_statement_STSC_Mabhongo.pdf (accessed September 20, 2018).
195Ibid.
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This points to a noteworthy evolution in the position of some African states on
outer space, especially geostationary orbit. In 1976, eight equatorial states (including
four African ones) signed the Bogotá Declaration that represented a challenge to the
legal status quo in relation to space. Along with Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and
Indonesia, the states of the Republic of the Congo, then-Zaire (now Democratic
Republic of the Congo), Uganda, and Kenya argued that “the segments of geosta-
tionary synchronous orbit are part of the territory over which Equatorial states
exercise their national sovereignty” by virtue of this orbit being “a physical fact
linked to the reality of our planet because its existence depends exclusively on its
relation to gravitational phenomena generated by the earth, and that is why it must
not be considered part of the outer space”.196 Therefore, these states argued that this
particular orbit qualified as a natural resource and that “[t]he devices to be placed
permanently on the segment of a geostationary orbit of an equatorial state shall
require previous and expressed authorization on the part of the concerned state, and
the operation of the device should conform with the national law of that territorial
country over which it is placed” and that “[e]quatorial states do not condone the
existing satellites or the position they occupy on their segments of the Geostationary
Orbit nor does the existence of said satellites confer any rights of placement of
satellites or use of the segment unless expressly authorized by the state exercising
sovereignty over this segment”.197 Because these claims never received wider
international support, they have faded away to the point that the African Group
(which includes Kenya as a UNCOPUOS member) could make the above statement
relating to the use of geostationary orbit on the basis of the equality of all countries.
As argued earlier, a middle power is defined by its support for the international
order and by its favouring of gradual reform instead of radical change and confron-
tation. Thus, especially in the case of Kenya, there has been a marked shift in tone
from appropriation to exploitation for mutual benefit of all states. One of the likely
reasons for this shift in tone is the end of the Cold War, since “space policy was the
protagonist of the Cold War for its high symbolic meaning and strong military
significance” which “has changed profoundly in recent years, for political, eco-
nomic, and technological reasons, after having long been the stage on which the
two superpowers of the Cold War measured their ability to impress international
opinion”.198 Additionally, since “traditional security concerns are no longer the only
driver behind the adoption of space policies”, there has been a shift towards
investment “in space assets primarily as a vehicle to promote socioeconomic growth
through better natural resource management and improved communications—or
196Declaration of the First Meeting of Equatorial Countries, “The Bogotá Declaration,” 1976,
https://bogotadeclaration.wordpress.com/declaration-of-1976/ (accessed September 20, 2018).
197Ibid.
198Giorgio Petroni and Davide Gianluca Bianchi, “New patterns of space policy in the post-Cold
War world,” Space Policy 37, (2016):12.
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even to inspire their youth to study science”.199 This is very difficult to achieve in
isolation, thus helping to explain the shift in tone. Nevertheless, as was evident in the
statement on behalf of the African Group within the UN, the continent does still
place heavy emphasis on respect for sovereignty, in line with the arguments
presented in the last chapter regarding Africa’s preference for consensus and self-
determination.
2.4 International Space Activities, Agreements,
and Initiatives in Africa
This section will examine the third dimension of the African international space
ecosystem, namely, various international efforts related to space taking place on the
continent, in contrast to Sect. 2.2, which considered efforts that were more intra-
African in nature. This section will itself be divided into various subsections
dedicated to exploring (i) international initiatives with a bearing on Africa, (ii) a
range of African agreements with foreign space agencies and other actors, and (iii)
foreign space infrastructure in Africa, with particular reference to the Italian Luigi
Broglio Space Centre in Kenya and the Chinese satellite ground station in Namibia.
Again, while it is not possible to include a full account of every initiative or
agreement here, the focus will be placed on surveying those with particular bearing
on the primary needs identified previously.
2.4.1 International Initiatives in Africa
This first initiative to be discussed here is the Regional Centres for Space Science
and Technology Education (ARCSSTE) effort of UNOOSA, which established two
African centres—one in English and one in French—thus known by their acronyms
ARCSSTE-E and CRASTE-LF, both inaugurated in 1998 in Nigeria and Morocco,
respectively.200
ARCSSTE-E is housed at the Obafemi Awolowo University Campus, Ile-Ife, for
the benefit of Anglophone African countries, and is supervised by the Nigerian
National Space Research and Development Agency (NASRDA).201 It has four broad
199Robert C. Harding, “Introduction: Space policy in developing countries,” Space Policy 37, no.
1 (2016): 1.
200United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, “Regional Centres for Space Science and
Technology Education (affiliated to the United Nations),” 2018, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/
ourwork/psa/regional-centres/index.html (accessed September 21, 2018).
201African Regional Centre for Space Science and Technology Education-English, “Brief on the
Centre,” http://arcsstee.org.ng/index.php/about-us (accessed September 21, 2018).
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goals, namely, (i) the development of skills and knowledge of university educators
and environmental research scientists in the four principal areas of remote sensing,
satellite meteorology applications, satellite communication, and basic space and
atmospheric science and technology, (ii) to engage educators in the development
of environmental and atmospheric science curricula that can be used to advance the
knowledge of the scholars, (iii) the development of research scientists and project
personnel in preparing the space-derived information for presentation to the policy-
and decision-makers in charge of national and regional development programs, and
(iv) the coordination of regional and international cooperation in space science and
technology programs.202 Its expectations are (i) to contribute to sustainable devel-
opment of natural resources (air/water/land); (ii) to provide an input for the conser-
vation of all earth resources and natural environment through increased capacity
building for educators, research, and application scientists in environmental infor-
mation systems with emphasis on remote sensing, satellite meteorology, and other
spin-off technologies at the local level; and (iii) to develop skills for satellite
communication, including those associated with rural development and health
services, long distance education, disaster mitigation, navigation, and regional
networking/linkages with industries.203 Its operations are thus directly applicable
to the primary needs of climate, biodiversity, health (e.g. through meteorological
services), water, education, and capacity building. With regard to the last, the
centre’s Master’s Programme in Space Science and Technology focuses on the
thematic areas of satellite communication, basic space physics, satellite meteorol-
ogy, and remote sensing and geographic information systems (GIS).204
The establishment of the centre is also argued to have “either initiated or
encouraged the establishment of space related courses in some tertiary institutions
in Nigeria” such as programmes in remote sensing/GIS at Obafemi Awolowo
University, Federal University of Technology Akure, and the Regional Centre for
Training in Aerospace Surveys, as well as a Meteorology Department at the Federal
University of Technology Akure.205 It was also a catalyst that “led to the establish-
ment of the Nigerian space agency” (NASRDA).206 Apart from its postgraduate
programme, the centre also runs “several outreach programmes” for students, the
public, and policymakers while also organising workshops, conferences, and sem-
inars, alongside a conference dedicated to “advance the use of space in the socio-
economic development of Africa”.207 Beyond these functions it also “promotes
awareness and knowledge in international space law”, in particular by supporting
the Nigerian participants in the Manfred Lachs Space Law Moot Court Competition
202Ibid.
203Ibid.
204Ibid.
205Olakunle Oladosu and Etim Offiong, “Improving space knowledge in Africa: The ARCSSTE-
E,” Space Policy 29, (2013): 155.
206Ibid.
207Ibid.
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(more on this later in this section).208 ARCSSTE-E thus fulfils a critical function as
an incubator of space-related skills and outreach for Nigeria specifically and Anglo-
phone African countries in general.
CRASTE-LF fulfils a very similar role to ARCSSTE-E for Francophone coun-
tries. It is a “high-level training and research institution”, established at the
Mohammadia School of Engineers of Mohammed V University in Rabat (EMI),
and is supported by other Moroccan institutions such as the Royal Centre for Remote
Sensing (CRTS), the Veterinary Agronomic Institute (IAV) HASSAN II, the
National Institute of Posts and Telecommunications (INPT), and the Directorate of
National Meteorology (DMN).209 A total of 11 African states participated in the
establishment of the CRASTE-LF, and current member states and their relevant
organisations are Algeria (Algerian Space Agency, ASAL), Cameroon (Ministry of
Scientific Research and Innovation), Cape Verde (Ministry of Higher Education
Science and Innovation), Central African Republic (Ministry of National Education,
Higher Education, and Research), Democratic Republic of the Congo (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs), Côte d’Ivoire (Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific
Research), Gabon (Ministry of Higher Education, Research, and Technological
Innovation), Morocco (Ministry of Higher Education, Scientific Research, and
Executive Training), Mauritania (Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific
Research), Niger (Ministry of Secondary and Higher Education, Research, and
Technology), Senegal (Ministry of Higher Education, Universities, and Regional
University Centres and Scientific Research), Togo (Ministry of Technical Education
and Vocational Training), and Tunisia (Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific
Research).210 Similar to ARCSSTE-E, CRASTE-LF offers “training courses for
academics, researchers, engineering administrators and system planning” in areas
of satellite communication, space sciences and atmospheric sciences, satellite mete-
orology and global climate, and remote sensing and geographic information systems,
with a master’s degree in Sciences and Technology of Space in the chosen spe-
cialty.211 The ARCSSTE initiative is thus intimately tied to the primary needs of
education and space-related capacity building.
Another UNOOSA initiative which is also found in Africa is the United Nations
Platform for Space-based Information for Disaster Management and Emergency
Response (UN-SPIDER), which “develops solutions to address the limited access
developing countries have to specialized technologies that can be essential in the
208Ibid., 156.
209Le Centre Régional Africain des Sciences et Technologies de l’Espace en langue Français,
“Création,” 2018, http://www.crastelf.org.ma/index.php/2016-02-29-09-08-40/historique
(accessed September 21, 2018). Translated from French.
210Le Centre Régional Africain des Sciences et Technologies de l’Espace en langue Français, “Pays
membres,” 2018, http://www.crastelf.org.ma/index.php/2016-03-13-23-21-46/pays-membres
(accessed September 21, 2018).
211Le Centre Régional Africain des Sciences et Technologies de l’Espace en langue Français,
“Introduction,” 2018, http://www.crastelf.org.ma/index.php/2016-02-29-09-10-06/formation
(accessed September 21, 2018).
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management of disasters and the reducing of disaster risks”.212 UN-SPIDER has a
range of Regional Support Offices around the world, including national space
agencies, geographic institutes, civil protection agencies, universities, and regional
remote sensing centres, with which it sets up “international and regional workshops
and conferences, provides technical advisory support, facilitates the access to space-
based resources in case of disasters and elaborates relevant content for
UN-SPIDER’s Knowledge Management tools”.213 Three Regional Support Offices
are based in Africa. The first is hosted by the Algerian Space Agency and was
established during the third ALC in 2009 in Algiers.214 It covers the North African
and Sahel region, and “[i]n case of an emergency, it will liaise between the end-users
of space-based information and the Algerian Space Agency, which will act as a
value-adder to space-derived data”.215 A second Regional Support Office is hosted
by the Nigerian NASRDA, and was established in 2008, to “promote and support the
use of space technology within and outside of Nigeria in the management of the full
disaster cycle including prevention and mitigation”.216 The third centre is hosted by
the previously discussed RCMRD in Kenya.217
Closely related to UN-SPIDER is the Disaster Monitoring Constellation (DMC),
which is an international programme proposed in 1996. The DMC consortium
consists of a partnership between five states (Algeria, China, Nigeria, Turkey, and
the United Kingdom) and their relevant organisations.218 The African contributions
to the first generation of satellites were, as earlier mentioned, AlSat-1 and
NigeriaSat-1, while the second-generation contributions were NigeriaSat-2 and
NigeriaSat-X, as well as AlSat-1B, AlSat-2, and AlSat-2B.219 The constellation is
212United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, “United Nations Platform for Space-based
Information for Disaster Management and Emergency Response (UN-SPIDER),” 2018, http://
www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/un-spider/index.html (accessed September 21, 2018).
213United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, “UN-SPIDER’s Network,” 2018, http://www.
unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/un-spider/network.html (accessed September 21, 2018).
214United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, “Algeria Regional Support Office,” 2017, http://
www.un-spider.org/network/regional-support-offices/algeria-regional-support-office (accessed
September 21, 2018).
215Ibid.
216United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, “Nigeria Regional Support Office,” 2017, http://
www.un-spider.org/network/regional-support-offices/nigeria-regional-support-office (accessed
September 21, 2018).
217United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, “Regional Center for Mapping of Resources for
Development (RCMRD),” 2017, http://www.un-spider.org/network/regional-support-offices/
regional-center-mapping-resources-development-rcmrd (accessed September 21, 2018).
218European Space Agency, “DMC-1G,” eoPortal, 2018, https://directory.eoportal.org/web/
eoportal/satellite-missions/d/dmc (accessed September 21, 2018).
219European Space Agency, “DMC-3,” eoPortal, 2018, https://directory.eoportal.org/web/eoportal/
satellite-missions/d/dmc-3 (accessed September 21, 2018); World Meteorological Organisation,
“Satellite Programme: Algeria Satellite,” OSCAR: Observing Systems Capability Analysis and
Review Tool, 2018, https://www.wmo-sat.info/oscar/satelliteprogrammes/view/8 (accessed
September 21, 2018).
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coordinated by DMC International Imaging (DMCii), to “deliver high quality
commercial earth imaging services”, and apart from this commercial service, the
DMC “works actively within the International Charter ‘Space and Major Disasters’
to provide free satellite imagery for humanitarian use in the event of major interna-
tional disasters such as tsunamis, hurricanes, fires and flooding”.220 The satellites are
all built in partnership with Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd (SSTL), and the UK
Space Agency represents the DMC on the International Disasters Charter Board, and
DMCii represents it in the Executive Secretariat.221 Through the DMCAfrican states
are thus both contributors and potential users of data supporting primary needs
related to climate, water, and health in the case of disasters, as well as biodiversity
depending on commercial needs.
The next initiative is ArabSat, which is “one of the world’s top satellite operators
and by far the leading satellite services provider in the Arab world, it carries over
500 TV channels, 200 radio stations, pay-tv networks and wide variety of HD
channels reaching tens of millions of homes in more than 80 countries across the
Middle East, Africa and Europe”.222 Having been founded in 1976 by the 21 member
states of the Arab League, nine African countries contributed to Arabsat’s initial
capital fund of $500 million, with Libya being the third-largest contributor
(11.2785%), followed by Algeria in 11th place (1.7163%), Egypt in 13th place
(1.5937%), Tunisia in 15th (0.7355%), Morocco in 16th (0.6129%), Mauritania in
17th (0.2758%), Sudan in 18th (0.2678%), Somalia in 20th (0.24465%), and
Djibouti in 21st place (0.1225%).223 Arabsat operates with the mission to “[c]onnect
Arab societies and the world by providing reliable telecommunications services in
harmony with Arab values and culture”, and the vision “[t]o be the regional and
global leader in the field of space telecommunications”.224 The organisation is
headquartered in Saudi Arabia but has a satellite control station in Tunis, Tunisia.
Accordingly, Arabsat can be argued to contribute some level of capacity building in
North Africa.
The next initiative is the above-mentioned Manfred Lachs Space LawMoot Court
Competition, founded by the International Institute of Space Law (IISL) in 1992 as
an “unparalleled learning experience” with judges of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) presiding over and judging the contest.225 The moot court consists of
a “simulated hearing in the area of space law” and includes the Africa Regional
Round, first introduced in 2011, alongside other regions (Asia-Pacific, Europe, and
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North America).226 Regional winners go one to represent their regions in the World
Finals, which are held in conjunction with the International Astronautical Congress.
The runner-up in 2016 was from Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria.227
The same institution produced semi-finalists in 2012, 2014, and 2015, while the
University of Pretoria, South Africa, produced semi-finalists in 2013 and 2017 and
World Finals winners in 2018—the first time an African team won the World
Finals.228 This initiative is directly related to the primary needs of education and
capacity building and has drawn participants from countries including Nigeria,
South Africa, and Kenya.
In 2009 the South African Astronomical Observatory (SAAO) in Cape Town
managed to win the bid to host the International Astronomical Union’s (IAU) Office
of Astronomy for Development (OAD), which is a joint project of the IAU and the
South African National Research Foundation (NRF), supported by the Department
of Science and Technology (DST).229 The OAD has 10 regional offices and lan-
guage centres around the globe, including in Zambia (covering Southern Africa),
Nigeria (for West Africa), Ethiopia (for East Africa), and Jordan (for the Arab world
including North Africa).230 The OAD’s goal is to “help further the use of astronomy,
including its practitioners, skills and infrastructures, as a tool for development by
mobilizing the human and financial resources necessary in order to realize the field’s
scientific, technological and cultural benefits to society”. It achieves this through
funding and coordination of projects “using Astronomy as a tool to address issues
related to sustainable development”.231 Over 120 projects have been funded since
2013, including about 31 projects in Africa such as an optical camera for a 14-inch
telescope in Namibia, a West African International Summer School for Young
Astronomers in Ghana, Astro-Science Ambassadors Outreach for Science Education
in Tanzania, Madagascar Astronomy Python Workshop, and others.232 The OAD
also engages in its own activities such as Virtual Observatory workshops, World
Wide Telescope workshops, AstroVARSITY, Astro4Dev Brainstorming Meetings,
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and others.233 The OAD thus fulfils a powerful role in education and space-related
capacity building in Africa (where it is also headquartered) and elsewhere around the
world.
A recent initiative is the African Regional Data Cube (ARDC), launched in 2018
and developed by the Committee on Earth Observation Satellites (CEOS), in
partnership with the Group on Earth Observations (GEO), Amazon Web Services,
Strathmore University in Kenya, Office of the Deputy President—Kenya—and the
Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Data.234 It is a “new tool that
harnesses the latest Earth observation and satellite technology to help Kenya,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Ghana, and Tanzania address food security as well as issues
relating to agriculture, deforestation, and water access”235—thus speaking to the
primary needs of biodiversity, water, and health (through food security). The ARDC
is based on the Open Data Cube (ODC) infrastructure, which “allows analysis-ready
satellite data (e.g. Landsat, Sentinel) to be spatially and temporally aligned in ‘cubes’
of pixels”.236 It is aimed for the ARDC to “help governments, farmers and con-
sumers manage the complex challenges they face in trying to navigate the economic,
social and environmental systems on which they depend” by making available
“[v]ast quantities of freely available satellite data [which] offer real opportunity to
improve agricultural production, food security and access to water”.237 The Deputy
President of Kenya has stated that “[t]his technology will help us understand month
by month how our land is being used so that we can target interventions aimed at
improving our actions against climate change, help smallholder farmers and secure
sustainable food and water for our citizens”.238
The Inter-Islamic Network on Space Sciences and Technology, hosted by the
Pakistan Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission, is an “independent,
autonomous and self governing institution” under the Organisation of the Islamic
Conference’s Standing Committee on Scientific and Technological Cooperation and
has the mission to “[p]romote Space Sciences, Space Technology and their Appli-
cations for peaceful purposes in OIC member countries”.239 Member countries
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include the African states of Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Sudan, and
Tunisia. The organisation works with its members “for the peaceful uses of outer
space; exploiting the potential of the outer space for the development and benefit of
these countries” and “provides a platform for space science experts of OIC [Orga-
nisation of Islamic Cooperation] member states to come forward and share their
experiences, research studies and developments in space sciences and applications in
their respective countries so that these activities may jointly benefit all OIC coun-
tries”.240 It relates directly to education and capacity building since it “forms a
network of information exchange by assisting in training to develop the quality and
capability of manpower of the OIC countries in the relevant fields”, through annual
training programmes, and sponsoring of member states citizens to attend.241
Another noteworthy initiative, by Japan, is known as the Joint Global Multi-
Nation Birds Satellite project (Birds Project), with Ghana and Nigeria as African
participating countries of the first phase (Birds-1) between 2015 and 2017.242 Birds-
1 was a “cross-border interdisciplinary satellite project for non-space faring coun-
tries” for students from the seven participating countries to “design, develop and
operate 5 units of identical 1 U CubeSats (1 kg, 10 cm cubic)” which belong to the
participating countries and are operated from seven ground stations—one in each
participating country—thereby “to form first time in the world a constellation of
5 CubeSats operated in 7 networked ground stations”.243 This project is thus directly
relevant to the education of African students and building of capacity in satellite
manufacturing and design, and Nigeria and Ghana’s satellites (GhanaSat-1 and
Nigeria Edusat-1) were launched in 2017.244 Training was provided by the Graduate
School of Engineering of the Kyushu Institute of Technology, and students were
enrolled in master’s or doctoral degree programmes in a Space Engineering Inter-
national Course. The Birds Project is continuing, now in its third phase, Birds-3.
Japan, together with the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs
(UNOOSA), also runs the KiboCUBE initiative, and as will be seen in the next
chapter, African countries are also taking part. The KiboCUBE initiative is a
“dedicated collaboration between UNOOSA and JAXA in utilizing the ISS Kibo
for the world” whereby “KiboCUBE aims to provide educational or research
institutions from developing countries of United Nations membership with oppor-
tunities to deploy, from the ISS Kibo, cube satellites (CubeSats) which they develop
and manufacture”.245 Three rounds of the initiative have been held, with the fourth
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now open, predicated on the notion that “KiboCUBE will lower the threshold of
space activities and will contribute to build national capacity in spacecraft engineer-
ing, design and construction”.246
Morocco has also taken part in the TUBSAT (Technical University of Berlin
Satellite) programme, which is a “low-cost and fast-turnaround microsatellite pro-
gram series defined, designed and built by the Institute of Aeronautics and Astro-
nautics (ILR: Institut für Luft- und Raumfahrt) of the Technical University of Berlin
(TUB), Germany”, pursuing the goal to “explore technical capabilities in microsat-
ellite design (in particular in the field of attitude determination) and space-related
applications”.247 Thus far, Morocco has been the only African country to participate
in the TUBSAT programme, which is “an educational program including the design,
manufacture, testing, launching and operation of ‘microsatellites’ (<100 kg) that
was initiated in 1985 for students at the Technical University of Berlin (TUB)”.248
2.4.2 African Agreements with Foreign Space Agencies
and Other Actors
In recent years, as African space agencies have been established (more on these in
the next chapter), international agreements between these agencies and their foreign
counterparts have proliferated, even extending to countries without formal govern-
ment space offices. In a 1992–2004 survey of cooperative agreements between 12 of
the world’s space agencies, Africa did not feature as an actor at all, instead only
being blocked with the Middle East as partners for these 12 major space agencies.249
Thus, given this grouping with the Middle East, it was not even possible to identify
specifically African agreements. In recent years, this picture has changed drastically
however, and a range of agreements are examined here.
First, South Africa’s National Space Agency (SANSA) recently signed its first
memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the United Arab Emirates Space
Agency, which outlines a “framework for cooperation in the peaceful exploration
and use of outer space”.250 It was signed at UNISPACE+50 in Vienna, and specific
goals include “organisation and exchange of information, data, expertise, laws and
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regulations”, together with human capital development plans, including exchange of
engineers, experts, and academics.251 The two states will also cooperate to “identify
projects of common interest that can be supported and developed in both countries”
and will “hold joint conference and symposiums, promote educational activities in
space science and technology, and enhance collaboration between their space sector
and industry bodies”.252
South Africa also held talks with France in 2017 on the sidelines of the meeting of
the Committee on Earth Observation Satellites (CEOS), with the French Space
Agency CNES (Centre national d’études spatiales) “ready to step up their partner-
ship”.253 Existing South African-French cooperation revolves around operation of
the control station in Hartebeesthoek (more on this in the next chapter), while also
covering “coordination with CNES’s subsidiary CLS on tracking of wildlife and
could be extended to tele-epidemiology”. It is also reported that the Institute for
Sustainable Malaria Control at the University of Pretoria is working on an instrument
to help predict the spread of the disease in infested areas, and “CNES could
contribute its recognized expertise in this domain to planned studies”, and “[t]raining
could also be pursued at the French-South African Institute of Technology with
support from the French Embassy”.254
In 2017, SANSA also joined a space initiative through its BRICS (Brazil, Russia,
India, China, South Africa) partnership, which will establish the BRICS Remote
Sensing Satellite Constellation.255 This will occur in two phases, with “phase one
comprising of a virtual constellation of existing satellites, and phase two compro-
mises of a new satellite constellation”, as a “practical step towards high-tech
cooperation between these countries that will assist in attaining the sustainable
development goals and challenges pertaining to our respective economies and
societies”.256 In 2018, SANSA also signed an MoU specifically with the Indian
Space Research Organisation (ISRO) to formalise their relationship, on the sidelines
of the BRICS summit in Johannesburg.257 The MoU provides “for the two agencies
to engage in mutually beneficial joint projects and joint research” in areas of
applications for space technologies, Earth remote sensing, satellite navigation and
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communication, space infrastructure, and space science and planetary explora-
tion.258 Also in 2018, SANSA and Algeria’s ASAL signed an MoU “on cooperation
in the field of space science and technology”, also in Vienna.259
In turn, Algeria also signed an MoU with the UAE Space Agency in 2017 to
promote “collaboration in the fields of policy-making, regulations, space science,
technology, and human capital development in the space sector”.260 ASAL also has
other agreements such as with Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd (SSTL) to build
satellites and provide training. More general agreements were concluded by ASAL
with British firm Wisscom Aerospace Ltd. and Spanish company Zero 2 Infinity to
“boost the national space technology capacities of the North African nation”.261
Algeria had also signed an MoU on cooperation and training with India in 2006
which “enabled 20 Algerian engineers to attend Master’s degree courses in space
applications and advanced training in space telecommunications and
geo-information”, and a new cooperative agreement was signed on 19 September
2018 in Bangalore covering areas of science, technology, and space applications.262
Other agreements involving African states include a framework space coopera-
tion agreement between Morocco and France, signed in 2015, which meant that
“discussions and exchanges between the two nations have stepped up a gear”, while
the themes underpinning the cooperation between the two states include “areas such
as agriculture, water resource management, oceanography, crisis management and
climate change, which are integral to sustainable development”.263 The President of
CNES also highlighted at a more recent event (in 2017) that Morocco was a “relay
for the rest of Africa, notably in developing and disseminating new applications”,264
neatly tying in with Morocco’s role as an emerging space middle power. There was
also a recent MoU signed between Egypt and China at the 2017 BRICS summit in
China, whereby China will partly fund MisrSat-2, which is expected to be “Egypt’s
first indigenously made satellite in 2020”, and Space City, which is a planned
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100 acre plot of land in New Cairo where “satellite manufacturing and other space
facilities are being built”.265 China already provided U.S.$23 million by 2017 and
will contribute a further U.S.$45 million “as part of an overall aid package worth
over U.S.$65 million for Egypt’s space programme”.266 Intergovernmental agree-
ments between Kenya and Italy, and China and Namibia, will be discussed in the
next section, since they have a direct bearing on foreign space-related infrastructure
in Africa.
2.4.3 Foreign Space Infrastructure in Africa
Two particular international projects based in Africa will be discussed here—the
longstanding Luigi Broglio Space Centre (LBSC) in Kenya and the newer China
Telemetry, Tracking, and Command Station at Swakopmund, Namibia. The LBSC
has been operated by Italy (originally through the San Marco Project Research
Centre, CRSPM, and was managed by the University of Rome La Sapienza until
the end of 2003, thereafter by the Italian Space Agency, ASI) in accordance with
renewable intergovernmental agreements with Kenya since the early 1960s.267
These agreements allow for the “possibility to carry out launch activities, data
acquisition from satellites, remote sensing and training activities both in Kenya
and in Italy”, and while Italy delineates the programs, supplies equipment, and
hires local Kenyan employees, Kenya rents out the territory used by the LBSC to
Italy. Kenya must also “be informed about programmes making use of the Centre
and asks, for commercial programmes, a royalty depending on the terms of the
commercial agreement”, while equipment becomes the property of Kenya after
15 years.268
LBSC consists of three main components. The first, the Santa Rita Oil Rig, was
towed from Italy to Kenya within days of Kenyan independence, due to the
advantages of launching rockets from the equator, while the second component, a
larger steel barge named San Marco (used as the main launch site), was purchased
from the United States, and both were then anchored after environmental studies on
the seabed of Ungwana Bay, “right on the end of Kenya’s territorial waters” (then
three nautical miles) so that the “platforms could be supported in international
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waters, not having to pay Kenya anything for the main platform”.269 Apart from
these two components, the project required a ground station, which was built in Ras
Ngomeni near Malindi in Kenya, and today this Earth segment “involves many
buildings made of masonry and wood used as accommodations and services, a small
seaport for docking the ships serving as a link with the platforms as well as three
Earth Stations (antenna systems) for the in-orbit control as well as the telemetry
receipt from satellites and vectors”.270 The three stations have the following spec-
ifications: (i) S-Band station, equipped with a 10-m-long parabola used for the
agency programs; (ii) S-/X-/L-band station, equipped with a 10-m-long parabola
used for the control of launch vehicles (Arianespace, Titan) and to give support to the
first phases of commercial satellites flight (LEOP); and (iii) X-band station equipped
with a 6-m-long parabola used to receive remote sensing data (ERS2, Spot,
Landsat).271 In 1969 Kenya’s territorial waters increased to 12 nautical miles, and
the platforms “survived past 1969 through sheer goodwill and a loose treaty signed
in 1964” since Italy and Kenya would only reach an agreement on rent about
15 years later.272
Twenty-seven launches, most of which were sounding rockets but nine of which
were for satellites, were made between 1964 and 1988, with a 100% success rate for
the nine satellites (four Italian, four American, and one British), including the
notable NASA satellite named Uhuru, launched on Kenya’s independence anniver-
sary in 1970.273 It is reported that the platforms are in disrepair but that the ground
station “thrived” with the addition of a remote sensing centre in 1997 and new
equipment.274 The latest agreement was signed between Italy and Kenya in 2016,
renewing the Luigi Broglio Space Centre Agreement, with the inclusion of five
implementation protocols: “Support to the Kenyan National Space Agency”,
“Establishing a Regional Centre for the Observation of the Earth”, “Access to
Earth Observation Data and Scientific Data”, “Training and Educational Activities”,
and “Telemedicine”.275 There is thus an increased scope for the LBSC to play a
larger supporting role for Kenya’s primary needs, especially education and capacity
building, and (indirectly) other needs via EO data and support of the Kenya National
Space Agency.
The International Centre for Space Education in Africa is a recent initiative by the
International Astronautical Federation, Kenya Ministry of Defence, and Italian
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Space Agency to “[p]repare African students and trainees to become Africa’s space
leaders and foster regional and international cooperation”. It is open to all African
countries and aims to have its first space course by the end of 2018 and is based at
Luigi Broglio Space Centre (LBSC) in Malindi.276 This is a very positive develop-
ment and is a strong step to increasing capacity building in Eastern Africa in
particular and all of Africa more generally. Disciplines and areas of research include
Earth observation, including services and applications; space communications;
satellite data acquisition, processing, archiving, and dissemination; control and
telemetry services; and launching and control of satellites, suborbital platforms,
and stratospheric balloons.277 Activities and programs include training courses,
workshops, seminars, internships, research projects, and spin-off activities. The
International Centre for Space Education in Africa operates with the mission:
“Prepare African students and trainees to become the Space leaders of future Africa
and promote regional, international and inter—continental cooperation, for a peace-
ful and sustainable development of the African continent”.278
The Chinese Telemetry, Tracking, and Command Station in Namibia is the result
of an agreement signed between the two countries in 2000. The purpose of the
station is to “manage and control the re-entry or landing procedure of China’s
Manned Spacecraft”.279 The station has “successfully participated” in at least six
manned Chinese missions. A further Employment Agreement was signed in 2012
for the employment of Namibians at the station, and the original agreement makes
provision for China to help Namibia to develop local space science and technology
capacity. China also agreed to train Namibian citizens in this area through skills
transfer, and at least 11 have been trained with five receiving master’s degrees. The
China Aerospace Science and Technology Exhibition Centre was also opened in
2010, during which degrees and certificates were handed over to recent Namibian
graduates who studied in China and would be employed at the station. This coop-
eration thus serves Namibia in terms of education and capacity building in the
context of the primary needs model.
As discussed in the next chapter, São Tomé and Príncipe also signed an MoU
with India in September 2018 for ISRO (the Indian Space Research Organisation) to
set up “a Space Centre” in the country.280
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2.5 Conclusion
This chapter has shown that Africa is integrated into the international space ecosys-
tem on three dimensions with direct bearing on primary needs. Two of these—the
intra-African dimension of continental space-related IGOs and NGOs and the
international dimension of Africa’s participation in UNCOPUOS—were used to
identify the levels of Africa’s space engagement through the Intra-African Space
Engagement and the International Space Engagement Matrices. It was found that a
range of African states are engaged in the space arena, but seven in particular stood
out as the emerging space middle powers of the continent, namely, Algeria, Egypt,
Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, and Tunisia. The third dimension also
served to illustrate that Africa is an increasingly attractive destination for space-
related projects and partnerships, and international agreements have been prolifer-
ating in recent years.
That is, however, not to say that there is not a range of challenges that remain in
terms of expanding space engagement across much of Africa. Some of these include
involvement of key stakeholders, sensitisation and awareness, further capacity
building programmes, and ICT infrastructure.281 In terms of the first factor, it has
been argued that most regional projects fail precisely because all key stakeholders,
defined as “the right expert with the necessary experience and political clout”, have
not been involved to adequate degrees, with the result that there is little ownership by
the people and the fruits of such projects are accordingly underutilised.282 Strict and
clear requirements in terms of knowledge, status, availability, and the contributions
required from participating countries, plus involvement through all stages of projects
(planning, design, implementation), are thus critical factors for success, especially if
projects are to survive past pilot stage.
The second factor was mentioned earlier in the chapter, namely, sensitisation and
awareness, and often a problem emerges with African decision-makers being
unaware of the full range of initiatives or projects on the continent.283 Key technical
personnel are also absent from participation awareness meetings at times due to lack
of travel funds, while “communications amongst African governments are generally
poor”.284 The third factor of additional “robust and enduring” capacity building
programmes is also critical if there is to be domestication of, and identification with,
projects, and greater emphasis on open system and open-source software is “of the
utmost importance”.285 Particular skills in demand are related to interoperability,
standardisation, metadata and data publication, data management, governance, and
fostering cooperating and collaboration.286 Finally, as discussed in Chap. 1, ICT
281Agbaje and John, “Cooperating in earth observation missions in Africa,” 9–10.
282Ibid.
283Ibid.
284Ibid.
285Ibid.
286Ibid., 11.
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infrastructure on the continent is often a barrier to the uptake of space data utilisation
in Africa, and more “deliberate decision” making must be done to improve this.
Beyond these four factors, some argue that existing collaborative projects, including
the ARMS-C, “must not be allowed to die”,287 and thus the initiatives discussed
throughout this chapter cannot, and must not, be taken for granted but must be fought
for and defended. They provide the kernel around which further collaboration can be
promoted (the IASE and ISE Matrices suggest good candidates for such collabora-
tion), and they have a clear advantage in that “it is easier to collaborate when there
are central institutions that unite smaller actors” since “networks can produce
maximization of space benefits”.288 Needless to say, but worth repeating here, a
“society that fails to invest in the future may have no future at all”.289
One promising proposal for the African space sector is that Africa should emulate
the European model of establishing an African Space Policy Institute (ASPI), since
“[t]oday, there is no institution in Africa, that offers evidence-based space policy
advice to a national government nor the African Union”, and thus, like the European
Space Policy Institute (ESPI) in Austria, ASPI could fill this gap in policy formu-
lation, capacity building, analysis, and training.290 Another function of ASPI could
be to promote awareness around the African Space Policy and Strategy, while
addressing the “dearth of such skills [in space law and governance, which are]
largely due to the nascent state of the African space sector and limited career
opportunities for professionals”.291 The urgent need for such an institute is
emphasised by the fact that “only South Africa has national space legislation and a
regulatory body to oversee its implementation”.292 ASPI could also promote Africa’s
participation in discourse around issues such as space debris and other potential
challenges to the sustainability of space and help work towards forming the single
voice with which Africa is hoping to speak on the global stage, especially on the
international space agenda. Indeed, current regulatory complexity means that simply
investing in technology is not enough, and “[o]ne must also have the capacity to
understand and shape regulatory agendas around technologies”.293 It is also neces-
sary to have a full understanding and appreciation of the role of UNCOPUOS, for
example, and a clearing away of misconceptions so that—given Africa’s preference
for consensus in decision-making among equal and sovereign partners—more states
will recognise the value of fuller participation in that organisation. It is thus critical
287Ibid., 10.
288Timiebi Aganaba-Jeanty, “Space Sustainability and the Freedom of Outer Space,” Astropolitics
14, no. 1 (2016): 6–7.
289Ibid., 11.
290Etim Offiong and Valanathan Munsami, “Towards a space policy institute for Africa,” Space
Policy 46, (2018): 4–5.
291Ibid., 6.
292Ibid.
293Dennerley, “Emerging space nations and the development of international regulatory regimes,”
30.
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for Africa’s decision-makers to avoid a lack of long-term vision in this regard.
Fostering commercial enterprises and public-private partnerships is also critical to
reducing the length of time it takes to implement space projects in Africa and to
ensuring sustainability.
To conclude, while it is true that not all countries are, or need to be, active in
space in terms of owning satellites, the need for all to take seriously their involve-
ment in space, and its regulatory aspects, is clear. In Africa, as in the rest of the
world, cooperation and partnerships are the cornerstones of the space sector, and in
this regard, Africa can benefit from more “space ubuntu” in the sense of better
integrating and supporting the entire African family and community within the
international space ecosystem, to unlock the benefits thereof for primary needs,
through what the UN Secretary General called in 1977 a step of humility and
hope. The next chapter will examine African space infrastructure, assets, national
space-related authorities, initiatives, capabilities, and activities.
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Chapter 3
African Union Member States:
National Space Infrastructure, Activities,
and Capabilities
Abstract Having examined the space-related engagements of African states and the
context framing the primary needs approach in earlier chapters, this chapter exam-
ines the national space capabilities and initiatives of African states through the main
lenses of the modified Space Technology Ladder and the emerging space actor
(EMSA) framework, which are discussed first. The examination then proceeds
according to Africa’s Regional Economic Communities, identifying national space
agencies, and current as well as upcoming infrastructure and satellite projects. This is
followed by a summary of Africa’s key ground segment infrastructure, as well as
scientific research output across the continent in the areas of Space and Planetary
Science, Astronomy and Astrophysics, and Aerospace Engineering. African space-
related spending is also considered. In line with findings from the previous chapter,
the current African space growth poles are identified, as are a host of promising
rising stars in the sector. These findings, combined with those of previous chapters,
powerfully counter the views that Africa remains behind in the space sector of the
twenty-first century, that space activities are not relevant to developing nations with
many other pressing concerns, and that space is not relevant to, or used to support,
the daily lives of Africans—themes that are further examined in an upcoming work
on Space Supporting Africa.
3.1 Introduction
There are some who question the relevance of space activities in a developing nation. To us,
there is no ambiguity of purpose. We do not have the fantasy of competing with the
economically advanced nations in the exploration of the moon or the planets or manned
space-flight. But we are convinced that if we are to play a meaningful role nationally, and in
the community of nations, we must be second to none in the application of advanced
technologies to the real problems of man and society.
Vikram Ambalal Sarabhai1
1Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), “Dr. Vikram Ambalal Sarabhai (1963–1971),” 2017,
https://www.isro.gov.in/about-isro/dr-vikram-ambalal-sarabhai-1963-1971 (accessed November
12, 2018).
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019
A. Froehlich, A. Siebrits, Space Supporting Africa, Studies in Space Policy 20,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12173-0_3
191
Dr. Sarabhai, known as the father of the Indian space programme, had a clear
appreciation of the role of space and advanced technology in addressing societal
needs. Due to his vision, India’s first satellite, Aryabhata, was launched in 1975, a
feat he did not live to see.2 This example serves to illustrate two critical points in
relation to national investments in space technology and space-related activities.
First, developing countries must be driven in their actions by the overriding need to
address the “real problems” facing their societies, not by motives of prestige by
competing with the more developed countries. Related to this, the challenge
highlighted in earlier chapters—of needing to justify space expenditure in the face
of many other pressing socio-economic needs—must continue to be faced through
public outreach efforts and publicising and sharing the benefits derived from space
activities, precisely so that the public and policymakers can fully appreciate the
value of space for the well-being of Africa’s people. Second, Dr. Sarabhai’s example
shows that narrow, short-term, and short-sighted thinking and planning must be
avoided if investments in space are to bear fruit. Long-term vision, commitment, and
clarity of purpose are the keys to success, and, today, India’s “space program is
thriving as one of the fastest-growing in the world”. The key reason it “has become
such a success is the belief in and acknowledgement of space as an avenue for a
variety of practical applications, from scientific exploration to military applications
and economic gain”, supported by “a national narrative explaining the need for a
robust and sustainable space program”.3
The reality is that Africa cannot afford to ignore the space sector. The recent white
paper issued by Airbus, entitled The Great Enabler: Aerospace in Africa, has made it
clear that:
The aerospace industry offers solutions to many of the socio-economic challenges Africa is
facing on the path to sustainable development. A paradigm shift from thinking about
aerospace as an isolated industry to a key enabler of socio-economic change is necessary
to realise its benefits for a prosperous future.4
The white paper further stipulates that “[b]uilding a robust commercial aerospace
industry in Africa is no longer a question of if but how”5 and sets out the challenge
for Africa in relation to critical success factors:
For those countries that are already part of the global aerospace value chain as well as those
in the process of becoming so, the critical success factors are human capital development and
creation of a business-friendly environment in order to become competitive. In order to
pursue these approaches in aerospace, government officials and policymakers must
2Ibid.
3Raja Mansoor, “Pakistan Is Losing the Space Race,” The Diplomat, February 1, 2018, https://
thediplomat.com/2018/02/pakistan-is-losing-the-space-race/ (accessed November 13, 2018).
4Airbus, “Airbus launches landmark report on the impact and future of aerospace technologies in
Africa,” October 30, 2018, https://www.airbus.com/newsroom/press-releases/en/2018/10/airbus-
launches-landmark-report-on-the-impact-and-future-of-aero.html (accessed November 13, 2018).
5Samsana Ismail and Ilunga Mpyana, The Great Enabler: Aerospace in Africa (Airbus, 2018),
9. https://www.airbus.com/content/dam/corporate-topics/publications/brochures/TheGreatEnable_
AerospaceinAfrica.pdf (accessed November 13, 2018).
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implement clear and realistic strategies to enable countries to reap the benefits of this
robust and impactful industry.
In Chap. 1 it was argued that while not all countries are producers in the global
aerospace value chain, all are consumers and are thus in some way involved in the
sector. This is also echoed by the Airbus white paper, which put forth the argument
that:
On manufacturing and industrialization, many African countries are final consumers in the
global aerospace value chain. Joining the rank of producers in this value chain is challenging
for many but not impossible. The examples of Africa’s current leaders in
aerospace—South Africa, Tunisia and Morocco—demonstrate the complexities but also
the opportunities for African countries to develop aerospace manufacturing and industrial-
ization capacity.6
Many African countries are already taking up this challenge of joining the ranks
of the producers, as illustrated through the example that a stunning 40% of all
African satellites have been launched in the last 2 years (2016–2018).7 Since the
first African satellite was launched by Egypt in 1998 (NileSat-101), over $3 billion
has been spent on space projects on the continent, and the space sector is set to be
one of the most dynamic in the coming years as more countries join in.8 Therefore,
an analysis of African space activities, capabilities, and infrastructure is a timely
endeavour. In addition, entry barriers have been greatly reduced through
miniaturisation and technological innovation, meaning that it:
is becoming increasingly more viable for low income countries thanks to the recent
proliferation of small satellites, such as CubeSats. CubeSats and other nanosatellites are
relatively cheaper that can even be built locally—indeed they can be. They thus provide a
unique avenue where by even low-income nations can, within a short time and with few
resources, acquire invaluable pertinent data that contributes toward judicious policies
regarding natural disaster management, climate change mitigation, and agribusiness
decision-making in general.9
In the previous chapter, Africa’s relations in the space arena and participation and
engagement on the continent and beyond were investigated. A very clear picture
emerged of Africa’s emerging space middle powers, and seven countries10 were
identified in this regard (the three identified by Airbus, above, as aerospace leaders
6Ibid., 8.
7Space in Africa, “Four (4) more satellites from Africa before the end of 2018,” Africa Space News,
October 13, 2018, https://africanews.space/four-4-more-satellites-from-africa-before-the-end-of-
2018/?fbclid¼IwAR3TQXUHB6LamE2YLg-PL4uR7wNS42uLV1Xut_1L13_
FK3aZWE0JgSMSfso (accessed November 13, 2018).
8Space in Africa, “Over $3 billion have been spent on space projects in Africa since 1998,” Africa
Space News, May 11, 2018, https://africanews.space/over-3-billion-have-been-spent-on-space-pro
jects-in-africa-since-1998/ (accessed November 13, 2018).
9Christon Maganga and Christopher Luwanga, “How Investing in Space Could Help Malawi,”
Africa Space News, June 2, 2018, https://africanews.space/how-investing-in-space-could-help-
malawi/ (accessed December 9, 2018).
10Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa and Tunisia.
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were included), with a number of other promising rising stars11. In this chapter, the
capabilities of African states with regard to space-related infrastructure and national
space activities will thus be investigated to complement these findings. This will be
done via the framework of the Space Technology Ladder (STL) of Wood and
Weigel12 and Harding’s13 framework of emerging space actors (EMSAs),
supplemented in places with concepts from the European Space Agency’s Techno-
logy Readiness Levels14 (TRL). These were all introduced in Chap. 1 (Sect. 1.3.2).
A regional approach will be taken, based on the Regional Economic Communities
(RECs) discussed in Chap. 1, and this will be coupled with the findings of Chap. 2 in
relation to the emerging space middle powers to structure the discussion
(in particular Table 2.13 of Chap. 2). The interlinked nature of the analysis is
presented in Fig. 3.1, identifying African space growth poles (as called for by
Nhamo in Chap. 1), with “every subcontinental region needing strong drivers of
growth”15—including in the space arena. Once again, the need to embed space
Intra-African
Space
Engagement
Africa’s
International
Space
Engagement
ENGAGEMENT:
EMERGING
SPACE MIDDLE
POWERS
CAPABILITIES &
INFRASTRUCTURE
AFRICAN SPACE GROWTH POLES
SOCIO-ECONOMIC LANDSCAPE:
PRIMARY NEEDS
International
Agreements
and
Initiatives
European Space
Agency’s
Technology
Readiness Level
Emerging
Space
Actors
Space
Technology
Ladder
Fig. 3.1 Identifying African space growth poles
11Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote D’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Mali, Mauri-
tius, Namibia, Niger, Republic of Congo, Senegal, Seychelles, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia,
and Zimbabwe, with a range of others also showing promise.
12Danielle Wood and Annalisa Weigel, “Charting the Evolution of Satellite Programs in Develop-
ing Countries – The Space Technology Ladder,” Space Policy, 2012, no. 28.
13Robert C. Harding, Space Policy in Developing Countries: The Search for Security and Devel-
opment on the Final Frontier (London: Routledge, 2013).
14European Space Agency, “Technology Readiness Level (TRL),” 2017, http://sci.esa.int/sci-ft/
50124-technology-readiness-level/ (accessed July 8, 2018).
15Godwell Nhamo, “New Global Sustainable Development Agenda: A Focus on Africa,” Sustain-
able Development, 2016: 1.
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activities in the socio-economic landscape (and primary needs in particular) to meet
the urgent needs of Africa is also emphasised.
The ultimate aim of this book is thus to present, at the end of this chapter, an
overview of Africa’s most notable space actors and space sector growth poles by
combining the findings of this chapter with those of Chap. 2. As such, the structure
of this chapter will be as follows—first, Wood and Weigel’s STL will be used as a
framework for analysing African space-related technological capabilities, including
areas of national space agencies, satellites, and launch capability, as will the frame-
work of Harding’s emerging space actors. This will be approached regionally to
provide a better picture of the nuances in the African space landscape. Second, since
the STL does not include aspects of space budgets or scientific and research output in
the space sector, these will be considered in the following section, alongside an
overview of Africa’s ground-based space infrastructure, such as in the astronomy
field. Finally, the chapter, and the volume as a whole, will be concluded, laying the
groundwork for the next volume considering aspects of space applications, policies,
and African-European relations.
3.2 Application of the Space Technology Ladder
In this section, the Space Technology Ladder, developed by Wood and Weigel, will
be used as a conceptual framework for the analysis of major space technology
achievements in Africa. Before delving further into this framework, it is useful to
consider the possible orbits that satellites can occupy around the Earth, in order to
identify trends in African efforts, since these concepts are key to the Space Tech-
nology Ladder. Figure 3.2 depicts the main orbital zones of relevance, namely, low
Earth orbit (LEO), medium Earth orbit (MEO), and geostationary and geosynchro-
nous orbits (GEO). Satellites in LEO and MEO can vary in their orbits from
equatorial to polar, with all possible inclinations in between. Equatorial orbits are
usually favoured for observation of tropical weather patterns, and it is possible to
monitor cloud conditions around the globe from this orbit.16 In reality, many LEO
satellites are in inclined orbits as an object’s orbit generally reflects the latitude of the
launch site, since orbital inclination changes are expensive to make in terms of fuel.
For this reason, the International Space Station is in a 51.6-degree inclined orbit,
since this is the “lowest inclination orbit into which the Russians can directly launch
their Soyuz and Progress spacecraft”.17 Polar orbits are useful for mapping or
surveillance since they can observe virtually every part of the Earth as the planet
rotates underneath.18 A special class of polar orbit is a sun-synchronous orbit, which
16Iasmania, “Types of Satellite Orbits: How satellites move in space,” Iasmania.com, 2015, https://
iasmania.com/types-of-satellite-orbits/ (accessed November 14, 2018).
17Patrick Donovan, “Mission Control Answers Your Questions,” National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, August 10, 2002, https://spaceflight.nasa.gov/feedback/expert/answer/mcc/sts-112/
09_04_12_54_17.html (accessed November 14, 2018).
18Iasmania, “Types of Satellite Orbits.”
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uses the Earth’s nonspherical shape, and resultant gravity, to alter its path by about
1 degree per day (for 360 degrees, thus a full orbit of the Earth around the sun),
meaning that a satellite maintains its angle to the sun and passes over a section of the
Earth at the same time every day.19 Highly elliptical orbits are also possible, as is the
case of Russian Molniya satellites (after which a particular type of elliptical orbit was
named).
Finally, geostationary orbit is a very specific type of equatorial orbit which is
located at an altitude of 35,780 km above the surface of the Earth, in which satellites
orbit at the same speed as the Earth’s rotation, thus allowing them to appear
motionless from the ground, occupying a fixed position in the sky.20 This orbit is
vital for communications and weather satellites, and their “footprint” constitutes the
areas they cover. Geosynchronous orbits are very similar to geostationary orbits but
are inclined, with satellites’ angular velocity matching that of the Earth, again
maintaining a nearly fixed position (although it will shift somewhat during the day
it will return to the same position every 24 h), and are useful for covering areas of
higher latitude on Earth.21 GEO is thus considered to fall within the category of high
Earth orbits (HEO). Beyond these, lunar and other orbits are possible, but not
relevant to this study. Figure 3.3 illustrates some of the different orbits discussed.
To return to the Space Technology Ladder, its four categories, which are ranked
to highlight increasing technical and managerial autonomy and complexity, are
useful because “historically, they reflect the initial efforts of both developed and
developing countries in space”, and while African investments in space have been
increasing, particularly in the last few years, the continent’s efforts are predomi-
nantly in the initial phase of establishment. As was summarised in Chap. 1, these
4 categories contain 13 distinct actions, and while their levels of complexity and
autonomy are not consistent across categories, they are within categories. For
example, purchasing a geostationary satellite is less complex than building a satellite
meant for low Earth orbit. Table 3.1 summarises these categories and their actions.
Fig. 3.2 Orbital zones around the Earth (not to scale)
19Ibid.
20Ibid.
21Ibid.
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As Wood and Weigel argue, the STL “provides a basis by which to compare the
actual choices made by countries as they pursue new space technology”, and it is
possible to depict this through visual mapping in graph form.22 This will be done
here as well, depicting the first time a country achieves one of the milestones and
thereby taking a “major step forward in their level of technical autonomy in the area
of space or build new technological capability”.23 While the discussion here will
highlight developments currently underway, each of the milestones will only be
counted if the country in question has completed it, and thus new developments will,
as Wood and Weigel suggest, be mapped to “future”.
A discussion of the STL is not complete without noting the gaps in the frame-
work. In this regard, six were noted in a study of Argentina’s space activities by
López, Pascuini, and Ramos.24 First, the Space Technology Ladder does not account
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Table 3.1 The Space Technology Ladder (Wood and Weigel)
4. Launch capability 13. Satellite to GEO
12. Satellite to LEO
3. GEO satellite 11. Build locally
10. Build through mutual international collaboration
9. Build locally with outside assistance
8. Procure
2. LEO satellite 7. Build locally
6. Build through mutual international collaboration
5. Build locally with outside assistance
4. Build with support in partner’s facility
3. Procure with training services
1. National space agency 2. Establish current national space agency
1. Establish first government space office
Wood and Weigel, “Charting the Evolution of Satellite Programs in Developing Countries,” 17
22Wood and Weigel, “Charting the Evolution of Satellite Programs in Developing Countries,” 18.
23Ibid., 17.
24Andrés López, Paulo Pascuinia, and Adrián Ramosa, “Climbing the Space Technology Ladder in
the South: the case of Argentina,” Space Policy, 2018.
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for technical complexity within individual milestones—for instance, using more
sophisticated technology or components to build a satellite as opposed to a small
CubeSat—and it does not make a distinction for constellations.25 However, since
most of Africa’s satellites tend to be smaller “entry-level” satellites, not part of
massive constellations, this concern is reduced. Second, because the four different
categories are based on different sets of scientific and technological abilities, there is
no need for countries to follow any particular set of milestones. For instance, a
country may skip establishing a national space agency in favour of launching a GEO
satellite. Indeed, the purpose of the STL is not to depict a strict linear pathway all
countries necessarily follow but, as stated, to show a general progression in com-
plexity and autonomy, thus providing a basis for a comparative discussion of policy
choices, being “very useful for analysing national trajectories in the space sector and
as a way to bring together all the steps involved in mastering the technology cycle in
the space industry”.26
Moreover, the work by Al-Rumhi et al. provides an additional nuance to refine
the STL framework and partially account for this.27 They propose adding three
categories or lenses through which to consider the STL: (i) High Space Technology
Countries, namely, countries with space agencies; (ii) Medium Space Technology
Countries, namely, countries with space involvement or capabilities, but no space
agency; and (iii) Low Space Technology Countries, namely, countries with scarce or
no space involvement or capabilities.28 In this case, the factor of having a space
agency represents a more concerted effort by the particular countries which have
them to drive space efforts forward, to secure funding, be able to negotiate with
similar agencies elsewhere, and develop a cadre of space experts domestically. This
is an important consideration, and these categories will thus be applied alongside the
STL, which does include a specific category for space agency, as a useful heuristic
device.
Ercan and Kale also argue in their work on Turkey that it is necessary to add two
more subcategories within Wood and Weigel’s “National Space Agency” category,
namely, Establish First Government Space Policy and Establish Space Infrastruc-
ture/Assembly, Integration, and Test (AIT) Centre, thus renaming this first category
to “Establishing Space Policy, Agency and Infrastructure”.29 This is an excellent
suggestion and will be taken up here as well, and thus aspects of both space and
ground segments of space systems will be highlighted. Finally, Ercan and Kale
propose modifying the category of GEO satellite to include MEO satellites as well
25Ibid., 2.
26Ibid., 2.
27Ahmed Al-Rumhi, Bin Chen, Chee Wee Choo, et al., “Identifying and Developing Effective
Applications of Space for Africa (IDEAS for Africa): Final Report,” IDEAS For Africa, April
15, 2012, http://africa.isunet.edu/w/Final_Report_FINAL_OUTPUT#Title_Page (accessed
November 15, 2018).
28Ibid., “Selection Methodology” section.
29Cihan Ercan and İzzet Kale, “Historical space steps of Turkey: It is high time to establish the
Turkish space agency,” Acta Astronautica, 2017, no. 130: 71–72.
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since “their radiation environments are more similar to those of GEO’s rather than
LEO’s”.30 This suggestion will thus also be adopted here.
The third gap noted by López, Pascuini, and Ramos is that the “build locally”
milestone does not make allowance for nuances, such as certain parts being procured
from abroad—important in the “current context of global fragmentation of technical
and production capabilities”.31 One suggestion is to account for “integrating at least
some locally produced key components and instruments”.32 This is captured to some
extent by the modification proposed by Ercan and Kale, namely, the inclusion of AIT
infrastructure. Fourth, the Space Technology Ladder does not include any aspects of
national “capacity of building the ground stations” or other infrastructure.33 This
also includes other aspects such as national space-related research output, and thus,
following this section utilising the STL, the next section will focus on factors such as
research output, space budgets, astronomy, and other infrastructure.
Fifth, the milestone of “build through mutual international collaboration” is
criticised for being very loosely defined since most projects “involve collaboration
among different countries even in the developed world”, and “collaboration also
exists when a satellite completely designed and built in a certain country integrates
into its payload instruments manufactured by a foreign country”.34 Moreover,
López, Pascuini, and Ramos argue that ranking this milestone beneath “build
locally” is problematic since “a country can manufacture a satellite integrating
mostly imported components, while a mutual collaboration project may imply
contributing with highly sophisticated technology developments to a bilateral pro-
ject”.35 These points are not disputed here, but the original definition proffered by
Wood and Weigel—stating that mutual collaboration “is used here to refer to
collaboration projects in which the financial and technical contributions of each
partner are similar”36—remains useful in the context of this study.
Finally, the sixth gap identified is that the STL does “not capture the emergence of
a relatively new phenomenon in the space industry”, namely:
(i) The growing diffusion of small satellites: small satellites are more affordable but given
their small size they can carry fewer instruments. However, technological advances
(e.g. miniaturization) may help to bypass that restriction. Fractionated mission architectures
are also a way to take advantage of small satellites working in networks/constellations;
(ii) the introduction of new processes aimed at applying mass production techniques to
manufacture spacecraft and launchers; (iii) the increasing use of advanced manufacturing
technologies in the space industry; (iv) the expansion of electric propulsion satellites which,
thanks to their lower weight, may embark more payload (e.g. more transponders in the case
of telecommunication satellites).37
30Ibid.
31López, Pascuinia, and Ramosa, “Climbing the Space Technology Ladder in the South,” 2.
32Ibid.
33Ibid., 3.
34Ibid.
35Ibid.
36Wood and Weigel, “Charting the Evolution of Satellite Programs in Developing Countries,” 17.
37López, Pascuinia, and Ramosa, “Climbing the Space Technology Ladder in the South,” 3.
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For the purposes of this study, this concern is noted, but achievements in small
satellites will still be considered as completing the relevant milestones. There is no
question that Africa’s achievements in space, even in small satellites, represent
critical milestones in the continent’s efforts to advance its aerospace industry, and
thus affordability and size do not diminish these achievements—often great sources
of national pride—or their importance for the people of Africa. A final point can be
raised here regarding an omission in the STL not mentioned by López, Pascuini, and
Ramos, namely, launching an astronaut into space. While no African country has
done so, there are plans for this, and this achievement represents the ultimate
expression of technical and managerial autonomy and complexity, and thus a
category for this will be added under “launch capability”38.
Having thus considered the concerns and debates around the STL, a modified
version that includes 16 milestones is presented in Table 3.2.
At this point, a summary of Harding’s model of emerging space actors
(EMSAs)39 is useful. This model provides very broad categories for organizing the
capabilities of space actors and is thus useful to see which larger, structural shifts
have taken place in the African space arena. Harding’s first category of developed
space actors (DVSAs) will be ignored here since it applies to developed states with a
full range of capabilities, such as the United States, Russia, Japan, and the European
Union. Within the EMSAs the first tier consists of the largest and most capable
developing states, such as China, India, and Brazil. Thus, second- and third-tier
subcategories are important here, and the goal is to identify whether any African
states have moved from the third tier to the second tier or are about to do so. As
stated in Chap. 1, the difference between these two subcategories is as follows
(Harding identifies South Africa as the only second-tier African EMSA):
The “second tier” states are those that produce some of their own space technology, have
basic launch capacity (typically sounding rockets), have national space agencies, and
frequently, out of necessity, collaborate with more advanced states’ programs in the pro-
duction of space technology. The “third tier” states occasionally make contributions in
space-related technology, almost always purchase space-related technology from more
advanced producers, and almost always collaborate with other more developed space actors
to achieve their space policy goals. Rather than being space-faring, third tier space actors
have made the policy decision to invest in space technology to accomplish what could not be
done otherwise.40
38The first African citizen in space (“Afronaut”) was South African billionaire Mark Shuttleworth
who, at own expense and in personal capacity, paid for a trip to the International Space Station in
2002 through Russian partnership. [First African in Space, “About the First African in Space
Project,” Here Be Dragons, http://www.africaninspace.com/ (accessed November 15, 2018).]
Mike Melvill, born in South Africa and test pilot of SpaceShipOne, also crossed over into space
above the 100 km altitude line, thus technically becoming an astronaut but was doing so in capacity
of US citizen at the time [Dave Hirschman, “The Unlikeliest Astronaut: Mike Melvill’s journey into
space,” Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, June 5, 2013, https://www.aopa.org/news-and-
media/all-news/2013/june/pilot/the-unlikeliest-astronaut (accessed November 15, 2018).]
39Robert C. Harding, Space Policy in Developing Countries: The Search for Security and Devel-
opment on the Final Frontier (London: Routledge, 2013), 250.
40Ibid., 79.
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Thus, the emphasis is on the development of national space technology (much
like Ercan and Kale argued in terms of including AIT infrastructure in the STL) and
on possessing at least basic sounding rockets.
In agreement with Al-Rumhi et al., “[i]n the Low (or non-existing) Space
Technology category, there are no benefits from applying a technology framework
to countries which hardly produce spaceborne technology”, and thus countries that
are not very active in space in terms of the STL will be excluded from the discussion
in this chapter. The following sections will follow the structure of the RECs as
discussed in Chap. 1, starting with the Arab Maghreb Union, and will use the
findings of African emerging space middle powers as structure, thus beginning
with the most prominent space actors in each region. Where countries are members
of more than one REC, the relevant analysis will be presented at the first appearance
and then noted in subsequent RECS.
3.2.1 Arab Maghreb Union (UMA)
While the UMA has only five members, three were featured prominently in the
discussion in Chap. 2 and were subsequently identified as emerging space middle
powers. The discussion will thus begin with them.
Algeria arguably established its first space office in 1987, “with the creation of the
National Centre for Space Technology (Centre National des Techniques Spatiales—
CNTS), the result of a merger between the National School of Geodetic Sciences
(Ministry of Defence) and the Laboratory for Space Studies of Radiation (High
Table 3.2 Modified space technology ladder
4. Launch capability 16. Astronaut to space
15. Satellite to GEO
14. Satellite to LEO
3. MEO/GEO satellite 13. Build locally
12. Build through mutual international collaboration
11. Build locally with outside assistance
10. Procure
2. LEO satellite 9. Build locally
8. Build through mutual international collaboration
7. Build locally with outside assistance
6. Build with support in partner’s facility
5. Procure with training services
1. Establishing space policy,
agency, and infrastructure
4. Establish space AIT centre/space industry
3. Establish current national space agency [critical factor
for High/Medium/Low Space Technology Countries]
2. Establish first government space office
1. Establish first government space policy
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Commissioner for Research)”.41 The Algerian Space Agency (ASAL) (L’Agence
Spatiale Algérienne) was established in 2002 following a presidential decree, incor-
porating the CNTS.42 The country’s first satellite, AlSat-1, was launched the same
year and was designed and constructed by Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd (SSTL)
as part of a “wider international collaboration to launch the first constellation of
Earth observation satellites specifically designed for disaster monitoring”.43 As such,
AlSat-1 was the first satellite in the Disaster Monitoring Constellation (DMC) led
by SSTL.
However, rather than just having the satellite built by SSTL, Algerian personnel
from the Centre National des Techniques Spatiales (CNTS) were involved, and
training for 11 Algerian scientists and engineers was included.44 SSTL also installed
a mission control ground station in Algeria at the CNTS. Weighing 90 kg and placed
in a sun-synchronous orbit by Russia45, AlSat-1 had specifications including “spe-
cially-designed Earth imaging cameras which provide 32-m resolution imaging in
3 spectral bands (NIR, red, green) with an extremely wide imaging swath of 600 km
on the ground that enables a revisit of the same area anywhere in the world at least
every 4 days with just a single satellite”46. Since AlSat-1, five further Algerian
satellites have been placed in sun-synchronous orbits, as detailed in Table 3.3, with
one—AlComSat-1—built and launched by China in 2017, being placed in geosyn-
chronous orbit.47
Algeria’s space policy, known as the Programme Spatial National (PSN) Horizon
2020, was adopted by the government in 2006 and runs until 2020.48 The three
strategic targets include industrial capacity development, satisfaction of national
needs, and mastery of knowledge and know-how. Under the PSN Application
Action Program, 86 projects were selected, involving “the use of satellite remote
sensing, satellite tracking (GPS, GLONASS, GALILEO in perspective), space
telecommunication services, and Geographic Information Systems (GIS), offering
to the different national sectors powerful tools for decision support”.49 In December
41GlobalSecurity.org, “Algerian Space Agency (ASAL),” July 27, 2016, https://www.
globalsecurity.org/space/world/algeria/agency.htm (accessed November 17, 2018).
42Agence Spatiale Algérienne, “Mission,” 2009, http://www.asal.dz/mission.php (accessed
November 16, 2018)
43Gunter Dirk Krebs, “AlSat 1,” Gunter’s Space Page, June 22, 2018, https://space.skyrocket.de/
doc_sdat/alsat-1.htm (accessed November 16, 2018).
44Ibid.
45Observing Systems Capability Analysis and Review Tool (OSCAR), “AlSat-1,” World Meteo-
rological Organisation, July 27, 2015, https://www.wmo-sat.info/oscar/satellites/view/8 (accessed
November 16, 2018).
46Krebs, “AlSat 1.”
47Aerospace Technology, “Alcomsat-1 Communications Satellite,” Verdict Media Limited, 2018,
https://www.aerospace-technology.com/projects/alcomsat-1-communications-satellite/ (accessed
November 16, 2018).
48Agence Spatiale Algérienne, “Programme spatial national (PSN),” 2015, http://www.asal.dz/psn.
php (accessed November 16, 2018).
49Ibid. Translated from French.
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Table 3.3 Algerian satellites
Satellite Launched Orbit Features Focus
AlSat-1a,b 2002 Sun-
synchronous
• Earth imaging cam-
eras—32 m resolution
imaging in three spec-
tral bands (NIR, red,
green) with an imaging
swath of 600 km
• Launch site: Plesetsk
Cosmodrome, Russia
• Designed and
constructed by SSTL
in a collaborative
programme with the
Algerian Centre
National des Tech-
niques Spatiales
(CNTS)
• Data openly avail-
able through the
DMC agreement
• Key areas: Earth
observation for disas-
ter monitoring,
capacity building
AlSat-2Ac,d,e 2010 Sun-
synchronous
• “Equipped with
NAOMI (New
AstroSat Optical Mod-
ular Instrument), a
latest-generation pay-
load capable of sup-
plying images with a
resolution of 2.5 m in
panchromatic mode
and 10 m in each of
4 colour bands in mul-
tispectral mode”
• “Acquires high reso-
lution images with a
repeatability of 3 days
and a field of observa-
tion of 17.5 km”
• Launch site: Satish
Dhawan Space Centre
(SDSC), India
• In February 2006,
EADS Astrium
signed a contract with
the Algerian National
Space Technology
Centre (CNTS) for the
development of the
AlSat-2 system
• AlSat-2A was inte-
grated and tested in
France at EADS
Astrium
• CTNS responsible
for managing the
AlSat-2 programme
and operating the sat-
ellite system
• Data acquired at the
Arzew station com-
plex in western Alge-
ria (Oran region),
where imagery is
analysed and from
where spacecraft is
controlled
• Key areas: Earth
observation (cartogra-
phy, management of
agriculture, forestry,
water, mineral and oil
resources, crop pro-
tection, management
of natural disasters,
and land planning)
AlSat-1Bf,g,h 2016 Sun-
synchronous
• Based on the SSTL-
100 platform, hosting a
24 m multispectral
imager and a 12 m
panchromatic imager
• Built jointly by the
Algerian Space
Agency (ASAL) and
Surrey Satellite Tech-
nology Ltd (SSTL)
(continued)
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Table 3.3 (continued)
Satellite Launched Orbit Features Focus
• “Time to revisit
within 7 days of any
point of National terri-
tory”
• Launch site: Satish
Dhawan Space Centre
(SDSC), India
• “Eighteen ASAL
engineers will under-
take the Assembly,
Integration and Test
phase of the satellite
in Algeria, offering
further opportunities
for the transfer of
skills and the devel-
opment of local capa-
bilities. Eighteen
Algerian students will
also study for Higher
Degrees at the Uni-
versity of Surrey
based in Guildford”
• “Ground segment is
located at the Satellite
Development Centre
in Oran with a pri-
mary and a redundant
chain composed of:
(1) GCS: Ground
Control Segment
(SOC), (2) GIS:
Ground Imaging Seg-
ment (MOC), (3) GS:
Ground Station”
• Data openly avail-
able through the
DMC agreement
• Key areas: main
mission—land obser-
vation for disaster
monitoring, capacity
building
AlSat-2Bi,j 2016 Sun-
synchronous
• “Equipped with
NAOMI (New
AstroSat Optical Mod-
ular Instrument), a
latest-generation pay-
load capable of sup-
plying images with a
resolution of 2.5 m in
panchromatic mode
and 10 m in each of
4 colour bands in mul-
tispectral mode”
• Launch site: Satish
Dhawan Space Centre
(SDSC), India
• Designed and
developed by EADS
Astrium
• Integrated in Algeria
within the small sat-
ellite development
centre (UDPS) in
Oran
• CNTS responsible
for managing the
AlSat-2 programme
and operating the sat-
ellite system
• “AlSat-2A and
AlSat-2B form a
mini-constellation
offering high-
(continued)
204 3 African Union Member States: National Space Infrastructure. . .
Table 3.3 (continued)
Satellite Launched Orbit Features Focus
resolution images,
with greater respon-
siveness in program-
ming and a much
higher volume of
images taken daily
(in monoscopic and
stereoscopic mode).
The images collected
are used, among other
things, in the areas of
urban and agricultural
planning and devel-
opment of the terri-
tories and coastline,
the mapping and
monitoring of infra-
structures and struc-
tures, the
establishment and
updating of steppe
and Saharan cadastre
and the prevention
and management of
natural hazards
(floods, forest fires,
. . .)”
• Key areas: Earth
observation (wide
variety of applica-
tions: cartography,
management of agri-
culture, forestry,
water, mineral and oil
resources, crop pro-
tection, management
of natural disasters,
and land planning),
capacity building
AlSat-1N
(Nano)k,l
2016 Sun-
synchronous
• 3U CubeSat
• Launch site: Satish
Dhawan Space Centre,
India
• Delivered by the
SSC (Surrey Space
Centre) of the Uni-
versity of Surrey,
funded and steered by
the UKSA (UK Space
Agency)
• “Jointly developed
by the Algerian Space
Agency ASAL and
the UK Space
Agency”
• “Involves a number
of Algerian graduate
students hosted at
(continued)
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Table 3.3 (continued)
Satellite Launched Orbit Features Focus
SSC and focused on
the development and
operation of a
nanosatellite as a
hands-on learning
exercise for the stu-
dents and ASAL staff,
to demonstrate the
practical implementa-
tion of this type of
low cost space tech-
nology. Graduate stu-
dents are enrolled on
courses related to key
areas of satellite tech-
nology. Additional
focused training pro-
grams were delivered
to ASAL staff in the
areas definition,
implementation and
testing of a full
nanosatellite”
• Key areas: capacity
building,
collaboration
AlComSat-1m 2017 Geosynchronous • Communications sat-
ellite
• “Total of 33 tran-
sponders, including
19 Ku-band,
12 Ka-band, and two
L-band transponders”
• “X-band, UHF and
EHF transponders as
well as two transmis-
sion and three receiver
antennas”
• Launch site: Xichang
Satellite Launch Cen-
ter in Sichuan prov-
ince, China
• Built by China
Academy of Space
Technology (CAST)
under a subcontract
with China Great
Wall Industry Corpo-
ration (CGWIC)
• “The contract also
covers the supply of
two ground control
stations for use by the
ASAL to control the
satellite”
• “Services, including
telecommunications,
broadband internet,
audio transmission,
broadcast and televi-
sion, satellite-based
navigation, remote
education, as well as
enterprise and emer-
gency communica-
tions”
• “Nine of the
19 Ku-band transpon-
ders are used to
broadcast TV and
(continued)
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Table 3.3 (continued)
Satellite Launched Orbit Features Focus
digital radio channels,
while the remaining
are used to provide
communications in
North African
regions, including
Tunisia, Northern
Chad, and Northern
Sudan at speeds of
2 Mbps”
• “The Ka-band tran-
sponders are used to
deliver high-speed
broadband internet to
the Algerian territory
at speeds of 20 Mbps”
• Key areas:
communication
aSurrey Satellite Technology US LLC, “AlSat-1,” 2018, http://www.sst-us.com/missions/alsat-1%
2D%2Dlaunched-2002/alsat-1/alsat-1%2D%2Dthe-mission (accessed November 16, 2018)
bObserving Systems Capability Analysis and Review Tool (OSCAR), “Satellite: AlSat-1,” World
Meteorological Organisation, July 27, 2015, https://www.wmo-sat.info/oscar/satellites/view/
8 (accessed November 17, 2018)
cGunter Dirk Krebs, “AlSat 2A, 2B,” Gunter’s Space Page, December 11, 2017, https://space.
skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/alsat-2.htm (accessed November 17, 2018)
deoPortal Directory, “AlSat-2 (Algeria Satellite-2),” European Space Agency, 2018, https://direc
tory.eoportal.org/web/eoportal/satellite-missions/a/aisat (accessed November 17, 2018)
eAgence Spatiale Algérienne, “Alsat-2A, deuxième satellite d’observation de la terre,” 2015, http://
www.asal.dz/Alsat-2A.php (accessed November 17, 2018)
fGunter Dirk Krebs, “AlSat 1B,” Gunter’s Space Page, December 11, 2017, https://space.sky
rocket.de/doc_sdat/alsat-1b.htm (accessed November 17, 2018)
gObserving Systems Capability Analysis and Review Tool (OSCAR), “Satellite: AlSat-1B,” World
Meteorological Organisation, August 3, 2017, https://www.wmo-sat.info/oscar/satellites/view/708
(accessed November 17, 2018)
hAgence Spatiale Algérienne, “ALSAT-1B, le quatrième satellite d’observation de la terre,” 2015,
http://www.asal.dz/Alsat-1B.php (accessed November 17, 2018)
iGunter Dirk Krebs, “AlSat 2A, 2B”
jAgence Spatiale Algérienne, “Le satellite Alsat-2B, troisième satellite d’observation de la terre,”
2015, http://www.asal.dz/Alsat-2B.php (accessed November 17, 2018)
keoPortal Directory, “AlSat Nano/AlSat-1N,” European Space Agency, 2018, https://directory.
eoportal.org/web/eoportal/satellite-missions/a/alsat-nano (accessed November 16, 2018)
lGunter Dirk Krebs, “AlSat-Nano (AlSat 1N),” Gunter’s Space Page, December 11, 2017, https://
space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/alsat-nano.htm (accessed November 17, 2018)
mAerospace Technology, “Alcomsat-1 Communications Satellite”
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2017, ASAL announced Algeria’s 2020–2040 space programme, which is currently
“under study” but includes plans to “send several state-of-the-art satellites” into
space.50 As Table 3.3 depicts, there has been a progression in Algeria’s capabilities,
with AlSat-1B being integrated and tested in Algeria and with Algeria operating the
satellites from its own territory. The CDS (Centre for Satellite Design) was inaugu-
rated by President Bouteflika in 2012, in Oran, and hosts “modern infrastructures
(workshops and laboratories) dedicated to the design, assembly of satellites as well
as means of testing and environmental testing”.51 Alongside CDS, ASAL operates
three units, namely, the Space Technology Centre (STC), the Space Applications
Centre (SAC), and the Telecommunication Systems Operating Centre (CEST).
Based on Al-Rumhi et al., Algeria thus qualifies as a High Space Technology
Country. While two launch facilities exist within Algeria (built during colonial times
by the French)—namely, a sounding rocket launch site in Béchar and Reggane52 and
a full rocket launch site in Hammaguir53—Algeria does not appear to be actively
developing launch capacity, even of sounding rockets. Nevertheless, because the
country is such an active player in space, possesses a growing space technology
sector, has a well-developed national space agency, and collaborates with more
advanced states as well as other African states (as seen in Chap. 2), on balance it
qualifies as a second-tier EMSA.
Morocco’s Royal Centre for Remote Sensing (CRTS), established in 1989, is the
“national institution responsible for the promotion, use and development of remote
sensing applications in Morocco” and is responsible for the “acquisition, archiving
and dissemination of data and images, the observation of the Earth, the realization of
projects and the development of methodologies in Remote Sensing and Geographic
Information Systems and related fields” as well as providing training and collabo-
ration with foreign institutions and partners.54 Three Moroccan satellites have been
placed in orbit. The first was launched in 2001, named Maroc-Tubsat (Zarkae Al
Yamama), in cooperation between the CRTS and the German Institute für Luft- und
Raumfahrttechnik of the Technical University of Berlin (TUB).55 Maroc-TUBSAT
was thus one of a series of TUBSATs launched over the years, and the University of
50Algeria Press Service, “Several Algerian satellites to be launched under space programme
2020–2040,”December 18, 2017, http://www.aps.dz/en/health-science-technology/21871-several-alge
rian-satellites-to-be-launched-under-space-programme-2020-2040 (accessed November 16, 2018).
51Agence Spatiale Algérienne, “Son excellence le Président de la République Abdelaziz Bouteflika
inaugure le Centre de Développement des Satellites (CDS),” http://www.asal.dz/inauguration-CDS.
php (accessed November 17, 2018).
52Mark Wade, “Reganne,” Astronautix, 2017, http://www.astronautix.com/r/reggane.html
(accessed November 20, 2018).
53Luncedo Ngcofe and Keith Gottschalk, “The growth of space science in African countries for
Earth observation in the twenty-first century,” South African Journal of Science 109, no. 1/2 (2013): 4.
54Centre Royal de Télédétection Spatiale, “The CRTS,” “Qui Sommes Nous,” 2018, https://www.
crts.gov.ma/Royal%20Centre%20for%20Remote%20Sensing and https://www.crts.gov.ma/le-
crts/qui-sommes-nous (accessed November 17, 2018). Translated from French.
55eoPortalDirectory, “TUBSAT (Technical University ofBerlin Satellite) Program,”European Space
Agency, 2018, https://directory.eoportal.org/web/eoportal/satellite-missions/t/tubsat (accessed
November 17, 2018).
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Berlin’s project is described as an “educational program including the design,
manufacture, testing, launching and operation of ‘microsatellites’ (<100 kg)”.56
Maroc-TUBSAT’s satellite bus was provided by the German partner, while the
payload and launch were the responsibility of Morocco. Launched from Russia
and with spacecraft operations controlled from TUB and CRTS (with ground
stations at TUB and at CRTS), Maroc-TUBSAT focused on Earth observations.
Mohammed VI A is the second Moroccan satellite in orbit and was built by
Astrium Satellites and Thales Alenia Space of France as a “high-resolution optical
reconnaissance system”.57 As the first of a pair of satellites, it is “used for mapping
and land surveying activities, regional development, agricultural monitoring, the
prevention and management of natural disasters, monitoring changes in the envi-
ronment and desertification, as well as border and coastal surveillance”.58 It was
reported that “Moroccan security forces will use the satellites to help combat
insurgent militants in the Sahel, such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, piracy
in the Gulf of Guinea, and for border enforcement”.59 Mohammed VI B was
launched in November 2018.60 These surveillance satellites present “considerable
and unprecedented advances to Morocco in its deep-rooted regional rivalry with
Algiers”.61 It is however reported that civilian benefits also accrue since “space
imagery operated from Morocco is playing a key role in the implementation of
national strategies for the socio-economic development of the country especially on
those relating to the agricultural sector—an important part of the Moroccan eco-
nomy”.62 Overall, Morocco’s space industry appears to be in the nascent stage, and
since it does not have a national space agency (only a remote sensing-focused space
office in the form of the CRTS) or active launch capacity, it qualifies as a Medium
Space Technology Country and third-tier EMSA (Table 3.4). While the twoMoham-
med IV satellites are designed to be a dual civil/military system, Morocco’s space
efforts appear to be heavily focused on military aspects, and it is reported that:
56Ibid.
57Gunter Dirk Krebs, “MohammedVIA, B (MN35-13),”Gunter’s Space Page, December 11, 2017,
https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/mohammed-6.htm (accessed November 20, 2018).
58Ibid.
59StephenClark, “Morocco’sfirst high-resolution surveillance satellite launched aboardVega rocket,”
Spaceflight Now/Pole Star Publications Ltd, November 8, 2017, https://spaceflightnow.com/2017/11/
08/moroccos-first-high-resolution-surveillance-satellite-launched-aboard-vega-rocket/ (accessed
November 20, 2018).
60Chris Bergin, “Arianespace’s Vega rocket conducts Mohammed VI-B launch,” NASAspaceflight.
com, November 20, 2018, https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2018/11/arianespace-vega-mohammed-
vi-b-launch/ (accessed December 13, 2018).
61Space in Africa, “Morocco’s Satellite Mohammed VI-A is Changing North African Regional
Power Balance,” Africa Space News, May 10, 2018, https://africanews.space/moroccos-satellite-
mohammed-vi-a-is-changing-north-african-regional-power-balance/ (accessedNovember 20. 2018).
62Space in Africa, “Overview of the Morocco Space Industry,” Africa Space News, May 6, 2018,
https://africanews.space/overview-of-the-morocco-space-industry/ (accessed November 20, 2018).
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Table 3.4 Moroccan satellites
Satellite Launched Orbit Features Focus
Maroc-
TUBSAT
(Zarkae Al
Yamama)a
2001 Sun-
synchronous
• Microsatellite
• “EIC (Earth Imaging
Camera), developed at
RAL (Rutherford Apple-
ton Laboratory), UK
[same camera design as
flown on BADR-B of
SUPARCO (Pakistan
Space and Upper Atmo-
sphere Research Com-
mission)]. The
instrument optics have a
focal length of 72 mm
with f/6 number. Obser-
vations are performed in
the visible/near-infrared
range. A filter is used for
the near-infrared range.
The FOV is 8.5
 8, providing an
image size of about
190 km  144 km at a
resolution of 250 m”
• Launch site: Baikonur
Cosmodrome
• Joint venture, the
Moroccan side is
responsible for the
development of the
payload and launch of
the satellite, while the
German side provides
the satellite bus
• “Objectives of the
mission are in earth
remote sensing
(in particular with
regard to vegetation
detection at medium-
scale resolutions), and
in the field of store-and-
forward communica-
tions for mobile locali-
zation. A further goal is
to develop attitude con-
trol strategies for high-
resolution Earth obser-
vations”
• Key areas: Earth
observation, capacity
building
Mohammed
VI A
(MN35-13)b,c
2017 Sun-
synchronous
• “Instrument description
not yet available. It
should be similar to the
High-Resolution Imager
(HiRI) of the Pléiades
satellites, i.e. VNIR
channel with resolution
around 0.7 m (panchro-
matic) and 2.8 m (multi-
spectral)”
• “Can capture over
500 images on a daily
basis and update its data
every 6 h”
• Launch site: Kourou,
French Guiana
• “Although the satellite
project received sizable
support from France in
its early phases, the sat-
ellite has been totally
monitored by more than
100 Moroccan national
engineers since its
launch in November
2017. The specialist
further explained that
these top-performing
engineers studied at two
of the country’s best
information and docu-
mentation agencies and
received ‘3 years of
solid training in total
discretion’”
• Substantial contribu-
tion to disaster monitor-
ing
• Key areas: high-
resolution land observa-
tion, capacity building
(continued)
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Morocco’s first spy satellite fuels regional tension and regional space race with neighbouring
Algeria and Spain. The satellite system allows Morocco to obtain detailed information on
military installations and troop movements in Spain and Algeria, as well as spy on the
Western Sahara separatist group Polisario Front, with which Morocco maintains a precarious
ceasefire.63
Tunisia’s national space sector is in its fledgling stages, although the country did
create the Tunisian National Commission for Outer Space Affairs (NCOSA) in 1984
and followed this up with the establishment of the National Centre for Cartography
and Remote Sensing of Tunisia (Centre National de la Cartographie et de la
Télédétection) in 1988.64 The CNCT “is a non-administrative public enterprise
Table 3.4 (continued)
Satellite Launched Orbit Features Focus
Mohammed
VI B (MN35-
13)d,e
2018 Sun-
synchronous
• “Instrument description
not yet available. It
should be similar to the
High-Resolution Imager
(HiRI) of the Pléiades
satellites, i.e. VNIR
channel with resolution
around 0.7 m (panchro-
matic) and 2.8 m (multi-
spectral)”
• “Capable of taking up
to 1000 images per day
with a resolution of up to
70 cm and will be circu-
lating in the same orbit as
the first satellite, 620 km
above the earth”
• Will weigh about
1108 kg at launch
• Launch site: Kourou,
French Guiana
• Second flight model of
the Mohammed VI
programme
• Substantial contribu-
tion to disaster monitor-
ing
• Key areas: high-
resolution land observa-
tion, capacity building
aeoPortal Directory, “TUBSAT (Technical University of Berlin Satellite) Program”
bObserving Systems Capability Analysis and Review Tool (OSCAR), “Satellite: Mohammed
VI-A,” World Meteorological Organisation, February 22, 2018, https://www.wmo-sat.info/oscar/
satellites/view/736 (accessed November 20, 2018)
cSpace in Africa, “Morocco’s Satellite Mohammed VI-A is Changing North African Regional
Power Balance”
dObserving Systems Capability Analysis and Review Tool (OSCAR), “Satellite: Mohammed
VI-B,” World Meteorological Organisation, November 9, 2018, https://www.wmo-sat.info/oscar/
satellites/view/737 (accessed November 20, 2018)
eAhlam Ben Saga, “First Photos of Mohammed VI-B Satellite Installation Emerge Before Launch,”
Morocco World News, November 19, 2018, https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2018/11/
258154/photos-mohammed-vi-b-satellite-installation/ (accessed November 20, 2018)
63Shaul Shay, “MoroccoSeeks SpaceEdge overAlgeria and Spain,” IsraelDefense, February 7, 2018,
https://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/node/32980 (accessed November 20, 2018).
64Space in Africa, “Overview of the Tunisian Space Industry,” Africa Space News, April 19, 2018,
https://africanews.space/overview-of-the-tunisian-space-industry/ (accessed November 20, 2018).
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under the supervision of the Ministry of National Defense, responsible for promoting
remote sensing, research and training in its fields”, and its mission was expanded in
2004 to “cover the areas of cartography, geodesy, topography and photogrammetry
and gravimetry”.65 The centre’s other missions include “multi-scale cartographic
production, aerial photography activities, validation of GIS specifications, and
technical control of GIS products”.66 In March 2018, a conference was held on the
topic “Towards a Tunisian National Space Strategy” and was coordinated by the
Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research.67
While Tunisia possesses no satellite at present, it was reported that “Brigadier
Zuhair Al-Jandali hinted that the Centre is currently in the process of joining the
National Committee for Outer Space [Tunisian National Commission for Outer
Space Affairs (NCOSA)] on the completion of a satellite for Tunisia; emphasizing
that the new satellite will be focused on socio-economic areas, especially communi-
cations”.68 It has also been reported that “[w]ork is currently ongoing on the
development of the first Tunisian Satellite, the result of cooperation with Japanese
and French companies”, with this satellite named Challenge-1 to be launched by
2020.69
Tunisia’s space technology growth and expansion has been described as “deli-
berate and intentional”,70 and the country is active in a variety of collaborative
projects, such as “cooperation with fellow Maghreb states to establish a communi-
cation network that was envisioned to utilize satellite communication and data-
sharing to further develop the region’s educational system”71 in 2001 and is “playing
a significant role in launching of the ArabSat satellite enjoying the lattice space
telecommunications”.72 Nevertheless, recent developments suggest Tunisia’s space
sector is set to expand rapidly, with “a company named Sfax Technopole [having]
signed a partnership deal with Telnet and Aerospace Valley Toulouse [in 2017] with
the aim of making the Sfax Technopole a centre of space, courtesy of the partnership
between the Telnet Group and the European leader Airbus Safran Launchers”.73 This
is reported to be the “first major private space investment” in the country and has led
to the initiation of the development of Tunisia’s first satellite.74 There are also
65Centre National de la Cartographie et de la Télédétection, “Présentation,” 2014, http://www.cnct.
defense.tn/index.php/fr/site-map/presentation (accessedNovember 20, 2018). Translated fromFrench.
66Ibid.
67Space in Africa, “Overview of the Tunisian Space Industry.”
68Ibid.
69Space in Africa, “Is Tunisia the next space giant from Africa?,” Africa Space News, December
11, 2018, https://africanews.space/is-tunisia-the-next-space-giant-from-africa/ (accessed December
12, 2018).
70Space in Africa, “Towards a Tunisian National Space Strategy,” Africa Space News, March
22, 2018, https://africanews.space/towards-a-tunisian-national-space-strategy/ (accessed November
20, 2018).
71Ibid.
72Ibid.
73Space in Africa, “Is Tunisia the next space giant from Africa?.”
74Ibid.
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indications that the development of a new “assembly, integration and microsatellite
testing facility and the implementation of an engineering centre for microsatellites”
is included in the Sfax Technopole project.75 The engineering centre is set to have
three main missions, namely, engineering and satellite design, research and patents
in the field of space, and the development of innovative services in space.76
Accordingly, Tunisia can be classified as an emerging second-tier EMSA and
Medium Space Technology Country. Although Tunisia has a “movement for the
official establishment of the Tunisian Space Agency”77, the organisation has not yet
succeeded the CNCT, and this remains “a scientific association in Tunisia created in
June 2012 to promote aerospace field in Tunisia”78. Such a development would
make Tunisia a High Space Technology Country. At present, its upward trajectory
appears strong (Table 3.5).
The Libyan Centre for Remote Sensing and Space Sciences is “a governmental
research organization specialized in remote sensing, space, seismology, and astro-
nomy research, headquartered in Tripoli and with branches in different regions of
Libya”. It was founded in 198979 as a response to “demands of the Libyan society in
achieving sustainable development using modern technologies”. Accordingly, it acts
as a “specialized reference and advisory body at the local, regional and international
levels, enabling it to play a pivotal role in comprehensive development programs”.80
The centre operates three scientific programmes, namely, in the fields of remote
sensing science, seismology, astronomy and observatories, and maintains the fol-
lowing priorities:
• Build specialised capacities and enable them to contribute to sustainable develop-
ment programmes through the transfer and resettlement of space technologies in
Libya.
Table 3.5 Tunisian satellite
Satellite Launched Orbit Features Focus
Challenge-1 Future
2020?
• Centre National de la Cartographie
et de la Télédétection and the Tunisian
National Commission for Outer Space
Affairs satellite collaboration?
• Sfax Technopole/Telnet/Airbus
Safran Launchers collaboration?
• Key areas:
socio-economic
areas, especially
communications
75Ibid.
76Ibid.
77Space in Africa, “List of Space Agencies in Africa,” Africa Space News, June 22, 2018, https://
africanews.space/list-of-space-agencies-in-africa/ (accessed November 20, 2018).
78Tunisian Space Agency, “Association,” http://tunispacedays.com/association/ (accessed
November 20, 2018).
79Libyan Center for Remote Sensing and Space Sciences, “About the Center,” 2008, http://www.
lcrsss.ly/about-center.html (accessed November 20, 2018). Translated from Arabic.
80Ibid.
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• Preparation of research and scientific plans and follow-up implementation and
provide scientific advice in the areas of specialisation.
• Cooperation with the corresponding research centres and specialised international
organisations and federations.
• Preparation and participation in awareness programmes and organisation of
seminars and scientific conferences and workshops in the fields of
specialisation.81
Despite the activities of the centre, Libya’s space activities are at an early phase of
development and have no doubt been harmed by the political turmoil of recent years.
In the past, the West German Orbital Transport und Raketen Aktiengesellschaft
(OTRAG) operated in Libya between 1979 and 1983 (after leaving the then Zaire).82
OTRAG was the world’s first commercial launcher development, production, and
launch company, founded in the mid-1970s by Lutz Kayser to “develop a low-cost
satellite launcher using clusters of mass-produced pressure-fed liquid propellant
modules”.83,84 OTRAG’s activities were, however, mired in controversy, including
claims “that the company was using its ostensibly peaceful rocket program to mask
efforts to sell military technology, including short-range military rockets, to Libya,
Pakistan, Iraq, and other countries”.85 OTRAG Libyan suborbital test launches took
place at the sounding rocket launch site in Tawiwa, but in 1983:
the Libyan Government unlawfully confiscated all of OTRAG’s rocket manufacturing and
test equipment in the country (as it had done earlier with petroleum production facilities of
Western companies). All of Kayser’s attempts to obtain return of the property or to receive
damages were unsuccessful (despite personal promises by Gaddafi to settle the matter
lawfully). Without Kayser’s know-how the Libyans were able to conduct only a few test
launches with the stolen equipment. After ten years of desultory testing the Libyan program
came to an end. The Libyans were apparently unsuccessful because the essential know-how
and blueprints were retained by Kayser.86
Libya maintains no rocket launch capability, and without a space agency, the
country can be classified as a Low Space Technology Country and due to its nascent
space industry a third-tier EMSA.
Figure 3.4 depicts the STL milestones achieved by Arab Maghreb Union member
states (Mauritania does not feature as it has not achieved a milestone yet). Based on
this figure, the clear leader is Algeria with a succession of milestones, particularly
visible after the adoption of the Horizon 2020 policy in 2006. As such, the country
achieved three milestones in 2016 with its three satellites launched that year.
81Ibid.
82Mark Wade, “OTRAG,” Astronautix, 2017, http://www.astronautix.com/o/otrag.html (accessed
November 21, 2018).
83Ibid.
84Judith Miller, “West German Rocket Company pulls out of Libya,” New York Times, December
27, 1981, https://www.nytimes.com/1981/12/27/world/west-german-rocket-company-pulls-out-of-
libya.html (accessed November 21, 2018).
85Ibid.
86Mark Wade, “OTRAG.”
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3.2.2 The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA)
While Tunisia and Libya are members of COMESA, they will not be discussed again
here. Two emerging space middle powers were identified in this REC (apart from
Tunisia), namely, Kenya and Egypt. This discussion will thus start with them.
Kenya is a rapidly rising space actor and has been making strides in recent years.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Kenya is the site of the Italian-owned Luigi
Broglio Space Centre, from which several orbital and suborbital launches have taken
place. However, Kenya’s own space efforts are more recent, although the country
established its National Space Secretariat under the Ministry of Defence in 1993.87
The “National Space Secretariat, under the Chairmanship of the Principal Secretary,
coordinate[d] all space related activities in the Country” with the goal “to promote
and enhance social and economic development through the utilization of space tech-
nology”.88 The Kenyan Space Agency, also falling under the Minister of Defence,
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87National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation, “Achievements,” 2018, https://
webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q¼cache:gyryD9XU2fwJ:https://www.nacosti.go.ke/com
ponent/content/article%3Fid%3D85:achievements%26start%3D2+&cd¼1&hl¼en&ct¼clnk&
gl¼za (accessed November 22, 2018).
88Ministry of Defence – Kenya, “National Space Secretariat,” http://www.mod.go.ke/?p¼1932
(accessed November 22, 2018).
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was founded in 2017.89 The agency’s responsibilities include “co-ordinating space-
related activities, recommending national space policies and establishing centres of
excellence in space science”.90 The board of the agency was appointed in 2018 and
includes “principal secretaries for State Ministries and Departments, these are;
Defence, National Treasury, University Education and Research, Environment and
Forestry, Information, Communications and Technology”.91 Apart from the law
establishing the Kenyan Space Agency (The Kenya Space Agency Order, 2017)92,
the country also issued the Kenya Space Policy and Kenya Space Strategy in 2016.93
Information about this policy and strategy is scarce however.
The country’s first satellite, a 10 cubic centimetre nanosatellite named First
Kenyan University Nano Satellite-Precursor Flight (1KUNS-PF)94, was developed
by a team at the University of Nairobi95 after they were “selected in 2016 by [the
United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs] UNOOSA, in collaboration with
[Japan’s Aerospace Exploration Agency] JAXA, for the first round of the
KiboCUBE programme”96. The satellite was deployed in 2018 by JAXA from the
International Space Station (ISS).97 Technical support was offered by La Sapienza
University of Rome and “the Italian Space Agency (ASI), in the framework of an
Agreement fostering cooperation between La Sapienza University of Rome and
Kenya Universities,” while “[m]ost of the on-board hardware was donated by the
Italian companies NPC-New Production Concept and Roboptics, which provided
technical support for the program development”.98 Nevertheless, the satellite was
developed by the University of Nairobi, demonstrating how countries are able to
leap ahead in the Space Technology Ladder, thanks to miniaturised technology and
components. The 1KUNS-PF satellite is a precursor for “the Kenyan-Italian IKUNS
89Elvis Ondieki and Silas Apollo, “Kenya yet to activate its rich space agenda,” Daily Nation,
February 17, 2018, https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Why-work-at-Kenya-Space-Agency-is-yet-to-
begin/1056-4309212-10s6deu/index.html (accessed November 21, 2018).
90Ibid.
91Ministry of Defence – Kenya, “Kenya Space Agency Board Appointed and Inaugurated,” http://
www.mod.go.ke/?p¼10219 (accessed November 21, 2018).
92National Council for Law Reporting (Kenya Law), “The Kenya Space Agency Order, 2017,”
March 7, 2017, http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/LegalNotices/2017/LN22_2017.
pdf (accessed November 22, 2018).
93Nicholas Kimani, “Space Policy,” February 28, 2016, https://nicholaskimani2011.wordpress.
com/tag/space-policy/ (accessed November 22, 2018).
94Elvis Mboya, “Report on Kenya’s first satellite,”Africa Space News, September 20, 2018, https://
africanews.space/report-on-kenyas-first-satellite/ (accessed November 21, 2018).
95AMSAT-UK, “Linear transponder CubeSat to deploy from ISS,”May 10, 2018, https://amsat-uk.
org/tag/1kuns-pf/ (accessed November 21, 2018).
96Space in Africa, “First KiboCUBE Satellite owned by Kenya deployed from the International
Space Station,” Africa Space News, May 13, 2018, https://africanews.space/first-kibocube-satellite-
owned-by-kenya-deployed-from-the-international-space-station/ (accessed November 21, 2018).
97Ibid.
981KUNS-PF Team, “1KUNS-PF,” University of Nairobi & La Sapienza – University of Rome,
2018, https://1kuns-pf.ns0.it/ (accessed November 21, 2018).
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earth observation CubeSat”, which is “an extension of IKUNS (Italian-Kenyan
University NanoSatellite), [and which] is a project run by the University of Nairobi
in collaboration with ‘La Sapienza’ University of Rome and the Italian Space
Agency, and is part of the projects initiated in 2015 between ASI and ‘La Sapienza’
under the Convention for managing activities at the Broglio Space Centre in Malindi
(Kenya)”.99 IKUNS “will involve developing a CubeSat for Earth Observation and
technological testing”.100
Table 3.6 outlines information about Kenya’s satellites. While the University of
Nairobi played a key role in developing the 1KUNS-PF satellite, the country’s space
industry is at an emerging level, and the country can broadly be classified as a third-
tier EMSA, although it has the potential to move into the second tier soon if the
promise of its space agency and policy bear fruit. It can also be considered as a
borderline High Space Technology Country given its space agency, but much more
work is needed to actualise on this agency, especially since it took a year for the
agency’s board to be assembled101.
Egypt’s efforts in the space arena date from the 1970s, when an “[e]arlier remote
sensing initiative has [sic] started in Egypt in 1971 within the frame of the Egyptian
Academy of the Scientific Research and Technology (ASRT) through an American-
Egyptian joint project”, which in turn “enabled for [sic] the establishment of the
Remote Sensing Centre (in 1972) under ASRT”.102 In turn, the National Authority
for Remote Sensing and Space Sciences (NARSS) was established in 1991, as a
“General Authority for Remote Sensing” under the Ministry of Scientific Research
since 1992.103 NARSS has “two large sectors for remote sensing applications and
space science and technology”:
The sector of remote sensing application works on the use of data provided by earth
observation satellites and various airborne sensors to produce maps and spatial data for
various applications such as the evaluation and monitoring of natural resources, natural
hazards and environmental management. The sector of space science and technology is
concerned with the development of sensors to be mounted on the earth observation satellites,
satellite subsystems and space research. The sector is also concerned with the control and
communication with the satellites as well as receiving the data for archiving and
dissemination.104
99Gunter Dirk Krebs, “1KUNS-PF,” Gunter’s Space Page, October 24, 2018, https://space.sky
rocket.de/doc_sdat/1kuns-pf.htm (accessed November 21, 2018).
100Ibid.
101Daily Nation, “Kenya yet to activate its rich space agenda,” February 17, 2018, https://www.
nation.co.ke/news/Why-work-at-Kenya-Space-Agency-is-yet-to-begin/1056-4309212-10s6deu/
index.html (accessed November 22, 2018).
102Mohammed Rajaei, “Egypt Space Agency (NARSS),” Geoinformation Online, May 25, 2015,
https://geoinformation.com/GeoInformation-dir/egypt-space-agency-narss/ (accessed November
22, 2018).
103Ibid.
104National Authority for Remote Sensing & Space Sciences, “About NARSS,” 2015, http://www.
narss.sci.eg/about (accessed November 24, 2018).
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NARSS has three main premises, namely, the El-Nozha building (Cairo), which
is “the main building (Headquarter)”, the New Cairo space control station (Cairo),
and the Aswan building receiving station (Aswan).105
In 2018, the Egyptian President passed Law no. 3 of 2018, thereby establishing the
Egyptian Space Agency, to be headquartered in Cairo.106 It is also reported that “the
agency aims to develop and transfer space science and technology into Egypt to build
satellites and launch them from Egyptian territories”.107 In this regard, “China and
Egypt have signed an agreement that will see Beijing provide a U.S.$23 million grant
for an Egyptian satellite test, integration, and assembly facility”, which is “in line with
the Egyptian policy intent to be self-sufficient and strategically autonomous in the
manufacture of satellites and satellite components”.108 In line with this Chinese
Table 3.6 Kenyan satellites
Satellite Launched Orbit Features Focus
1KUNS-PF (First
Kenyan University
Nano Satellite-
Precursor Flight)a,b
2018 LEO • Nanosatellite
• “Testing in orbit and
prove functionality of
several components,
either commercial or
developed in house,
intended for use in the
IKUNS mission. In detail,
the in-house developed
systems are: Silicon cell
solar panel; Telemetry
Electronic Board; 3-DOF
attitude control system,
using a momentum
wheel”
• Launch site: Interna-
tional Space Station (ISS)
• “To test technologies it
has developed for the
future launch of a larger
earth observation satel-
lite”
• “Run by the University
of Nairobi in collabora-
tion with ‘La Sapienza’
University of Rome and
the Italian Space Agency,
and is part of the projects
initiated in 2015 between
ASI and ‘La Sapienza’
under the convention for
managing activities at the
Broglio Space Centre in
Malindi (Kenya)”
• Key areas: capacity
building
IKUNS Future • CubeSat for Earth
observation and techno-
logical testing
aSpace in Africa, “First KiboCUBE Satellite owned by Kenya deployed from the International
Space Station”
bGunter Dirk Krebs, “1KUNS-PF”
105Ibid.
106Al-Masry Al-Youm, “Sisi passes law establishing Egyptian Space Agency,” Egypt Independent,
January 18, 2018, https://egyptindependent.com/sisi-passes-law-establishing-egyptian-space-
agency/ (accessed November 22, 2018).
107Ibid.
108Space Watch Middle East, “China to Contribute Funds to Egypt’s Space Programme,”
ThorGroup GmbH, 2018, https://spacewatchme.com/2017/03/china-contribute-funds-egypts-
space-programme/ (accessed November 24, 2018).
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support, Egypt “intends to create a satellite manufacturing centre in 2019”.109 The
space agency will also “be given the responsibility of devising and implementing a
national space policy and programme for the short, medium, and long-term”.110
There is however an “Initiative for Egyptian Space Policy”, which outlines the
following steps: “(1) Optimization of domestic resources, (2) Building Infrastructure
for space science and technology, (3) Human resources capacity building, (4) Domes-
tic Data and knowledge sharing, (5) Space awareness, (6) User needs and database
integration, (7) International collaboration”.111 Herein, an Egyptian Space Strategy is
outlined as well, “(1) Installation of Space city, (2) Foster and improve feeding
industry for space technology and satellite building, (3) Partnership and international
collaboration for the purpose of technology transfer, (4) Launching series of satellite
with necessary facilities for operation testing serving strategic objectives, (5) Building
required laboratories, (6) Building an integrated in situ measurement systems,
(7) Improvement of space science and astronomy domestic network. (8) Completion
of Space law and regulation”.112 However, there is a lack of “any indication as to the
role of the Egyptian National Authority for Remote Sensing and Space Sciences
(NARSS)” in the new space agency.113
In relation to the space segment of Egypt’s space sector, the country was “the first
Arab and African country to own a satellite in 1998 with the launch of ‘NileSat-101’,
which was manufactured by the British-French company Matra Marconi space”.114
A further four satellites launched (and one planned) are detailed in Table 3.7. It is
noteworthy that Egypt’s first satellites were dedicated to communications, and
NileSat-101 delivered “more than 100 digital TV channels as well as radio and
multimedia services to more than five million homes over the whole of North Africa
from Morocco to the Persian Gulf, [and thus] Egypt became the first African country
to have its own direct TV broadcast satellite”.115 Egypt’s second satellite was
NileSat-102, and its fourth satellite was NileSat-201, and today “the NileSat system
now broadcasts more than 150 digital TV channels and provides additional services
such as data transmission, turbo internet and multicasting applications”.116
109Space in Africa, “Over $3 billion have been spent on space projects in Africa since 1998.”
110Space Generation Advisory Council, “SGAC Egypt,” 2018, https://spacegeneration.org/regions/
middle-east/egypt (accessed November 24, 2018).
111Ayman El-Dessouki, “Egyptian Space Program: Road-Map,” National Authority for Remote
Sensing & Space Sciences, 2015, http://www.alc.narss.sci.eg/webroot/attachments/alc2015/Day%
203/Session%202/ESP%20Road%20Map.pdf (accessed November 24, 2018).
112Ibid.
113Spacewatch Middle East, “Egypt on the road to establishing national space agency amidst
controversy,” ThorGroup GmbH, August 2016, https://spacewatchme.com/2016/08/egypt-road-
establish-national-space-agency-amidst-controversy/ (accessed November 24, 2018).
114Space in Africa, “Egypt close in on launching Misr Sat 2,” Africa Space News, August 27, 2018,
https://africanews.space/egypt-close-in-on-launching-misr-sat-2/ (accessed November 24, 2018).
115Gunter Dirk Krebs, “Nilesat 101, 102,” Gunter’s Space Page, July 18, 2018, https://space.
skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/nilesat-101.htm (accessed November 24, 2018).
116Ibid.
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Table 3.7 Egyptian satellites
Satellite Launched Orbit Features Focus
NileSat-101a 1998 Geostationary • “Astrium supplied
the two direct-
broadcast satellites
(based on the
Eurostar-2000 ver-
sion of the
company’s Eurostar
series) and the two
control centres
(in Cairo and Alex-
andria), together
with comprehensive
operator training for
the Egyptian engi-
neers for control of
the satellite once in
orbit”
• 12 Ku-band
transponders
• Launch site:
Kourou, French
Guiana
• “Delivering more
than 100 digital TV
channels as well as
radio and multime-
dia services to more
than 5 million
homes over the
whole of North
Africa from
Morocco to the
Persian Gulf”
• Key areas: com-
munication, capac-
ity building
NileSat-102a,b 2000 Geostationary • Prime contractor:
Matra Marconi
Space
• 12 Ku-band
transponders
• Launch site:
Kourou, French
Guiana
• Key areas: com-
munication, capac-
ity building
EgyptSat-1
(MisrSat-1)c,d
2007 Sun-synchronous
orbit
• “International col-
laborative
minisatellite project
of NARSS (National
Authority for
Remote Sensing and
Space Science) of
Egypt and the
Yuzhnoye State
Design Office
(YSDO),
Dnepropetrosvk,
Ukraine”
• Two instruments: a
multispectral imager
and an infrared
imager
• Equipment: infra-
red imager, high-
resolution multi-
spectral imager,
store and forward
• “Providing also
technical expertise
and on-the-job
training to 60 Egyp-
tian engineers and
experts as well as
technology trans-
fer”
• “Total of 5000
scenes were imaged
by the satellite from
2008 to 2010”
• Key areas: Earth
observation, capac-
ity building
(continued)
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Table 3.7 (continued)
Satellite Launched Orbit Features Focus
communications
payload
• Launch site:
Baikonur
NileSat-201e 2010 Geostationary • NileSat’s second-
generation satellite
• Manufactured by
Thales Alenia Space
• 24 Ku-band and
4 Ka-band transpon-
ders
• Coverage includes
MENA region,
including the GULF
region, and full cov-
erage of Sudan and
East of Africa
• Launch site:
Kourou, French
Guiana
• Key areas:
communication
EgyptSat-2
(MisrSat-2)f,g
2014 “Non-sun-synchro-
nous orbit of
685 km  710 km,
inclination ¼ 51.6.
The lower inclina-
tion allows the sat-
ellite to pass over
Egypt more often
than a satellite in a
polar orbit”
• Built by RSC
Energia for opera-
tion by the NARSS
(National Authority
for Remote Sensing
and Space Sciences)
• “Resolution of 1 m
in panchromatic
mode and 4 m in
multispectral mode.
The camera can take
both single frame
images or stereo-
scopic images and
can operate in push-
broom continuous
imaging mode or in
a cartographic
mode”
• Launch site:
Baikonur
• The “goal of the
mission is to collect
high-resolution
imagery of the
Egyptian territory
and surrounding
regions for digital
mapping, assess-
ments of mineral,
water and other
resources, environ-
mental monitoring,
vegetation monitor-
ing, studies of the
headwaters of the
Nile, and disaster
management”
• “In January 2015,
control over the
satellite was handed
over to Egyptian
specialists at
NARSS”
• Key areas: Earth
observation, capac-
ity building
(continued)
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Table 3.7 (continued)
Satellite Launched Orbit Features Focus
EgyptSat-A
(MisrSat-A)h,
i,j,k
2019 Sun-synchronous
orbit
• “China has agreed
to contribute
U.S. $64 million to
the Egyptian earth
observation satellite
programme,
EgyptSat, as part of a
new cooperation
agreement between
the two counties
signed on March
21, 2017”
• “EgyptSat-A is
being built as a
replacement for
EgyptSat-2 that failed
in orbit in April 2015
less than a year after
its launch”
• “EgyptSat-A is
being built using the
funds recouped from
the insurance claim
against the EgyptSat-
2 loss, said to be
U.S. $100 million”
• “A delegation of
about 20 engineers
have been sent for
training on how to
build satellites in
China over the past
few months,” El
Koussy said, “the
mission came back
about 2 months ago,
and satellite building
will proceed for the
next 24 months”
• Launch site:
Baikonur
• “The satellite,
built by the Russian
national rocket and
space corporation
Energia”
• “Will provide
important images
and data about bor-
der areas”
• “Egypt has been
trying to better
monitor its borders
with Libya and
Sudan to respond to
infiltrations. The
Egyptian Army has
a particular chal-
lenge in controlling
the 1200 km border
with Libya because
of unrest in the
country”
aRevolvy, “Jabal Hamzah ballistic missile test and launch facility,” https://www.revolvy.com/page/
Jabal-Hamzah-ballistic-missile-test-and-launch-facility? (accessed November 26, 2018)
bThe Satellite Encyclopedia, “Nilesat 102,” Tag’s Broadcasting Services, September 2, 2018,
https://www.tbs-satellite.com/tse/online/sat_nilesat_102.html (accessed November 26, 2018)
ceoPortal Directory, “EgyptSat-1,” European Space Agency, 2018, https://earth.esa.int/web/
eoportal/satellite-missions/e/egyptsat-1 (accessed November 26, 2018)
dGunter Dirk Krebs, “EgyptSat 1 (MisrSat 1),” Gunter’s Space Page, December 11, 2017, https://
space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/egyptsat-1.htm (accessed November 26, 2018)
eNileSat, “Nilesat 201,” 2018, http://www.nilesat.com.eg/en/Pages/Index/6?type¼1 (accessed
November 26, 2018)
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Egypt can be considered a High Space Technology Country given the founding of
its new space agency and, like Algeria, given that it is an active player in space, is
growing its space technology sector and collaborates actively with other space actors.
On balance, it can be considered as a second-tier EMSA. Also, an Egyptian Military
Technical College and Institute of Aviation Engineering and Technology Joint Rocket
Team took part in the Intercollegiate Rocket Engineering Competition (IREC) in 2017,
and theKEMET-2Rocket Teamworked to “design, build, and launch a rocket carrying
no less than ten pounds of payload to a target apogee of 10,000 feet AGL”.117 The
country also maintains the Jabal Hamzah ballistic missile test and launch facility that
was built in the 1950s, but it is unclear what recent activities are taking place at the
military facility or if they have any relation to space.118
Sudan established its National Remote Sensing Centre (NRSC) in 1977 within
the auspices of the National Council for Research, Ministry of Higher Education and
Scientific Research, later renamed in 1996 to the Remote Sensing Authority (RSA)
in affiliation with the National Centre for Research, Ministry of Science and Tech-
nology.119 In 1995 the Seismological Research Unit was established and later
upgraded into the Seismological Research Institute, merged in 2013 with the RSA
into the current Remote Sensing and Seismology Authority (RSSA).120 According to
the RSSA, the “RSA is doing research in the field of remote sensing, geo-informatics
and GPS technology applications for natural resources, environment and disasters”,
while the “Institute provides value-added services in natural resources management,
remote sensing, GIS, GPS and technology transfer”.121 The vision of the
117Military Technical College, “Egyptian KEMET-2 Rocket Team 2017 returns from the IREC
with new perspectives,” Armed Forces Main Information Center (AFMIC), January 8, 2018, http://
www.mtc.edu.eg/mtcwebsite/ReadMore.aspx?id¼10 (accessed November 26, 2018).
118Revolvy, “Jabal Hamzah ballistic missile test and launch facility,” https://www.revolvy.com/
page/Jabal-Hamzah-ballistic-missile-test-and-launch-facility? (accessed November 26, 2018).
119Remote Sensing & Seismology Authority, “About Us,” 2018, https://rssa.gov.sd/about/
(accessed November 26, 2018).
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121Ibid.
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web/eoportal/satellite-missions/e/egyptsat-2 (accessed November 26, 2018)
gGunter Dirk Krebs, “EgyptSat 2 (MisrSat 2),” Gunter’s Space Page, December 11, 2017, https://
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iSpace in Africa, “Egypt close in on launching MisrSat 2,” Africa Space News, August 27, 2018,
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organisation is “[t]owards optimized peaceful use of space technologies and seis-
mology research in Sudan”, while the mission is “[t]o ensure that space science,
technology and seismological studies promote for [sic] socio-economic uplift of the
country”.122 Its mandate is to “[c]onduct applied research in remote sensing in
natural resources and environment and seismological studies” and to “[a]ssist gov-
ernment agencies, universities and research institutes in involving remote sensing
and GIS for research, studies, and capacity building”.123
Three space technology projects are said to be ongoing in the country. These are
(i) the “University of Khartoum’s Cubesat Project, which was established in 2010 and
still going on, with 2 CubeSat prototypes developed and no launch yet”, (ii) “National
Centre of Research’s Institute of Space Research and Aerospace (ISRA) which
recently completed developing their first CubeSat Prototype”, and (iii) “Future Uni-
versity established their Kush Institute of Space Technology in 2000. Although they
have been working mostly on remote sensing, but they recently started a CubeSat
project”.124 As such, Sudan is yet to place its first satellite in orbit. At present it can be
classified as a third-tier EMSA and a borderline Medium Space Technology Country
although its space capabilities are in the nascent stage (Table 3.8).
Ethiopia is making rapid strides in the space sector following the establishment of
the non-profit Ethiopian Space Science Society (ESSS) in 2004, which now has
“more than 10,000 members, 19 branches and 100 school space clubs”.125 The
vision of the organisation is “[t]o make Ethiopia effective and extensive user of
space science and technology, especially satellite science and technology appli-
cations in all aspects of the development of the country and become contributor to
the development of astronomy, space science and related sciences within ten years”.
Its mission is to (i) “[s]atisfy all space science and technology, especially satellite
Table 3.8 Sudanese satellites
Satellite Launched Orbit Features Focus
Future • University of Khartoum’s CubeSat Project • Key areas:
capacity
building
Future • National Centre of Research’s Institute of
Space Research and Aerospace (ISRA) CubeSat
• Key areas:
capacity
building
Future • Future University CubeSat • Key areas:
capacity
building
122Ibid.
123Ibid.
124Space Generation Advisory Council, “Sudan,” 2018, https://spacegeneration.org/regions/africa/
sudan (accessed November 26, 2018).
125Ethiopian Space Science Society, “About ESSS,” 2018, https://webcache.googleusercontent.
com/search?q¼cache:YKmKo7dJDbAJ:https://www.ethiosss.org.et/about-esss/+&cd¼2&
hl¼en&ct¼clnk&gl¼za (accessed November 26, 2018).
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science and technology needs of the country fully by 2025”; (ii) “[d]evelop the
necessary Capacity and research to be contributor to the development of science and
Technology of the field”; (iii) “[b]uild regional, continental and international net-
work to be fast learning country in space science, astronomy and related sciences and
technologies”; and (iv) “[p]romote space science, astronomy and related sciences
and technologies, by establishing different outreach programs”.126
Following the establishment and advocacy work of ESSS, the Ethiopian govern-
ment stated that it “seeks to develop and build satellites for the purposes of national
security, disaster management and response, and land management”, and the Ethi-
opian Space Science and Technology Institute and Council were founded under the
Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST) after the approval of the Council of
Ministers was granted in 2016.127 Consequently, the first ordinary meeting of the
Space Science Council was held in 2017, and “[t]he Ethiopian government (MoST)
announced on January 2017 that it intends to build its own medium-sized space
launch vehicle (SLV) and develop the capabilities to domestically build satel-
lites”.128 In future, “[s]pace policy is to be developed by the Ethiopian Space Science
institute”, while plans for the development of a space industry exist.129 The Ethio-
pian Space Science Institute has the following objectives:
to enable the country to fully exploit multidimensional uses of space science and techno-
logies; to produce demand based knowledgeable, skilled and attitudinally matured pro-
fessionals in the field of aerospace science that enable the country to become
internationally competitive in the sector; to develop and strengthen space science and
technology infrastructures to speed up space science and technology development in the
country; and enable the country to be robust contributor for the development of aerospace
science and technology.130
The country is planning to place its first satellite in orbit by 2019, in collaboration
with China, and the “design, development and manufacturing of the satellite are
done in collaboration with the Chinese at $8 million cost”, while “China has
provided training and $6 million for the project”.131 It is reported that “[t]he satellite
will be launched from China while the control and command station will be in
Ethiopia”. It is planned to be “an earth observatory satellite . . . to improve its
weather-monitoring capabilities”.132 Training and capacity building are key tenets
126Ibid.
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131Space in Africa, “Ethiopia Set To Launch Its First Satellite Next Year,” Africa Space News,
November 3, 2018, https://africanews.space/ethiopia-to-launch-first-satellite-next-year/ (accessed
November 26, 2018).
132Ibid.
3.2 Application of the Space Technology Ladder 225
of this project, and “the most preliminary and critical design is done by Ethiopian
scientists” with “20 Ethiopian aerospace engineers involved in the satellite project”,
and a further “60 masters and PhD students are also taking part in research and
training at the space institute as well as the country’s multibillion-dollar Entoto
Observatory and Research Centre” with the ultimate goal being to enable Ethiopia to
“design, build and launch the second satellite independently”.133
Ethiopia is as yet a third-tier EMSA and a Medium Space Technology Country,
although this is set to change in the near future if the above-mentioned plans bear
fruit (Table 3.9).
Mauritius is set to have its first satellite launched from the International Space
Station in 2019, as part of the same programme that saw Kenya’s first satellite placed
in orbit. The Mauritius Research Council was selected in the third round of the
KiboCUBE programme of JAXA (Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency) and
UNOOSA (United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs), and the planned satellite
MirSat-1 “will include a longwave infrared thermal camera that will allow it to
collect thermal infrared images of Mauritius and its surrounding areas” and will “test
the onboard communication capabilities of the CubeSat by studying the satellite’s
capacity to transfer information via satellite radio wave frequency”.134 The launch
date is planned for October 2019.135 The satellite is planned to contribute to three
major challenges facing Mauritius: “(1) Ocean surveillance and optimal manage-
ment of ocean resources (e.g. tackling fish depletion) in the Mauritian Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) which is about 2.3 million kilometre square; (2) Road traffic
congestion and (3) Natural disaster mitigation (i.e. frequent flooding)”.136 Mauritius
Table 3.9 Ethiopian satellite
Satellite Launched Orbit Features Focus
Future • Planned for 2019
• Partnership with China
• Launch site: China’s
Xichang Satellite Launch
Centre?
• Key areas: Earth observation,
meteorology, capacity building
• Design, build, and launch the
second satellite independently
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can be classified as a third-tier EMSA and as yet a Low Space Technology Country,
although this is set to change soon (Table 3.10).
Rwanda is another COMESA member with ambitious plans regarding the space
sector. The country recently “began work to train aerospace engineers and launch a
nano-satellite in the next few years”, and specifically, the “Rwandan government
announced they are working on building a Rwandan satellite to monitor progress in
sustainable development goals”.137 In 2018 Rwanda’s Utilities Regulatory Author-
ity signed a “Space Inclusion in Africa agreement with Japanese government to start
training Rwandan engineers in fabricating local satellites in big data, weather and
space technology” as “part of Japanese African program to train satellite engineers,
to provide required information and date in different areas”.138 Six Rwandan
engineers are benefitting from training in 2018, and six annually after that, “with a
high possibility of sending Japan’s trainers to Rwanda as our starting point of
expanding systems engineering technology in Africa”.139 Infrastructure is also
being built, and the “first satellite data transmission on Rwanda was tested in
March and the plan is to build a satellite station in Rwanda, which has already
started in Kicukiro district alongside train[ing] Rwandans to develop smaller satellite
to feed in various data”.140 The satellite is planned to be the country’s “first telecoms
satellite by 2020” with the goal “to achieve total telecoms autonomy with the launch
of the satellite”.141 As such, “the government is putting together the Rwanda Space
Project in partnership with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA),
Rwanda Regulatory Agency Utilities (RURA) and the Japan Space Agency
(JAXA)”.142 Rwanda remains for now a third-tier EMSA and a Low Space Tech-
nology Country (Table 3.11).
Table 3.10 Mauritian satellite
Satellite Launched Orbit Features Focus
MirSat-1 Future Low Earth
orbit
• Planned for October 2019
• CubeSat
• KiboCUBE programme
• Launch site: International
Space Station
• Key areas: Earth
observation
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Democratic Republic of the Congo was the first country used by OTRAG to
establish its rocket range, and in 1977 flight tests were initiated in Shaba (Katanga),
where a pad and gantry were set up.143 After the country (then known as Zaire) was
pressured by the USSR in particular to withdraw OTRAG’s permission to use the
Shaba site (also known as Kapani Tonneo144), OTRAG left for Libya. In more recent
times, the Democratic Republic of Congo announced that it has “contracted with
China Academy of Space Technology (CAST) to manufacture and launch a com-
munication satellite named CongoSat-1”.145 It was reported that the Democratic
Republic of the Congo’s National Network of Satellite Telecommunications
(Renatelsat) had signed a deal worth US$320 million with China’s Great Wall
Industry Corporation, to build and place the communication satellite in geosynchro-
nous orbit.146 However, it currently appears that “the launch of the satellite seems
like an unrealistic dream due to financial constraints” since the deal was “put on
hold” in May of 2016 for financial reasons, and as such, “[f]rom many indications,
the deal may not be feasible in the near future”.147 Given this ambition, however, it
does seem likely that the country will complete this goal at some point.
Renatelsat is the country’s “public agency responsible for managing the . . .
domestic telecommunication network and geostationary communication satellites”
and will be responsible for the operation of CongoSat-1.148 Recent developments for
Renatelsat include a public-private sector deal signed with the Africa Union Finan-
cial Services (AUFS) to “overhaul satellite connectivity” in the country and to
“finance Renatelsat’s capacity to exploit the Belarusian . . . satellite Belintersat-1
to improve connectivity and telecommunication infrastructure in DR Congo”, with
the deal “structured to resuscitate the moribund Renatelsat and pull the agency to
self-sustainability”.149
Jean-Patrice Keka Ohemba Okese is a “self-made” Congolese “rocket expert
[who] has been launching projectiles from yam farms . . . near the village of
Table 3.11 Rwandese satellite
Satellite Launched Orbit Features Focus
Future Geostationary? • Partnership between RURA,
JAXA, and JICA
• Key areas:
communications
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Menkao” in his Troposphere programme.150 Five sounding rockets have been
constructed, of which three launches have taken place from his eastern Congo
location. Troposphere II “shot a mile up”, and Troposphere IV “rose 10 miles . . .
a sixth of the way to space, gracing the stratosphere”, while Troposphere V, which
“turned sideways” hitting a mountain, was “a 1576-pound, two-stage solid-fuel
rocket designed to climb 23 miles” with “[o]n board . . . computers to send back
video, GPS data and flight readings—and a rat, caught from the wild, in the
Ovaltine-can passenger pod”.151 Troposphere VI is being built as a “three-stage-
engine rocket, nicknaming it Soso Pembe or ‘white rooster,’ to power 120 miles up,
60 miles beyond what is considered the inner boundary of outer space”.152 While
receiving no government support—“Every time I went to see the government . . .
they told me that rocket science is too complicated and they don’t want a part of it”—
the launches are broadcast on television.153 In effect, the Democratic Republic of the
“Congo’s space program is more or less synonymous with Jean-Patrice’s Tropo-
sphere space program”.154 Despite these efforts, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo is a third-tier EMSA and Low Space Technology Country. Since the ambition
to develop a launch vehicle has no government support, the Space Technology
Ladder will not reflect this ambition (Table 3.12).
Malawi’s National Commission for Science and Technology has recently held
talks with the Kyushu Institute of Technology (KYUTECH)—which operates the
Birds programme discussed in the previous chapter—and while “Malawi will not
join KYUTECH’s upcoming Birds project, this very discussion was a significant
step in getting the government involved and aware of the benefits of space” with the
ultimate aim “to build Malawi’s first satellite”.155 While Malawi remains a third-tier
EMSA and Low Space Technology Country, there are thus prospects for future
space-related developments given the government’s interest.
Zimbabwe has very recently established the Zimbabwe National Geospatial and
Space Agency (ZINGSA), which launched in July 2018.156 ZINGSA is run by the
Table 3.12 Democratic Republic of the Congo satellite
Satellite Launched Orbit Features Focus
CongoSat-1 Future? Geostationary • Key areas: communications
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Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education, Science and Technology Development,
with five departments. The first is the Space Operations and Launch Services
Department, with the following responsibilities: preparation and implementation of
Earth observation missions; satellite command and control; managing communi-
cation between spacecraft, ground stations, and control centres; linking various com-
plex operating processes; incorporating new technologies to space operations as the
technologies become available; strategic planning of space operations; specifically
developing future plans for ZINGSA systems, facilities, and personnel; launch
services facilitating access to space for ZINGSA missions; and ensuring that critical
infrastructure to access and use space meets expectations of ZINGSA.157 The second
is the Space Science Department, which researches key areas of space physics,
astrophysics, and space weather and planetary science. The third is the Space
Engineering Department, tasked with offering engineering advice to ZINGSA
programmes and projects and ZINGSA innovations for space, from concept to
applications, and to “educate scientists and engineers as well as inspire Space
Research to better understand the Earth, our solar system and beyond”.158 The fourth
is the Geospatial and Earth Observation Department, tasked with geoinformation
Science and Earth observation; geospatial analytics and remote sensing; mining and
mineral exploration; disaster management; weather and climate; and geospatial
intelligence.159 The fifth is the Finance and Administration Department, responsible
for developing business plans, timelines, and budgets to perform financial projects;
developing and maintaining standard financial and administrative procedures; mon-
itoring and managing expenditures within allotted budget; ensuring the preparation
and maintenance of all financial records; identification and resolution of financial
and administrative issues; agriculture intelligence; and water, energy, health, and any
other nationally strategic applications.160 Key projects outlined for ZINGSA are
renewable energy mapping, geological mineral mapping, wildlife surveillance, and
malaria and bilharzia mapping.161
While the country has no satellites yet, talks are under way with “Geoscan, a
Russian space company, for a joint venture in drones manufacturing. Belgian
investors are also in talks with the ministry”, while “President Emmerson
Mnangagwa recently met China Space to discuss the possibility of accessing detailed
imagery from Chinese satellites”.162 ZINGSA has also signed an agreement with
“South Africa’s Space Advisory Group to assist the Government arm start opera-
tions”.163 The government is reported to have “released $1.6 million for the Zingsa
157Ibid.
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(accessed December 9, 2018).
163Ibid.
230 3 African Union Member States: National Space Infrastructure. . .
pilot project”.164 While Zimbabwe thus has ambitious plans for space, for now it
remains a third-tier EMSA and Low Space Technology Country.
In the COMESA region, a large number of promising space actors have thus been
identified, as seen in Fig. 3.5. Egypt is the clear leader, with Kenya and Ethiopia new
and rising entrants. Smaller actors like Rwanda, Mauritius, and Zimbabwe are also
noteworthy.
3.2.3 The Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD)
CEN-SAD, with its large membership, includes the already discussed Morocco,
Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, and Kenya, and as before, these will accordingly be
excluded here. Beyond these, one emerging space middle power was identified,
namely, Nigeria, and thus it will be the first CEN-SAD member looked at here.
Nigeria is, as seen in the preceding chapter, one of the most active African space
actors and a leader on the continent. The country expressed the ambition to establish
a space programme as early as 1976 during a joint session of the United Nations
Economic Commission for Africa and the Organisation of African Unity.165 The
establishment of a National Centre for Remote Sensing was approved by the
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National Council of Ministers,166 and subsequently the National Remote Sensing
Centre became operational by October 1995.167 This was followed in 1999 by the
establishment of the National Space Research and Development Agency
(NASRDA), with the goal to “develop and promote the use of space technology as
a key driver for socio-economic development”. In 2001 the adoption of the Nigeria
Space Policy set out the key responsibilities of NASRDA, in the areas of the
development of human resources and capacity; natural resources management;
defence, security, and law enforcement; study of the Earth and its environment;
space communication and applications; education and training; and promotion of
international cooperation.168
Nigeria’s National Space Council is chaired by the president, and NASRDA has
seven main centres, namely, Centre for Basic Space Science, Nsukka; Centre for
Remote Sensing, Jos; Centre for Satellite Technology Development, Abuja; Centre
for Space Transport and Propulsion, Epe; Centre for Space Science and Technology
Education, Ile-Ife; Centre for Geodesy and Geodynamics, Toro; and Centre for
Lower Atmospheric Research, Kogi State University.169 It also operates one com-
pany, named GEOAPPS Plus Nig. Ltd. The country also maintains a Defence Space
Administration (DSA), established by the National Assembly of the Federal Repub-
lic of Nigeria with the mandate to develop and operate military space technologies;
support Nigerian military operations both within and outside the country as well as
security agencies responsible for internal security, through the use of satellites; and
provide resilient, affordable space and cyberspace capabilities for the Nigerian
military as well as other security and law enforcement agencies.170 Currently, the
main legislative framework regulating the Nigerian space sector is the National
Space Research and Development Act (2010).171
Nigeria initiated a 25-year space programme roadmap in 2005, divided into three
phases. Phase one covered 2005–2013, phase two covers 2014–2022, and phase
three will cover 2023–2030.172 This roadmap has three overarching goals, namely,
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to produce a Nigerian astronaut, to launch a satellite manufactured in Nigeria, and to
build and launch a Nigerian-made satellite from a launch site in Nigeria on a
Nigerian launch vehicle. Thus far, the country has had six satellites placed in
orbit, as Table 3.13 details, with the first being NigeriaSat-1 in 2003 and the most
recent NigeriaEduSat-1 in 2017.173
While the “infrastructural deficit is a big challenge to every sector in Nigeria”, the
government is “providing intervention funds for the development of an indigenous
Design Center (DC) and an Assembly and Integrated Testing (AIT) centre to
facilitate the growth of its space programme”. However, “institutions of higher
learning are yet to venture into actual space research and satellite development”
with the exceptions of “one university [University of Ife, now Obafemi Awolowo
University] with facilities to teach and research engineering physics, a discipline
crucial to space science and instrumentation”, and, another, the Federal University of
Technology, Akure, which was involved in building NigeriaEduSat-1.174,175,176
Increasing private sector participation is another challenge for Nigeria, and it is
reported that the “Nigerian government is yet to create an environment for private
sector participation to thrive”.177 Moreover, while Nigeria has announced the inten-
tion to send an astronaut to space by 2030, concerns have been raised as “[s]ome
experts took to social media to express their doubt with the vision 2030, dubbing it as
usual political rhetoric”, while “[m]any Nigerians expressed concern over limited
resources and disbelief that NASRDA has the capacity to achieve the vision”.178
Furthermore, a “critical analysis of Nigeria’s space program reveals that sending an
astronaut into space could be a misplaced priority or an unfounded claim” and “[a]t
best, Nigeria may send an astronaut into space onboard a foreign spaceship”, most
likely in partnership with China.179 In terms of the ambition to launch satellites from
Nigeria, “experts decry the near total absence of necessary infrastructure to achieve
this”.180
Nevertheless, Nigeria has shown a steady progression in developing local exper-
tise with each satellite, and a clear progression is visible in Nigerian capabilities.
NigeriaSat-1 involved the training of 15 engineers, NigComSat-1 involved the
training of 55 engineers, and NigeriaSat-2 involved the training of 27 engineers
and 10 M.Sc. degrees awarded by the University of Surrey, while NigeriaSat-X was
173Space in Africa, “Over $3 billion have been spent on space projects in Africa since 1998,” Africa
Space News, May 11, 2018, https://africanews.space/over-3-billion-have-been-spent-on-space-pro
jects-in-africa-since-1998/ (accessed December 10, 2018).
174Ibeh, “A Deep Dive into Nigeria’s Space Sector.”
175Tade Ipadeola, “The Terrestrial Challenges to Nigeria’s Ambitious Space Program,” Slate,
March, 2017, http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2017/03/nigeria_s_ambi
tious_space_program_is_held_back_by_terrestrial_politics.html (accessed December 10, 2018).
176Chizea, “Space Technology Development in Nigeria.”
177Ibeh, “A Deep Dive into Nigeria’s Space Sector.”
178Ibid.
179Ibid.
180Ipadeola, “The Terrestrial Challenges to Nigeria’s Ambitious Space Program.”
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Table 3.13 Nigerian satellites
Satellite Launched Orbit Features Focus
NigeriaSat-1a,b,c 2003 Sun-
synchronous
• Built in collaboration
with Surrey Satellite
Technology (SST)
• “Earth observatory
satellite with a 32 m
resolution camera and
an optical sensor”
• “32-m resolution
imager in 3 spectral
bands”
• Launch site: Plesetsk,
Russia
• Part of disaster
monitoring constella-
tion
• “Also paid for the
training of Nigerian
engineers”
• Key areas: Earth
observation, capacity
building
NigComSat-1a 2007 Geostationary • “Failed in orbit in
November the follow-
ing year [2008] as a
result of a poorly-built
solar array”
• Built by China Great
Wall Industry Corpo-
ration
• Nigeria received
“NigComSat-1R as a
replacement for the
failed satellite at no
extra cost. The loss was
covered by insurance
and CGWIC built a
replacement to make
up for the faulty
NigComSat-1”
• Launch site: China’s
Xichang Satellite
Launch Centre
• Key areas:
communication
NigeriaSat-2d 2011 Sun-
synchronous
• Built by Surrey Sat-
ellite Technology Ltd
(SSTL), under contract
“for the supply of the
NigeriaSat-2 Earth
observation satellite,
related ground infra-
structure and a training
programme to further
establish a national
indigenous space capa-
bility in the Federal
Republic of Nigeria”
• Launch site: Yasny in
southern Russia
• To “provide Nigeria
with valuable geo-
graphically referenced
high-resolution satel-
lite imaging for appli-
cations in mapping,
water resources man-
agement, agricultural
land use, population
estimation, health
hazard monitoring and
disaster mitigation
and management”
• Key areas: Earth
observation, capacity
building
(continued)
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Table 3.13 (continued)
Satellite Launched Orbit Features Focus
NigeriaSat-Xa,e 2011 Sun-
synchronous
• “UK-based Surrey
Space Technology
Limited built the
NigeriaSat-2 and pro-
vided technical training
for Nigerian engineers
to build NigeriaSat-X”
• “Developed by a team
of 25 Nigerian trainee
engineers at SSTL
under a program to
provide hands-on
experience in all
aspects of spacecraft
development”
• Launch site: Yasny in
southern Russia
• 22 m multispectral
imaging system with
an 600 km swath
• Key areas: Earth
observation, capacity
building
NigComSat-
1Ra,f,g
2011 Geostationary • “Operated by Nige-
rian Communications
Satellite Limited
(NigCom LTD) and
NASRDA. The com-
munication satellite
improved Nigeria’s
telecommunication
sector with about 65%
capacity usage”
• “Fitted with a total of
28 transponders
(8 Ka-band,
14 Ku-band, 4 C-band
and 2 L-band)”
• Launch site: China’s
Xichang Satellite
Launch Centre
• “Super hybrid geo-
stationary communi-
cations satellite”
• Key areas:
communication
NigeriaEdu
Sat-1h,i
2017 Low Earth
orbit
• Part of Joint Global
Multi-Nation Birds
Satellite project. Acro-
nym as ‘Birds project’
• First Nigerian univer-
sity satellite
• “Designed, built and
owned by The Federal
University of Technol-
ogy Akure, FUTA, in
collaboration with
National Space
Research and Develop-
ment Agency,
NASRDA, Abuja,
Nigeria, and Kyushu
Institute of Technology
Japan”
• “Ground Station
Equipment include:–
Cross Yagi-Uda
antennas (2 m and
70 cm), Icom
Transceiver,– Yeasu
Antenna Rotator, PC
with Satellite tracking
software”
• “Antenna develop-
ment completed by
NASRDA Engineers/
Scientists”
• Key areas: “capacity
building,
i.e. domesticating the
satellite technology in
a Nigerian university,
(continued)
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Table 3.13 (continued)
Satellite Launched Orbit Features Focus
• Launch site: released
from the International
Space Station
FUTA, and making
the technology a
common business
among staff and stu-
dents of the university
in Nigeria for the pur-
pose of research,
resources and envi-
ronmental manage-
ment and sustainable
socio-economic
development of the
nation”
NigeriaEdu
Sat-2j
Future • NASRDA “con-
cluded all technical
arrangements for the
successful building and
launch of a second
NANOSATELLITE”
• Collaboration with
Landmark University,
Omu-Aran Kwara
State
• “Technical work is set
for EduSat-2, but
activities will begin as
soon as the budget is
passed”
• Key areas: “for Uni-
versities to develop
capabilities on satel-
lite technology”;
Agriculture:
“detecting diseased
crop”
Not yet knownj Future • “Nigeria in early 2018
announced a $550 mil-
lion deal to acquire two
communication satel-
lites from China. The
deal offers the Chinese
company equity stake
worth $550 million in
Nigerian Communica-
tion Satellite
(NigComSat Ltd).
NigComSat Ltd is a
state-owned communi-
cations satellite opera-
tor and services
provider. The Nigerian
government claims the
deal will cost Nigeria
nothing because they
did not make any direct
(continued)
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“designed & built by Nigerian Engineers using SSTL Facilities”.181 The postgrad-
uate Institute of Space Sciences and Engineering (ISSE) was also established in 2015
in Abuja to “address the growing needs of Space scientific knowledge and innova-
tions in Nigeria and Africa continent at large” with the first students expected in
2018.182 As mentioned, the Assembly Integration, Test, and Design Centre (AITDC)
and the Mechanical Design Laboratory are progressing, with other major infrastruc-
ture developments including a planetarium and space museum.183 As such, Nigeria
can be considered as a second-tier EMSA and High Space Technology Country. The
country also runs a “low-profile” sounding rocket programme at the Centre for Space
Transport and Propulsion, Epe.184
181Chizea, “Space Technology Development in Nigeria.”
182Ibid.
183Ibid.
184Samuel Oyewole, “Space Research and Development in Africa,” Astropolitics 15, no. 2 (2017):
191.
Table 3.13 (continued)
Satellite Launched Orbit Features Focus
financial commitment
to the deal”
aIbeh, “A Deep Dive into Nigeria’s Space Sector”
bGunter Dirk Krebs, “NigeriaSat 1,” Gunter’s Space Page, December 11, 2017, https://space.
skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/nigeriasat-1.htm (accessed December 10, 2018)
cWood and Weigel, “Charting the Evolution of Satellite Programs in Developing Countries,” 19
dGunter Dirk Krebs, “NigeriaSat 2,” Gunter’s Space Page, December 11, 2017, https://space.
skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/nigeriasat-2.htm (accessed December 10, 2018)
eGunter Dirk Krebs, “NX (NigeriaSat X),”Gunter’s Space Page, December 11, 2017, https://space.
skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/nx.htm (accessed December 10, 2018)
fChina Great Wall Industry Corporation, “NigComSat-1R Program,” 2009, http://www.cgwic.com/
In-OrbitDelivery/CommunicationsSatellite/Program/NigComSat-1R.html (accessed December
10, 2018)
gNigcomsat Ltd, “NigComSat-1R,” 2018, http://www.nigcomsat.gov.ng/fleet.php (accessed
December 10, 2018)
hSpace in Africa, “FUTA sets Nigerian record, to launch Nigeria’s first Nanosatellite,” African
Space News, January 25, 2018, https://africanews.space/futa-sets-nigerian-record-to-launch-
nigerias-first-nanosatellite/ (accessed December 10, 2018)
iChizea, “Space Technology Development in Nigeria”
jSpace in Africa, “NASRDA and Landmark University collaborates to build Nigeria EduSAT-2,”
Africa Space News, June 2, 2018, https://africanews.space/nasrda-and-landmark-university-collab
orates-to-build-nigeria-edusat-2/ (accessed December 10, 2018)
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Ghana is a recent entrant into the space arena, having established its Ghana Space
Science and Technology Centre (GSSTC) as an arm of the Ghana Atomic Energy
Commission (GAEC) in 2011.185 The Centre is currently based at the Commission’s
Graduate School of Nuclear and Allied Sciences, Atomic Campus, and is an
initiative of the Ministry of Environment, Science, and Technology (MEST). The
goal of the Centre is to “coordinate, undertake, spearhead, steer and manage all space
science (including Astronomy) programmes, projects and research activities in the
country”, with the mission to “establish a centre of excellence in space science and
technology to foster teaching, learning, commercial application of space research for
the economic transformation of Ghana and the sub-region”.186 There were “specu-
lations” that the Centre was to have been converted to the Ghana Space Agency in
2016, “intended to lead the nation’s civilian space exploration efforts, in accordance
with the National Science, Technology and Innovation Policy and Development
Plan for 2011–2015”, but this has not yet occurred.187
Like Kenya, Ghana also launched its first satellite as part of the Birds Project (Joint
GlobalMulti-Nation Birds Satellite project) in partnershipwith the Kyushu Institute of
Technology and the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA).188 The first phase
of the Birds Project entailed that “students shall design, develop and operate 5 units of
identical 1UCubeSats (1 kg, 10 cm cubic) belonging to the five participating countries
and operated from 7 ground stations (operation is done at 7 ground stations; the
5 participating countries including Thailand and Taiwan) to form first time in the
world a constellation of 5 CubeSats operated in 7 networked ground stations”.189
Ghana’s satellite was developed by students of the All Nations University in
Koforidua and was sent into orbit from the International Space Station in 2017 along
with NigeriaEduSat-1.190 GhanaSat-1 (see Table 3.14) has two missions, namely,
“detailed monitoring of the coastlines of Ghana” and “an educational piece—we want
to use it to integrate satellite technology into high school curriculum”.191
Interestingly, the success of GhanaSat-1 has prompted the “support of the pres-
ident and cabinet support”, with plans “to develop a GhanaSat-2, with high resolu-
tion cameras, that could monitor things such as illegal mining, water use, and
185Ghana Space Science and Technology Centre, “Ghana Space Centre,” 2012, http://gsstc.gov.gh/
# (accessed December 10, 2018).
186Ibid.
187Space in Africa, “List of Space Agencies in Africa,” African Space News, June 22, 2018, https://
africanews.space/list-of-space-agencies-in-africa/# (accessed December 10, 2018).
188Kyushu Institute of Technology, “Joint Global Multi Nation Birds 1,” 2017, https://birds1.birds-
project.com/index.html#about (accessed December 10, 2018).
189Ibid.
190British Broadcasting Corporation, “Ghana launches its first satellite into space,” July 7, 2017,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-40538471 (accessed December 10, 2018).
191Space in Africa, “Africa Space Race: Ghana’s launches first satellite, now orbiting earth,” Africa
Space News, January 5, 2018, https://africanews.space/africa-space-race-ghanas-launches-first-sat
ellite-now-orbiting-earth/ (accessed December 10, 2018).
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deforestation in the country”.192 In November 2018, an announcement was made by
the All Nations University Space Systems Technology Laboratory (ANU-SSTL)
that “GhanaSat-2 is intended to be a meteorological Satellite in collaboration with
Table 3.14 Ghanaian satellites
Satellite Launched Orbit Features Focus
GhanaSat-1a,b 2017 Low
Earth
orbit
• Part of “Joint Global
Multi-Nation Birds Satellite
project. Acronym as ‘Birds
project’”
• “Successfully designed
and developed satellite by
Ghanaian students in Japan”
• “Low and high resolution
cameras on-board to take
pictures of our homeland
and provide data that can be
used to monitor coastal
areas of Ghana”
• Launch site: International
Space Station
• “Also has Digi-Singer
SNG mission from which
the national anthem and
other independence songs
will be broadcast from
space as well as collect
requested songs from the
ground and send to the sat-
ellite to broadcast in space.
An initiative aimed at stim-
ulating interest in science,
technology, engineering
and mathematics (STEM)
education in high schools
and tertiary institutions”
• “Will also embark on a
scientific mission to inves-
tigate the radiation effects
on commercial-off-the-
shelf microprocessors. This
means it will measure the
single event latch-up
occurrence that degrades
electronic system on board
satellites due to the harsh
space environment and
analyse this data to con-
tribute to scientific
research”
• “Collaboration between
the ANUC and the Kyutech
Institute of Technology
(KYUTECH) in Japan”
• Key areas: Earth observa-
tion, capacity building
GhanaSat-2 Future
2019?
• Project of All Nations
University Space Systems
Technology Laboratory
(ANU-SSTL)
• Key areas: meteorologi-
cal/Earth observation
aBenjamin Bonsu, “Ghana’s first satellite (GhanaSat-1) will be launched to the International Space
Station (ISS) by Space X, flight 11 from Kennedy Space Centre in Florida, USA on June 1, 2017 at
21:55 UTC,” Embassy of Ghana in Japan, May 29, 2017, http://www.ghanaembassy.or.jp/pdf/
2017_05_29.pdf (accessed December 10, 2018)
bKyushu Institute of Technology, “Joint Global Multi Nation Birds 1”
192Ibid.
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the Ghana Meteorological Agency (GMA) to improve weather forecast and other
related activities”, with the goal to realise this satellite “hopefully by end 2019”.193
Because of these developments, while Ghana remains a third-tier EMSA for now, it
can be considered as a Medium Space Technology Country.
Côte d’Ivoire appears set to have its first satellite placed in space in the near future,
potentiallymaking it the ninthAfrican country to do so.194 It is reported thatAirbus beat
the China Great Wall Industry Corporation in its bid “to provide an Earth observation
satellite” for Côte d’Ivoire, which is seeking to “monitor its maritime borders”.195 This
follows the announcement in 2015 by the Minister of Telecommunications that the
country intends to utilise a satellite to “fight threats from pirates and terrorists in the
Gulf of Guinea”.196 The launch date for the satellite is expected to be 2020 and will
“monitor maritime borders, tackle terrorism and obtain better meteorological data for
the countrywith a population of 25million located inWestAfrica”.197 Côte d’Ivoire for
now remains a third-tier EMSA and Low Space Technology Country (Table 3.15).
São Tomé and Príncipe is noteworthy since, as mentioned in Chap. 2, the country
signed an MoU with India in September 2018 for ISRO (the Indian Space Research
Organisation) to set up “a Space Centre” in São Tomé and Príncipe.198 While the
goal is to “enhance India’s Space capabilities in wide range of areas including
communication, Space monitoring, remote sensing, etc.”, the agreement will “also
enable joint space research and development activities, cooperation in providing
satellite launch services and development of ground infrastructure for satellite pro-
grams”.199 São Tomé and Príncipe is a third-tier EMSA and Low Space Technology
Table 3.15 Ivoirian satellite
Satellite Launched Orbit Features Focus
2020? • Built by Airbus
Defence and Space
• Key areas: Earth observation, meteo-
rology, capacity building?
193Space in Africa, “All Nations University unveils and demonstrates GhanaSat-2 mission con-
cept,” Africa Space News, November 24, 2018, https://africanews.space/all-nations-university-
unveils-and-demonstrates-ghanasat-2-mission-concept/ (accessed December 10, 2018).
194Space in Africa, “Ivory Coast to become the 9th African Country with Satellite in Space,” Africa
Space News, July 26, 2018, https://africanews.space/ivory-coast-to-become-the-9th-african-coun
try-with-satellite-in-space/ (accessed December 10, 2018).
195Spacewatch Africa, “Côte d’Ivoire To Acquire Earth Observation Satellite From Airbus, Rejects
China Great Wall Industry Corporation,” ThorGroup GmbH, July, 2018, https://spacewatch.global/
2018/07/cote-divoire-to-acquire-earth-observation-satellite-from-airbus-rejects-china-great-wall-
industries-corporation/ (accessed December 10, 2018).
196Space in Africa, “Ivory Coast to become the 9th African Country with Satellite in Space.”
197Ibid.
198Space in Africa, “India and Republic of Sao Tome and Principe sign MoU to set up Space
centre,” Africa Space News, September 9, 2018, https://africanews.space/india-and-republic-of-sao-
tomi-and-principe-sign-mou-to-set-up-space-centre/ (accessed December 10, 2018).
199Ibid.
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Country, but this may pave the way towards setting up basic space activities in the
country and a government space office.
As depicted in Fig. 3.6, Nigeria is by far the leading space actor in the region. It
also has a wide-ranging engagement across categories of milestones. However,
Ghana is a new and rising star, while Côte d’Ivoire will soon join with its first
milestone. It is not certain if São Tomé and Príncipe will achieve a milestone in the
near future, but it remains a country of note.
3.2.4 The East African Community (EAC)
A recent noteworthy development in the EAC region is that the East African Heads
of State agreed during the 14th Northern Corridor Infrastructure Projects (NCIP)
Summit in June 2018 “to launch a common Satellite that will serve the region”.200
This development follows on the 2012 signing of a deal between the East Africa
Communications Organisation (EACO) and the International Telecommunications
Satellite Organisation (ITSO) to “revamp the use of satellite technology in the
region”, and it is reported that the new common satellite will “help the region to
easily enjoy access to telecommunications services for voice, data, video communi-
cations and internet”.201 It thus appears to be a planned communications satellite.
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200Dan Ngabonziza, “EAC Leaders Agree on Common Satellite Project,” KT Press, June 26, 2018,
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11, 2018).
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Under this agreement, ITSO will “help in developing human capital through training
telecommunication experts within the region”.202 The proposed satellite is also
meant to drive forward regional integration in the EAC region.
EAC members, Kenya (the only emerging space middle power identified within
this REC) and Rwanda, have already been discussed earlier and will thus be
excluded here. Among the remaining members, no country has as yet achieved, or
is planning in the near future to achieve, any of the Space Technology Ladder
milestones, although Tanzania has been reported as engaging in the “training of
engineers and research collaborations” in relation to the African Space Policy and
Strategy.203
3.2.5 Economic Community of Central African States
(ECCAS)
ECCAS counts among its members the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda,
and São Tomé and Príncipe, which will thus be excluded here to avoid repetition. No
emerging space middle powers were identified in this REC, although, as will be seen,
Angola has the most promising space sector in the region.
Angola was identified in Chap. 2 as an underperformer in space when measured
against expectations of its power internationally, but when considering its domestic
space sector developments, this assessment is not warranted as the country is
showing strong signs of ramping up its space efforts. Angola began its space efforts
in 2006, when the AngoSat project was initiated through a decree.204 This was
followed in 2008 when a “government resolution established the need to set up a
satellite telecoms infrastructure in the country”.205 While this resolution was directed
at formalising the AngoSat project, it “covers not only the production, launch and
operation of the satellite, but also the creation of national capability in human
resources and infrastructure in the field of outer space”.206 Following this, in 2009,
Angola signed an agreement with Russia for the development of the Angosat-1, and
“[a]s part of the deal, Energia built a control centre in Funda, in north-western
Angola, manned by local employees”.207
202Ibid.
203Rusana Philander, “Tanzania, Three Other Nations Leading Africa into Space?,” TZ Business
News, no date, http://www.tzbusinessnews.com/tanzania-three-other-nations-leading-africa-into-
space/ (accessed December 11, 2018).
204Jaroslaw Adamowski, “Angola eyes new satellite as African space race accelerates,” Space
News, June 12, 2018, https://spacenews.com/angola-eyes-new-satellite-as-african-space-race-accel
erates/ (accessed December 11, 2018).
205Helena Correia Mendonça, “With Angosat-1 a New African Country Reaches Space,” Via
Satellite, March, 2018, http://interactive.satellitetoday.com/via/march-2018/with-angosat-1-a-
new-african-country-reaches-space/ (accessed December 11, 2018).
206Ibid.
207Adamowski, “Angola eyes new satellite as African space race accelerates.”
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The AngoSat project also received attention in the National Development Plan
2013–2017 and the White Book on ICT from 2011, which “once again highlighted
the need to develop national industries and know-how in space technology, an
objective boosted by the AngoSat”, and also provided a preliminary outline of the
National Space Program and its objectives.208 By 2013 the country had also set up
the Inter-ministerial Commission for the General Coordination of the National Space
Program (Gabinete de Gestao do Programa Espacial Nacional—GGPEN) and the
Angolan National Office for Space Affairs, with the former mandated to oversee the
AngoSat project and “study the need for a space agency in the country, among other
responsibilities”, while the latter was mandated to pursue “strategic studies aimed at
establishing cooperation agreements in the space field, among other tasks”.209 In
May 2017, the Angolan Space Strategy 2016–2025 was also published.
The strategy clearly outlines that, by 2025, Angola envisions itself as being a
“country with space infrastructures, with scientific and technological capabilities in
this field, which takes advantage of space for its socio-economic development—
placing space at the service of its citizens, the industry and the State—and that
assumes a leadership and cooperation role at the regional and international
levels”.210 The strategy also outlines five pillars—space infrastructure, capacity
building and promotion, industry and technology, international positioning, and
organisation and cooperation—with three priority space projects, the AngoSat-1,
the Angolan Centre for Space Studies, and the creation of a space agency.211
AngoSat-1 was the country’s first communications satellite, which was built by
Russia’s RSC Energia, but failed relatively soon after it entered into service.212 The
loss of this satellite was covered by insurance “worth $121 million” with Russia
covering the “remaining $199 million”.213 It is planned for a replacement AngoSat-2
to launch in 2020. In the interim, the country is “using capacity on third-party
communications satellites paid for by Russia as part of a compensation package
for the failure in orbit of AngoSat-1”.214
Angola’s efforts mean it is on the borderline of becoming a third-tier EMSA, and
while it has, as yet, no space agency, it is a Medium Space Technology Country,
meaning that it cannot be seen as an underperformer in the sector (Table 3.16).
Gabon is in the very beginning stages of establishing its space sector. In 2015, the
Gabonese Agency for Space Studies and Observations (l’Agence gabonaise d’études
208Mendonça, “With Angosat-1 a New African Country Reaches Space.”
209Ibid.
210Ibid.
211Ibid.
212Adamowski, “Angola eyes new satellite as African space race accelerates.”
213Ibid.
214Spacewatch Africa, “Angola Using SATCOM Capacity Paid For By Russia As Compensation
For AngoSat-1 Failure,” September, 2018, https://spacewatch.global/2018/09/angola-using-
satcom-capacity-paid-for-by-russia-as-compensation-for-angosat-1-failure/ (accessed December
11, 2018).
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Table 3.16 Angolan satellites
Satellite Launched Orbit Features Focus
AngoSat-1a,b 2017 Geostationary • “Power of 3753 W in
the CKu band with
16 C + 6 Ku repeaters”
• “Primary control and
mission centre in
Angola and a secondary
centre in Russia in
Korolev”
• Launch site: Baikonur
• “Angola will be
responsible for mission
control during this
period”
• “A crucial role in the
proliferation of tele-
medicine, a way of
providing clinical care
from a distance using
telecommunications”
• “Expand satellite
communications ser-
vices, internet access,
radio, and television”
• “Expected that the
satellite will have a
99.2% of its capacity
used, with 40% of the
satellite capacity
already assigned to
operators, 10% to
national security and
defence services, and
another 10% to social
initiatives (such as in
the sectors of educa-
tion, health, and small
businesses). The
investment is expected
to be recouped in about
2 years”
• Key areas: communi-
cation, capacity
building
AngoSat-2c Future
2020?
Geostationary? • “Will have better
technical possibilities
than the lost AngoSat-1
satellite”
• “Roscosmos to build
Angola’s second satel-
lite”
• Launch site:
Baikonur?
• Key areas:
communication
aGlobalSecurity.org, “Angola in Space,” 2018, https://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/angola/
index.html (accessed December 11, 2018)
bMendonça, “With Angosat-1 a New African Country Reaches Space”
cAndrea Ayemoba, “Angola accepts Russian offer to build AngoSat-2,” Africa Business Commu-
nities BV, April 26, 2018, https://africabusinesscommunities.com/news/angola-accepts-russian-
offer-to-build-angosat-2/ (accessed December 11, 2018)
244 3 African Union Member States: National Space Infrastructure. . .
et d’observation spatiales—AGEOS) was established at Nkok, 27 km from the
capital Libreville.215 The Agency was established with “various technical and
scientific partners including the National Centre for Space Studies (CNES), Zodiac
Data Systems (ZDS), the U.S. Agency for Geological Studies (USGS), Telespazio
France and the French Institute Development research [which] has helped to equip
Gabon with this tool to improve and better manage its natural resources, land and
marine space”.216 The Agency is reported to possess a “reception antenna which
covers a 2800-kilometer circle encompassing 23 African countries, the totality of the
Congo Basin and Ogooué Basin forests, a part of West Africa and the entire Gulf of
Guinea” and has the goals of research, innovation, and development.217 Telespazio
France also maintains EarthLab in Gabon, which is an “environmental monitoring
centre”, and allows for the creation of local and regional momentum in the field of
environmental monitoring, value added services in the fields of maritime surveil-
lance and mapping, “[i]ncrease[d] momentum for space services in Gabon”, and
expertise in Africa in the field of satellite Earth observation.218 EarthLab in part
relies on “AGEOS infrastructure and resources (and in particular a satellite reception
antenna over 7 meters wide)”.219
Gabon for now remains a third-tier EMSA and borderline Medium Space Tech-
nology Country.
Figure 3.7 highlights that Angola is the space leader within the ECCAS region
due to having achieved two milestones.
3.2.6 The Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS)
Since the membership of ECOWAS overlaps with that of CEN-SAD, no countries
remain to be discussed here. Nigeria was the only emerging space middle power
identified here.
215Sylvain Moussavou, “Gabon: Inauguration de l’Agence gabonaise d’études et d’observation
spatiales,” Koaci, August 30, 2015, http://koaci.com/gabon-inauguration-lagence-gabonaise-
detudes-dobservation-spatiales-90932.html (accessed December 11, 2018).
216Ibid.
217Ibid.
218FGIS Gabon, “EarthLab Gabon (EGSA),” 2014, http://www.fgis-gabon.com/?page_id¼996#
(accessed December 11, 2018).
219EarthLab, “Gabon confirms its space ambitions,” Telespazio France, December 20, 2013, http://
www.earthlab-galaxy.com/en/news/gabon-confirms-its-space-ambitions/ (accessed December
11, 2018).
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3.2.7 The Intergovernmental Authority on Development
(IGAD)
Apart from South Sudan, which has no space sector as yet, all countries of IGAD
overlap with COMESA, and thus will not be repeated here. Kenya was the only
space middle power identified in IGAD.
3.2.8 The Southern African Development Community
(SADC)
SADC includes among its membership Angola, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Malawi, Zimbabwe, and Mauritius, and thus only the remaining countries
will be considered here. South Africa was the only identified emerging space middle
power, and the discussion will begin there.
South Africa can be rightfully considered as one of Africa’s leading space nations,
and it was, as seen in Chap. 1, the only African country identified by Harding as
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being a second-tier EMSA due to the launch vehicle development by the apartheid
regime, which was cancelled at the time of democratic transition due to international
pressures.220 In the post-apartheid era after 1994, South Africa inherited space-
related physical infrastructure, including “[a]t least six units within the Council for
Scientific and Industrial Research [CSIR] [which] are actually or potentially space-
related”, with a Defence, Peace, Safety, and Security Unit, Materials Science and
Manufacturing Unit, National Laser Centre, Satellite Applications Centre (SAC)
(now known as SANSA Space Operations SSO), and high-speed computing net-
work.221 It also inherited the Institute of Satellite and Software Applications (ISSA),
also known as Houwteq (and now operated by Spaceteq222), with “facilities for
satellite integration: a clean room, the biggest anechoic chamber in the southern
hemisphere, and a vacuum and thermal stress chamber”, a vibration table able to test
satellites weighing up to 1 tonne, 23 tonne capable gantry cranes, and work sta-
tions.223 The third main component of heritage infrastructure is the Overberg Test
Range, built as an “eastwards and polar space launch facility, with a control centre,
three launch pads, a 4.5 m tracking antenna, cinetheodolites and radar tracking
facilities, and an air transportable tracking station”, in total covering 43,000 hectares
and capable of hosting up to 120 engineers.224 The South African Air Force’s Test
Flight and Development Centre with a primary runway 3115 m long, and “good
telemetry and optical tracking facilities” with three prefab hangar bays capable of
servicing a 5 tonne flying test bed each, or a 100 tonne technology demonstrator in
total, plus the South African Airforce Waterkloof Base with engine test cells and
“other very under-used R&D facilities”, forms another component.225 Upington
Airport’s 4.9-km-long runway is the longest in Africa, and “spacious aircraft parking
facilities” makes it “suitable to become a test flight area”.226
Various pieces of legislation have also been passed since 1993 relating to space.
The first were the Space Affairs Act 84 of 1993, and the Space Affairs Amendment
Act 64 of 1995, together addressing “the regulatory obligations accepted by the
Government under international treaties”.227 Additionally, the Space Affairs Act of
1993 established the South African Council for Space Affairs under the Ministry of
Trade and Industry to “undertake regulatory functions”.228 The Astronomy
220Harding, Space Policy in Developing Countries: The Search for Security and Development on
the Final Frontier; Samuel Oyewole, “Space Research and Development in Africa,” Astropolitics
15, no. 2 (2017): 191.
221Keith Gottschalk, “South Africa’s space programme – Past, present, future,” Astropolitics 8, no.
1 (2010): 4–5
222Spaceteq, “About,” 2018, https://www.spaceteq.co.za/ (accessed December 11, 2018).
223Ibid.
224Ibid.
225Ibid.
226Ibid.
227Ibid., 6.
228South African Council for Space Affairs, “Report 2006–2009,” 2009, 10, http://www.sacsa.gov.
za/reports/SACSA_report_2009.pdf (accessed December 11, 2018).
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Geographic Advantage Act 21 of 2007 provides powers to the government to “cap or
ban radio and light pollution that would impair the sites of radio- and optical
telescopes” in order to protect the Southern African Large Telescope (SALT) and
subsequent Square Kilometre Array.229 The South African National Space Agency
Act 36 of 2008 provided for the creation of the South African National Space
Agency (SANSA) in 2010 under the Department of Science and Technology,
which “will not attempt to manufacture in-house, but will outsource building
satellites and software development to the private sector”.230 Preceding the estab-
lishment of SANSA, the Department of Science and Technology issued the National
Space Strategy and Policy.231 SANSA works under its Strategic Plan 2015/2020,
while the Department of Science and Technology is guided by its own 10-year
innovation plan.232
Prior to these developments, space activities in the country during the mid- to late
1990s “took place in an isolated, uncoordinated ad hoc fashion at the institutional
level and in a policy vacuum at national level”.233 One such activity was the building
of South Africa’s first satellite, SunSat, by students and academics at Stellenbosch
University, launched in 1999 with the “first push-broom imager on a microsatellite
platform that achieved a 12-m resolution”, and this became the first object to be
registered under the Space Affairs Act.234 The spin-off company Sunspace also built
the second South African satellite, Sumbandila235, which was launched in 2009,
with SunSat and Sumbandila being “Africa’s first two microsats that were entirely
constructed on the continent, demonstrating hi-tech industrial capabilities”.236 To
date, South Africa has placed seven satellites in orbit (Table 3.17). The country has
been described as having “the largest and most active space technology on the
continent”237 and as “the undisputed industrial hotspot of Africa’s nascent space
industry” with “a remarkable and intentional collaboration between government
agencies, academic institutions and private sector companies in the development
229Ibid.
230Ibid., 6, 8.
231Peter Martinez, “The development and initial implementation of South Africa’s national space
policy,” Space Policy 37, (2016):37.
232South African National Space Agency, “Documents,” no date, https://www.sansa.org.za/docu
ments/ (accessed December 11, 2018).
233Ibid., 31.
234Ibid.
235Sumbandila means ‘lead the way’ in Tshivenda, one of the 11 official languages of South Africa;
South African Agency for Science and Technology Advancement, “Sumbandila – leading the way
to a brighter future,” November 9, 2009, http://www.saasta.ac.za/images/pdfs/
EasyScienceNovember09.pdf (accessed December 14, 2018).
236Gottschalk, “South Africa’s space programme – Past, present, future,” 8.
237Fredrick Ngugi, “Top 5 African Countries with Advanced Space Programs,” Face2Face Africa,
August 15, 2017, https://face2faceafrica.com/article/top-5-african-countries-advanced-space-pro
grams (accessed December 11, 2018).
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Table 3.17 South African satellites
Satellite Launched Orbit Features Focus
SunSata 1999 Sun-
synchronous
• “Following instrumen-
tation onboard: high res-
olution imager, precision
attitude control, magne-
tometer, GPS array, ret-
roreflector array: a
hemispherical annulus
mounted to the boom.
The RRA has eight cor-
ner cubes made of fused
silica, radio amateur
communications (oper-
ated as OSCAR 35 or SO
35)”
• Launch site: Vanden-
berg Air Force Base
• “Primary mission
objectives are imaging,
worldwide store-and-
forward email commu-
nications, and satellite
engineering research.
Secondary mission
objectives are studies of
the earth magnetic field,
gravity field, atmo-
sphere, and ionosphere
plus intercomparison of
GPS and SLR precision
orbits”
• Key areas: Earth
observation, capacity
building
SumbandilaSatb,c 2009 Sun-
synchronous
• Formerly ZASat-002
• “ZASat became in fact a
National Space Program
Initiative, consisting of
two parts: (1) The devel-
opment of a microsatellite
bus by SunSpace as
prime contractor; (2) The
research and human
resource development is
largely the responsibility
of Stellenbosch Univer-
sity over a period of
4 years (a considerable
number of students will
be involved in research
work on various aspects
of remote sensing satel-
lites and payloads)”
• “GSD imager with a
ground resolution of
6.25 m. Live
downlinking of PAL
video images during
TT&C ground station
passes will also be possi-
ble. Additional experi-
ments are VLF
measurements, an ama-
teur radio payload, an
AIS experimental pay-
load and a vibrating string
experiment”
• Launch site: Baikonur
• “Operated from the
SANSA (South African
National Space Agency)
SSO (SANSA Space
Operations) ground sta-
tion in Pretoria,
supported on an ad-hoc
basis by Sunspace via
the ESL (Electronic
Systems Laboratory)
ground station in Stel-
lenbosch”
• Key areas: Earth
observation, capacity
building
(continued)
3.2 Application of the Space Technology Ladder 249
Table 3.17 (continued)
Satellite Launched Orbit Features Focus
ZACube-1
(South Africa
CubeSat-1)/
TshepisoSatd,e
2013 Sun-
synchronous
• “A student-developed
1U CubeSat of CPUT
(Cape Peninsula Univer-
sity of Technology),
Cape Town,
South Africa”
• “Main payload is a high
frequency (HF) beacon
transmitter that will be
used to help characterize
the Earth’s ionosphere
and to calibrate SANSA’s
(South African National
Space Agency) auroral
radar installation at the
SANAE-IV base in Ant-
arctica”
• “In-house developed
subsystems:– VHF/UHF
Transceiver—
145.86 MHz Uplink—
437.345 MHz Downlink–
Payload Board—HF
Beacon Transmitter—
ADCS—Camera
Payload– HF Antenna
Deployment Mechanism”
• Launch site:
Dombarovsky (Yasny),
Russia
• “ZACube-1’s ADCS
was developed in a col-
laboration between
F’SATI [French
South African Institute
of Technology] and ESL
(Electronic System’s
Laboratory) at Stellen-
bosch University, Stel-
lenbosch, South Africa”
• Key areas: technology,
capacity building
Kondor-Ef,g 2014 Low Earth
orbit
• “Designed by NPO
Mashinostroyeniya”
• “Features a S-band syn-
thetic aperture radar
(SAR), which can con-
duct both continuous
swath surveys or detailed
spot surveys. The swath
width is 10 km. Ground
resolution is 1–2 m in
spotlight mode, 1–3 m in
stripmap mode and 5–
30 m in ScanSAR mode”
• Launch site: Baikonur
• “Operator: Russian
Ministry of Defense”
• “Top-secret spy satel-
lite”/“military satellite”
• “Project and details
thereof are classified”
• “Project was first called
Project Flute and then
Project Consolidated
Flute”
• “Reportedly a type fre-
quently used for spying,
capable of collecting
radar images—at night
through cloud cover—of
objects as small as cars”
• “It appears SA has
spent money financing a
Russian company to
build a satellite we will
have no control over and
won’t be able to operate
from SA”
• Key areas: military,
surveillance
(continued)
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Table 3.17 (continued)
Satellite Launched Orbit Features Focus
nSight-1h 2017 Low Earth
orbit
• “2U-CubeSat for tech-
nology development and
upper atmosphere sci-
ence”
• “Developed and built at
SCS-Space,
South Africa”
• “Carries the first flight
model of the SCS Gecko
imager, a very compact
RGB camera with a
ground sampling distance
of approximately 30 m”
• “Carries the FIPEX
(Flux-Φ-Probe Experi-
ment) of TU Dresden as
the primary payload for
the QB50 project, which
is able to distinguish and
measure the time-
resolved behaviour of
atomic and molecular
oxygen as a key parame-
ter of the lower thermo-
sphere”
• Launch site: Interna-
tional Space Station
• “Main objectives of the
mission are: To comply
with the QB50 mission
objective of doing atmo-
spheric research mea-
surements in the lower
thermosphere; To pro-
vide first space flight
heritage for the SCS
Gecko imager; To dem-
onstrate a patented radi-
ation mitigation VHDL
coding technique devel-
oped by Nelson Mandela
Metropolitan University;
To showcase the capa-
bility of South Africa’s
private space sector”
• “It is a part of the QB50
constellation to gather
science data in the upper
layers of the troposphere
in the altitude range from
350 km down to 200 km.
The QB50 project,
which demonstrates the
possibility of launching
a network of
50 CubeSats built by
Universities Teams all
over the world to per-
form first-class science
in the largely unexplored
lower thermosphere”
• Key areas: Earth
observation, technology,
capacity building
ZA-AeroSati,j 2017 Low Earth
orbit
• “2U-CubeSat for tech-
nology development and
upper atmosphere sci-
ence”
• “Carries four feather
communication antennas,
which are also used for
passive aerodynamic
stabilisation”
• “Developed and built at
the Stellenbosch Univer-
sity, South Africa”
• Launch site: Interna-
tional Space Station
• “Part of the QB50
constellation to gather
science data in the upper
layers of the troposphere
in the altitude range from
350 km down to 200 km.
The QB50 project,
which demonstrates the
possibility of launching
a network of
50 CubeSats built by
Universities Teams all
over the world to per-
form first-class science
in the largely unexplored
lower thermosphere”
(continued)
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Table 3.17 (continued)
Satellite Launched Orbit Features Focus
• “Stellenbosch Univer-
sity, the mother of
South Africa’s civil
space research,
established its second
spin-out company—
CubeSpace (first was
SunSpace) to commer-
cialize its microsatellite
programme. CubeSpace
built the ZA-AeroSat
mini-satellite for the
European Union’s QB50
constellation of
50 CubeSats”
• “Science data, teleme-
try data, as well as
images captured by the
star and Nadir cameras
were sent to the ground
station with each com-
munications opportu-
nity”
• Key areas: technology,
capacity building
XinaBox
ThinSatk
2018 Low Earth
orbit
• “Sensors and the data to
be collected include: An
inertial measurement unit
(IMU) to measure and
report the ThinSats’
angular rate, and the
magnetic field surround-
ing the body, using a
combination of acceler-
ometers, gyroscopes, and
magnetometers. This data
will allow the students to
calculate pitch, yaw and
roll of the satellite to
describe its flight; A set
of light sensors to assess
visible light (lux), Ultra-
Violet A and Ultra-Violet
B. Using this data, the
teams can calculate the
light available for the
solar cells to charge the
on-board batteries, as
well as the UV-Index
experienced by the satel-
lite, as it has no protection
from our Earth’s
• “Schools participating
include 16 schools in the
Western Cape of
South Africa, collabo-
rating on one ThinSat.
These schools will be
able to share their data
with the USA-based
schools collaborating on
54 ThinSats, collectively
creating a BIGData pro-
ject with never-before
collected data”
• “Fifty-five student
ThinSats will be
deployed at an altitude
of roughly 250 km and
will enter what is known
as Extreme Low Earth
Orbit (ELEO)”
• Key areas: capacity
building, technology
(continued)
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Table 3.17 (continued)
Satellite Launched Orbit Features Focus
atmosphere; Multiple
temperature sensors on
the frame of the satellite,
as well as the interior of
the ThinSat. The satellites
will experience extreme
temperature swings from
way below zero when in
the Earth’s shadow, and
over 150 degrees centi-
grade when in full sun.
Everyone is hoping to
collect the temperature
profile as the ThinSat
burns up in our atmo-
sphere!; Radiation detec-
tion in the Infra-Red
range, to complete the
knowledge of the condi-
tions the ThinSat finds
itself; Each set of six
ThinSats will have a GPS
giving their location in
orbit, and at least one will
have a camera for orbital
selfies”
• Launch site: Wallops
Island in Virginia, USA
ZACube-2l,m December
2018
Sun-
synchronous
• “The most advanced
Nanosatellite from
Africa”
• “Developed at the
French South African
Institute of Technology
(F’SATI), of CPUT
(Cape Peninsula Univer-
sity of Technology),
Cape Town,
South Africa”
• “Will serve as technol-
ogy demonstrator for
essential subsystems and
form the basis on which
an innovative Software
Defined Radio (SDR)
platform will be devel-
oped as primary payload”
• “Additionally, the satel-
lite will feature a medium
resolution imager as sec-
ondary payload to dem-
onstrate the feasibility of
future remote sensing
• “The mission will fur-
ther grow the core
expertise of CPUT and
its technology partners
and validate the technol-
ogy innovations that
result from it. ZACube-2
will be a test bed for a
ship tracking payload
and will be used to vali-
date the use case of
employing nanosatellites
in ocean vessel detection
through the Automatic
Identification System
(AIS) protocol. Addi-
tionally, the satellite will
carry medium resolution
imagers as a secondary
payload to demonstrate
the feasibility of using a
nanosatellite for imaging
applications, such as
ocean colour monitoring
and fire tracking”
(continued)
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Table 3.17 (continued)
Satellite Launched Orbit Features Focus
applications such as
ocean colour monitoring
and large fire tracking”
• “Initiative funded by the
Department of Science
and Technology, the
South African National
Space Agency, the
National Research Foun-
dation and the Cape Pen-
insula University of
Technology. Other tech-
nology partners on the
project include the CSIR,
Stone Three, Clyde
Space, Stellenbosch Uni-
versity and Astrofica”
• Launch site: Vostochny,
Russia
• “Main payload on the
satellite is an AIS (auto-
matic identification sys-
tem) receiver with which
navigational data will be
received from ships
along our coast. This
data, which includes the
ships’ GPS coordinates,
registration information,
speed and direction of
travel, will assist the
authorities to track ship
traffic in our exclusive
economic zone, and
improve the safety of
ships. ZACube-2 also
carries an advanced
camera, which will
detect forest and veldts
fires. ZACube-2 serves
as a precursor mission
for two future satellite
constellations—the one
for Maritime Domain
Awareness in support of
Operation Phakisa and
the other a FireSat con-
stellation to track fire on
the African continent”
• Key areas: capacity
building, disaster moni-
toring, navigation,
technology
EOSat-1j,n 2020? • “High resolution multi-
spectral imaging satellite,
which will be used for
urban planning and
development, safety and
security, disaster man-
agement and food secu-
rity”
• “EOSat-1 will have a
2.5 m resolution imager
and is planned to have a
life span of 7 years.
Launch is scheduled for
2020. However, the
programme is hampered
by a lack of funding—in
addition to the satellite,
the ground station and
• “EOSat-1 forms part of
the African Resource
Management Constella-
tion (ARMC)”
• “Denel’s Spaceteq—a
subsidiary of Denel
Dynamics, a division of
Denel SOC Ltd, a
South African arma-
ments development and
manufacturing company
entirely owned by the
South African Govern-
ment. Spaceteq incorpo-
rated the satellite
manufacturer,
SunSpace, and absorbed
its assets, engineering
(continued)
254 3 African Union Member States: National Space Infrastructure. . .
Table 3.17 (continued)
Satellite Launched Orbit Features Focus
launch also need to be
funded. For instance a
new X-band antenna will
need to be built for
EOSat-1”
talents and legacies
including the
SumbandilaSat.
Spaceteq is developing
the EOSat-1”
nSight-2 and
nSight-3n
2019 and
2020?
• “SCS is now working
on nSight-2 and nSight-3,
with nSight-2 to be
launched in 2019 and
nSight-3 in 2020”
• “They will be used for
agricultural
applications”
Unknownj • “Mzanzisat is building a
satellite infrastructure to
provide internet access to
remote communities in
South Africa”
aGunter Dirk Krebs, “Sunsat (SO 35, Sunsat-OSCAR 35),” Gunter’s Space Page, December 11, 2017,
https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/sunsat.htm (accessed December 11, 2018)
beoPortal, “SumbandilaSat,” European Space Agency, https://directory.eoportal.org/web/eoportal/satel
lite-missions/s/sumbandilasat (accessed December 11, 2018)
cGunter Dirk Krebs, “Sumbandila (ZA-002, SO 67, SumbandilaSat-OSCAR 67),” Gunter’s Space Page,
December 11, 2017, https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/sumbandila.htm (accessed December 11, 2018)
dGunter Dirk Krebs, “ZACube-1 (TshepisoSat, ZA 003),” Gunter’s Space Page, December 11, 2017,
https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/zacube-1.htm (accessed December 11, 2018)
eRenier Siebrits, “The First African CubeSat, ZACube-01,” Cape Peninsula University of Technology,
August 7, 2011, http://mstl.atl.calpoly.edu/~bklofas/Presentations/SummerWorkshop2011/Sebrits_
ZACUBE-01.pdf (accessed December 11, 2018)
fGunter Dirk Krebs, “Kondor-E,” Gunter’s Space Page, August 5, 2018, https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_
sdat/kondor-e-1.htm (accessed December 11, 2018)
gMybroadband, “Top-secret South African satellite,” October 26, 2014, https://mybroadband.co.za/news/
security/112881-top-secret-south-african-satellite.html (accessed December 11, 2018)
hGunter Dirk Krebs, “nSIGHT 1 (QB50 AZ02),” Gunter’s Space Page, June 25, 2018, https://space.
skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/nsight-1.htm (accessed December 11, 2018)
iGunter Dirk Krebs, “ZA-AeroSat (QB50 AZ01),” Gunter’s Space Page, June 25, 2018, https://space.
skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/za-aerosat.htm (accessed December 11, 2018)
jIbeh, “Why the South African Space Industry is Progressive”
kSpace in Africa, “Satellite built by South African students to be launched on Thursday,” Africa Space
News, November 11, 2018, https://africanews.space/satellite-built-by-south-african-students-to-be-
launched-on-thursday/ (accessed December 11, 2018)
lGunter Dirk Krebs, “ZACube-2 (ZA 004),” Gunter’s Space Page, November 20, 2018, https://space.
skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/zacube-2.htm (accessed December 11, 2018)
mSpace in Africa, “ZACube-2, Africa’s most advanced Cubesat to be launched on December 25,” Africa
Space News, November 18, 2018, https://africanews.space/zacube-2-africas-most-advanced-cubesat-to-
be-launched-on-december-25/ (accessed December 11, 2018)
nGuy Martin, “South Africa to increase focus on space,” DefenceWeb, April 17, 2018, http://www.
defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option¼com_content&view¼article&id¼51386:south-africa-to-increase-
focus-on-space&catid¼35:Aerospace&Itemid¼107 (accessed December 11, 2018)
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of space industry ecosystem”238, as is also reflected in Table 3.17, and is a second-
tier EMSA and High Space Technology Country. While the country is not seeking
launch capability, the University of Kwazulu-Natal maintains its Phoenix Hybrid
Sounding Rocket Program (HSRP), which was started in 2010 within the School of
Engineering’s Aerospace Systems Research Group (ASReG).239 It’s most recent and
most advanced sounding rocket is the Phoenix-1B Mk II, with a design apogee of
35 km and with development started in 2017.240
Namibia has recently set up its National Space Science Council (2015), with a
mandate to facilitate the development of a “national agenda related to Space Science in all
sectors”, which “may include national space policy development, provide a strategic
direction onmatters related to SpaceScience e.g. ethics in space science research, identify
space activities relevant to Namibia, and promote space research and development”.241
One of the country’s citizens has also enrolled at the Kyushu Institute of Technology
(KYUTECH) in the Space Engineering International Course (SEIC), with the aim of
having Namibia join the Birds Project in 2020 and develop its first satellite, NamSat.242
For now, Namibia remains a third-tier EMSA and Low Space Technology Country.
Figure 3.8 depicts the milestones achieved by South Africa and Namibia, and
while SADC includes other members such as Angola, South Africa is the clear
leader in space capabilities based on the Space Technology Ladder. South Africa’s
space legacy stems from the 1980s in particular, and while the country does not
maintain launch capability, as it was on the verge of achieving in the early 1990s,
this achievement is included in the figure since the infrastructure and skills legacy of
that period largely remain in the country.
3.3 Other Capabilities
Having thus considered the capabilities and achievements of African countries in the
context of the modified Space Technology Ladder, in concert with Harding’s model of
emerging space actors (EMSAs) and the space technology categories of Al-Rumhi et al.
(as well as concepts from the Technology Readiness Level framework—such as
238Joseph Ibeh, “Why the South African Space Industry is Progressive,” Africa Space News,
November 29, 2018, https://africanews.space/why-the-south-african-space-industry-is-progressive/
(accessed December 11, 2018).
239University of Kwazulu-Natal, “Phoenix Hybrid Sounding Rocket Program,” no date, http://
aerospace.ukzn.ac.za/Projects/Phoenix.aspx (accessed December 11, 2018).
240University of Kwazulu-Natal, “Phoenix-1B Mk II Hybrid Sounding Rocket,” no date, http://
aerospace.ukzn.ac.za/Rockets/Phoenix-1B_Mk_II.aspx (accessed December 11, 2018).
241National Commission on Research Science and Technology, “National Space Science Council
Established,” March 5, 2015, http://www.ncrst.na/news/64/-National-Space-Science-Council-
Established/ (accessed December 11, 2018).
242Space Generation Advisory Council, “The first Namibian steps towards space,” August
17, 2018, https://spacegeneration.org/namibian-steps-to-space (accessed December 11, 2018).
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reported upcoming satellites), this section will supplement this overview with a selec-
tion of other space-related capacities and factors. The first of these will be astronomy-
related capabilities and other ground segment infrastructure not already discussed. The
secondwill consider a brief overview ofAfrica’s scientific and research output related to
space, since a consideration of space capabilities is incomplete without also considering
intellectual endeavours. The third, and final, factor will be that of space-related budgets
and expenditure. As Oyewole put it, it “is important to understand the priority given to
space by governments of African states vis-à-vis their capacities to pay the bill”.243
3.3.1 Ground Segment Infrastructure
Some aspects of ground segment infrastructure have already been discussed earlier,
such as satellite testing and integration centres, and satellite control centres set up in
the context of satellite contracts of various African countries, such as Angola and its
Russian-built control centre in Funda for AngoSat-1. The Square Kilometre Array
was also discussed in Chap. 2. This section will thus present a summary of Africa’s
space ground infrastructure, including developments detailed earlier in this volume.
In some cases, such as the Hammaguir launch site in Algeria, facilities were not in
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243Oyewole, “Space Research and Development in Africa,” 195.
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use in for extended periods of time, but nevertheless warrant inclusion as heritage
infrastructure, and for their legacy that might in future be taken up again.
Table 3.18 provides a good indication of Africa’s space-related ground infra-
structure and also includes new and ongoing developments such as the Chinese-
funded New Cairo Space City. The next section will consider the scholarly output of
Africa related to the space sector.
3.3.2 Scientific and Research Output
One of the great concerns echoed throughout this volume is that much still needs to
be done in terms of investment in science, mathematics, engineering, and related
skills, which are of absolute necessity to growing the continent’s space sector. The
result of the “decades’-long individual national attitude of its member states towards
science and technology, the indisputable foundation of any space programme”244
was observed in March of 2018 when Elsevier reported that “Africa generates less
than 1% of the world’s research”245. This shocking statistic is a clarion call to the
continent’s decision-makers and leaders to implement the goals outlined in the
Agenda 2063 as discussed in Chap. 1. Before investigating how this relates to the
space sector, a few other observations are noteworthy.
First, in a more positive view, Elsevier also reports that Africa “has by far the
strongest growing scientific production: 38.6 percent over a 5-year period from the
start of 2012 to the end of 2016” and that “[t]he number of authors is growing at an
equally astounding rate of 43 percent over that period”.246 Second, while this is a
positive growth trajectory, it is also undeniable that much of Africa’s research is
produced in only a few countries and the “bulk of Africa’s scientific production
originates from Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa and
Tunisia”247—not coincidentally also the exact same countries identified as Africa’s
emerging space middle powers. Of these, South Africa is “the highest research
output producing country in Africa, holding two positions in the top 200 Times
Higher Education World University Rankings”.248 This powerfully suggests that
scientific research and output have a strong impact on, and correlation with, the
success of a country’s space efforts. However, a few other rising stars were also
244Abiodun, “Trends in the Global Space Arena – Impact on Africa and Africa’s Response,” 288.
245Charon Duermeijer, Mohamed Amir, and Lucia Schoombee, “Africa generates less than 1% of
the world’s research; data analytics can change that,” Elsevier, March 22, 2018, https://www.
elsevier.com/connect/africa-generates-less-than-1-of-the-worlds-research-data-analytics-can-
change-that (accessed December 12, 2018).
246Ibid.
247Ibid.
248Ibid.
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Table 3.18 African ground facilities
Name/
Locality Facilities
Country/
Organisation
Béchar/
Reganne
Sounding rocket launch site Algeria
Hammaguir Rocket launch site
Arzew Satellite ground station
Arzew Space Technology Centre (STC)
Oran Centre for Satellite Design (CDS)—assembly, integra-
tion, and test facility
Space Applications Centre (SAC)
Telecommunication Systems Operating Centre (CEST)
Ouargla Centre de Réception et d'Exploitation des Images
Satellitaires (CREIS)
Funda Satellite control centre Angola
Extended facility for the Square Kilometre Array radio
telescope
Botswana
1-m Marly telescope, University of Ouagadougou Burkina Faso
Douala RASCOM Satellite Operation Centre/network control
centre/customer service centre
Cameroon/
RASCOM
Kapani
Tonneo,
Katanga
Sounding rocket launch site, airstrip Congo (Demo-
cratic Republic of)
Cairo
Governorate
Kottamia observatory centre & 1.9 m telescope Egypt
Al-Hammam NileSat Satellite Operation Centre Egypt/NileSat
Sixth of
October City
NileSat Satellite Operation Centre Egypt/NileSat
Aswan Receiving station Egypt
New Cairo
Space City
New Cairo space control station, new satellite
manufacturing, test, integration, and assembly facility
Jabal Hamzah Ballistic missile test and launch facility
Mt. Entoto Mount Entoto Observatory Centre Ethiopia
Addis Ababa Ethiopian Space Science and Technology Institute
Nkok Agency for Space Studies and Observations, Satellite
antenna
Gabon
Extended facility for the Square Kilometre Array radio
telescope
Ghana
Accra Ghana Space Science and Technology Centre
Extended facility for the Square Kilometre Array radio
telescope
Kenya
Malindi Luigi Broglio Space Centre and San Marco launch
platform
Tawiwa Sounding rocket launch site Libya
Tripoli Centre for Remote Sensing and Space Sciences
Gharyan RASCOM Satellite Operation Centre Libya/RASCOM
(continued)
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Table 3.18 (continued)
Name/
Locality Facilities
Country/
Organisation
Bras d’Eau Mauritius Radio Telescope, Low frequency radio
telescope
Mauritius
Extended facility for the Square Kilometre Array radio
telescope
Extended facility for the Square Kilometre Array radio
telescope
Madagascar
Rabat Royal Centre for Remote Sensing, Satellite ground station Morocco
Atlas
mountains
Oukaïmeden Observatory, 0.5-m telescope
Extended facility for the Square Kilometre Array radio
telescope
Mozambique
Gamsberg Gamma ray telescope, High Energy Stereoscopic System Namibia
Swakopmund Chinese satellite ground station
Extended facility for the Square Kilometre Array radio
telescope
Jos Centre for Remote Sensing Nigeria
Toro Centre for Geodesy and Geodynamics
Abuja Centre for Satellite Technology Development, Satellite
control centre
Epe Centre for Space Transport and Propulsion, Sounding
rocket launch site
Nsukka Centre for Basic Space Science and Astronomy, 0.25-m
and 0.15-m telescopes
Ile-Ife Centre for Space Science and Technology Education
Satellite ground station planned Rwanda
ISRO Space Centre São Tomé and
Príncipe
Sutherland South African Large Telescope, 9-m telescope South Africa
MeerKAT/KAT-7 radio telescopes
Square Kilometre Array radio telescope
Hartebeeshoek Satellite Application Centre
HartRao—VLBI, geodesy, and radio telescope
Arniston Overberg Test Range, orbital launch pad and satellite
ground station
Grabouw ISSA—Houwteq, Satellite testing facility and ground
station
Hermanus SANSA Space Science, previously the Hermanus Mag-
netic Observatory (HMO)—South Africa’s national
geomagnetic research facility
Khartoum Remote Sensing and Seismology Authority Sudan
National Centre of Research’s Institute of Space
Research and Aerospace
(continued)
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identified by Elsevier, with “Mozambique, Rwanda and Zambia [having] more than
double the world average citation impact”.249
How then does Africa fare in terms of space-related scientific research and
output? One measure is the Scimago Journal and Country Rank, which is a “publicly
available portal that includes the journals and country scientific indicators developed
from the information contained in the Scopus® database (Elsevier B.V.)”.250 Three
particular subject categories relating to space were selected here for use in the
country rankings. These are Space and Planetary Science, Astronomy and Astro-
physics, and Aerospace Engineering. These are the most useful and indicative, since
other subjects such as Space Law are lumped together under broader categories such
as Law. For the purposes here, the indicator “Citable Documents” for the years
1996–2017 was selected, which refers to all articles, reviews, and conference papers
produced on the continent contained within the Scopus database (the largest abstract
and citation database of peer-reviewed literature in the world251). Table 3.19 outlines
the findings for all African countries and ranks them on the continent in terms of
citable scientific output. The seven countries producing the bulk of Africa’s scientific
production (and the emerging space middle powers) are indicated in bold text. When
Table 3.18 (continued)
Name/
Locality Facilities
Country/
Organisation
Tunis National Centre for Cartography and Remote Sensing of
Tunisia
Tunisia
Sfax Sfax Technople, Development of a new assembly, inte-
gration and microsatellite testing facility and engineering
centre for microsatellites
Extended facility for the Square Kilometre Array radio
telescope
Zambia
Zimbabwe National GeoSpatial and Space Agency Zimbabwe
Sources: Oyewole, “Space Research and Development in Africa,” 190–191; Luncedo Ngcofe and
Keith Gottschalk, “The growth of space science in African countries for Earth observation in the
21st century,” South African Journal of Science 109, no. 1/2 (2013): 4; Morocco
Oukaïmeden Sky Survey, “Oukaïmeden Observatory,” Société jurassienne d'astronomie,
September 8, 2018, http://moss-observatory.org/ (accessed December 12, 2018); South African
Astronomical Observatory, “The General Assembly of the International Astronomical Union to be
hosted on African soil for the first time in 2024,” August 30, 2018, https://www.saao.ac.za/press-
release/the-general-assembly-of-the-international-astronomical-union-to-be-hosted-on-african-
soil-for-the-first-time-in-2024/ (accessed December 12, 2018); All Nations University College,
“Quick Info,” https://anuc.edu.gh/about/quickinfo (accessed March 26, 2019); Discussions above
related to individual countries and related sources
249Ibid.
250Scimago Lab, “About Us,” 2018, https://www.scimagojr.com/aboutus.php (accessed December
12, 2018).
251Scopus, “Search for an author profile,” Elsevier B.V., 2018, https://www.scopus.com/
freelookup/form/author.uri (accessed December 12, 2018).
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considering the amount of citable scientific output, it is clear the seven countries,
plus Ethiopia, Namibia, Senegal, Cameroon, Libya, and Sudan, produce by far the
largest volume of scientific and research output, with South Africa clearly the most
prolific, followed by Egypt.
However, for reference, the United States, which is the world leader in all three
categories, produced 191,590 citable documents in Space and Planetary Science,
118,775 in Astronomy and Astrophysics, and 118,150 in Aerospace Engineering
over the same period (1996–2017). South Africa, which is the highest ranking
African country in all three categories, reached 27th place in Space and Planetary
Science, 26th in Astronomy and Astrophysics, and 36th in Aerospace Engineering—
clearly highlighting the extent of the imbalance between Africa’s population and
scientific output.
The next section will consider Africa’s space-related spending, since this is
another critical facet of space capabilities.
3.3.3 African Spending on Space
While definitive, recent figures detailing African spending on space are hard to come
by, some general trends are discernible. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, since
1999, about $3 billion has been spent in Africa on space projects, a number which
are set to increase rapidly given that 40% of all African satellites have been launched
in the last 2 years, with more to come as the analysis above revealed.
In 2014, African civil space programme spending was “about $185-million
compared to the global $42.4-billion”252, increasing to $62.2 billion by 2016
according to Euroconsult data, which also reports for the same year that Algeria
spent $115 million on its space programme, Morocco $73 million, Angola $63
million, Nigeria $61 million, Egypt $53 million, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo $20 million, and South Africa $20 million253. Oyewole also provides an
overview of major spending in Africa, indicating that for 2016, Nigeria appropriated
$62 million for its civil space programme, while NASRDA “was floated in 2001
with an investment of $93 million”.254 South Africa was also planning to spend $270
million in preparation for the SKA between 2009 and 2012, with the SKA “opera-
tions and maintenance . . . likely cost[ing] €150–200 million per annum”, with
SALT’s first 10-year cost amounting to $36 million.255 Kenya was also expected
252Sarah Wild, “Making the case for African investment in space programmes,” Africa Portal,
February 6, 2018, https://www.africaportal.org/features/making-case-african-investment-space-
programmes/ (accessed December 12, 2018).
253Euroconsult, “Government Spending in Space Programs Reaches $62 Billion in 2016,” May
30, 2017, http://euroconsult-ec.com/30_May_2017 (accessed July 5, 2018).
254Oyewole, “Space Research and Development in Africa,” 193.
255Ibid.
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to pay $102 million to establish its space agency.256 Ethiopia’s Entoto telescopes
cost $3 million in 2013.257
More recent figures, especially related to satellite spending, are reported as
follows: the Algerian space programme, 2006–2020, was reportedly allocated a
budget of “about $1.3 billion”; Angola’s AngoSat-1 cost “almost $300 million”;
Egypt’s five satellites cost “over $600 million”; Ghana spent $500,000 on its first
satellite in 2017, while the government “allocated GHC $38.5 million ($10 million)
to nuclear and space science technology in 2015 as it aims to further space education
and benefit from its own satellite imagery”; Kenya’s satellite cost “about $1.2
million”; Morocco’s latest satellite Mohammed VI A cost “about $500 million”;
and Nigeria “built capacities in satellite design and manufacturing spending over
$500 million on satellite projects since 2003”.258
Spending specifically by South Africa and Nigeria in particular are insightful,
since “South Africa and Nigeria have always been in a supremacy battle on who is
the number one in Africa”.259 Figures for Nigeria for 2018 are reported as follows:
Federal Ministry of Science and Technology received ₦75,677,747,631 ($209m) and
₦5,573,471,146 ($15.4m) of this was allocated to the National Space Research and Devel-
opment Agency (NASRDA) headquarters located in Abuja. A total of ₦13,688,991,138
($37.8m) was budgeted for space science and technology, which is approximately 18.1% of
the total budget of the Federal Ministry of Science and Technology. The breakdown of this
allocation is: Centre for Atmospheric Research ₦618,394,407 ($1.7m); Advanced Space
Technology Application Laboratory Uyo Akwa Ibom State ₦588,631,420 ($1.6m);
Advanced Aerospace Engine Laboratory Oka Akoko, Ondo State. ₦350,000,000 ($970k);
NASRDA Institute of Space Science and Engineering, Abuja ₦275,000,000 ($760k); Zonal
Advanced Space Technology Application, Kashere, Gombe State ₦250,000,000 ($691k);
Zonal Advanced Space Technology Application, Langtang, Plateau State ₦250,000,000
($691k); Centre for Geodesy and Geodynamics—Toro Bauchi State ₦766,908,554 ($2.1m);
African Regional Centre for Space Education—Ile Ife, Osun State ₦661,825,984 ($1.8m);
Centre for Space Transport Propulsion—Epe, Lagos ₦1,199,579,288 ($3.3m); Centre for
Basic Space Science—Nsukka ₦1,052,103,658 ($2.9m); National Centre for Remote Sens-
ing—Jos, Plateau State ₦2,103,076,081 ($5.8m).260
For South Africa, figures are reported as follows:
South Africa’s Department of Science and Technology (DST) budget this financial year
increased to R779 billion ($550m)—out of this, the South African National Space Agency
receives R138 million ($9.7m). This is an improvement on the last financial year’s budget
for the space agency which was R131-million ($8.6m). The Square Kilometre Array project
receives R709 million ($50m) this year; altogether, approximately, R847 million ($60m)
about 10.9% of the total budget of the department of science and technology is spent on
space activities.261
256Ibid.
257Ibid.
258Space in Africa, “Over $3 billion have been spent on space projects in Africa since 1998.”
259Space in Africa, “South Africa and Nigeria supremacy battle on space investment,” Africa Space
News, September 17, 2018, https://africanews.space/south-africa-and-nigeria-supremacy-battle-on-
space-investment/ (accessed December 12, 2018).
260Space in Africa, “South Africa and Nigeria supremacy battle on space investment.”
261Ibid.
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Together, these figures powerfully counter the “popular opinion that there are no
Space Activities going on in Africa”.262 This is especially the case given that
South Africa’s “aerospace sector is worth $1.8 billion in market size”.263 In terms
of Africa’s overall expenditure on space, Oyewole reports that research and devel-
opment costs are split between governments, private investors, and external actors,
with roughly 62% of satellites “fully funded” by governments, as are most astro-
nomical observatories, ground stations, and sounding rocket launch sites.264 A
further 19% of satellites are cosponsored by governments or agencies and investors.
The question thus often becomes why are African governments spending so much on
space when other pressing concerns such as poverty loom large? As discussed
previously, this question is often directed against Africa’s perceived “frivolous” or
“wasteful” spending on space.
However, several critical points need to be made in this regard. First, despite this
spending, “[e]ven Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa, which have the most
advanced space programs on the continent, spend less than 1% of their GDP on
R&D”, with Africa having the “lowest ratio of R&D to GDP in the world”.265
Second, as the figures above show, Africa is “responsible for a tiny proportion of
both civil space spending and global space spending”.266 Thus, contextualising
African spending on space is critical to avoid creating a false image of excessive
spending. Third, “industry spending dwarfs civil spending, but it does so by building
on government investment”, and “[w]ithout government investment in space, you
don’t get an industry that burgeons around it”.267 This point clearly outlines how
government spending is crucial to bolstering private industry and investment in the
sector. Fourth, this spending also does not come without return. One aspect of this is
the creation of direct employment opportunities, the “revolutionizing” of the mining,
agriculture, and information and communications technology sectors, as well as
reducing the dependency of the continent on foreign technology.268 In this regard,
the views expressed by Spacewatch are apt and worth repeating at length here:
However, the question of justifying the cost of a space initiative is one that looms large, and
whilst the socio-economic benefits are obvious, the investment that has to be made to kick
off a space programme is enormous. Partnerships and collaboration can help considerably,
but the fundamental stumping up of cash is critical and whilst a government may see the
long-term benefits of launching a satellite into space, the rest of the world looks critically
on. Why should other countries send aid to a nation that cannot even afford to feed its own
people, yet alone build a satellite and get it to space? That said, space programmes have to
begin somewhere. Should space simply be for those who can afford it? Space is becoming
more affordable, and it can help to solve some significant problems through the provision of
262Space in Africa, “Over $3 billion have been spent on space projects in Africa since 1998.”
263Ibeh, “Why the South African Space Industry is Progressive.”
264Oyewole, “Space Research and Development in Africa,” 194.
265Ibid., 196.
266Wild, “Making the case for African investment in space programmes.”
267Ibid.
268Oyewole, “Space Research and Development in Africa,” 197–198.
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critical data, imagery and communications. The socio-economic benefits of space
programmes are undeniable. It is enormously encouraging to see such interest in space
from players that, ten years ago may not have even given space a second thought in terms of
their country’s future. In nurturing a space industry, nations, such as the ones we have read
about here, are investing in the future of their people and the world as a whole. It is true that
we have to look to our skies and beyond our planet both today and in the future. However,
the question will always dominate of just how much of a priority space actually is to
countries that have more fundamental problems facing them.269
3.4 Conclusion: The Rise of Africa’s Space Middle Powers
in the Context of Meeting Primary Needs
This chapter has aimed to complete the picture, presented in Fig. 3.1, of Africa’s
space growth poles by utilising the modified Space Technology Ladder, Harding’s
emerging space actor framework, and some basic concepts from the European Space
Agency’s Technology Readiness Level framework (such as reports of basic princi-
ples observed regarding upcoming satellites, concepts, and functions). Together with
the analysis of African space engagement in Chap. 2, these capability and infra-
structure considerations now allow conclusions to be drawn regarding Africa’s space
growth poles and emerging space middle powers in the context of primary needs
(contextualised in Chap. 1).
First, strong upward trajectories in terms of milestone achievements are visible in
a range of countries across the continent. The most prominent are Algeria, Egypt,
Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa and, to a lesser (but no less significant) extent,
Angola, Ethiopia, Tunisia, Morocco, and Ghana, with others showing promise as
well. Combined with an assessment of their status within the emerging space actor
framework as well as that of Al-Rumhi et al., it is now possible to identify Africa’s
space growth poles, as well as to provide an updated assessment of the continent’s
space sector. This is done in Table 3.20, combining engagement in space and
national space capabilities and identifying national trajectories and key focus areas
based on the analysis above.
Table 3.20 reinforces the sense of the rapid pace at which African states have
been increasing their space-related capabilities, and since Harding argued that
South Africa was a second-tier EMSA in 2013, two more states can arguably be
counted in that category today, with two more approaching that point through
development of significant capabilities in terms of space technology. Institutionally,
African states have also been expanding their capabilities, with Zimbabwe a very
recent example. This reflects a recognition among African leaders and decision-
makers of the value and importance of space for societal development. Figure 3.9
269Spacewatch Middle East, “#SpaceWatchME Op’ed.: Satellite Sovereignty –Africa,” ThorGroup
GmbH, 2018, https://spacewatch.global/2017/01/satellite-sovereignty-part-2/ (accessed December
12, 2018).
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provides a summary of the achievements and milestones of African countries as
discussed in this chapter.
The analysis in this chapter, by way of the modified Space Technology Ladder,
also makes it possible to compare the approaches or pathways of countries in
pursuing space capabilities. Egypt and Angola have, for instance, placed great
emphasis on communication via their NileSat and AngoSat programmes—recently
also joined by Algeria with its AlComSat-1. Morocco, on the other hand, has
pursued high-resolution Earth observation for both developmental and military
objectives, thus turning to foreign manufacturers to provide these sophisticated
tools. Meanwhile, Kenya, Ghana, Mauritius and, in some cases, Morocco and
South Africa have developed satellites and engineering skills via international
initiatives such as the Birds programme, or the TUBSAT programme, or other
collaborations such as ThinSat. This is often reflective of the initial efforts of
Fig. 3.9 Summary of African space achievements
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countries to build up a cadre of space professionals and clearly demonstrates the
democratisation and opening up of space to developing nations through the small
satellite revolution. Algeria, Nigeria, and South Africa have also focused heavily on
developing their domestic manufacturing capabilities, and in all three cases, this has
been guided by a clear strategy, driven by a responsible space authority. Egypt is also
joining in this effort via its new Space City development, as is Tunisia via its Sfax
Technopole project, and thus these states form the core of what was referred to in
Chap. 1 as the African Regional Space Regime Complex. Via the frameworks
utilised in this chapter, it is thus possible to identify comparable groups of countries
based on their space sector initiatives. South Africa, Nigeria, and Algeria form the
core, and Egypt and Tunisia are approaching the core, while Kenya,Morocco, Ghana,
Angola, and Ethiopia are key rising space actors, with Gabon, Sudan, Libya,
Mauritius, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Malawi, Zimbabwe,
Côte d’Ivoire, and Namibia undertaking establishment of their capabilities.
This chapter has also reinforced the sense of overlap between the RECS, which
serves to strengthen the need for continental coordination via an African Space
Agency, for example. However, it is also clear that this overlap is good for building
the African Regional Space Regime Complex and reinforces the power of space to
overcome divisions within the RECS, and thus across Africa. An excellent example
of this is the call for the Arab Maghreb Union, which is “wallowing in and bitterly
grappling with various political, social and economic problems, yet tenaciously
refusing to stand united” to form a Maghreb Space Agency given the high level of
space activities in the region.270 This
might not solve the political problem in the region, [but] it could lead to significant growth in
the region. The exchange of information at the highest level will create a safer region, thus
attracting more foreign direct investment and more tourists. The region’s backyard is too
messy for the five countries not to cooperate in order to solve their socio-economic
problems. Investors are looking for political stability and security, and the cost of a lack of
intra-regional cooperation is simply too high.271
While the likelihood of such an initiative being undertaken in the context of the
African Union’s effort to establish a continental space agency is low, it nevertheless
points to a way in which space cooperation and collaboration can build closer
relationships within the RECs, and thus the continent, in the spirit of ubuntu. This
has been recognised by the East African Community in its effort to obtain a common
satellite.
However, as the opening quote by Vikram Sarabhai suggested, the Space Tech-
nology Ladder serves to demonstrate that progress in establishing a space sector
requires long-term, consistent planning, vision, and effort. This is clearly visible in
the space trajectories of Africa’s best performers such as Algeria and Nigeria. It also
270Space in Africa, “Is a Maghreb Space Agency the solution to the North African Supremacy
Battle?,” Africa Space News, July 7, 2018, https://africanews.space/is-a-maghreb-space-agency-
the-solution-to-the-north-african-supremacy-battle/ (accessed December 13, 2018).
271Ibid.
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requires a clear focus on bringing space to bear in meeting the challenges facing the
continent and in particular in meeting the most basic, primary, needs of its citizens.
This was encapsulated in the primary needs approach to African space activities
model presented in Chap. 1. This focus will be carried through to the next volume,
which follows on and further develops the overview of how space is serving Africa
and how African states are approaching their efforts to establish space capabilities.
For this reason, having established the broad socio-economic context of Africa,
the international engagement of African states in space, and their space-related
capabilities, the next volume will investigate the space applications used to further
the key primary needs areas served by space, the policies driving them, and the
critical relationship in the space sector between Africa and the European Union (and
the European Space Agency). Doing so will further clarify how Africa’s space-
related spending is benefitting the continent and what Africa is doing to advance, as
Dr. Sarabhai put it, the “application of advanced technologies to the real problems of
man and society”. As a final note, the insights of Carl Sagan regarding the deep and
pervasive societal impact of pursuing space technology—and clear motivation for
Africa to continue efforts in this regard—are worth repeating here. They succinctly
point to the powerful emancipatory potential of space and why the future of this
beloved continent depends on it:
Spaceflight speaks to something deep inside us—many of us, if not all. An emerging cosmic
perspective, an improved understanding of our place in the Universe, a highly visible
program affecting our view of ourselves might clarify the fragility of our planetary environ-
ment and the common peril and responsibility of all the nations and peoples of Earth. . . .
Exploratory spaceflight puts scientific ideas, scientific thinking, and scientific vocabulary in
the public eye. It elevates the general level of intellectual inquiry. The idea that we’ve now
understood something never grasped by anyone who ever lived before—that exhilaration,
especially intense for the scientists involved, but perceptible to nearly everyone—propagates
through the society, bounces off walls, and comes back at us. It encourages us to address
problems in other fields that have also never before been solved. It increases the general
sense of optimism in the society. It gives currency to critical thinking of the sort urgently
needed if we are to solve hitherto intractable social issues. It helps stimulate a new
generation of scientists. The more science in the media–especially if methods are described,
as well as conclusions and implications–the healthier, I believe, the society is. People
everywhere hunger to understand.272
272Carl Sagan, Pale Blue Dot: A Vision of the Human Future in Space (New York: Ballantine
Books, 1994), 226–228.
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Organisation Details
African Union Commission African Union Headquarters
P.O. Box 3243 | Roosevelt Street (Old Airport
Area) | W21K19 | Addis Ababa | Ethiopia
Tel: (251) 11 551 77 00
Fax: (251) 11 551 78 44
Website: www.au.int
Email: dic@africa-union.org (Directorate of
Information and Communication)
Arab Maghreb Union/(AMU/UMA) 73 Rue Tansift | Agdal, Rabat 10080 | Morocco
Tel: (212) 537 68 13 74/73/72/71
Fax: (212) 537 68 13 77
Website: http://www.umaghrebarabe.org/?
q¼en
Email: Sg.uma@maghrebarabe.org
Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa (COMESA)
COMESA Centre
Ben Bella Road | P. O. Box 30051 | Lusaka |
Zambia
Tel: +260 211 229725
Fax: +260 211 225107
Website: http://www.comesa.int/
Email: info@comesa.int
• Indian Ocean Commission Commission de l’Océan Indien
Blue Tower – 3ème étage | Rue de l’Institut |
Ebène | Maurice
Tel : (+230)4026100
Fax : (+230)4656798
Website: http://www.commissionoceanindien.
org/accueil/
Email : secretariat@coi-ioc.org
• Economic Community of the Great Lakes
Countries (ECGLC)
Tel: 0788307061 / 0788309395 / 0788301764
Website: http://www.cepgl.org/
Email: http://www.cepgl.org/webmail
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The Community of Sahel-Saharan States
(CEN-SAD)
CEN-SAD Secretariat
Place d’Algeria | P.O. Box 4041 | Tripoli |
Libya
Tel: +218 21 3614832 / (218) 3614832 –
3614833
Fax: +218 21 3346854 / (218) 3614832
Website: http://www.cen-sad.org/ (not func-
tional)
E-mail: censad_sg@yahoo.com / info@cen-
sad.org
East African Community (EAC) EAC Close | Afrika Mashariki Road | P.O. Box
1096 | Arusha | United Republic of Tanzania
Tel: +255 (0) 27 216 2100
Fax: +255 (0) 27 216 2190
Website: https://www.eac.int/
Email: eac@eachq.org
Economic Community of Central African
States (ECCAS/CEEAC)
Haut de Guégué | BP: 2112 | Libreville | Gabon
+(241) 01 44 47 31
+(241) 01 44 47 32
Website: http://www.ceeac-eccas.org/index.
php/en/
Email: contact@ceeac-eccas.org
• Central African Economic and Monetary
Community (CEMAC)
Commission de la CEMAC
Immeuble CEMAC | Avenue des Martyrs | BP
969 | Bangui | République centrafricaine
Tel: +236 61 0922
Fax: +236 61 2135
Website: https://www.cemac.int/
Email: cemac@cemac.int
Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS)
114 Yakubu Gowon Crescent | Asokoro,
Abuja | Nigeria
P.M.B. 401 | Abuja| Nigeria
Tel: (234) (9) 31 47 6479
Fax: (234) (9) 31 43 005 / (234) (9) 31 47 646
Website: http://www.comm.ecowas.int/
Email: info@ecowas.int
• West African Economic and Monetary
Union (UEMOA)
Head office in Ouagadougou
Commission de l’UEMOA | 380 Avenue
Professeur Joseph | KI-ZERBO 01 BP 543 |
Ouagadougou | Burkina Faso
+226 25 31 88 73
+226 25 31 88 74
+226 25 31 88 75
+226 25 31 88 76
+226 25 31 88 72
Website: www.uemoa.int
Email: commission@uemoa.int
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• West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) The West African Monetary Institute
Gulf House | Tetteh Quarshie Interchange
PMB CT 75 | Accra | Ghana
Tel: (+233-302) 743801
Fax: (+233-302) 743807
Website: http://www.wami-imao.org/
E-mail: info@wami-imao.org
• Manu River Union Website: http://manoriverunion.int/ (not
functional)
• Liptako-Gourma Region Integrated
Development Authority
Autorité de Développement Intégré de la
Région du Liptako Gourma
417, Avenue Kwamé N’KRUMAH
01 BP 619 | Ouagadougou 01 | Burkina
Faso
Tel: (+226) 25 30 61 48/49
Fax: (+226) 25 30 85 88
Website: http://www.liptakogourma.org
Email: dg@liptakogourma.org
Intergovernmental Authority on Development
(IGAD)
IGAD Secretariat
Avenue Georges Clemenceau | P.O. Box
2653 | Djibouti | Republic of Djibouti
Phone +253-21354050 / 352 880
Fax +253-21356994 / 284
Website: https://igad.int/
Email: igad@intnet.dj
Southern African Development Community
(SADC)
SADC House
Plot No. 54385 | Central Business District |
Private Bag 0095 | Gaborone | Botswana
Telephone: +267 395 1863
Fax: +267 397 2848 / +267 318 1070
Website: www.sadc.int
Email: registry@sadc.int
• Southern African Customs Union (SACU) Physical Address:
Corner Lazarett and Feld Street | Private Bag
13285 | Windhoek | Namibia | 9000
Postal Address:
The Executive Secretary
Private Bag 13285 | Windhoek | Namibia |
9000
Telephone: +264 (61) 295 8000
Fax: +264 (61) 245 611
Email: info@sacu.int
Website: http://www.sacu.int/
Regional African Satellite Communication
Organisation (RASCOM)
Website: http://www.rascom.org/#
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• RascomStar Head Office
Unit G18 | Building 9 | Dubai Internet City | PO
Box 500435 | Dubai | United Arab Emirates
Telephone: +971 4 425 7899
Website: http://rascomstar.com/contact-us/
Email : info@rascomstar.com
Registered Office
2nd. Floor | 85 Medine Mews | Chaussee
Street | Port Louis | Mauritius
Telephone: +230 212 9719
SCS Space Physical Address:
3rd Floor St Andrews Building | Somerset
Links Office Park | De Beers Avenue | Som-
erset West | Cape Town 7130 | South Africa
Postal Address:
PO Box 12037 | Die Boord | Stellenbosch
7613 | South Africa
T: +27 21 300 0060
F: +27 21 300 0064
Website: http://scs-space.com/
Email: info@scs-space.com
FarmPin Tel: +27 82 829 7212 / +27 82 374 5157
Website: https://farmpin.com/
Square Kilometre Array (South Africa) Cape Town Office
SARAO
2 Fir Street | Black River Park | Observatory
(North Gate entrance) | 7925 | South Africa
Tel: +27 (0)21 506 7300
Fax: +27 (0)21 506 7375
Website: https://www.ska.ac.za/
Email: enquiries@ska.ac.za
Group on Earth Observations 7 bis, avenue de la Paix | Case postale 2300 |
CH-1211 Geneva | Switzerland
Tel: +41 22 730 8505
Fax: +41 22 730 8520
Website: http://www.earthobservations.org/
index2.php
Email: secretariat@geosec.org
• AfriGEOSS Website: http://www.earthobservations.org/
afrigeoss.php
African Regional Institute for Geospatial Infor-
mation Science and Technology (AFRIGIST)
Off Road 1 | Obafemi Awolowo University
Campus | P.M.B. 5545 | Ile-Ife | Osun State |
Nigeria
Tel: +234-8064042198
Website: https://afrigist.org/
Email: info@afrigist.org
Regional Centre for Mapping of Resources for
Development (RCMRD)
P.O. Box 632-00618 | Nairobi | Kenya
Roysambu | Kasarani | Nairobi | Kenya
Tel: +245 020 2680748 / 2680722
+254 723 786161 / +254 735 981098
Website: https://www.rcmrd.org/
Email: rcmrd@rcmrd.org
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African Centre of Meteorological Application
for Development (ACMAD)
85, Avenue des ministers | bp:
13 184 | Niamey | Niger
Tel: +227 20 73 49 92
Fax: +227 20 72 36 27
Email: dgacmad@acmad.ne /
dgacmad@acmad.org
Website: http://www.acmad.net/new/?q¼en/
home
African Association of Remote Sensing of the
Environment (AARSE)
Attention: Prof. Harold Annegarn | 3 Dover
Road | Muizenburg | 7945 |
South Africa
Website: http://www.africanremotesensing.
org/
Email: info@africanremotesensing.org
Women in Aerospace Africa (WIA) Website: https://wia-africa.org/
Email: info@wia-africa.org
African Space Foundations (ASF) Website: https://www.africanspacefoundation.
org
Foundation for Space Development Website: https://developspacesa.org/
Email: info@developspacesa.org
International Astronautical Federation 100 Avenue de Suffren | 75015 Paris | France
Tel: +33 1 45 67 42 60
Fax: +33 1 42 73 21 20
Website: http://www.iafastro.org/
Environmental Information Systems (EIS)
Africa
Website: http://www.eis-africa.org/
Space Generation Advisory Council (SGAC)
Africa
c/o European Space Policy Institute |
Schwarzenbergplatz 6 | 1030 Vienna | Austria
Phone: +43 1 718 11 18 30
Website: https://spacegeneration.org/regions/
africa
Email: info@spacegeneration.org
United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs
(UNOOSA), including United Nations Com-
mittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(UNCOPUOS) and United Nations Platform for
Space-based Information for Disaster Manage-
ment and Emergency Response (UN-SPIDER)
United Nations Office at Vienna | Vienna
International Centre | Wagramerstrasse 5 |
A-1220 Vienna | Austria
Telephone: +43-1-260 60 4950
Fax: +43-1-260 60 5830
Website: http://www.unoosa.org/
• African Regional Centre for Space Science
and Technology Education – English Language
Yellow House | Obafemi Awolowo University
Campus | Ile Ife | Nigeria
P.M.B. 019 | OAU Post Office | Ile Ife.
Telephone: 08028327463
Website: http://arcsstee.org.ng/index.php/
home, Email: director@arcsstee.org.ng /
gagbaje@gmail.com / admin@arcsstee.org.ng
• Centre Régional Africain des sciences et
technologies de l’espace en langue français
Avenue Ibn Sina | BP 765 | Agdal Maroc |
10090 Rabat | Maroc
Tél: (+212)537681826
Fax: (+212)537681824
Website: http://crastelf.org.ma/
Email: craste@emi.ac.ma
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Disaster Monitoring Constellation (DMC) Compass House | 60 Priestley Road | Surrey
Research Park | Guildford GU2 7AG |
United Kingdom
Tel: +44 (0)1483 447000
Fax: +44 (0)1483 576382
Website: http://www.dmcii.com/
Email: info@dmcii.com
Arabsat Diplomatic Quarter | Alfazari Square | Abdulla
Bin Huthafa Al Sahmy Street | Public Pension
Agency Complex | C-6 Riyadh 11431 | Saudi
Arabia
Tel: +966-11-482-0000
Fax: +966-11-488-7999
Website: https://www.arabsat.com/english/
home
Email: info@Arabsat.com
International Institute of Space Law – Manfred
Lachs Space Law Moot Court
International Institute of Space Law
94bis | Avenue de Suffren | 75015 | Paris |
France
Website: https://iislweb.org/lachs_moot/
Email: secretary@iislweb.org
International Astronomical Union Office of
Astronomy for Development (OAD)
Postal address
P.O. Box 9 | Observatory | South Africa | 7935
Street address
South African Astronomical Observatory
1 Observatory Road | Observatory | 7925 |
South Africa
Tel: +27 (0) 21 460 6297
Website: http://www.astro4dev.org/
Email: info@astro4dev.org
Global Partnership for Sustainable Develop-
ment Data – African Regional Data Cube
Website: http://www.data4sdgs.org/initiatives/
africa-regional-data-cube
Email: info@data4sdgs.org
Inter Islamic Network on Space Sciences and
Technology
ISNET Secretariat
SUPARCO Headquarters | Suparco Road | PO
Box 8402 | Karachi-75270 | Pakistan
Tel: +92 21 34654132
Fax: +92 21 34644928, 34694941
Website: http://www.isnet.org.pk/
E-mail : admin@isnet.org.pk
Joint Global Multi-Nation Birds Satellite
(BIRDS) Project
Tejumola Taiwo
Department of Applied Science for Integrated
System Engineering | Laboratory of Spacecraft
Environment Interaction Engineering | Kyushu
Institute of Technology | 1-1 Sensui-cho |
Tobata-ku | Kitakyushu | 804-8550 | Japan.
Tel: +81-93-884-3228
Website: https://birds1.birds-project.com/
Email: n350949r@mail.kyutech.jp
KiboCUBE (See UNOOSA) Email: hsti-kibocube@un.org
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TUBSAT Website: https://www.raumfahrttechnik.tu-ber
lin.de/menue/forschung/abgeschlossene_
projekte/tubsat/v_menue4/tubsat/
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China,
South Africa)
Tel: +27 12 351 1000
Website: http://www.brics2018.org.za/
Email: info@dirco.gov.za
Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd. Surrey Satellite Technology Limited
Tycho House | 20 Stephenson Road | Surrey
Research Park | Guildford GU2 7YE | United
Kingdom
Tel: +44 (0)1483 803803
Fax: +44 (0)1483 803804
Website: https://www.sstl.co.uk/
Email: info@sstl.co.uk
Italian Space Agency – Luigi Broglio Space
Center
‘Luigi Broglio’ Space Centre (BSC) – Malindi
P.O. Box 450 80200 | Malindi | Kenya
Tel: +254 42 20999
Fax: +254 42 20611
Website: https://www.asi.it/en/agency/bases/
broglio
Email: urp@asi.it
Algerian Space Agency Mohamed Arab Metaiche | Bouzareah | Algeria
Tel: (213) 21 94 11 07
Website: http://www.asal.dz/
Morocco Royal Centre for Remote Sensing 21 Angle Avenue Sanawbar et Avenue Allal El
Fassi | quartier Hay Riad | Rabat | Maroc
Tel: (+212) 5 37 71 54 48/98
Fax: (+212) 5 37 71 14 35
Website: https://www.crts.gov.ma/Royal%
20Centre%20for%20Remote%20Sensing
Centre National de la Cartographie et de la
Télédétection (Tunisia)
Route La Marsa | L’Aouina | BP 200 | 1080
Tunis Cedex
Tel: (+216) 71 761 333
Fax: (+216) 71 760 890
Website: http://www.cnct.defense.tn/
Email: cnct@defense.tn
Libyan Centre for Remote Sensing and Space
Science
Website: http://www.lcrsss.ly/
Email: info@lcrsss.ly
National Space Secretariat Kenya (Ministry of
Defence)
The Principal Secretary | Ministry of Defence |
Ulinzi House | Lenana Road | PO Box 40668 –
00100 | Nairobi | Kenya
Tel: +254 20 2721100
Fax: +254 20 2737322
Website: http://www.mod.go.ke/?p¼1932
Email: publicaffairs@mod.go.ke
National Authority for Remote Sensing and
Space Sciences (Egypt)
23 Joseph Tito Street | El-Nozha El-Gedida |
P.O. Box | 1564 Alf Maskan | Egypt
Phone: (202) 26251299 / (202) 26251200
Fax: (202) 26225800 / (202) 26225833
Website: http://www.narss.sci.eg/contact
Email: info@narss.sci.eg
(continued)
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Organisation Details
Remote Sensing and Seismology Authority
(Sudan)
National Center For Research | Alsayed Abd
Alrahman Street | P.O. Box: 2404 | Khartoum |
Sudan
Tel/Fax: +249 183 770701
Website: https://rssa.gov.sd/contact/
Email: rssa@ncr.gov.sd
Ethiopian Space Science Society: ESSS Addis Ababa University Institute of Technol-
ogy (5Kilo Campus) | 4th floor
Room 405 | PO. Box.: 8412 | Ethiopia
Tel: +251 118 677 699/+251 111 261 668/
+251 111 261 200
Website: https://www.ethiosss.org.et/
Email: ethiopiaspace@gmail.com
Ethiopian Space Science and Technology
Institute
Tel: +251-118-961050
Website: http://etssti.org/
Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Authority
(RURA)
KN 39 St | Kigali | Rwanda
Tel: +250 252 584 562
National Space Research and Development
Agency (Nigeria)
Umaru Musa Yaradua Express Way | PMB
437 | Lugbe | Abuja | Nigeria
Website: http://nasrda.gov.ng/en/
Email: contact@nasrda.gov.ng
Ghana Space Science and Technology Centre P.O. Box LG 80 | Legon | Accra
Website: https://gsstc.gov.gh/
Email: info@spacecentre.gov.gh
Gabinete de Gestão do Programa Espacial
Nacional (Angola)
Tel: +244 222728234
Website: http://www.ggpen.gov.ao/
Email: geral@ggpen.gov.ao
Agence gabonaise d’études et d’observations
spatiales (Gabon)
BP 3 850 | Centre-ville | Immeuble Les
Arcades – 1er étage | Libreville | Gabon
Tel: +241-01 74 17 16 / +241-03 00 77
79 (Secrétariat ZES de NKOK)
Website: http://www.ageos.ga/ (not functional)
Earthlab Gabon Website: http://www.earthlab-galaxy.com/
gabon/en/
South African National Space Agency Physical Address:
Enterprise Building | Mark Shuttleworth
Street | Innovation Hub | Pretoria 0087 |
Gauteng | South Africa
Postal Address:
PO Box 484 | Silverton | 0127 | Gauteng
Tel: 012 844-0500
Fax: 012 844-0396
Website: https://www.sansa.org.za/
Email: information@sansa.org.za
Namibian National Commission on Research
Science and Technology
ERF 490 | Platinum Street | Prosperita | Private
Bag 13253 | Windhoek
Tel: +264 61 431 7000
Fax: + 264 61 216 531
Website: http://www.ncrst.na/about-us/
programme-policies/47/
Email: info@ncrst.na
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